S&C Nicola Pty Ltd v Peter Holmes Investment Pty Ltd

Conclusions

It is inappropriate and unnecessary that this Court make any order relating to the costs of the parties at first instance because there were before the primary judge a number of issues in addition to that dealt with above and the primary judge has reserved determination of the question of costs. In making his determination he will be able to take this judgment into account.
For the reasons above, I propose the following orders: 1. Allow the appeal. 2. Set aside Orders 1 and 2 made in the Equity Division on 20 September 2021. 3. Direct the referee that, in the taking of the Partnership accounts, the interest entitlement due to the respondent is to be treated as an expense of the Partnership which is to be paid from the Partnership assets before the division of profits and not from the appellant's share of the Partnership profits. 4. Order the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
LEEMING JA: I agree with Macfarlan JA that the appeal should be allowed because, on its proper construction, the partnership agreement provides that the 5% interest to which the respondent Peter Holmes Investments Pty Ltd (PHI) is entitled is to be treated as a partnership expense to be paid from partnership assets before distribution of profits, rather than as a personal obligation of the appellant S&C Nicola Pty Ltd (SCN).
The pleadings make two things plain. The first is that the same two parties engaged in a number of business dealings prior to entering into the partnership agreement, including one styled "The 20 October 2016 Loan Agreement" in which PHI was lender and SCN was borrower at rates of 9% reducing to 7% if payment was made in time (Statement of Claim and Defence, paragraphs 22 and 23). The second is, that some six weeks prior to entering the partnership agreement, the same parties had entered into "The Clyde Road JV". The Statement of Claim alleges that under that agreement, SCN and PHI were not partners. The Statement of Claim does not mention the partnership agreement dated 10 April 2017 which is the subject of this appeal, while the Defence accepts that the Clyde Road JV bound the parties until 10 April 2017 after which the parties' rights were governed by the partnership agreement (Statement of Claim and Defence, paragraphs 52 and 53). The Statement of Claim refers to recitals D, E and clause 6(c) of the earlier "Clyde Road JV" in terms which suggest that it was a document upon which the partnership agreement was based.
However, the partnership agreement falls to be construed without regard to extrinsic material. I intend no criticism of the course taken in this litigation. The parties are free to restrict the scope of the contextual considerations which will be brought to bear upon the task of construction, and their decision is to be respected; cf Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd v Fenshaw Pty Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 128; [2016] NSWCA 207 at [32]. It may very well be that the mass of material leading up to the execution of the partnership agreement was equivocal, and both sides have taken the decision that their cases stand or fall on the contractual text alone.
Hence, the task of construction in essence amounts to resolution of the conflict between provisions of the contract dealing with PHI's entitlement to interest which point in different directions.
The first impression most readers of the partnership agreement would obtain is that it is poorly expressed. It is replete with syntactical or typographical errors. The defined terms "Capital" and "the Properties" are sometimes used, but not always, and, where they are, capitalization is haphazard. Similarly, the terms "development", "project", "Development Project" and "Partnership Development" (only the latter of which is defined) appear to be used interchangeably. Recital F states "tax return I properly completed". "Partnerships" is plural in cll 1(i), 2(d) and 8(b), but in each case a reference to "Partners" seems to have been intended. The indemnity referred to in Recital D is not explicitly found elsewhere in the document, although it may perhaps be implied from cl 6(a). The address of SCN has been left blank, and so on.
Readers would also come to appreciate that the errors are not merely typographical, but also conceptual. For example, cl 1(i) provides that "The company means the company incorporated to carry on the Partnership described in this agreement, in which each of the Partnerships [sic] holds a parcel of shares". But there is no suggestion in the balance of the agreement of a separate company which carries on the business of the partnership, and as will be seen cl 6(c) provides that PHI is "entitled to be the sole owner of the properties".
Sometimes typographical and conceptual errors are combined. Thus cl 8(b) provides that "The rights and obligations of the parties under this agreement are individual and nothing in this agreement constitutes the parties as partners of one another nor do they have any other relationship except that of Partnerships" [sic]. Happily this appeal may be resolved without construing that koanic clause.
Nonetheless, the parties chose to express their bargain in writing, in a document which has the form of having been drafted by a solicitor (to be clear, not one of the firms acting in this litigation, and it is even possible that the parties themselves altered the joint venture agreement which had been drafted by a solicitor, without seeking further advice as to its form). The Court's task is to give legal effect to the parties' words. It turns on an objective intention to be imputed to the parties, by reference to the contractual text construed in light of its context and purpose: Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 at [35]; Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 at [46]-[51] and [108]-[109]; Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85; [2016] HCA 47 at [18] and [78]. The lack of care and precision and apparent lack of understanding of legal concepts in the document informs the task of construction in a number of ways.
First, where errors are numerous, and the drafter's approach to grammar and syntax is casual, it would be wrong to place great weight on considerations turning on the precise form of the clauses. "Legal meaning should not turn on arguments based on semantic exactitude where it is plain that the parties have recorded their bargain in loose, ungrammatical language": see Norton Property Group Pty Ltd v Ozzy States Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWCA 23 at [49]. As it was put in Down Town Visuals Pty Ltd v Panorama Investments Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 427 at [94]: "Nor, where parties have recorded their agreement in loose and ungrammatical language, should meaning turn on 'semantic exactitude'. To read 'repaid' as 'paid', in a document bedevilled by inelegant drafting and internal inconsistencies, requires considerably less contortion than accepting the overall interpretation proposed by the Receivers of Native Bond."
As it happens, cl 6(c) also refers to "repaid" and may suffer from a similar defect.
Secondly, Mr Coles QC suggested that little weight should be given in this contract to the rule that where a recital is in conflict with an operative provision, the latter prevails. To the contrary, he submitted that "a safer guide may be to accept the golden rule almost of commercial instrument construction: namely, you've got to read the instrument as a whole and give appropriate attention and effect to every part of it". There is some force in the submission, because it is clear that quite elaborate attention has been given to Recitals D and E dealing with the 5% return on "Capital" provided by PHI including an indemnity which bears directly upon the allocation of commercial risk, and it might be thought to follow that the intention to be imputed to the parties would not discount the effect of the recitals. Why should the parties be taken to know of the different weight to be given to recitals and operative clauses when they seem to have taken such little effort to attend to both the formal and substantive aspects of their written bargain? Mr Coles' approach is supported by what was said in Tom Elvin Pty Ltd v Knell [2003] ACTSC 36 at [19] and endorsed in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; [2009] NSWCA 407 at [381]: "Despite the apparently unequivocal statements in some of the authorities … I am not persuaded that operative parts of a deed, even if otherwise apparently clear and unambiguous, could never be read down by reference to the recitals. I am inclined to think that there may be cases in which the recitals may so clearly spell out the scope of the intended transaction that it would be an affront to common sense not to treat them as providing a context within which operative provisions in the deed should be construed."
However, as that passage recognises, Mr Coles' submission is at odds with familiar statements of principle, perhaps the strongest of which was Lord Halsbury's speech in Mackenzie v The Duke of Devonshire [1896] AC 400 at 405-406: "[I]t seems to me to be absolutely unarguable that the true meaning of those words, and the purposes of the trust so set forth, can be in any way controlled, qualified, or modified by the initial statement of what the motive of the author of the deed was. It would to my mind be disastrous to introduce such a system of construing a deed."
The inability of a recital to control the operation of an operative clause when the latter is clear and unambiguous was more recently reiterated in Harpur v Levy (2007) 16 VR 587; [2007] VSCA 128 at [16], [63] and [102] and OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 1; [2013] NSWCA 27 at [63]. The traditional approach is criticised in J Carter, The Construction of Commercial Contracts (Hart Publishing, 2013), pp 445-446, but endorsed in P Herzfeld and T Prince, Interpretation (2nd ed, Lawbook Co, 2020), pp 497-498.
Further, in its application to this poorly drafted document, the parties have chosen to call some of their provisions "Recitals" and the remainder are found under the heading "Operative Part", and it cannot be right to discard that structural division in the form of the document. Accordingly, both as a matter of authority and principle I am disinclined to accept Mr Coles' submission. That said, although the tension between recitals and operative clauses was central to the submissions on this appeal, no argument was addressed to the authorities and commentary mentioned above, or to the more general question of principle. I think that if it mattered to my conclusion, I would have invited further submissions from the parties. On the view I take, this appeal can be resolved without expressing a concluded view one way or the other as to the correctness of Mr Coles' submission.
Thirdly, sometimes the imprecision and indeed ignorance of a drafter may lead to a threshold question about what the literal or grammatical meaning of the words used actually is. The trusts established by Mr Calouste Gulbenkian considered in In re Gulbenkian's Settlements [1970] AC 508 and the licence agreement drafted by Mr Arthur Coulls considered in Coulls v Bagot's Executor and Trustee Co Ltd (1967) 119 CLR 460; [1967] HCA 3 are examples. Clause 8(b) reproduced above which simultaneously asserts and denies a partnership may fall into this category. However, that issue does not arise on the limited point raised for determination in this appeal. For all of its infelicities, it is tolerably clear that PHI had contributed the whole of the capital for the project, including the land (which it continued to own) and all development costs and expenses, and was to receive a return of 5% per annum on the whole of that investment. The question is whether the partner SCN was to pay that return, or whether the partnership as a whole was to pay that return.
Another way of putting this is to ask whether SCN was required to bear the whole of the agreed cost of financing the particular development, or whether that was to be borne by the partners, in the same way as the other costs of acquisition, construction and selling.
In those circumstances, the starting point is to consider the clauses which directly bear on PHI's entitlement to interest. Those clauses are Recitals D and E and cl 6(c), which it is convenient be reproduce below: "D. In consideration of the Second Party entering into this Partnership the First party will entered into the Partnership agreement, support the Second Party in the Partnership and indemnify the Second party from half of the costs of the development, plus pay the Second Party 5% interest per annum on all monies spent on the project by the Second Party. E. After completion of the Development Project the units will be sold and the proceeds will be paid first towards return of the capital invested by the Second party, then toward 5% interest calculated per annum on a monthly basis on that Capital and finally distributed equally between the Partnership parties. … 6. Contribution of capital and share of profits and losses (c) Despite (a) and (b) above Party 2 has agreed to fund the whole capital of the project on behalf of the parties until completion of the Partnership project and in consideration therefor Party 2 is entitled to be the sole owner of the properties and entitled to 5% interest on the all capital expenditure to be repaid before any profits are distributed." [sic]
Nothing turns on the use of "Party 2" and "the Second Party" (and "Second party"); these inconsistencies are typical of the way the agreement has been drafted. Both terms refer to PHI. "Capital" was defined in Recital B ("The Parties have agreed that the Second Party has purchased the properties and will fund all of the costs and expenses for the Development ('Capital')") and must be taken to mean all of the costs and expenses including the initial purchase price of the land.
Four initial points may be made about the construction of those provisions.
First, it seemed to be common ground that there was something of an ellipsis in the closing words of cl 6(c) "and entitled to 5% interest on the all capital expenditure to be repaid before any profits are distributed". Plainly enough, PHI was to be "repaid" all of the costs and expenses which it had paid in funding the development, even though that is not expressly stated (except insofar as it is implicit in the verb "repaid" and in the notion of calculating "profits"). In addition, PHI was to receive interest together with the repayment of costs and expenses. I am inclined to doubt that this is a case of ambiguity, as opposed to casual elliptical expression. But if I am wrong about that, or if Mr Coles' submission be correct, then regard may be had to the recitals, which confirm the sense of cl 6(c) which I would in any event reach without reference to Recitals D and E.
Secondly, those clauses also proceed on the basis that there will be, at the completion of the venture, a fund representing the proceeds of sale. In law the question is whether the parties' agreement displaces the prima facie entitlement upon the taking of partnership accounts to be repaid funds lent with interest in accordance with s 24 of the Partnership Act 1892 (NSW). But there is no reason to impute that conception to the parties, and every reason to respect their chosen language, namely, of the "proceeds" from which expenses will be "paid" or "repaid" with the resultant "profit" being "distributed", reflecting a fund being distributed. The parties' submissions proceeded on that basis.
Thirdly, I do not consider that much turns on the distinction between the obligation to "pay" 5% interest in Recitals D and E and the 5% interest being "repaid" in cl 6(c). Strictly, interest was not "repaid" in the sense of reimbursement for some earlier payment made by PHI, unlike the repayment of other costs and expenses. However, there is a clear distinction in recital E and cl 6(c) between the payment or repayment of expenses and interest on the one hand, and the distribution of profits on the other.
Fourthly, Recital E is the only place in the partnership agreement where reference may be found to the 5% interest being calculated "on a monthly basis". It is clear that, in accordance with conventional principles, the entitlement to "5% interest on all capital expenditure" in cl 6(c) is ambiguous as to how the interest is to be calculated, and regard may be had to Recital E to confirm that the interest rate is per annum and with monthly rests.
PHI emphasised the seemingly personal obligation in Recital D that SCN "pay [PHI] 5% interest per annum on all monies spent on the project". PHI then submitted that Recital E was to be regarded as addressing timing, and did not undercut the personal obligation upon SCN, and that cl 6(c) was to be construed as being to substantially the same effect.
While those submissions are not without force, upon analysis I do not agree that they reflect the proper construction of the contract.
First, cl 6(c) speaks in terms of "any profits". Profits are to be regarded as the surplus (if any) of revenue from sales over the costs of the development. It is plain that PHI's entitlement to 5% interest is to be paid before profits are distributed. The conjunction of the entitlement to 5% interest and the distribution of profits tends to suggest that the interest entitlement is a partnership expense, which needs to be taken into account before the profit is determined. Another way of making this point is that if the liability to pay 5% interest is a personal liability of SCN, then there would be no need for that entitlement to be paid before profits are distributed.
The alternative, as exposed during oral argument on the appeal, involves some little complexity. Let there be assumed to be a notional fund representing proceeds of sale. The first task is to repay PHI its "Capital" from that fund. Only when that is done can the total amount of interest to which PHI is entitled be determined (noting that the interest is accruing at 5% per annum on a varying amount representing the difference between the total costs to date and the revenue derived from sales). If the obligation to pay interest is a personal obligation upon SCN, then there may arise a series of difficulties. If the fund after the repayment of capital is less than double the amount of interest, then on PHI's construction, PHI is entitled to everything that remains, and will have a claim upon SCN. Even if the fund after the repayment of capital is more than double the amount of interest, it is a little unnatural to apply the provisions. This is best seen by way of two examples. 1. Suppose the fund after repayment of capital is $1,000,000 and interest is $400,000. On PHI's construction, the $400,000 is to be paid personally by SCN. But SCN has not contributed any money to the development at all, and so the most natural way for the interest to be paid is for it to come from what would have been SCN's share of the profits. Save for interest, each partner would be entitled to $500,000, and when SCN pays $400,000 interest to PHI, the effect is that of the $1,000,000, PHI receives $900,000 and SCN receives $100,000. 2. Alternatively, now suppose that interest is $400,000, but there is a surplus of only $700,000 after all sales are made and all costs and expenses of the development have been repaid to PHI. Then on PHI's construction, SCN's personal obligation to pay interest will not be capable of being satisfied from its share of the profits. It would be natural for PHI to set off SCN's obligation to pay $400,000 against its entitlement to its share of the residue after interest, with the result that PHI would take the entirety of the $700,000 ($350,000 representing most of SCN's obligation to pay interest and $350,000 representing PHI's distribution of profits) and then look to SCN for the final $50,000 by way of interest.
My point in spelling that out is that introducing a personal obligation upon one partner to pay another partner's entitlement at the conclusion of the partnership makes the provisions dealing with interest quite different from the way of dealing with other expenses of the development. It is difficult to reconcile that difference with cl 6(c), which treats the repayment of capital and the repayment of interest in a rolled up way.
Further, if SCN is subject to a personal obligation to pay interest, then in circumstances where it has hitherto contributed nothing to the costs of the development, the ordinary approach would be for that liability to PHI to be discharged out of the profits which PHI already holds (as vendor) rather than looking separately to SCN for payment. But that sits ill with the words "before any profits are distributed". That is to say, PHI's construction most naturally involves SCN paying the entirety of the interest out of its profits, which is quite awkward in light of the express agreement that interest is to be repaid before any profits are distributed.
Secondly, SCN's approach accords with the natural reading of Recital E. Recital E envisages a fund representing the proceeds of sale of the lots, from which is to be deducted the costs and expenses paid by PHI, then PHI's entitlement to interest, with the balance being distributed equally between SCN and PHI. That too reflects interest as being treated as a partnership expense.
Thirdly, I am conscious of the limited weight to be given to a precise textual analysis in this casually drafted agreement, but Recital E identifies three things that will happen to the proceeds of sale: (a) payment first towards return of capital, (b) paid secondly towards 5% interest and (c) finally distributed equally. The structure of the clause, the repeated use of "towards" in respect of the first and second payments, and the use of a new verb "distributed" in relation to the third payment, all suggests that the return of capital and the payment of interest are to be regarded as occurring in the same way.
Fourthly, when looking to other clauses aside from those which are squarely directed to the 5% interest entitlement, cl 4 (which is reproduced in Macfarlan JA's judgment) tends to confirm that this is a case where the partners share the expected profits after the costs of the development have been paid from the sale of the property. Implications from silence are equivocal, but if there were a personal obligation upon SCN to pay the entirety of the interest on funds deployed to acquire and undertake and sell the development, it might be expected that mention would be made of that in a clause described as "Overview of the purpose of the Partnership" which starts at the acquisition, then deals with the costs of construction and concludes with the division of profits.
Fifthly, as noted above, this is a case where contextual considerations have little force. However, if the development had been funded by an external lender, then interest would inevitably be regarded as a partnership expense. There is no compelling reason in the contractual text to depart from that approach merely because one of the parties was the financier, and obtaining the benefit of interest on its investment in addition to a share of the profits.
Telling against all of the above is the ordinary meaning of Recital D. If Recital D is regarded as being insufficient to control the operation of cl 6(c), in accordance with the conventional approach to the construction of recitals and operative clauses, then that is not to the point, and the appeal must be allowed.
If alternatively I proceed on the basis of Mr Coles' submission, then contrary to SCN's submission, it is difficult to read Recital D as a "true recital" which merely expresses the intent of the operative clauses, because aside from anything else it contains the only explicit reference to an indemnity. However, there is an apparent direct conflict between Recital D insofar as it obliges SCN to pay the interest, and Recital E, which speaks unequivocally of the interest being paid from the same source as the return of capital. That is to say, Recital E is not merely speaking about timing or priority; it is speaking of the source of funds to be used to discharge PHI's entitlement to repayment of capital, and PHI's entitlement to interest, and both partners' entitlements to the distribution of profits. All are to be paid from the proceeds of sale. SCN submitted that the obligation in Recital D to "pay" fell short of imposing a personal obligation: "The obligation in D is to cooperate in the paying of 5% interest to the first payment. That word 'pay' is capable of meaning pay from one's own funds, but that's not the only sense in which the word can be used."
That may be so, but it is not the natural meaning of the recital, although in this carelessly drafted document, it is one way of reconciling the recitals.
If contrary to the conventional approach a recital is capable of cutting down cl 6(c), then there is still no entirely satisfactory way of construing this document. Applying that approach, I would reason in the following way. There is a direct inconsistency between Recitals D and E on the point that matters, namely, the source of the funds to pay the 5% interest. The consequence is that neither recital is sufficient to diminish the effect of cl 6(c), even if I were to disregard their status as recitals as opposed to operative clauses.
For those reasons, on balance I favour SCN's construction. I agree with the orders proposed by Macfarlan JA.
WHITE JA: The provisions of the partnership agreement that fall for consideration in this appeal are set out in the reasons for judgment of Macfarlan JA, which I have had the advantage of reading in draft.
The partnership agreement is not a deed, but contains recitals and operative provisions, the latter appearing under the heading "Operative Part". Where the operative provisions are ambiguous, the recitals can assist in their interpretation (OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Blue Scope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 1; [2013] NSWCA 27 at 21, [63] (per Allsop P)). If the operative provisions are ambiguous and the recitals are clear, the recitals will govern the construction (Ex parte Dawes (1886) 17 QBD 275 at 286 (Lord Esher MR) and see generally P Herzfeld and T Prince, Interpretation (2nd ed, 2020, Law Book Co) at [23.10]).
The parties were partners in the development of land at Dee Why. The respondent purchased the properties and agreed to fund all the costs and expenses of the development (Recitals A and B).
On the taking of the partnership accounts, the respondent is entitled to interest at 5% per annum on the moneys it advanced for the acquisition and development of the land the subject of the partnership (cl 6(c)). The issue is whether, on the proper construction of the partnership agreement, the liability to pay that interest is a liability of the firm or the appellant.
Under s 24 of the Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) where a partner makes advances beyond the amount of capital which the partner has agreed to subscribe, the prima facie position is that the partner is entitled to interest and the advances are payable by the firm and not by the other partner or partners. For this purpose, the firm is treated as an entity separate from the individual partners (K Fletcher, Higgins and Fletcher the law of partnership in Australia and New Zealand (8th ed, 2001, LBC Information Services) at 98).
In such a case the partner making the advance will contribute to the repayment of the advance and payment of interest to the extent he or she shares in the capital and profits or losses of the partnership business. The appellant rightly described this as an aspect of ordinary partnership arrangements (per Macfarlan JA at [7]).
It is convenient to set out again the key provisions. Recital D. In consideration of the Second Party [the respondent] entering into this Partnership the First party [the appellant] will [enter] into the Partnership agreement, support the Second Party in the Partnership and indemnify the Second party from half of the costs of the development, plus pay the Second Party 5% interest per annum on all monies spent on the project by the Second Party. Recital E. After completion of the Development Project the units will be sold and the proceeds will be paid first towards return of the capital invested by the Second party, then toward 5% interest calculated per annum on a monthly basis on that Capital and finally distributed equally between the Partnership parties.
Clause 6(a) - (c) provides: "(a) The parties must contribute the capital required to complete the project in the following proportions and will share in the profits and losses of the venture in the same proportions. (i) Party 1 50% (ii) Party 2 50% (b) If a Partner pays money on behalf of the Partnership, the other Partners must make a contribution as soon as practicable after being informed of the payment, to restore equality of contribution between them. (c) Despite (a) and (b) above Party 2 has agreed to fund the whole capital of the project on behalf of the parties until completion of the Partnership project and in consideration therefor Party 2 is entitled to be the sole owner of the properties and entitled to 5% interest on the all capital expenditure to be repaid before any profits are distributed."
Recital D records the parties' agreement that the appellant would pay the respondent 5% interest per annum on all moneys spent on the project by the respondent. That obligation is expressed as an obligation personal to the appellant and not an obligation of the firm.
Further, Recital D provides that the appellant is to indemnify the respondent for half of the costs of the development plus pay 5% interest on moneys spent on the project by the respondent, indicating that the interest is treated separately from and not as part of the costs of the development.
The appellant relies upon Recital E which provides that the 5% interest, calculated yearly, on a monthly basis, will be paid from the proceeds of sale of the units. That recital is not inconsistent with Recital D. Recital E stipulates the source from which advances are to be repaid and interest is to be paid to the respondent. That is not inconsistent with the appellant's being liable, on the taking of partnership accounts, for the 5% interest payable on the moneys spent on the project by the respondent.
Under cl 6(a) the profits and losses of the venture are to be borne by the parties equally. Prima facie, interest on the moneys advanced by the respondent would be accounted for in calculating the profit or loss of the venture and hence be an expense to be borne by the partners equally. But Recital D does not treat interest as a cost of the development.
Clause 6(c) is equivocal. The respondent is entitled to be paid interest before profits are distributed. But that does not answer the question as to whether the interest is to be paid from the proceeds of sale as provided for by Recital E, which could, but need not, indicate that interest is an expense of the firm, or whether it is to be paid by the appellant as indicated by Recital D.
The operative provisions in cl 6(a) - (c) are ambiguous. Their interpretation is controlled by the recitals.
There is no extrinsic evidence to assist in the clarification of the ambiguities. There is no evidence whether at the time of the agreement a market rate for the provision of finance for the acquisition and development of the land would have been closer to 10% or 5%. Nor is there evidence of how interest was treated in other ventures in which the parties engaged.
The respondent was the legal owner of the land. It was the legal owner of the proceeds of sale of individual units, but those proceeds have to be accounted for in the taking of the partnership accounts. An amount owing to a partner by his fellow partners is recoverable only on the taking of an account (Hurts v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 at 194 per Lord Millett, cited with approval in Commissioner of State Taxation of South Australia v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd (2010) 242 CLR 508; [2010] HCA 43 at 516, [22]).
In Cyril Henschke the High Court also said (at [23]-[25]) that a partner's interest can only be ascertained finally on the completion of the winding up of the partnership and the identification of the surplus share of assets over liabilities.
The better construction of the agreement is that, although profits and losses are to be shared equally, interest on the moneys spent on the project by the respondent are treated separately from other development costs (Recital D). The respondent is entitled to charge 5% interest (cl 6(c)) and the appellant (not the firm) is obliged to pay it (Recital D). The fact that payments are to be made from the proceeds of sale (Recital E) does not affect the question of who, on the taking of the partnership account, is liable for the payment of interest.
For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal.

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