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[2025] NSWCCA 25
General information, not legal advice.
Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
2025-03-21
Davies J at [1]Dhanji J at [120]Huggett J at [121]
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Sampson v R [2025] NSWCCA 25
Hearing dates: 21 February 2025
Date of orders: 21 March 2025
Decision date: 21 March 2025
Before: Davies J at [1]
Dhanji J at [120]
Huggett J at [121]
Decision: (1) Grant leave to appeal.
(2) Appeal allowed.
(3) Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court on 13 December 2023.
(4) In lieu, taking into account the matter on the Form 1, sentence the appellant to a non-parole period of 2 years 8 months commencing 9 September 2022 and expiring 8 May 2025 with a balance of term of 1 year 10 months expiring 8 February 2027.
(5) The applicant is first eligible for parole on 8 May 2025.
Catchwords: CRIME – appeals – appeal against sentence – where the applicant pleaded guilty to one count of intentionally causing grievous bodily harm at a super call-over – where the applicant struck the victim in the eye causing permanent damage – where the sentencing judge combined discounts under ss 22A and 25D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 – whether the sentencing judge erred in rounding down the discount to even months – where the rounding down of the discount reduced the discount – where the sentencing judge was obliged to provide the stipulated discount in s 25D – ground of appeal upheld – where it was still necessary to resentence the applicant – error not an arithmetical or date error
CRIME – appeals – appeal against sentence – objective seriousness – whether the sentencing judge erred in assessing objective seriousness – where the onus was on the applicant to show that a lack of planning should be a mitigating factor – where the offence was typified by jealousy – where there was a history of domestic violence – where the lack of planning was insignificant – ground rejected
CRIME – appeals – appeal against sentence – where the applicant was diagnosed with PTSD and alcohol/substance abuse disorder – where submission made that applicant was not a suitable vehicle for general deterrence - where the sentencing judge did not engage with the effect of the mental health issues on deterrence – where the sentencing judge erred by not referencing general deterrence – ground upheld
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 33
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 14
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 3A, 21A, 22A, 25A, 25D, 25E, 25F, 44
Cases Cited: Akkawi v R; Akkawi v R [2012] NSWCCA 11
BAP v R [2024] NSWCCA 206
Baydoun v R [2024] NSWCCA 65
Black v R (2022) 107 NSWLR 225; [2022] NSWCCA 17
Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18
Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150
Christian v R [2021] NSWCCA 300
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Doyle v R (2022) 108 NSWLR 1; [2022] NSWCCA 81
GAS v R; SJK v R (2004) 217 CLR 198; [2004] HCA 22
Kennedy v R [2022] NSWCCA 215
Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37
Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 146
Lehn v R (2016) 93 NSWLR 205; [2016] NSWCCA 255
Ming v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2022) 109 NSWLR 604; [2022] NSWCA 209
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67
R v Lambroglou [2024] NSWSC 829
R v Mitchell; R v Gallagher [2007] NSWCCA 296; (2007) 177 A Crim R 94
R v Stephens [2024] NSWCCA 170
R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48
Shen v R [2024] NSWCCA 252
Shine v R [2016] NSWCCA 149; (2016) 260 A Crim R 534
Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 69
Wang v R [2021] NSWCCA 282
Warwick v R [2016] NSWCCA 183
Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14
Williamson v R [2015] NSWCCA 250
Zeiser v R [2020] NSWCCA 154
Texts Cited: Nil
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Jeremy Sampson (Applicant)
Crown (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
T Ramrakha (Applicant)
E Wilkins SC (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Legal Aid NSW (Applicant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2022/266683
Publication restriction: Nil
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
The applicant, Mr Jeremy Sampson, pleaded guilty to one offence of intentionally causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). During sentencing the applicant asked the sentencing judge to take into account the offence on a Form 1, an offence of knowingly contravening an apprehended domestic violence order (“ADVO”). Taking into account the offence on the Form 1, the sentencing judge sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for 5 years commencing 9 September 2022 and expiring 8 September 2027 with a non-parole period of 3 years expiring 8 September 2025.
The victim, Miri Morris-Duncan, had known the applicant for 11 or 12 years and had been in a relationship with him for about eight years. They have two children. The applicant had a history of domestic violence towards the victim and at the time of the offending there was an enforceable ADVO that included a non-contact provision in place. On the night of 21 August 2022, the applicant and the victim were at the victim’s home in Adamstown. The applicant was under the influence of alcohol and illicit drugs, and the victim was under the influence of alcohol. Around 8:00pm the applicant began to argue with the victim. The applicant then followed the victim out onto the balcony, picked up a garden stake and said to her “I’m gonna whack you”. The applicant then struck the victim with the stake in her right eye area. The police arrested the applicant on 9 September 2022. The victim has very limited vision in her right eye with no substantial improvement expected.
In his ROS, the sentencing judge made a finding of special circumstances due to the applicant’s childhood trauma, alcohol/substance use disorder, PTSD and his risk of institutionalisation. The sentencing judge did not find the offence mitigated by a lack of planning, nor did his Honour make findings about whether general and specific deterrence were given less weight by reason of the applicant’s mental illness. The sentencing judge also rounded down the discount given to the applicant for the utilitarian value of his guilty plea.
The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on three grounds:
Ground 1: The sentencing judge erred in applying the sentence discount of 10 per cent by rounding down the discount to even months.
Ground 2: The sentencing judge erred in assessing the objective seriousness of the principal offence by failing to analyse the intent component of the offence and consider the submission that the offence was unplanned.
Ground 3: The sentencing judge erred in failing to properly evaluate the applicant’s mental illness in accordance with the principles stated in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194.
The Court (per Davies J, Dhanji J and Huggett J agreeing) held, upholding the appeal and re-sentencing the applicant:
As to Ground 1:
(1) Division 1A of Part 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) is a mandatory scheme subject only to the exceptions in s 25F(2) and (4). The sentencing judge was obliged to provide the discount stipulated in s 25D, even if inconvenient because the discount involved part of a month. By rounding the discount to even months his Honour effectively reduced the discount. The failure to provide the stipulated discount did not invalidate the sentence but did amount to error: [38]-[44] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
Baydoun v R [2024] NSWCCA 65; Black v R (2022) 107 NSWLR 225; [2022] NSWCCA 17; Doyle v R (2022) 108 NSWLR 1; [2022] NSWCCA 81; Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 69*,* cited.
(2) This was not the type of error where there could be a mathematical correction. Where a “discrete error” has affected a sentencing purpose and been taken up in the exercise of the sentencing discretion the Court cannot simply adjust for the error and must resentence in accordance with Kentwell: [52]-[55] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
Christian v R [2021] NSWCCA 300; Lehn v R (2016) 93 NSWLR 205; [2016] NSWCCA 255; Zeiser v R [2020] NSWCCA 154*,* cited.
As to Ground 2*:*
(1) This was a case where a lack of planning was not a mitigating factor. The lack of planning could not mitigate an offence typified by irrational jealousy, insecurity and an attempt at control especially in light of the applicant’s history of domestic violence. The lack of planning was of little significance: [71] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
Kennedy v R [2022] NSWCCA 215, Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14*,* cited.
As to Ground 3*:*
(1) The sentencing judge’s failure to make reference to general deterrence was an error. A specific submission was made about general deterrence that his Honour did not respond to. Nor was it possible to infer from his Honour’s approach to the applicant’s mental health issues that his Honour had considered the issue of general deterrence: [96]-[97] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
Shine v R [2016] NSWCCA 149; (2016) 260 A Crim R 534 at [76], cited.
(2) The judge’s responsibility to determine and apply the law is not circumscribed by the conduct of counsel. A failure by counsel to raise a matter will not mean that a judge has not fallen into error by not mentioning the matter. Moreover, some matters are of such significance that, regardless of the submissions made, the judge is obliged to deal with them. The judge is obliged to resolve critical matters between parties and a failure to mention those matters may lead to the conclusion that the judge overlooked the matters, thereby demonstrating an error: [99]-[103] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
GAS v R; SJK v R (2004) 217 CLR 198; [2004] HCA 22; Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 146; Ming v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2022) 109 NSWLR 604; [2022] NSWCA 209; Warwick v R [2016] NSWCCA 183*,* cited.
(3) General deterrence is a fundamental principle of sentencing, particularly for domestic violence offences. A judge is expected to make reference to the weight given to general deterrence when sentencing. The effect of the applicant’s mental health on general deterrence was expressly put forward as a submission on behalf of the applicant: [104]-[106] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150; Shen v R [2024] NSWCCA 252; R v Stephens [2024] NSWCCA 170*,* cited.
As to Re-sentence:
(1) A slightly reduced starting point for the sentence is justified given the progress the applicant has made in prison. The evidence presented on re-sentence suggest a less pessimistic outlook of the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation: [115]-[117] (Davies J); [120] (Dhanji J); [121] (Huggett J).
DAVIES J: The applicant pleaded guilty at a super call-over to one offence of intentionally causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The maximum penalty for this offence is 25 years’ imprisonment and there is a standard non-parole period of seven years.
He came before Judge Ellis in the Newcastle District Court for sentence on 13 December 2023. He asked Judge Ellis to take into account the offence on a Form 1, an offence of knowingly contravening an apprehended domestic violence order (“ADVO”) contrary to s 14(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
On that day Judge Ellis, taking into account the offence on the Form 1, sentenced the applicant to imprisonment for 5 years commencing 9 September 2022 and expiring 8 September 2027 with a non-parole period of 3 years expiring 8 September 2025.
The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against his sentence on the following grounds:
The sentencing judge erred in applying the sentence discount of 10 per cent by rounding down the discount to even months.
The sentencing judge erred in assessing the objective seriousness of the principal offence by failing to analyse the intent component of the offence and consider the submission that the offence was unplanned.
The sentencing judge erred in failing to properly evaluate the applicant's mental illness in accordance with the principles stated in D**irector of P**ublic Prosecutions *(*Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194.
The applicant was sentenced on the basis of a statement of agreed facts which may be summarised as follows.
The victim of the offending was Miri Morris-Duncan. She and the applicant had known each other for 11 or 12 years and had been in a relationship for about eight years. They have two children from the relationship, JS aged 11 years and LD aged four years. Each of those children was being brought up by their grandparents.
At the time of the offending there was an enforceable ADVO in place for the protection of the victim and that included a non-contact provision. There was a history of domestic violence towards her.
On the evening of 21 August 2022, the applicant and the victim were at the victim’s home in Adamstown. The applicant was under the influence of alcohol and illicit drugs, and the victim was under the influence of alcohol.
At around 8:00pm the applicant began to argue with the victim, demanding her online passwords and accusing her of sleeping with other people.
The victim went out onto the balcony. The applicant followed her. He picked up a garden stake from the balcony and said to the victim, "I'm gonna whack you". He then used a garden stake to strike the victim once. The stake made contact with the victim's right eye area.
The victim screamed loudly and said, "Ring an ambulance, ring an ambulance". The victim's eye was bleeding significantly and she was crying. The applicant also started crying. He called an ambulance. Surrounding neighbours heard the screaming and called police who attended shortly thereafter.
When the police attended at the property, the victim indicated that no one else was present, and said she had been assaulted by "Dane Brooks", who had since left the scene.
Police noted an internally locked bathroom, and after some negotiation, including with the victim who said that nobody was in the bathroom, police forced entry. They found and detained the applicant. The applicant protested his innocence and denied assaulting the victim. He told the police that the offender’s name was Jordan Thomas McGrady.
The victim was transported to John Hunter Hospital by ambulance and was ultimately referred to the Sydney Eye Hospital due to the severity of the injury to her eye.
Shortly before she was discharged on 3 September 2022, she made a disclosure to an attending nurse about the offending being a domestic violence incident. The police were contacted and attended the hospital. The victim participated in a recorded Domestic Violence Evidence in Chief (“DVEC”) with the police and disclosed the offending. Thereafter the police arrested the applicant on 9 September 2022.
The victim suffered the following injuries as a result of the offending:
Periorbital bruising, traumatic uveitis (eye inflammation) requiring surgical correction, macular oedema (swollen retina), and commotio (retina trauma).
She underwent corrective surgery on 1 September 2022.
A letter from Dr Shivram Nadkami, an ophthalmologist, dated 10 January 2023 said that the victim had a good outcome from a surgical perspective but that her vision was very poor due to the scarring at the centre of the macula. She was advised that it was unlikely that there would be substantial improvement in her right eye vision.
On 27 November 2023, the victim’s general practitioner referred her to an optometrist at Specsavers. The doctor reported that the victim had presented today feeling that her right periorbital region was swollen and she was fearful that her vision might be worsening. The doctor said that her visual acuity in the right eye was hand movements only which is baseline.
The sentence proceedings were heard on 13 December 2023, following which the sentencing judge delivered his ROS. Both the Crown and the defence provided detailed submissions and made brief oral submissions.
Immediately before his Honour began to deliver his ROS, his Honour said this:
Well, I’ll tell you both what I'm thinking and give you the opportunity to say anything further. In terms of the standard non-parole period, well, it doesn’t strictly ‘cause it was a plea of guilty and also, in my view, the criminality is slightly below mid-range. In any event, my view is a starting point of five years and six months, discounted by 10% with some rounding to even years leaves a sentence of five years. I would find special circumstances and give him a non-parole period of three years. I would date the sentence from the date he went into custody on 9 September 2022, meaning it’s wholly concurrent with the three month sentence he’s served for contravening an ADVO.
He is entitled to a 10% discount for the utilitarian value of that plea and a further unspecified discount in relation to assistance to authorities given that the plea of guilty came through the course of a super call-over.
(emphasis added)
The reality is then, it would seem, that she has a long-term impairment to her vision, the degree of which is perhaps yet to be finalised, although as the ophthalmologist indicated, the prognosis is not good.
His Honour next noted the lengthy criminal record of the applicant and particularly his history of domestic violence matters concerning the victim that dated back to 2011. In particular, the sentencing judge noted a sentence of 3 months’ imprisonment imposed on the applicant on 12 September 2022 for a contravention of an ADVO against the same victim, which commenced on 9 September 2022. His Honour said he would apply the principle of totality by commencing the present sentence on the same date.
The sentencing judge was provided with a report from Dr Richard Furst and he referred to that report in some detail. The applicant was then a 32 year old Indigenous man. His mother was an alcoholic and a drug addict who had had many partners, a number of whom were violent both towards her and towards the applicant when he was growing up. The applicant told Dr Furst that he had been sexually abused by an uncle when he was aged about ten years, and he was subsequently sexually abused by a male worker at the Acmena Youth Justice Centre in 2008 when he was aged 16 years.
The applicant commenced drinking and using cannabis from the age of nine or ten years, and amphetamines and heroin from the age of 17 years. He was on monthly injections of buprenorphine. There was a family history of drinking and drug problems.
The applicant had been negatively influenced by peers who used drugs. His experience of domestic violence, general violence and sexual violence led to him being diagnosed in childhood with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). He never knew his biological father, and his mother’s maternal deficits had adversely impacted his social and emotional development, predisposing him to becoming an anxious and unhappy child and an emotionally troubled teenager.
Dr Furst’s report noted that there was now strong evidence that the risk of addiction to alcohol and drugs is largely inherited, with genetic factors accounting for at least 50% of the causation of addiction. Dr Furst concluded that the applicant’s drinking, drug use and drug addiction were largely the product of his genetic vulnerability to drug addiction coupled with the traumatic effects of parental abuse and neglect, and childhood sexual abuse victimisation.
The sentencing judge then said:
According to Dr Furst, the relevance of the literature to [the applicant] is that he has struggled to cope throughout his teenage years and adolescence and over the last ten years or so, as a consequence of his drinking, drug addiction and the longer term effects of childhood trauma and parental neglect. It is noted he has developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of the abuse and that his experiences fall within the principles set out by the High Court in Bugmy*.* He is formally diagnosed by Dr Furst as meeting the DSM-5 criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol substance use disorder.
It is noted that he has spent a considerable amount of his adolescent and adult years in custody and there is a risk of institutionalisation and that is a factor which I take into account in finding special circumstances. Other factors in relation to the finding of special circumstances are that he needs a longer than normal period on parole to deal with his substance abuse issues and the mental health issues set out within the report of Dr Furst. I note also that he has been in custody during the time that COVID-19 restrictions were in place and that his time in custody has been served in harsher circumstances than would otherwise apply. For all of those reasons I find that that there are special circumstances.
…I note that I have started the sentence at five and a half years and discounted it by 10%. In arriving at that start point I have taken into account the additional discount in relation to the super call-over s 23 assistance. Having rounded the discount to even months, I impose a sentence of five years which I will backdate, as I have indicated, to 9 September 2022 and which will run until 8 September 2027. Having regard to the finding of special circumstances, I impose a non-parole period of three years, which will run from 9 September 2022 to 8 September 2025, followed thereafter by two years on parole from 9 September 2025 to 8 September 2027.
(emphasis added)
The applicant submitted that his Honour rounded down the discount to even months so that instead of providing a discount of 6 months and 18 days, his Honour only discounted it by 6 months. The applicant submitted that such a rounding exercise is not permitted by what is provided in Div 1A of Pt 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Act”) and what this Court said in Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 69, Doyle v R (2022) 108 NSWLR 1; [2022] NSWCCA 81 and Baydoun v R [2024] NSWCCA 65.
The applicant submitted that the error was not one which required the Court to re-exercise a sentencing discretion. Rather, the error could be addressed by an approximate mathematical correction to the head sentence and non-parole period.
The Crown submitted that the use of rounding of sentences was orthodox and of long standing. The Crown submitted that the overall discount included the mandatory statutory 10% discount and an unspecified discount for assisting the administration of justice by pleading guilty at the super call-over. In that way it was within the proper exercise of the Judge’s sentencing discretion to adjust the head sentence to one of 5 years’ imprisonment, given that he was ultimately synthesizing both a mandatory and unquantified discount for the guilty plea.
The Crown submitted that if there was error it could not be corrected by an arithmetical exercise. Rather, the resentencing discretion had to be exercised in accordance with what was said in Christian v R [2021] NSWCCA 300.
While it is clear that the sentencing judge was providing a discount under s 25D of the Sentencing Act, what is less clear is what the other discount was provided for. As noted at [30] above, his Honour referred to “s 23 assistance”, and as noted at [22] above, his Honour referred to “assistance to authorities”. There was no evidence of such assistance. What the applicant had sought in his written submissions was “an additional discount for assisting the administration of justice by pleading guilty in the context of a super call-over”.
It seems likely, therefore, that the further discount was accorded pursuant to s 22A of the Sentencing Act which provides:
22A Power to reduce penalties for facilitating the administration of justice
(1) A court may impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise impose on an offender who was tried on indictment having regard to the degree to which the administration of justice has been facilitated by the defence (whether by disclosures made pre-trial or during the trial or otherwise).
(2) A lesser penalty that is imposed under this section in relation to an offence must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence.
The relevance of s 22A to pleas at super call-overs was discussed by Yehia J (Wright and Cavanagh JJ agreeing) in BAP v R [2024] NSWCCA 206 at [58]-[62]. Despite s 22A referring to “an offender who was tried on indictment”, a discount under that section is not confined to the position where there has been a trial on indictment: R v Lambroglou [2024] NSWSC 829 at [82]; Doyle at [19]; BAP at [54].
Division 1A of Part 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) relevantly provides:
25A Application of Division
(1) This Division applies to a sentence for an offence that is dealt with on indictment, other than -
(a) an offence under a law of the Commonwealth, unless the regulations otherwise provide in the case of a particular offence or class of offences, or
(b) an offence committed by a person who was under the age of 18 years when the offence was committed and under the age of 21 years when charged before the court with the offence.
(2) A court must not apply any other discount for the utilitarian value of a guilty plea to an offence to which this Division applies other than the discount provided for by this Division.
…
25D Sentencing discounts for guilty plea for offences dealt with on indictment
(1) Mandatory nature of sentencing discount In determining the sentence for an offence, the court is to apply a sentencing discount for the utilitarian value of a guilty plea in accordance with this section if the offender pleaded guilty to the offence at any time before being sentenced.
…
25E Sentencing discounts to apply in certain cases where guilty plea offer made for different offences and refused when made
(1) Discount where offer not accepted In determining the sentence for an offence, the court is to apply a sentencing discount in accordance with this section if -
(a) the offender made an offer recorded in a negotiations document to plead guilty to an offence, and
(b) that offence (the different offence) was not the offence the subject of the proceedings when the offer was made, and
(c) the offer was not accepted by the prosecutor, and
(d) the offer was not subsequently withdrawn, and
(e) the offender was found guilty of the different offence or an offence that is reasonably equivalent to the different offence.
For the purposes of this subsection, an offence is reasonably equivalent to a different offence if -
(a) the facts of the offence are capable of constituting the different offence, and
(b) the maximum penalty for the offence is the same or less than the different offence.
…
25F Other provisions applying to sentencing discount
…
(2) Exception to application of discount - level of culpability The court may determine not to apply the sentencing discount, or to apply a reduced sentencing discount, if the court determines, on its own motion or on the application of the prosecution, that the discount should not be applied or should be reduced because the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can be met only by imposition of a penalty with no allowance for, or a reduction of, that discount.
…
(4) Exception to application of discount - disputed facts The court may determine not to apply the sentencing discount, or to apply a reduced sentencing discount, if the court determines that the discount should not be applied or should be reduced because the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty has been eroded by a dispute as to facts that was not determined in favour of the offender.
…
(8) Sentence not invalidated by failure to comply The failure by a court to comply with this Division does not invalidate any sentence imposed by the court.
…Division 1A constitutes a mandatory and exclusive code for the application of sentencing discounts for the utilitarian value of pleas of guilty to charges of indictable offences: ss 25A(2), 25D(1) and 25E(1).
The new scheme for sentencing discounts for guilty pleas contained in Div 1A of Pt 3 of the Sentencing Act, which commenced on 30 April 2018, introduced a strict fixed sentencing discount scheme which replaced the common law discount for the utilitarian value of a guilty plea….
Section 25D is mechanical in the sense that a specified percentage reduction of the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed must be applied in the circumstances specified in the statute. No element of discretion is involved. By way of contrast, prior to the introduction of s 25D, the utilitarian value of an early plea of guilty was one of a number of factors that could be taken into account in the synthetic sentencing exercise.
The provisions in Part 3, Division 1A of the CSP Act – which includes s 25D – were described as “constituting a mandatory and exclusive code for the application of sentencing discounts for the utilitarian value of pleas of guilty to charges of indictable offences”: Black v R (2022) 107 NSWLR 225; [2022] NSWCCA 17 at [2]; see also Stubbings v R [2023] NSWCCA 69 at [15]; Giles-Adams v The King (2023) 377 FLR 426; [2023] NSWCCA 122 at [72].
Division 1A is a mandatory scheme subject only to the exceptions provided in s 25F(2) and (4). In the present case the sentencing judge, in fixing the discount for the plea, did not purport to rely on those exceptions. As inconvenient as it might have been because the discount involved part of a month, the sentencing judge was, nevertheless, obliged to provide the discount stipulated in s 25D. Although the failure to do so did not invalidate the sentence, it amounted to error.
The Crown’s submission that it was within the proper exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion to adjust the head sentence to one of 5 years’ imprisonment, given that he was ultimately synthesizing both a mandatory and an unquantified discount for the applicant's guilty plea is misconceived. What his Honour did in rounding the discount was effectively to reduce the discount. Had the discount been provided on an arithmetically correct basis, it would have been a discount of 6.6 months (10% of 66 months), that is 6 months and 18 days. The head sentence would, therefore, have been 4 years 11 months and 12 days.
In that way, if his Honour was rounding the discount to provide for an unquantified discount for facilitating the administration of justice, the discounted sentence should have been rounded down (if the sentence was to start in whole months rather than days) at least to 4 years and 11 months rather than the 5 years his Honour ordered, which was a rounding up, contrary to s 25D and to the detriment of the applicant. In that regard, it is difficult to understand the Crown’s submission that his Honour was justified in rounding to 5 years because he had included the unspecified discount for assistance. Such an inclusion should have resulted in a lower sentence, not a higher one.
The Crown also relied on decisions suggesting that the rounding of sentences is orthodox and of longstanding. In Williamson v R [2015] NSWCCA 250, R A Hulme J (with Macfarlan JA and Wilson J agreeing) said at [53]:
The judge said that the applicant "will receive a 25% discount for the utilitarian aspect of the pleas of guilty". I am not prepared to do other than to take his Honour at his word. He obviously did not engage in a process of mathematical precision, no doubt heeding what this Court has said to discourage it in cases where sentences have been imposed in terms of years, months and days: see, for example, Rios v R [2012] NSWCCA 8 at [43] (Adamson J) and Akkawi v R; Akkawi v R [2012] NSWCCA 11. In the latter, Simpson J (as her Honour then was) observed:
[101] I add one observation concerning the sentences imposed at first instance. In my opinion, the form of sentencing here undertaken (at first instance) is not to be encouraged. By this I refer to the imposition of sentences composed of years, months and days.
[102] I assume that this was done in order to apply the reduction in sentence of 15% referrable to the pleas of guilty. However, it is conducive to error, both at first instance and on appeal. In my opinion, justice is better achieved by the conventional means of sentencing in round figures. There is nothing in R v Thomson; R v Houlton that requires a mathematical approach of the precision here demonstrated.
What Simpson J said in the portion of Akkawi v R; Akkawi v R [2012] NSWCCA 11, cited by R A Hulme J, had become a common refrain in this Court. However, that was prior to the enactment of Div 1A which, apart from the two exceptions mentioned, provides for fixed and mandatory discounts.
The rounding referred to in R v Stephens [2024] NSWCCA 170 at [231] (also relied upon by the Crown) appears to have been done without any argument being addressed to the mandatory requirements of Div 1A. It should not be regarded as authority for any practice of rounding in respect of Div 1A discounts.
In my opinion, it was not open to the sentencing judge to round the discount provided in s 25D, either up or down. His Honour was obliged to discount his notional starting point by 6.6 months with the result (unfortunate as it is) that the head sentence ought to have been 4 years and 11 months and 12 days. It would then have been open to the judge to round that down to take account of the “lesser penalty” referred to in s 22A.
I would uphold ground 1.
The applicant submitted that if only ground 1 was upheld it was not necessary for this Court to engage in the resentencing process as required by Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37. The applicant submitted that the error could be corrected by an arithmetical correction to the head sentence and the non-parole period.
In my opinion, this is not the type of error where there can be an arithmetical correction. The matter was discussed in Lehn v R (2016) 93 NSWLR 205; [2016] NSWCCA 255, where Bathurst CJ, (Beazley P, R A Hulme, Schmidt and Wilson JJ agreeing) at [68] rejected the proposition:
…that if a discrete error is found, the sentence can be adjusted to take account of that error.
[68] …It seems to me that if there is an error which affects the exercise of the sentencing discretion, the section requires the court to form its own view of the appropriate sentence, although, as pointed out in Kentwell at [43], not necessarily to resentence.
…
[72] That is not to say that there will not be occasions when, notwithstanding error, it is not necessary to re-exercise the sentencing discretion. It will not be necessary where, for example, an arithmetical error occurred in the calculation of the commencement and end date of the sentence or the date of the expiration of a non-parole period arrived at in the proper exercise of discretion or, for example, an error in the calculation of the effect of a discount for a plea or assistance to the authorities, where the extent of the discount to be allowed was reached in accordance with proper principles.
In Zeiser v R [2020] NSWCCA 154, this Court (Payne JA, Fagan and Cavanagh JJ) construed Lehn as holding that even where a “discrete error” such as the application of a discount has affected a sentencing purpose and has been taken up in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, the Court cannot simply adjust for the error but must resentence in accordance with Kentwell*.*
Lehn and Zeiser were discussed by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in Christian at [29]-[35]. His Honour went on to hold (at [36]) that the error of the sentencing judge in that case in failing to give effect to the finding of special circumstances (his Honour did not alter the statutory ratio) was an error that required a full Kentwell resentencing because “[t]he fixing of a non-parole period is an essential component of the overall sentence”.
In the present case, there seem to me to be two problems with the notion that the present error is simply an arithmetical one. First, his Honour purported to include in the discount from the starting point of 5 years and 6 months not only the s 25D discount but also a discount under s 22A. That latter discount was not specified and appears to have been given largely for the purpose of rounding the total discount to produce a head sentence in whole months. If the s 25D discount is adjusted (as it must be), discretionary considerations then arise in respect of the s 22A discount.
Secondly, it is not clear from the remarks of the sentencing judge whether he considered that a non-parole period of 3 years was the minimum sentence which should be imposed so that the applicant was appropriately punished for his offending or whether the non-parole period should be 60% of whatever overall sentence was imposed. In other words, his Honour’s focus may not have been on the 60% ratio that his sentence produced but on the 3 year non-parole period.
Accordingly, since error has been found it will be necessary for the Court to resentence the applicant. Although not strictly necessary to do so because of the need to resentence the applicant, in deference to the submissions made, grounds 2 and 3 will be dealt with. What follows will also be relevant to the resentencing exercise.
The applicant submitted that the sentencing judge did not in terms address the objective seriousness of the principal offence, but the applicant acknowledged that his Honour referred to the nature of the injury that had been caused. The applicant submitted, however, that his Honour did not address the submission that the objective seriousness of the principal offence was mitigated because it was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity.
The applicant submitted that this submission, when seen within the context of the agreed facts, was an important one for determining the nature of the applicant's intention to cause grievous bodily harm and the seriousness of the offence. Reliance was placed on what was said by Howie J in R v Mitchell*; R v Gallagher* [2007] NSWCCA 296; (2007) 177 A Crim R 94 at [27].
The applicant submitted that the facts, being a single strike to the face with a bamboo rod that the applicant picked up from the balcony before saying “I’m gonna whack you”, established that the intention to use the item and cause grievous bodily was unplanned and did not involve a great deal of deliberation or premeditation. The applicant submitted that the failure of the sentencing judge to take into account the fact that the offence was not planned was a material error.
The Crown submitted that in the ROS the sentencing judge did not place the objective seriousness of the offence on some putative scale, although his Honour foreshadowed at the conclusion of the sentence proceedings that in his view the criminality of the offending was “slightly below the mid-range", which was consistent with the applicant's submissions on sentence. The Crown submitted that neither party took issue with that assessment.
The Crown submitted that the mens rea of the offence was an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, and it is not clear what more the sentencing judge could have reasonably been expected to do in his analysis of the applicant's intention.
The Crown submitted that while the offence was not obviously part of a planned or organised criminal activity, that factor was of little relevance or weight, and had little mitigating effect, when considering the objective seriousness of the offence, particularly in the context of domestic violence offences. The Crown submitted that such a factor could not be mitigating, given the applicant's repetitive behaviour of engaging in domestic violence against the victim over a lengthy period.
The Crown submitted that on a fair reading of the ex tempore reasons, the applicant simply did not persuade the sentencing judge on the balance of probabilities that the degree of planning was a relevant, let alone mitigating, factor in this case.
Although a written submission was made that the lack of planning was a mitigating factor, nothing further was said about the matter in oral submissions and, when the sentencing judge having almost finished his ROS asked counsel if there were any other matters he needed to deal with, nothing was said about that matter or the objective seriousness of the offence. Further, the defence submission had been that the offence fell below the midrange and his Honour expressed the view at the completion of the sentence hearing that the criminality was slightly below the midrange. That may be an explanation for nothing further being said about a lack of planning and its relationship to an assessment of objective seriousness.
The applicant relied on what was said by Howie J in Mitchell at [27]:
A very important aspect of an offence under s 33 is the result of the offender’s conduct. The nature of the injury caused to the victim will to a very significant degree determine the seriousness of the offence and the appropriate sentence. This is not to underestimate the intent component of the offence, after all that is the element that makes the offender liable to a maximum penalty of 25 years as opposed to 7 years for a s 35 offence. But there is less scope for variation in the nature of the intention to do grievous bodily harm when determining the seriousness of a particular instance of the offence than there is for variation in the nature of the injury inflicted. It should be borne in mind that, if the victim had died, the respondents would have faced a charge of murder. The injury suffered by the victim was, as her Honour noted, little short of death.
The applicant submitted that the lack of planning in the present case was relevant to “the nature of the intention to do grievous bodily harm” when the offence charged was one under s 33 rather than s 35. The applicant put the matter another way by submitting that on the facts of the present case there was little to distinguish a s 35 offence from the s 33 offence as charged. In that way the present facts, with a lack of planning, just made it to the threshold of an intention to do grievous bodily harm within s 33.
It was apparent from the facts of the matter, which the Judge recited in his ROS, that there was little planning involved in the offending. The fact that there was little planning does not necessarily mean the offending was mitigated. Although planning, or a lack of it, is a factor to be considered both in s 21A(2) and (3) of the Sentencing Act, it was the applicant here who was seeking the benefit of s 21A(2)(n), and the onus was on him to establish that the offending should be mitigated by the fact of any lack of planning.
A similar situation occurred in Kennedy v R [2022] NSWCCA 215. A ground of appeal in that case was an alleged failure to take into account that far more serious domestic violence offending was not planned. Justice Adamson (Garling and N Adams JJ agreeing) said:
[47] It was argued on behalf of the applicant that, although her Honour noted his submission at the sentence hearing that the offending was not planned, her Honour did not expressly address the submission or make a finding as to whether it was or was not planned. Thus, the applicant argued, he did not know (and this Court could not know) from the reasons whether his lack of planning had been taken into account as a mitigating factor or not.
[48] The relevance of the matters listed in s 21A(2) of the Act as aggravating and s 21A(3) of the Act as mitigating depends on the circumstances of the offending. Further, it is noteworthy that s 21A(2)(n) provides that it is an aggravating factor that “the offence was part of a planned or organised criminal activity”, whereas s 21A(3)(b) provides that it is mitigating that “the offence was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity”. Because aggravating factors must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and mitigating factors need only be proved on the balance of probabilities (Olbrich v The Queen (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ)), there will be cases where a Court cannot be satisfied to the requisite standard that an offence was planned or not.
[49] Whether such a factor mitigates or aggravates the offence, or neither, depends on the circumstances of the offending.
[50] In the present case, there was no suggestion that the onset of the detention was other than spontaneous and impulsive. It was obviously a case where there was no planning. It appears that something triggered the applicant’s jealousy and he reacted by taking the victim’s phone and car keys and assaulting her, all the while interrogating her about an “app”. The only element of “planning” which the sentencing judge found was that the applicant had taken the victim to Third Island because it was remote. This was not taken into account as an aggravating factor as it had not been contended for as such by the Crown.
[51] As is apparent from the detailed factual findings in the remarks on sentence, her Honour was well aware of how the offending started (without warning, as far as the victim was concerned) and how it ended (by reason of the apprehension of the applicant whose father had called the police). The lack of planning at the outset may be accepted but it is difficult to see how it could mitigate an offence which was typified by irrational jealousy brought about by insecurity and manifested by the taking of control, unlawful detention and physical assault of the victim and his threats to kill her. Indeed, the passage set out from Munda at [54] indicates that it is typical of offences of domestic violence committed by persons such as the applicant that they are not “premeditated”. Thus, lack of planning in this context is of negligible, if any, significance.
[52] Further, to regard lack of planning as necessarily mitigating and planning as necessarily aggravating is erroneous. As Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14 at [22]:
“Many matters that must be taken into account in fixing a sentence are matters whose proper characterisation may lie somewhere along a line between two extremes. That is inevitably so. The matters that must be taken into account in sentencing an offender include many matters of and concerning human behaviour. It is, therefore, to invite error to present every question for a sentencer who is assessing a matter which is to be taken into account as a choice between extremes, one classified as aggravating and the opposite extreme classified as mitigating. Neither human behaviour, nor fixing of sentences is so simple.”
[53] In the present case, the lack of planning, at least at the outset, was not necessarily mitigating, although a positive finding of planning (for example, had the applicant left a knife at Third Island in advance of taking the victim there) would have aggravated the offending. The subparagraphs in s 21A(2) and (3) of the Act are not to be applied in a formulaic or artificial way: R v Hopkinson; R v Robertson [2022] NSWCCA 80 at [2] (Leeming JA) and [111] (Rothman J). There are some cases in which a lack of planning will be mitigating and others where it will not be.
(emphasis added)
As that portion of Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629; [2003] HCA 14 at [22] makes clear, and as Adamson J said in Kennedy at [53], there will be some cases where a lack of planning will not be mitigating. In my opinion the present is such a case. As in Kennedy it is difficult to see how the lack of planning could mitigate an offence which was typified by irrational jealousy brought about by insecurity and manifested by the attempt at control. The significance of that is increased by the history of domestic violence over 10 or 11 years inflicted on the victim by the applicant in the present case. The fact that this offence was unplanned was of little or no significance in the matter.
Despite the reliance by the applicant on what was said by Howie J in Mitchell, the significant point being made in that judgment was that the nature of the injury inflicted is the important consideration for the assessment of the seriousness of the offending and the appropriate sentence. Mitchell was also a case involving a chance encounter between the victim and the offenders and, hence, no planning.
I would reject this ground.
The applicant submitted that although the sentencing judge accepted that the applicant met the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD and alcohol substance use disorder, and took the applicant's mental health issues into account in making a finding of special circumstances, at no stage did his Honour address the applicant's mental health issues in accordance with De La Rosa.
The applicant pointed out that submissions made on his behalf to the sentencing judge had expressly suggested that his mental health issues made him a poor vehicle for general deterrence and somewhat moderated the need for specific deterrence. His Honour said nothing about those matters. The applicant submitted that the submission to the sentencing judge was supported by the unchallenged report by Dr Furst which noted the presence of PTSD in the applicant dating back to childhood.
The applicant submitted that the failure to engage with the submission constituted error. In that regard the applicant submitted that the applicant's mental health issues were not entirely coterminous with the applicant's history of disadvantage, and the mental health issues required separate consideration.
The Crown submitted that on a fair reading of the ROS, it is clear that the sentencing judge accepted the thrust of the applicant’s submissions that the applicant had a deprived upbringing and had mental health issues, and that his Honour took these into account in determining the appropriate sentence. The Crown pointed out that the applicant's mental health was clearly relevant in the finding of special circumstances and operated to reduce the statutory ratio to 60%.
The Crown submitted that the sentencing judge was also required to take into account the fact that the applicant had a history of domestic violence offences dating back to 2011 and a criminal history involving other offences including relating to drugs and firearms. Accordingly, it did not automatically follow that the applicant’s long-standing mental health issues should lead to a reduction in the need for specific and/or general deterrence.
The Crown drew attention to what was said in R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 at 51, approved in Wang v R [2021] NSWCCA 282 at [98], which held that where an offender acts with knowledge of what they are doing and with knowledge of the gravity of their actions, the moderation of the need for general deterrence need not be great.
The Crown submitted further that, in the light of the applicant's long history of domestic violence against the same victim and continuing breaches of ADVOs, and the way this offence occurred, all of these matters required that very considerable weight be given to the issue of specific deterrence to vindicate the victim and in relation to the protection of the community.
This ground of appeal (and to a lesser extent ground 2) resulted in an issue being raised by the Court about which the parties sought leave to file additional written submissions. Such leave was given. The issue arose from two inquiries made by the sentencing judge of counsel, one prior to imposing the sentence, and, less importantly, one following the imposition of the sentence.
Before the sentence was imposed, but otherwise at the conclusion of the ROS, his Honour said:
I have had the benefit of reading submissions and supplementary oral submissions from Ms Wilson on behalf of the offender and from Mr Dixon on behalf of the Crown. Are there any other matters that I need to deal with or any qualifications I need to make to anything that I have said?
It should be recalled that immediately prior to the delivery of the ROS his Honour said what is set out at [21] above, where his Honour effectively summarised what he intended to find and the sentence he intended to impose.
Following the imposition of the sentence, his Honour said:
Are there any other matters? I should indicate that in imposing that sentence of 5 years, I took into account the matter on the Form 1.
In my opinion, the question posed after imposition of the sentence should be put aside. It is the sort of question that most judges ask after a sentence is imposed in case some arithmetical error or date error has been made in relation to the sentence. It is not an invitation for counsel to raise substantive issues.
The issue identified by the Court in relation to the first question asked by his Honour before sentence was imposed raised issues about the sentencing judge’s obligations and the obligations of counsel, including whether there was any obligation on counsel to reiterate or reagitate a particular submission previously made whether orally or in writing.
Before considering those matters, it is important to consider ground 3 without reference to the sentencing judge’s inquiry of counsel; in other words, is error demonstrated ignoring the judge’s inquiry of counsel?
In the applicant’s written submissions to the sentencing judge, there appeared a long section under the heading “Moral Culpability”. The applicant there dealt with the report of Dr Furst in considerable detail and submitted that the applicant’s deprived background reduced his moral culpability and allowed the Court to place more weight on the need to rehabilitate him to reduce his risk of reoffending and to protect the community.
Thereafter the written submissions under the heading “Mental Health” said this:
36. At the time of the offences and currently, the offender had/has a diagnosis of:
i) post-traumatic stress disorder; and
ii) alcohol /substance use disorder (currently in remission)
37. As Dr Furst explained the physical and sexual abuse and neglect the offender suffered during childhood predisposed him to both of these diagnoses.
38. Additionally, the offender continues to experience symptoms of anxiety, including being on-edge around others, especially strangers, having nightmares most weeks, suffering from insomnia and being unsettled if he sees television programs about sexual abuse or similar themes.
39. As noted in DPP (Comm) v De La Rosa:
‘the mental health problems of an offender need no amount to a serious psychiatric illness before they will be relevant to the sentencing process. The circumstances may indicate that when an offender has a mental disorder of modest severity it may nevertheless be appropriate to moderate the need for general or specific deterrence’.
40. In the Defence submission, the offender’s mental health issues:
i) moderate the need for specific deterrence somewhat; and
ii) make him a poor vehicle for general deterrence.
(citations omitted)
As can be observed, the applicant relied on his mental health issues to submit that they moderated the need for specific deterrence somewhat and made him a poor vehicle for general deterrence.
This was a case like many others where issues of a deprived or dysfunctional childhood and background were closely bound up with mental health issues that subsequently developed as a result. Dr Furst said in this report:
The relevance of this literature in relation to [the applicant] is that he struggled to cope throughout his teenage years and adolescence, and over the last 10 years or so, as a consequence of his drinking, drug addiction, and the longer-term effects of childhood trauma and parental neglect.
He developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a consequence of the abuse experiences he suffered as a child, a disorder associated with a much higher rate of drinking and drug abuse than people without PTSD, about 2-3 times higher rate, with the use of drugs and alcohol being at least in part a maladaptive means of coping with subjective distress, including the emotional distress associated with re-experiencing phenomena such as nightmares.
Additionally, the fact that his mother, her partners and other family members were drinkers/drug users/drug addicts likely normalised drinking and drug use, which means the principles of mitigation elucidated by the High Court in Bugmy apply to this offender.
…
… [The applicant] meets criteria for the diagnosis of (DSM-5 TR) of the following mental health disorders:
• Post-traumatic stress disorder.
• Alcohol/Substance use disorder.
…
Alcohol and drug intoxication, of themselves, do not necessarily mitigate against the seriousness of such offending, and he has a previous history of domestic violence against [the victim]; however, the presence of his PTSD and the adverse childhood experiences outlined above do mitigate against his moral culpability because they predisposed him to drinking and using drugs in the first place, as did his genetic loading for addiction, and have also maintained his drinking and addiction throughout his adolescence and adult years.
It appears clear from the ROS ([29] above) that his Honour had regard to both childhood deprivation and the applicant’s mental health issues in holding that the principles from Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18 applied, and it can be inferred that his Honour regarded the applicant’s moral culpability to have been reduced. It is apparent from Dr Furst’s report that he regarded the applicant’s mental health issues to be closely bound up with the applicant’s dysfunctional childhood. Although the applicant sought to have the two matters treated separately before the sentencing judge, there was no error in the approach taken by his Honour in that regard.
It is also clear that both matters were taken into consideration for the finding of special circumstances and that the applicant’s time in custody would be harsher for those reasons.
What his Honour did not engage with was the submission made as to the effect of the mental health issues on specific and general deterrence as identified in De La Rosa.
It is accepted that the principles set out at [177] of De La Rosa say only that the mental health issues “may” have the consequence that an offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence and “may” reduce or eliminate the significance of specific deterrence. It is a matter for a sentencing judge in any case to consider whether mental health issues have such an effect.
However, a specific submission was made in the present case which the sentencing judge said nothing about. Nor is it possible to infer from the way his Honour dealt with the mental health issues that, at least, the issue of general deterrence had been considered by his Honour. On the other hand, his Honour was alive to the fact that the applicant had engaged in domestic violence offences against the same victim over some 12 years with the result that specific deterrence was still likely to feature largely in any sentence imposed, as the applicant’s counsel accepted at the hearing of the appeal.
The failure to make reference to general deterrence or the applicant’s submission about it was an error: Shine v R [2016] NSWCCA 149; (2016) 260 A Crim R 534 at [76].
It must then be determined if his Honour’s question, set out at [82] above, and the applicant’s failure to respond to it, relieved his Honour of the need to address further the written submissions already made.
In GAS v R; SJK v R (2004) 217 CLR 198; [2004] HCA 22 the High Court said:
[31] … It is for the judge, assisted by the submissions of counsel, to decide and apply the law. There may be an understanding between counsel as to the submissions of law that they will make, but that does not bind the judge in any sense. The judge's responsibility to find and apply the law is not circumscribed by the conduct of counsel.
[32] Fifthly, an erroneous submission of law may lead a judge into error and, if that occurs, the usual means of correcting the error is through the appeal process. It is the responsibility of the appeal court to apply the law. If a sentencing judge has been led into error by an erroneous legal submission by counsel, that may be a matter to be taken into account in the application of the statutory provisions and principles which govern the exercise of the appeal court's jurisdiction.
(emphasis added)
[25] In the criminal context, on an appeal from a trial conducted by a judge alone, Douglass v The Queen, the High Court referred with approval to the explanation given by Doyle CJ in R v Keyte as to why a judge is required to give reasons for a verdict following trial:
“These included that in the absence of reasons, the appellate court is unable to determine whether the judge has correctly applied the relevant rules of law. In this case, the failure to record any finding respecting the appellant’s evidence left as one possibility that the judge simply preferred [the complainant’s] evidence and proceeded to convict upon it applying a standard less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of reasons sufficient to exclude that possibility constituted legal error.”
[26] Two propositions may be derived from this reasoning. First, the failure to give proper reasons is an error of law. Secondly, the reasons must be adequate to demonstrate the absence of a real “possibility” that the judge failed to apply correct legal principle. In other words, where the possibility of error was open, the appellate court should not have assumed that, because the legal principle was well known and indeed fundamental, it had been applied.
[26] It was common ground that the principle of totality had not been raised either by the applicant or the Crown at the sentence hearing. The Crown contended that, for this reason, this Court ought not entertain the applicant’s second ground and relied on Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44; 223 A Crim R 460 at [75]-[83] per Johnson J (McClellan CJ at CL agreeing). The applicant accepted that it ought to have been raised but contended that the principle of totality was so fundamental to the sentencing process that leave ought to be granted to argue this ground.
[27] It is regrettable that the principle of totality was not raised before the sentencing judge. His Honour was entitled to expect, and receive, greater assistance than was provided. However, the principle of totality is not properly classified as a “mitigating factor” (which was what Johnson J was addressing in Zreika) which needs to be brought forward on behalf of the applicant in a sentence hearing before a sentencing judge is required to take it into account.
[28] The principle of totality is, in my view, so fundamental that the failure to apply it will necessarily lead to error. …
What can be seen is that the judicial duty to give reasons does not extend to referring to every argument or piece of evidence. Relevantly for current purposes, what is required is that the judge expose the reasons for resolving a point critical to the contest between the parties, do justice to the issues posed by the parties’ cases, refer to evidence that is important or critical to the proper determination of the matter, and generally explain any conclusion on a significant factual or evidential dispute that is a necessary step to the final decision.
A number of propositions flow from what was said in those cases. First, it is ultimately the judge’s responsibility to determine and apply the law, and that task is not circumscribed by the conduct of counsel. Secondly, a failure of counsel to raise a matter of importance that affects the sentencing will not mean that a judge has not fallen into error where the judge does not mention the matter. Thirdly, some matters are of such significance that, regardless of whether submissions are made, the judge is obliged to deal with the issue or principle concerned. Fourthly, it is the obligation of the judge to provide reasons for resolving critical matters in the contest between the parties, and a failure to mention those matters may lead to the conclusion that the judge overlooked the matter, so that error is thereby demonstrated.
There can be no doubt that general deterrence is a fundamental principle of sentencing: s 3A(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). That is particularly the case in sentencing for crimes involving domestic violence: Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 at [76]-[80]; Stephens at [175]-[176]. In Shen v R [2024] NSWCCA 252, Rothman J (Kirk JA and Yehia J agreeing) said at [26]:
Domestic violence is a particularly pernicious and serious class of offending. It invariably involves a vulnerable victim and repeat offending. Further, given the incidence of domestic violence, it requires, ordinarily, significant attention to general deterrence.
Even where general deterrence or some factor that is said to mitigate the weight to be given to general deterrence is identified, it is expected that a judge will make reference to the weight to be given to general deterrence when sentencing for offences, and whether mental health issues make an offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence.
If error can be established where a judge is misled by the approach taken by counsel, an omission of counsel to raise or reiterate a matter when the sentencing judge asks if he or she has overlooked any matter, will not mean that error has not been established if the matter is not dealt with in the sentencing judge’s reasons. In the present case, as noted earlier, the effect of the applicant’s mental health issues on general deterrence was expressly put forward as a submission on behalf of the applicant. The omission of counsel to raise the matter again in answer to the judge’s question does not mean that error has not been committed.
I would uphold ground 3.
I agree with the sentencing judge’s assessment that the offence falls slightly below the midrange of objective seriousness. At the time of the offending the applicant was on bail for six offences: possessing a prohibited drug, supplying an indictable quantity of a prohibited drug and four counts of failing to comply with reporting obligations. That matter and the fact that the offending was committed in the home of the victim, are aggravating matters.
I also agree with the sentencing judge that by reason of the deprived childhood of the applicant which led to his mental health issues as identified by Dr Furst, there should be a diminution in moral culpability in accordance with what was said in Bugmy. I do not consider, however, that the applicant’s mental health issues mean that lesser weight should be placed on specific deterrence. In regard to specific deterrence the applicant had a long history of domestic violence offending against the present victim.
Dr Furst indirectly suggests that the applicant’s PTSD might have contributed to his offending because it caused a resort to drugs and alcohol, being a maladaptive means of coping with subjective distress. I would regard the applicant’s condition as one that renders him a less suitable vehicle for general deterrence than would otherwise be the case. Having regard, however, to his history and, in particular, his long record of domestic violence, this is a case where any amelioration of the weight to be given to general deterrence on the evidence given at sentence could properly be regarded as counterbalanced by the increased need for specific deterrence: R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67; Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [54]. However, the evidence available on re-sentence, discussed below, is more positive and provides a basis for some small amelioration of the weight that I would otherwise have given to specific deterrence.
Further, as the cases mentioned earlier make clear, general deterrence is of considerable significance in relation to domestic violence offences. In Wang, R A Hulme J (Meagher JA and Davies J agreeing) said at [98]:
The judge was prepared to find, nonetheless and as the Crown had conceded, a degree of diminution of the applicant’s moral culpability. That did not dictate any significant reduction in the emphasis to be given to general deterrence. As Hunt CJ at CL observed in R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 at 51, where an offender acts with knowledge of what they are doing and with knowledge of the gravity of their actions, the moderation of the need for general deterrence need not be great.
Nevertheless, I would place less emphasis on general deterrence than would have been the case but for the applicant’s mental condition. In all the circumstances, the reduction should be slight.
I am not satisfied on the basis of the applicant’s late plea and his statement to Dr Furst, that he “regretted everything, [i]t shouldn’t have happened”, that he has shown remorse in terms of s 21A(3)(i) of the Sentencing Act.
I agree with his Honour’s assessment that special circumstances are demonstrated in that the applicant is at risk of institutionalisation, his mental health issues will make his time in custody more difficult, he needs a longer period on parole to deal with his substance abuse issues, and he has been in custody while there have been COVID-19 restrictions.
Evidence received on the usual basis from the applicant and his solicitor showed that the applicant has completed four EQUIPS programs including domestic and family violence, addiction and aggression. The case notes suggest that he has gained some insight into his behaviour as a result of completing the courses.
The evidence also shows that the applicant was working as a sweeper when at Clarence Correctional Centre from January 2024 until January 2025. Although the applicant received a number of prison infringements since going into custody in respect of the present offences on 9 September 2022, the last such infringements were in December 2023 and January 2024. The applicant said that he is feeling healthy, he is continuing his Buvidal treatment and he has remained drug-free in custody. These matters and the completion of the EQUIPS programs point to a more positive outlook for his rehabilitation and are likely to reduce his risk of reoffending, but the prognosis must be guarded.
Notwithstanding that this offence was a serious act of domestic violence by someone who had perpetrated domestic violence against the same victim for over 10 years, the progress he has made in prison justifies a slightly reduced starting point for the sentence now to be imposed. I consider that before a discount for his plea the appropriate sentence is imprisonment for 5 years. He is entitled to a discount of 10% pursuant to 25D of the Sentencing Act. I would not allow any other discount pursuant to s 22A because it would result in a sentence unreasonably disproportionate to the offending. I would maintain the present ratio between the non-parole period and the balance of term rounded down to whole months.
Bearing in mind the totality principle I will commence the proposed sentence on 9 September 2022 being the same commencement date for the sentence imposed by the Newcastle Local Court on 12 September 2022 in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph [108] above.
I propose the following orders:
Grant leave to appeal.
**********
Sampson
R [2025] NSWCCA 25
(2022) 107 NSWLR 225
(1990) 169 CLR 525
(2010) 79 NSWLR 1
(2022) 108 NSWLR 1
(2004) 217 CLR 198
(2014) 252 CLR 601
(2016) 93 NSWLR 205
(2022) 109 NSWLR 604
(2011) 244 CLR 120
(2003) 212 CLR 629
(2023) 377 FLR 426
(1999) 199 CLR 270
Appeal allowed.
Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court on 13 December 2023.
In lieu, taking into account the matter on the Form 1, sentence the appellant to a non-parole period of 2 years 8 months commencing 9 September 2022 and expiring 8 May 2025 with a balance of term of 1 year 10 months expiring 8 February 2027.
The applicant is first eligible for parole on 8 May 2025.
DH****ANJI J: In this matter I have had the considerable benefit of reading the judgment of Davies J in draft. I agree with the orders proposed by his Honour and, in general, with the reasons for those orders. I would only add the following. The availability of a discount pursuant to s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) after a plea of guilty and in the absence of a trial was assumed by the parties on the appeal, and it appears by those who appeared at first instance. In the absence of full argument I am prepared to make the same assumption. Certainly, the current form of the provision is more amenable to such a reading than the form of the provision when first enacted.
HUGGETT J: I have had the opportunity to read in draft the reasons for judgment and the orders proposed by Davies J. I agree with his Honour’s reasons and proposed orders.
I also agree with the additional observations of Dhanji J at [120] regarding s 22A of the Sentencing Act. As was observed by Yehia J in BAP at [61], the extent to which s 22A of the Sentencing Act might be called in aid where a plea of guilty is entered during a “super call-over” warranting the imposition of a lesser penalty beyond the discount mandated by s 25D of the Sentencing Act, will depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.