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[2007] AIRCFB 713
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (Full Bench)
2007-09-17
Mr P
Original judgment source is linked above.
s 120 - Appeals to Full Bench against a decision issued by Commissioner Bacon on 25 June 2007 [PR977457].
Appeal re termination of employment - jurisdiction - award coverage - whether employee employed under award derived conditions - interpretation of 'clerk' - extension of time - extent of representative error - s 630(1)(a), s 642(6) Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth).
DECISION OF VICE PRESIDENT WATSON AND SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT O'CALLAGHAN
[1] This decision relates to two appeals lodged against the decision of Commissioner Bacon regarding an application for relief in respect of the termination of employment of Mr Shane Layton by North Goonyella Coal Mine Management Pty Ltd ("North Goonyella"). The decision of the Commission arises from a motion to dismiss the application lodged by North Goonyella.
[2] The motion to dismiss by North Goonyella alleged two grounds for dismissal of the application. First, it was submitted that Mr Layton was not employed under award derived conditions for the purposes of section 630(1)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ("the Act") and was thereby barred from the jurisdiction of the Commission. The second ground concerned the fact that the application was lodged outside the 21 day time limit and contended that the Commission should not allow an extension of time to the applicant under section 643(14) to allow him to lodge his application "out of time."
[3] Commissioner Bacon dealt with both matters in his decision of 25 June 2007. [1] He found that Mr Layton was employed under a Notional Agreement Preserving State Awards ("NAPSA") namely, the Clerical Employees Award - State 2002, ("the Queensland Clerical NAPSA"). A NAPSA is an award for the purposes of section 638(f) of the Act.[2] Commissioner Bacon also determined not to grant an extension of time for the lodgement of Mr Layton's application. As a result, he dismissed the application.
[4] Two appeals were lodged against this decision - one by Mr Layton against the decision not to grant an extension of time for lodgement, the other by North Goonyella cross appealing the decision that Mr Layton was covered by the Queensland Clerical NAPSA. The two appeals were heard together in Brisbane on 14 August 2007. Mr P. Copeland, of Counsel, represented Mr Layton. Mr H. Downes, of Counsel, represented North Goonyella.
[5] Mr Layton was employed in the position of Commercial Superintendent at the North Goonyella mine site by North Goonyella, a wholly owned subsidiary of Peabody Energy Australia Coal Pty Ltd ("Peabody"). He reported directly to the Commercial Manager, as did a Financial Superintendent. The positions of payroll clerk, accounts payable clerk and receptionist reported to him.
[6] In the proceedings before the Commissioner, Mr Layton and Ms Janet Woodham, General Manager - Human Resources at Peabody, both gave evidence concerning the role and position description of Commercial Superintendent. Mr Layton said that the position description is an accurate description of the purpose, accountabilities, skills and duties of the Commercial Superintendent role. Ms Woodham described the Commercial Superintendent as a senior member of the Commercial Department. She said that Mr Layton presented himself in his CV and work history as an accountant, worked with the company as an accountant and was employed and paid as such. She said he also attended Certified Practising Accountant (CPA) conferences, provided advice to employees on taxation/remuneration matters, and made decisions that required an understanding and interpretation of both Australian accounting/tax law and Peabody accounting policies without direct supervision. She said that for him to now claim that he was a clerk is merely a convenience he seeks to use to get a benefit from the system.
[7] The position description of the Commercial Superintendent role includes the following:
The principal objective of this position is to provide accounting and administrative support to the Commercial Manager and carry out role responsibilities in a professional manner.
[8] After Mr Layton's employment was terminated on 19 February 2007, he waited to receive written notice of his termination and the reasons for his termination. On 26 February 2007 he contacted a firm of solicitors in Mackay. An appointment was made to meet with a solicitor on 2 March 2007. At a further meeting with the solicitor on 6 March 2007, Mr Layton was advised that it was pointless proceeding with an unfair dismissal application because he was not eligible to make an application. Approximately one week later, an industry colleague suggested that he obtain a second opinion. On 19 March 2007, he contacted a Brisbane firm of solicitors. That firm indicated that they had a conflict of interest and gave him contact details of a third firm. On Thursday 22 March 2007, he contacted a third firm who subsequently filed the application on his behalf on Friday 23 March 2007 - 11 days over the 21 day time limit in which to file an application under the Act.
[9] North Goonyella characterised these periods as respectively, periods of action and inaction in the following time line:
Contacts second solicitor and is referred to third solicitor
[10] Section 638(1)(f) excludes from the operation of the unfair dismissal provisions of the Act an employee who is paid in excess of the amount specified in the regulations and who is not employed under "award derived conditions". It is common ground that Mr Layton was paid in excess of the limit in the regulations and that in order to be covered by the Act, he must be employed under award derived conditions. Section 642(6) provides:
"(6) For the purposes of this Division, an employee is taken to be employed under award-derived conditions if the employer is bound:
(a) in relation to the employee's wages and conditions of employment - by an award or a workplace agreement; or
(ii) in relation to the employee's conditions of employment - by an award or a workplace agreement."
[11] Section 643(14) of the Act provides that an unfair dismissal application must be lodged within 21 days after the day on which the termination took effect, or within such period as the Commission allows on application made during or after those 21 days.
[12] Under section 120 of the Act, an appeal lies to a Full Bench, with the leave of the Full Bench, against an order made by a member of the Commission or a decision of a member of the Commission that the member has jurisdiction in a matter arising under the Act. Section 685(3) provides that an appeal to a Full Bench under section 120 may not be made in relation to a decision on an extension of time application within the meaning of section 647. Section 647 permits an extension of time application to be decided without a hearing and is not relevant in this case.
[13] Full Benches of this Commission have entertained appeals against decisions on extension of time applications which have been determined following a hearing and have thereby interpreted section 685(3) as a limitation against appeals of decisions to determine the application for an extension of time without conducting a hearing. [3] No party submitted that an appeal does not lie in this case.
[14] The appeal lodged by Mr Layton challenges the decision of the Commissioner to decline to grant an extension of time to file an application. The cross appeal filed by the North Goonyella challenges the Commissioner's conclusion in relation to award coverage of Mr Layton.
[15] The decision to decline to grant an extension of time for the filing of the application is properly characterised as a discretionary decision. The appeal against the order giving effect to that decision must therefore be considered in the light of the principles arising from House v The King. Those principles require the identification of an error in the decision-making process such as an error of principle, a failure to have regard to a relevant consideration or a mistake in a finding of fact.
[16] The decision that Mr Layton was employed under award derived conditions is a decision concerning the jurisdiction of the Commission. Such a decision is not discretionary and the principles arising from House v The King [4] are not relevant. The Full Bench must consider for itself whether the decision regarding jurisdiction is correct.
[17] Both appeals require leave to appeal. As both appeals were argued in full we will deal with the issues raised by both appeals before determining how to dispose of the matters.
[18] The challenge to the decision of the Commissioner that no extension of time should be granted is that it fails to have regard to the fact that Mr Layton did not file an application within the statutory period because he relied on advice that he was not eligible to make the application. He obtained the advice within the period and if he was advised in a way that the applicant believes and the Commissioner found was correct, he would have filed the application within time. Hence Mr Layton contends that the error of his advisor provided an acceptable reason for the delay in lodging the application. As soon as he obtained alternative advice that he was eligible, he lodged the application. It was contended that insufficient weight was given to the conduct of the applicant and the ongoing impact of the representative error.
[19] Counsel for Mr Layton relies on the notion emanating from Full Bench decisions that a distinction should be drawn between delay properly apportioned to the applicant's representative where the applicant is blameless and delay occasioned by the conduct of the applicant. [5] On the facts of this case, it is contended on behalf of Mr Layton that the effect of the representative error explains the delay from 6 March to 23 March 2007, and did not cease when an industry colleague suggested he obtain a second opinion on 13 March 2007, as found by the Commissioner.
[20] North Goonyella submitted that the inaction of Mr Layton between 13 March and 22 March 2007 - essentially to make two phone calls when he should have known of the 21 day time limit, leads to the conclusion that there was no explanation for the delay. The company submitted that no appealable error in the discretionary decision of the Commission has been identified.
[21] Decisions of the Commission have approached the notion of 'representative error' with some caution. The conduct of the applicant is a central consideration in deciding whether the circumstances provide an acceptable explanation for the delay. [6] In this case it was not alleged that the first solicitor failed to make Mr Layton aware of the 21 day time limit. The alleged error related to his eligibility to lodge an application.
[22] An Applicant who seeks relief in respect to the termination of his or her employment and considers that he or she may be eligible to lodge an application, should do so within the 21 day period. The Commissioner, correctly in our view, looked at Mr Layton's conduct in the relevant period rather than the alleged representative error as such. The various facts and circumstances were all considered by the Commissioner and he made a decision which in our view, was within his discretion. Giving insufficient weight to a factor does not, in itself, give rise to grounds to overturn a discretionary decision.
[23] We should add that when an application is not lodged within time, and other jurisdictional issues are raised, it would normally be appropriate to consider whether to extend the time for lodging the application under section 643(14) before determining any contested matters of jurisdiction or merit. It is undesirable to expose the parties to the requirement to present their evidentiary cases twice. [7]
[24] Clause 1.4 of the Queensland Clerical NAPSA describes the coverage of the NAPSA in the following terms:
"This Award applies to persons employed wholly or principally as a clerk as defined within the State of Queensland…"
Certain exclusions are then specified but the parties did not contend that any were relevant.
"[t]he employees as prescribed by clause 1.4 and clause 1.6 and their employers..."
"any person employed either exclusively or principally in the pursuit or vocation of writing, engrossing, typing, or calculating, whether by ordinary means or by means of any process calculated to achieve a like result, and/or in invoicing, billing, charging, checking, or otherwise dealing with records, writings, correspondence, books, and accounts of any person, firm, company, association, corporation, or Local Authority, whether employed in trading, law, insurance, manufacturing, buying, selling, forwarding, receiving and recording. The term "Clerk" also includes any person engaged exclusively or principally in attending to telephone switchboards, receiving and answering calls, and manipulating any apparatus to enable people to converse, as well as manipulating any keyboard or other apparatus to facilitate communication, or in any other clerical capacity whatsoever, but does not include persons engaged solely in collecting money out of doors"
[25] Various Full Bench decisions have held that the proper approach to determining whether an employee is covered by an award requires an assessment of the principal purpose for which the employee was employed. [8] This test has also been referred to as the primary function test. Indeed, Justice Gray of the Federal Court applied such a test in relation to the interpretation of the term "clerk" in Joyce v Christoffersen 26 FCR 261. In that case, His Honour said at [270-1]:
"The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed, 1989, defines 'clerical' relevantly as 'of or pertaining to a clerk or penman'. The appropriate definition of 'clerk' is 'one employed in a public or private office, shop, warehouse, etc., to make written entries, keep accounts, make fair copies of documents, do the mechanical work of correspondence and similar 'clerkly' work. Among the definitions of 'clerk' is 'of or belonging to an office clerk'.
There are many authorities dealing with rule 2 of the Union's rules. In a now famous passage, in Re Federated Clerks' Union of Australia, New South Wales Branch, and Australian Workers' Union (1971) 71 AR (NSW) 419, at p 421, Sheldon J. said, in reference to the phrase 'clerical capacity':
'This phrase, in my view, must be read against the background of the way industry has developed and is now conducted. Clerical work in industry has long since moved from the Dickensian era of the high stool and the quill pen. The voice and the mind are now part of clerical stock-in-trade. So is the acceptance of responsibility and the exercise of discretion. The conception is fluid and progressive and recourse to a dictionary gives only partial help. It is impossible, and in any event it would be undesirable, to attempt to devise a code as to what in the setting of industry today can fairly be regarded as clerical work. But too fine a toothcomb should not be used in solving this question in particular cases. Obviously all employees in an office are not engaged in a clerical capacity. It is clear that professional employees are not nor are those who are truly and basically executive officers. But an employee does not cease to be employed in a clerical capacity merely because his work includes many administrative and non-recording functions. No doubt there are cases near the border which would be difficult to determine but in general, and subject to some special categories, those who are in a subordinate position but are engaged in the ordinary work of office administration are, in my opinion, prima facie covered by this constitution rule.... But the salient point is that for years clerical work has been regarded for industrial purposes as including more than mere recording and covers work of different kinds which no doubt leads to or results from recording but in fact is part of the general office administration system. That is why I deprecate dividing office functions too strictly by attempting to quantify the recording done by different members of the team and using this as the test'.
That passage has been quoted with approval in this Court in Voigtsberger v. Council of the Shire of Pine Rivers [1980] FCA 157; (1980) 49 FLR 391, at pp 398-399, Re Application by Prichard; Re Federated Clerks' Union of Australia (S.A. Branch) (1985) 12 FCR 66, at pp 77-78 and Re Federated Clerks Union of Australia; Ex parte Tanner (1986) 70 ALR 79, at p 84. As Sheldon J. indicated, and was recognised in Prichard's case, a person may be engaged in a clerical capacity or performing clerical work, whilst having other functions as well. In Prichard's case, at p 78, the test applied was whether the primary functions of the person concerned were directed to the recording, processing and disseminating of information. In the case of a person exercising clerical and non-clerical functions, the question will always arise as to which of them are the primary functions."
[26] It is clear from both passages and the definition of "clerk" in the Queensland Clerical NAPSA, that the task of interpretation is not a quantitative one based upon time spent performing certain types of duties. Rather, the task involves a qualitative assessment of the primary purpose of the position. Professional and managerial employees are clearly not clerks. Where the primary purpose of the role is the exercise of skills of a professional or quasi professional nature, the role will not be regarded as clerical - notwithstanding that the role involves various recording and ordinary administrative office functions. [9]
[27] We have considered the main accountabilities and other details of the Commercial Superintendent role as set out in paragraph [7] above. The role is in the nature of a professional accounting role and a senior member of the Commercial Department. The emphasis of the role is on management, interpretation and advice, not recording and administrative functions as such - although the roles of those who report to the Commercial Superintendent could be described in such a way. In our view, the principle purpose of the Commercial Superintendent role cannot be described as a 'clerk' within the meaning of the Queensland NAPSA. We therefore do not believe that Mr Layton was employed under award derived conditions.
[28] Submissions were made by North Goonyella that Mr Layton did not fall within any classifications in the Queensland Clerical NAPSA and that therefore in any event, the employer was not bound by the Queensland Clerical NAPSA in relation to his wages and conditions of employment. We accept, on the authority of Brand v APIR Systems Limited, [10] that engagement in a classification in the award is a further necessary requirement for employment under award derived conditions. However given our conclusion that Mr Layton was not employed as a clerk and not covered by the Queensland Clerical NAPSA, it is unnecessary for us to consider this matter further.
[29] The appeal by Mr Layton is against the order dismissing his application. The basis for this decision was the decision not to extend the time for lodging an application. As we have concluded that this decision was within the Commissioner's discretion and that alternative grounds for dismissing the application also exist, we refuse to grant leave to appeal. Mr Layton's application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
[30] In these circumstances, the cross appeal lodged by North Goonyella has no practical significance and we therefore formally refuse leave to appeal and dismiss North Goonyella's application for leave to appeal.
[31] This decision concerns two appeals lodged pursuant to s.120 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the Act), one by each party to the s.643 application for relief in respect of termination of employment lodged by Mr Shane Layton on 23 March 2007.
[32] Mr Layton's application relied solely upon the s.643(1)(a) ground; that the termination of his employment by North Goonyella Coal Mines Pty Ltd (North Goonyella) was harsh, unjust and unreasonable. The application was lodged in the Registry 32 days after the termination date. Subsequently the application came on before Bacon C for the purpose of dealing with two objections as to Mr Layton's application made by North Goonyella.
[33] North Goonyella's objection to the application being lodged beyond the 21 day time limit (s.643(14)) was accepted by the Commissioner and his order [PR977457] dismissed the application. Mr Layton appeals that decision. For reasons set out below I have dealt first with Mr Layton's appeal as to the Commissioner's decision that the late application not be accepted.
[34] The subject of North Goonyella's appeal is the decision also made by Bacon C as to the second ground of objection - that Mr Layton was beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission by virtue of him not having been employed under award derived conditions (s.638(1)(f)).
[35] The approach I have adopted in considering, and would take in dealing with these appeals makes it necessary for me, respectfully, to set out reasons separate from those of the Vice President and the Senior Deputy President. As to the s.643(14) late lodgement question it will be seen that I am in substantial agreement with the majority's decision to not grant leave to Mr Layton and to dismiss his appeal.
[36] The Commissioner's decision declining to extend time is, of course, a discretionary one and on appeal will remain undisturbed other than when an appealable error in the House and King sense is apparent (House v The King, (1936) 556 CLR 499). In my view no such error is discernable either in the reasons and analysis given by Bacon C of the circumstances of the late lodgement or having regard for the argument put on appeal for Mr Layton.
[37] While I would also refuse to grant Mr Layton leave to appeal and dismiss his application, unlike the majority, my reason does not extend beyond the finding that there is no error in the decision declining to extend time. To confine my concurrence in this way is made necessary by the majority, at paragraph 29 of their decision, making clear that their refusal to grant leave also derives from a conclusion "… that alternative grounds for dismissing the application also exist.".
[38] This is a reference to the majority's consideration of, and findings as to, the North Goonyella s.638(1)(f) objection that Mr Layton was not employed under award derived conditions. I am unable to accept that a further ground for dismissing Mr Layton's late lodgement application should inform the s.643(14) decision or, indeed, in light of the Full Bench's conclusion as to the error free nature of Bacon C's s.643(14) decision, whether a further ground continues, capable of being heard or determined.
[39] The basis for so holding commences with my view that where there are said to be jurisdictional impediments to an application for relief as to termination of employment (when the lodgement strictures set out in s.643(14) are not met), it accords with the statutory scheme for the Commission to first consider the issue as to whether there is a proper basis for allowing lodgement after 21 days.
[40] This follows because, in my view, unless the Commission allows lodgement of an application within a period determined pursuant to s.643(14) there is no application before the Commission. Only if an application is lodged within such period in excess of 21 days as is allowed by the Commission, can there be said to exist a s.643 application for relief capable of being heard or challenged jurisdictionally.
[41] I note that at paragraph 23 of the majority decision their Honours comment that "… when an application is not lodged within time, and other jurisdictional issues are raised, it would normally be appropriate to consider whether to extend the time for lodging the application under section 643(14) before determining any contested matters of jurisdiction or merit. It is undesirable to expose the parties to the requirement to present their evidentiary cases twice."
[42] While I agree with these comments, there is also in my view a further consequence relating to the sequence of dealing with s.643(14) cases where, as in this case, there is also a jurisdictional objection. The matter of sequence extends beyond both the logical attraction of determining late applications first and the importance of not duplicating proceedings; it is a reflection of the statutory scheme.
[43] Section 647 of the Act, which commenced on 27 March 2006, provides that s.643(14) applications may be decided by the Commission without conducting a hearing. The section is in the following terms:
"647 EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATIONS MAY BE DECIDED WITHOUT A HEARING
(a) an employee whose employment has been terminated by an employer makes an application (the extension of time application) under subsection 643(14) requesting the Commission to allow an application to be lodged under subsection 643(1) after the period of 21 days after the termination took effect; and
(b) the proposed application under subsection 643(1) is an application:
(i) on the ground referred to in paragraph 643(1)(a); or
the Commission is not required to hold a hearing in relation to the extension of time application." (bold type original)
[44] While the section is obviously directly relevant to the matter of hearings being optional in s.643(14) cases, the terminology used is revealing. By the Act terming an application under s.643(14) "an extension of time application", and, at s.647(b), referring to such an application as "the proposed application", my view is fortified that conceptually, an application under s.643(14) is nascent in character, distinguishable from other applications made under s.643 and, until determined and granted, generally not susceptible to analysis as to the exclusions and inhibitions to jurisdiction found in Division 4 of Part 12 of the Act.
[45] As to the importance of the Commission determining first whether to permit a late application to be lodged, it should be acknowledged that in hearing a "proposed application" pursuant to s.643(14), aspects of the application relevant to a jurisdictional finding may be received (such points can be raised at any time) and when justified in the circumstances of a particular case, form a part of the member's reasoning. In hearing a "proposed application" pursuant to s.643(14) it may, for example, become apparent on an applicant's own case that they are not an "Australia-based employee" (s.641) and that accordingly their application must fail. However, in my view, in the normal course it will neither be consonant with the statutory scheme nor serve the interests of the parties as to time, cost and duplication of proceedings for there to be any encouragement for parties to s.643(14) proceedings to put contested jurisdictional, substantive merit or whole of case points contrary to the reasoning set out in Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Limited, Giudice J, Acton SDP and Gay C, 10 November 2000 (Print T2421). It follows in my view that when such contested points arise they be dealt with only after the Commission has allowed lodgement.
[46] Having so concluded, it is similarly important on appeal to deal first with a challenged decision as to extension. In cases such as the present, where the decision below to not extend time to permit lodgement is confirmed and leave to appeal refused, there being then no s.643 application before the Commission, I would decline to deal, or further deal, with any other objections sought to be determined as to the case dismissed.
Deciding the s.638(1)(f) Objection
[47] The basis given for the majority also determining the award derived conditions issue is set out at paragraph 17 of their decision where it is said:
"Both appeals require leave to appeal. As both appeals were argued in full we will deal with the issues raised by both appeals before determining how to dispose of the matters."
[48] In my view in the circumstances of this case, once the decision to not extend time is confirmed by the Full Bench, the fact of other matters having been "argued in full" does not constitute a reason to decide the additional objection. This is not a case where the s.643(14) conclusion requires to be sustained or buttressed by some further findings or declarations.
[49] Notwithstanding another objection having been argued in full, in the normal course there will be good reasons for the Commission to not decide issues rendered otiose by time not being allowed pursuant to s.643(14). An example may be useful to illustrate my concern in this regard.
[50] It is, from the standpoint of efficiency and convenience to the parties, entirely normative for the Commission to list and hear a succession of preliminary points at a single sitting. Thus a s.643(14) extension argument and one (or more) jurisdictional arguments would frequently be heard on the same day.
[51] Noting that in the present case the majority's determination of the s.638(1)(f) objection goes against the employee, my example will hypothesize, in otherwise similar circumstances, a case where, in determining the further objection (time having not been extended) the conclusion of the additional objection favours the applicant.
[52] The example is the Commission hearing in full the argument as to extension of time and an employer's contention that there was no termination at the initiative of the employer. Such cases will regularly trench into merit issues and not infrequently require findings as to credit.
[53] Where such a proposed application had been refused pursuant to s.643(14) there would be, in my view, no good purpose served by the Commission nevertheless continuing to set out findings favourable to the applicant as to credit and merit. Despite the point having been argued in full such an approach on appeal would not be sound. Because one cannot readily envisage such findings or determinations favourable to an applicant being expressed once late lodgement was refused, I am troubled that the practice of delivering such determinations is likely to arise only when objections to jurisdictions are accepted.
[54] Consistent with the Commission's long practice on appeal to not deliver advisory judgements or decide points or findings no longer operative I would not, for these reasons and by virtue of the dismissal of the case below, make findings of no practical affect, or as the majority put it at paragraph 30, "of no practical significance". Making findings is likely to confer significance where none should arise. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which North Goonyella's appeal ought be determined.
[55] It will be appreciated that the s.638(1)(f) conclusion as to award derived conditions reached by Bacon C, and not being adopted by this Full Bench, falls away entirely upon our confirmation of the soundness of the Commissioner's decision to not extend time. To decide further issues, there being no application before the Commission, would also serve as an encouragement to parties to conflate exclusion and jurisdictional argument with s.643(14) hearings with the attendant disadvantages adverted to earlier.
Mr H Downes of counsel for North Goonyella Coal Mine Management Pty Ltd.
[2] Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 Schedule 4, Item 10, [2007] AIRC 402 &
[3] See, eg. Mappas v TAAU Australia Pty Ltd [2007] AIRCFB 260.
[6] Re Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital [P5279]
[7] Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Limited (Giudice J., Acton SDP and Gay C, Print T2421, 10 November 2000)
[8] See, eg. Carpenter v Corona Manufacturing Pty Ltd (2002) 122 IR 387, 388-9; Brand v APIR Systems Limited (unreported, AIRC Full Bench, 16 September 2003) [10], Envotec Pty Ltd t/as Australian Envelopes v Goldie [PR974595].
[9] Joyce v Christoffersen 26 FCR 261, 271-3.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
(1980) 49 FLR 391
(1985) 12 FCR 66
(1936) 55 CLR 499
(1986) 70 ALR 79
(1936) 556 CLR 499
(2002) 122 IR 387