The complaint was multi-faceted but generally related to the Respondent's conduct as counsel during the Ringwood hearing.

1. The Commissioner referred the complaint to the Legal Profession Board of Tasmania ('the Board'), apparently because the Respondent had a Tasmanian practising certificate. The Board agreed to take carriage of the complaint. The Tribunal is not required to review that decision.
2. On 30 October 2025 the Board summarily dismissed the complaint against the Respondent pursuant to s.433(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (LPA) on the basis that it was 'misconceived or lacking in substance'.
3. On 4 November 2025 the Applicant applied to this Tribunal for a review of the Board's decision pursuant to s.458(1)(a) LPA.

1. At a directions hearing held on the 3 December 2025 the Tribunal questioned the parties as to whether it had jurisdiction to hear this application.

The High Court's 2018 decision in Burns v Corbett[1] is authority for the proposition that state tribunals which are not courts cannot exercise judicial power in matters of the kinds identified in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution.

1. Burns v Corbett raises three discrete questions that must be answered in order to determine if this Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear this application, which are as follows;

(a) Is the Disciplinary Tribunal a court;

(b) Does the Disciplinary Tribunal exercise judicial power or administrative power; and

(c) Were the parties to the application both residents of the state of Tasmania at the relevant time.

1. In accordance with rule 6(1)(a)(i) & 6(4)(j) of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules 2021, the Tribunal on its own motion directed the parties provide any written submissions they wished to make concerning the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear the application.

Both the Applicant and Respondent took the opportunity to file submissions with the Tribunal.

1. From the outset there seems to have been some confusion as to the legislative foundation for the Disciplinary Tribunal of Tasmania. To be clear, the Tribunal does not form part of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal stands alone and was established by s.610(1) LPA. The Tribunal's operations are governed by the provisions in Parts 4 (5-7) & 7 (3) LPA together with the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules 2021.

1. The Burns v Corbett fetter is engaged if the Tribunal in question is not a court.

Unless otherwise limited by a federal law, there is no prohibition on state courts exercising judicial power in federal matters. This is by virtue of s.39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

Exactly when a tribunal can be described as being a court is not straightforward.

'No clear methodology has emerged for answering the question...One reason the question is difficult is that it is 'neither possible or profitable to attempt to make some single all-embracing statement of the defining characteristics of a court.''[2]

The answer is a matter of substance and not form, and will lie in an examination of workings of the individual tribunal in question.

1. The Respondent asserted without explanation that the Tribunal is "not formally constituted as a state court".
2. The Applicant erroneously asserted that s.464A LPA expressly provides that this Tribunal is a "court of record".

1. The Disciplinary Tribunal of Tasmania is not a court for the purposes of ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution.

That conclusion is based on a consideration of a number of features that define the Tribunal and which are not characteristic of a court. These include the following:

(a) There is no provision in the LPA, the rules, or any other relevant legislation that specifically establishes this Tribunal as a court of record. Some other Australian Tribunals are specifically established by their governing legislation as courts of record, including the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT)[3]. That example is important because QCAT is invested with the power to preside over disciplinary proceedings involving legal practitioners;

(b) s.464A(4)& (5) LPA read together require that the Tribunal dismiss an application in circumstances where 'the Tribunal's determination may involve the exercise of jurisdiction of a kind referred to in section 75 or 76 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.'

If the Tribunal does so dismiss an application it must give notice to the parties that the application can be renewed before the Supreme Court of Tasmania.[4] The only logical explanation for that legislative framework is that the Tribunal is not a court for the purposes of ss. 75 & 76 of the constitution;

(c) There is no legislative requirement that the Tribunal be presided over by a judicial officer. On the contrary, the Tribunal's panel consists of 10 Australian legal practitioners and 5 lay persons who are appointed by judges[5] ;

(d) The Tribunal must be constituted by at least one lay member and the chairperson of the Tribunal may 'appoint as a special member of the Tribunal for a particular hearing a person whom the chairperson considers to have the skill, knowledge or experience that is relevant for the purposes of that hearing[6]';

(e) The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence[7]; and

(f) The Tribunal is entitled to dispense with a requirement in the rules relating to any form, notice, affidavit, document, service, procedure or time[8].

1. The exercise of 'judicial power' by a tribunal is to be distinguished from the exercise of 'administrative power' when considering the application ss. 75 and 76 of the Constitution.

State tribunals are most commonly associated with the exercise of 'administrative power'.

It has been long established by the High Court that, except with respect to the subject matters identified in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution, a State Parliament can confer State judicial power on a State tribunal that is not a court of that State. [9]

1. This point was made by Kirk JA (with whom Bell CJ and Ward P agreed) in Searle v McGregor [2022] NSWCA 213, [11].

State tribunals are not forbidden by the principle [in Burns v Corbett] from taking steps or resolving issues which do not involve the exercise of judicial power, even if the dispute might otherwise be seen to fall within the scope of what would have been federal jurisdiction (that is, if judicial power were to be exercised). There is no suggestion that the Ch III restriction on allocation of decision-making authority at the State level is more restrictive than the restriction at federal level. It is well-established that federal tribunals are permitted to resolve a wide range of disputes arising under federal law so long as the exercise of power is not characterised as being judicial in nature.

1. This Tribunal will accordingly have jurisdiction to hear an application made pursuant to s.458(1)(a) LPA if to do so would be an exercise of administrative power.

1. The Respondent does not specifically address this point.
2. The Applicant stated the following in her submissions:

24. The question of whether a tribunal exercises judicial or administrative power when reviewing the decision of a government body was recently considered by the High Court in NSW v Wojciechowska [2025] HCA 27 from [15] onwards. That decision provides the leading recent authority on this issue.

25. Section 458 of the Act provides for a "rehearing" of the Board's decision. The Applicant submits that this proceeding has the character of an internal administrative review of a regulatory decision, rather than an exercise of judicial power in the constitutional sense.

26. The factors pointing to administrative character include:

(a) the proceeding is a rehearing of a decision by a regulatory

body (the Board), not a determination of a dispute between private

(b) the Board's functions are regulatory and protective, concerned

with professional standards and public protection;

(c) the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Board and may exercise

all the powers available to the Board under the Act; and

(d) the outcome of the review is not a binding determination of

rights between the parties but a regulatory decision about whether a complaint warrants further investigation.

1. The Tribunal has in the past ruled that its use of powers conferred on it by s.458(1)(a) and Part 4.7 LPA is an exercise of judicial power.[10]
2. That decision was made with an acknowledgement that 'Courts have frequently commented on the difficulty in attempting to formulate a comprehensive definition of 'judicial power'.[11]
3. The Tribunal notes recent court decisions (discussed below) prefer the view expressed in Albarran v Members of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board [2007] HCA 23; (2007) 231 CLR 350, and Medical Board of Australia v Kemp [2018] VSCA 168 that an administrative tribunal has the capacity to exercise both judicial power and administrative power when presiding over disciplinary proceedings.
4. In this regard it should also be noted that this Tribunal exercises a power to 'protect the public'[12] in their dealings with persons who are admitted to practice under the LPA.

"The powers are to be exercised for the purpose of, and in a manner seen to be likely to achieve, the maintenance of that high standard of conduct within the particular vocation that will continue its good reputation, and so protect, not only the future of those involved in the vocation, but also protect those who deal with them ... . Proceedings before the Tribunal are not conducted as if the [Board] is the prosecutor in a criminal cause or as if the Tribunal is engaged in the trial of a civil cause. The jurisdiction is a special one ... ".[13]

1. As held by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales (NSWCAT) in Health Care Complaints Commission v Murray [2018] NSWCATOD 119 at paras. [20]-[23], the exercise of protective power by a similarly constituted disciplinary tribunal, while conducted in a manner which shares some of the accepted criteria of a judicial power, comprises the exercise of administrative - not judicial - power.

NSWCAT observed in the Murray decision that the characterisation of that power as administrative is consistent with the previous decisions of the High Court in Albarran v Members of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board [2007] HCA 23; (2007) 234 ALR 618; 81 ALJR 1155 and of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Medical Board of Australia v Kemp [2018] VSCA 168.

1. A similar analysis was conducted by NSWCAT in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Judah [2022] NSWCATOD 89 at paras.[54]-[72], with NSWCAT arriving at the same conclusion as that in Murray: that the exercise of disciplinary powers by a disciplinary tribunal is not the exercise of judicial power so as to constitute a 'matter' of federal jurisdiction for the purpose of ss. 75 or 76 of the Constitution.
2. The decisions of NSWCAT in Health Care Complaints Commission v Le [2020] NSWCATOD 143 (at para. [15]) and Health Care Complaints Commission v Sloane; Health Care Complaints Commission v Hayles [2018] NSWCATOD 37 (at paras. [73]-[74]) further confirm the same proposition.
3. Most recently, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Quach v New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 177 per Gleeson JA, Meagher Mitchelmore JJA agreeing, at para. [22] likewise held that such "disciplinary proceedings ... did not involve federal jurisdiction".
4. As a result of these decisions it follows that this Tribunal, despite the ruling in PB v Legal Practitioner, is satisfied its power to hear and determine an application made pursuant to s.458(1)(a) LPA can be construed as an exercise of administrative power.

1. The question as to whether the Respondent was a resident of Tasmania or Victoria at the relevant time is no longer a matter to be determined given that it has been established the Tribunal is not a court and exercises administrative power in determining an application made pursuant to s.458(1)(a) LPA.
2. The Tribunal accordingly has the jurisdiction to hear this application.

The Tribunal convene for a further directions hearing on a date to be fixed for the disposition of this matter.

[2] Forge v ASIC (2006) 228 CLR 45; [2006] HCA 44 at [64] (Gummow, Hayne, and Crennan JJ).

[3] s.164 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009

[7] r.12(1) Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules 2021

[8] r.15(a) Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules 2021

[10] PB v Legal Practitioner [2019] TASLPDT 5

[12] Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545 per Coyle CJ (with whom Williams and Martin JJ agreed), pp.553-4; Martin v Medical Complaints Tribunal [2006] TASSC 73 per Evans J, paras. [18], [21].

[13] Martin v Medical Complaints Tribunal [2006] TASSC 73 per Evans J, para. [21].