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Saigal’s motion, filed on 11 February 2026, sought a declaration that he was a person under legal incapacity and could not manage his affairs without a tutor [1]. Shashikanth Mallegowda, the proposed tutor, later filed a further amended motion seeking both his appointment as tutor and a declaration of Saigal’s incapacity [2]. The Court noted that Mallegowda lacked standing to bring his application unless Saigal’s motion succeeded [3].

The evidence included affidavits from Saigal, his solicitor, and Mallegowda [4]. Saigal said that he had bipolar disorder type 1 and had been treated by Dr Raghunath Gupta in India. Dr Gupta’s report described symptoms including a manic episode lasting more than seven days, agitation, irritability, anxiety and illogical thought processes [13]–[17]. The report also said that Saigal had not achieved full remission after treatment and would require ongoing medication [17].

The report expressed opinions about Saigal’s ability to work and manage personal affairs, and advised against involvement in court matters [18]. But it did not assess the central question for these motions: whether Saigal could presently understand the issues on which decisions might be required in his appeal [18]. Price AJA gave the report modest weight, noting that it did not comply with the Expert Witness Code of Conduct in Sch 7 and r 31.23 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) [14].

Other evidence included an affidavit Saigal affirmed on 9 December 2025. He described his manic episodes as mild and said that he would take a personal interest in the appeal, obtain a new legal team, and try to progress the appeal and comply with the overriding purpose in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) [19]–[21]. Price AJA considered that affidavit relevant to Saigal’s understanding of what was necessary to proceed [21].

The Court dismissed Saigal’s motion because the evidence did not establish legal incapacity [22]. It also dismissed Mallegowda’s motion. In doing so, it observed that Mallegowda had known Saigal for less than a year and that the material did not show efforts to identify an available family member [24]–[25]. Saigal’s motion was dismissed with costs of the motion to be costs in the cause; there was no order as to costs on Mallegowda’s motion [25].

Why the court decided this way

The Court applied a functional, proceedings-specific test, rather than treating a diagnosis as conclusive of litigation incapacity. UCPR r 7.14(1) says that a person under legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by a tutor. UCPR r 7.13 includes within that expression a person incapable of managing their affairs [9]–[10]. The judgment also refers to the definition of “person under legal incapacity” in s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) [11].

For the particular capacity question, Price AJA adopted the test stated by Chadwick LJ in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2002] EWCA Civ 1889. The question is whether a party can understand, with appropriate explanations from lawyers and relevant experts, the issues on which the party’s consent or decision may be needed in the proceedings [11]. The judgment treats capacity as task-specific and time-specific: the assessment concerns the person’s ability to understand and evaluate what is involved in conducting the appeal at the relevant time [12].

The Court also applied the presumption that a person of full age can manage their affairs unless the contrary is proved, relying on Murphy v Doman [12]. On that approach, the evidence needed to address Saigal’s capacity for this appeal, rather than only establish a condition or describe broader difficulties.

The report did not make that connection. It described symptoms, treatment and an opinion that Saigal could not manage his personal affairs, but did not explain whether he could understand the issues requiring decisions in his appeal [13]–[18]. The Court did not exclude the report because of its code non-compliance. It considered the report, but gave it modest weight, noting that non-compliance with the expert code may affect weight under r 31.23(3) [14]. The report’s lack of a litigation-specific assessment was an additional, distinct evidentiary limitation [18].

Saigal’s own affidavit provided evidence relevant to his ability to engage with the appeal. He referred to taking a personal interest, having a new legal team and complying with the procedural purpose of just, quick and cheap resolution [20]. The Court considered that the affidavit indicated that, after returning from India, Saigal’s episodes were mild and that he understood what was necessary to proceed [21]. The Court therefore found the evidence insufficient to displace the presumption and discharge the onus [22].

The tutor issue was also addressed. The Court stated a general preference for an available family member over a stranger, provided the family member did not have an adverse interest [24]. It noted that Mallegowda had known Saigal since May 2025, less than a year before the decision, and that the material did not indicate that an available family member had been sought [24]. This was a general preference applied to the material before the Court, not a statement that a non-family member can never be appointed.

Before and after state of the law

The judgment presents the governing legal principles as established, not as a new rule. Before this decision, the cited authorities had already articulated the functional test for litigation capacity, the task- and time-specific nature of the inquiry, and the presumption that an adult can manage their affairs unless the contrary is proved [11]–[12]. The judgment’s contribution is its application of those principles to the particular evidence before Price AJA.

The test quoted from Masterman-Lister focuses on understanding the matters that require a party’s decision in the litigation. It does not ask simply whether the party has a diagnosis, whether they can manage every aspect of ordinary life, or whether a doctor considers court involvement undesirable. The judgment’s reasoning makes the importance of that distinction concrete: the report’s statements about personal affairs and court involvement were not enough when it did not address the appellant’s ability to understand the decisions involved in his appeal [18], [22].

The decision also illustrates that the relevant time and task matter. A person’s capacity is not presented as a permanent, all-purpose status. Price AJA described it as “always a task and time specific matter” [12]. Here, the inquiry was capacity to carry on this appeal, in the circumstances and at the time relevant to the motion.

The judgment does not establish a new evidentiary rule that every report must use particular words or follow a prescribed assessment format beyond the rules it cites. It does show why a report’s scope matters: a report may have limited value on litigation capacity if it does not address that capacity directly. The judgment separately notes that failure to comply with the expert code may affect the weight given to a report, without necessarily preventing the Court from considering it [14].

Nor does this judgment establish an absolute order of priority for tutors. It records the Court’s general preference for an available, non-adverse family member over a stranger, citing Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v P and Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 5) [24]. The decision’s precise effect is confined to its procedural context and stated reasoning. It dismissed the motions before it; it did not make a tutor appointment or determine any later application based on further evidence [23], [25].

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [11], the Court set out the Masterman-Lister test: the person must be able to understand, with appropriate explanation, the issues on which their consent or decision may be needed in the proceedings. In plain English, the question is about the person’s ability to understand the important decisions in the particular case, not whether they can understand every legal detail without help.

At [12], Price AJA said capacity is “always a task and time specific matter”. In plain English, a capacity assessment for one type of proceeding or one point in time does not necessarily answer the question for a different proceeding or a later point in time.

At [14], the Court explained that non-compliance with the Expert Witness Code of Conduct did not itself prevent consideration of Dr Gupta’s report, but could cause the report to receive less weight. The Court then said it gave the report “modest weight”. In plain English, the report was part of the evidence, but the identified code issue reduced its persuasive force.

At [18], the Court identified what it called the “critical problem” with the report: it did not address whether Saigal was presently able to understand the issues requiring decisions in his appeal. This is the central evidentiary point in the ruling. Evidence about diagnosis and general functioning did not answer the Court’s particular question.

At [21], the Court drew an inference from Saigal’s affidavit that he understood what was necessary to proceed with the appeal. At [22], it concluded that the evidence fell short of proving that he lacked the relevant capacity. In plain English, the Court weighed the medical material alongside Saigal’s own description of his intended participation and found the overall evidence insufficient.

At [24], the Court said there was a general preference for an available family member, where that person had no adverse interest, over a stranger as tutor. It also noted that the material did not show any efforts to identify an available family member. In plain English, even apart from the failure to establish incapacity, the proposed tutor’s relationship and the absence of evidence about family alternatives were relevant to the appointment question.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The ruling is most directly relevant where a party seeks a tutor on the basis that a mental health condition or other difficulty prevents them from managing proceedings. It indicates that the evidence should be assessed against the person’s ability to understand and evaluate the matters involved in the particular case, at the relevant time [11]–[12]. The judgment does not prescribe a universal checklist for medical reports, but shows that evidence directed only to diagnosis, treatment, work capacity or personal affairs may leave the litigation-capacity question unanswered [14], [18].

It is also relevant where the material contains both medical evidence and evidence of the person’s own understanding or intentions concerning the litigation. In this case, the Court considered Saigal’s statement that he intended to take a personal interest in the appeal and comply with its requirements alongside the psychiatric report [19]–[21]. The outcome turned on the evidence as a whole, not on diagnosis alone [22].

The ruling may also be relevant when the report relied upon does not comply with the expert evidence requirements identified in the judgment. The Court treated non-compliance as a matter that could affect weight, rather than as an automatic bar to consideration [14]. It separately examined whether the report actually addressed the relevant functional question.

Finally, the tutor aspect is relevant where a proposed tutor is not a family member. The Court’s stated general preference is conditional: an available family member is preferred over a stranger where the family member has no adverse interest [24]. The material here did not show that an available family member had been sought. The judgment does not say that family members must always be appointed or that a stranger is necessarily unsuitable.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment is dated 30 March 2026 and contains no information about later decisions applying, distinguishing, or revisiting Saigal v Goel. It would therefore be unsupported to describe how later courts have treated this decision.

The judgment itself identifies the authorities on which it relied. It cites Masterman-Lister for the understanding-based test [11]; Farr v State of Queensland and Murray v Williams as examples of its use [11]; Guthrie v Spence and Rappard v Williams for the task- and time-specific character of the inquiry [12]; and Murphy v Doman for the presumption of capacity [12]. It cites Wood v R on the potential effect of non-compliance with the expert code on evidentiary weight [14], and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v P and Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 5) on the general preference concerning a family member as tutor [24].

Those references describe the authorities considered by Price AJA in this ruling. They do not establish how later courts have treated Saigal v Goel itself.

Still-open questions

The judgment leaves open how the capacity issue might be resolved on different or further evidence. Price AJA noted that Saigal had an appointment with Dr Rastogi and that the issue might be addressed in a report from her [23]. The Court also referred to a general practitioner’s referral for medicolegal assistance and said there was nothing preventing another application if further medical evidence more sufficiently established incapacity [23]. The decision thus does not determine the result of any later motion or assess evidence that was not before the Court.

The judgment does not specify a standard format or detailed contents for a report addressing litigation capacity. It identifies the critical omission in Dr Gupta’s report, namely that it did not address Saigal’s present ability to understand the issues requiring decisions in the appeal [18]. Any broader checklist would go beyond what the judgment states.

The Court also said the appellant’s position regarding legal representation might be clarified [23]. It did not resolve how representation would be arranged, whether a solicitor would remain on the record, or how that issue might affect later steps in the appeal.

On tutor suitability, the judgment records that no evidence showed efforts to identify an available family member [24]. It does not determine whether a family member was in fact available, whether any such person would have an adverse interest, or whether Mallegowda would be suitable on a different evidentiary record. Nor does it decide whether the Court would make a different order if incapacity were established but no suitable family member were available.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.