(a) 'The law'
257 Palmer explained the concept of 'the law' as 'the way in which the power of the Dreaming and the spiritual component, the bugarigara, is interpolated into contemporary existence.' Palmer said that in some instances this is defined in terms of a set of normative behaviours that have a referential base in the period of the Bugarrigarra, but in other instances 'the law' is used to talk about ritual practices. Palmer also noted that 'the law' is a term:
'…also used to apply to the rules, sanctions, mores, cultural precepts and understandings of the correct manner to manage relations with others or the natural world. These are all believed to have been set down in the Dreaming and continue in contemporary dealings with the ever present authority of the spirituality of the Dreaming.'
258 Palmer stated in his main report that, for an individual, knowledge of the Bugarrigarra is attained through a prolonged series of ritual inductions.
259 Sansom stated in respect of the underlying ideology:
'PROF SANSOM: …The Bugarrigarra ideology has been part of Aboriginal Australia for as long as there've been records, and the belief that it is an eternal reality is shared across the continent.
MR BELL: Yes. So the - the evidence, in essence, is that from beginning - from the beginning of time, the Bugarrigarra brought the southern tradition to the Broome Peninsula.
PROF SANSOM: And that is evidence of the belief.'
260 Sansom was shown a gender restricted map drawn by Patrick Dodson for the Rubibi hearing, which shows the path in the Yawuru claim area of the Bugarrigarra Dreaming according to the southern tradition. Sansom was asked:
'MR BELL: That means, doesn't it, that each and every Yawuru is responsible for the maintenance of that law and the observance of the laws and customs which were ordained by that law.
PROF SANSOM: Yes, I - the only problem I have with it is the gender one.
…
MR BELL: Well, putting aside the gender issue, that the women would have, say, a different order of responsibility - - -
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MR BELL: - - - than the men, putting that aside, do you accept my proposition?
PROF SANSOM: I accept the proposition that, if that is the track of the law, the people who are on that track would have such a responsibility.
MR BELL: Yes. And, quite clearly, the Yawuru are on the track, aren't they?
PROF SANSOM: According to what I saw. [on the restricted map]
MR BELL: Yes. Okay.
HIS HONOUR: What do you mean by "responsibility for the law"?
PROF SANSOM: The responsibility to hold ceremonies in relation to the sites that are on that track.'
261 In his evidence, Palmer stated that:
'DR PALMER: …The - the - the Bugarrigarra contains the idea that things were founded according to a system, according to - well, you cannot - you can't escape, in talking about it, from the word "law", in Aboriginal English, because that's the way it's - it's seen, as - as something which set out the ways in which things have to happen, and always did happen, and always will happen, and that that cannot be changed, it cannot be challenged. And from that idea of - of the immutability of the law, spring a whole variety of ideas, the way people behave, how people define their relationship to each other and to the natural world about them.
…
DR PALMER: I suppose the other thing about Bugarrigarra is that it - it defines and informs, in my observation, the applicants' views about the essential spirituality of the natural world around them, and of their points of - well, their - their articulation with it, their interaction with it.'
262 Sansom stated that a tribal boundary 'defines a sort of jurisdiction' within which 'the law' of that jurisdiction applies. Worms recorded his observations of initiation ceremonies, which teach 'the law'. They were conducted by men of different tribes at a tribal 'law ground' and were based upon tribal, rather than any clan, boundaries. He also gave evidence that within the tribal boundary, there is the spiritual connection to country. Sansom stated:
'PROFESSOR SANSOM: The anthropologist's question, and it might seem arcane, Your Honour, is where do your spirits come from, and do you have two, because your connection to the country is a spiritual connection.'
263 The anthropological evidence linking 'the law', tribal boundaries and spiritual connection to country is consistent with the evidence of the Yawuru witnesses, but particularly of the senior 'law men', that the boundaries of the Yawuru country are essentially the tribal boundaries created by the Bugarrigarra creation story.
264 Palmer spoke of 'the law' as being immutable. However, Sansom accepted that it cannot be unchanging because traditional law and custom makes provision for unexpected contingencies. Of particular relevance is Sansom's response to questions about such contingencies, which were explained in Sansom's written reports to which I later refer, in the context of the evolution of cognatic changes in Yawuru social organisation:
'HIS HONOUR: …what you seem to be suggesting is that the traditional processes of Aboriginal society themselves contain provisions for contingencies. And you seem to be suggesting that the evolution which you've described in the first sentence can be regarded as one of the kind of contingencies that were inherent in traditional laws and customs. That's what you seem to be saying. Is that right or wrong?
PROF SANSOM: That is correct. As I said, it's further elaboration. And so, what you're dealing with is very rapid and unprecedented change.
MR BELL: Well, no - - -
HIS HONOUR: Yes, go on.
MR BELL: I'm sorry.
No doubt, Professor, I've already conceded that, but what I'm putting to you is that that's not what you advert to in these conclusions. What you advert to is the way in which traditional societies evolve in response to change by reference to inherent mechanisms, traditional in form. And what you say in paragraphs 3, 4, and 8 [of your interim report] is, in effect, that Yawuru social organisation now is the product of that kind of evolution.
PROF SANSOM: I say that, yes.'
265 Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Sansom's interim report, which are set out and discussed in [360]-[3612], are concerned with cognatic kinship as an evolutionary change.
266 There may be some tension between Palmer's immutability approach to 'the law', and Sansom's view that 'the law' adapts to unexpected contingencies, which is a view borne out by the evidence. A possible explanation for the different views is that Palmer was referring to the 'basic law' regarded as being laid down by the creation story itself, rather than to the general rules of social organisation that evolve as part of the southern tradition. Such rules can never be frozen in time as, inevitably, they adapt to changing circumstances. One example of such an adaptation, which is clearly established on the evidence, is the duty of succession of a traditional indigenous society to 'dead country' in order to preserve and protect the spirituality of that country when those responsible for discharging those duties have died. A change from a patrilineal to a flexible cognatic or ambilineal system of kinship and connection to country is, as was suggested by Sansom (see, for example, [289]-[290]), another example of evolutionary change by reference to inherent mechanisms that are traditional in form. It would follow that the 'contingency provisions' of which Sansom spoke can result in changes to and adaptations of traditional law and custom that satisfy the criterion in Yorta Yorta at 443 [44] that the changes or adaptations be 'of a kind contemplated by … traditional law and custom'. It would also follow that the changes or adaptations can result in the rights or interests presently possessed by reason of the change or adaptation, continuing to be rights or interests possessed under the traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the claimant community (see Yorta Yorta at 455 [83]).
(b) Rai and other totemic associations
267 In Rubibi at 433-434 [109]-[111], I outlined the evidence explaining rai, which was consistent with that given at the present hearing:
'The first such factor, rai, was described by Dr Sullivan as follows:
"Among the spirits which Broome fishers and hunters call out to after a long absence are those that are said to enter a woman as the essence of the child she is to give birth to. These are called "rai". The means of entry is usually a food species she has eaten. The child is frequently born with the mark of the spear, digging stick or other implement upon it. Thus each individual is linked to naturally occurring species, precise locations, father and mother (it is usually the father who has done the hunting or at least has "dreamed" the child spirit the woman has ingested) and the world of spirits and mythic ancestors, since the rai have been left in the landscape during the creative epoch, bugarigara, or Dreamtime.
The belief in spirit children is almost universal in Aboriginal Australia. Some anthropologists have concluded that in pre-contact times Aborigines had no understanding of the importance of insemination in conception and understood the entire process to be originated by the reception of a spirit child, or rai."
Rai was also described by Dr Sullivan as "conception totemism", which is a primary regulator of land attachment. Dr Sullivan explained that rai cuts across the descent process, making the system infinitely more flexible. A Yawuru person's rai will be located on Yawuru country and be ascertained from when the child is born. Thereafter, it directly links the child with that area. Dr Sullivan stated the belief in rai to be "a belief in the unity of spirit, land, myth and person". He noted that its significance in the present context was:
"…to situate the economic activity of hunting and gathering in a wider framework of religious [belief], and as an important means…by which people regulate and negotiate their particular and unique rights over areas of land within the common land heritage of the whole society".
It was clear from the evidence of almost all of the Rubibi witnesses that the concept of rai has been, and remains, important to Yawuru persons and that it links them in a unique way to their land. In a paper tendered in evidence, Joseph "Nipper" Roe described rai in the following terms:
"Contained within our Lian are our Bilyurr and Rai. Bilyurr is our spirit from within, which is oneness with the physical body. After death the Bilyurr goes on its journey to a special place. Rai is our spirit from the country. The father dreams or see "child spirit" that wandered away from the group dwelling place which is called Yadangal. He's now aware that his wife is or will be pregnant and the child's spiritual connection in a form of an animal, fish, plant or a particular area in the land, that will coincide during pregnancy, be his/her Rai. The physical and spiritual conceptual place of birth becomes the central part of the identity of that person and he also becomes a protector/custodian. When we pass away our Rai (spirit from the country) goes back to the country where it pre-existed and becomes a "child spirit" again and remains in the group at Yadangal awaiting another spiritual rebirth."'
268 Palmer explained that the concept of rai evokes a spiritual relationship between a person and a natural object, place or animal. This spiritual relationship is referred to by anthropologists as 'totemism'. Palmer explained that the individual is seen to be 'a living manifestation and a representation of a enduring and deep spirituality which is out there within and a part of the natural world'.
269 In his main report, Palmer noted:
'A person has a singular relationship with the place where his rayi originated (often called, "rayi place"). Spiritually, the one is the manifestation of the other and they are conceptually inseparable.'
270 In his supplementary report in reply to Sansom, Palmer explained that '[t]hose with a special attachment to an area (for example, through rayi) exercise a direct role in looking after those sites, but also on behalf of the whole community.' Palmer noted that a person's rai was usually associated with a specific location. Palmer stated that the evidence of the Walman Yawuru witnesses who declared that their rai was Walman Yawuru country is a 'new idea' in his experience. Sansom was also of the view that rai is site specific. He stated that 'it's always a site which is the sort of home for these spirits'.
271 Palmer stated that the rai principle and the belief in spiritual imbuement is related to the concept of totemism. Sansom viewed rai as giving a person a totemic relationship to country. Sansom stated that anthropologists regard spiritual connection as involving 'conception totems' (rai), which are site specific, and clan totems of the kind described by Worms. Palmer explained in his supplementary report in reply to Sansom, that totemic association, which he likened to the principle of spiritual imbuement, relates people to the natural world and to places within it. However, Palmer claimed that the special relationship does not attribute a proprietorial exclusivity to any one person.
272 Worms recorded the totemic associations of his Yawuru informants. Van Gent observed that she thought Worms' discussion and understanding of totemism was 'an excellent example to demonstrate spiritual connections of Yawuru with country'. When questioned by senior counsel for the Yawuru claimants on their totemic connection to country, Sansom gave the following evidence:
'MR BELL: We've got a whole host of animals and birds and fish who are described in the evidence in a way that makes reference to the powers of these animals or birds or fish, their presence in the landscape having special meaning for the person - I'm trying to summarise all this here. There's a body of evidence to that effect. Is there a totemic principle at work in that regard?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
…
MR BELL: … Well, would you accept that they have given evidence that they are one and of the country?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MR BELL: Is that too shorthand?
PROF SANSOM: No.
MR BELL: No. In other words they regard themselves and country as a part of a universal total?
PROF SANSOM: They share in the country, yes.
MR BELL: They share in the country? Okay. There's a totemic principle at work in that, isn't there?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MR BELL: Yes, okay. So it's clear, isn't it, that the relationship between members of the Yawuru community and their country is totemic in character?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.'
273 And:
'MR BELL: What I am suggesting to you and I don't believe that we are arguing with each other about this, is that if the Judge were to find that the system of belief that prescribes the nature of the relationship between the Yawuru and their country is totemic in character, that is they share in and of the land, etcetera, then it's anthropologically open to him to conclude that that's a traditional evolution from whatever totemic system existed previously.
PROF SANSOM: Provided there is real behaviour that attests to the existence of that relationship, yes.'
274 The evidence discussed and the findings made in [80]-[89] demonstrates that there is still 'real behaviour' in the Yawuru community that attests to the continuation of the totemic relationship between Yawuru persons and their country.
(c) Language and boundaries
275 The relationship between the Yawuru language and the country in which the Yawuru language is spoken was a contested issue. Palmer related the language of a people to their traditional country:
'It is believed…that the identity of land and the language of those who lived upon it was ordained in the bugarigara. The creative beings of that period that traversed the land gave the language that was from that day on spoken upon it, named the places where they performed their extraordinary acts in that language, and recorded these primordial acts for all generations in narrative and song, also in the language of that country. On moving into what is now identified as another country, they bestowed a different name to the land, the language and the people. And so they repeated the process, ordaining a different language, culture and identity for each successive country in turn which the people, who succeeded them, followed as their own. Claimants are descended from these first people and their ancestry is the first basis for their claim to be a continuing part of that culture that was first laid down in the bugarigara. Identity is therefore based on a belief in a continuing as well as ancestral link to the land which develops cultural practices, of which spoken language (Yawuru) is an important (but not necessary) part.'
276 When considering the analogous situation of the Jawoyn people, Palmer stated in his supplementary report in reply to Sansom that '[t]he Jawoyn…like some Yawuru, "are Jawoyn not because they speak Jawoyn, but because they are linked to places to which the Jawoyn language is also linked."' The Yawuru claimants' claim that the boundaries of a country are set at 'changeover places', which is where Dreamtime beings start to speak different languages as they carry the myths and stories across the land. A number of witnesses described how the language of songs and stories changes at points marking the boundaries of Yawuru country, such as at Bungarrangarra and at Willie Creek.
277 Dr Rumsey observed:
'…in the Aboriginal myths which associate language and land, no account at all is taken of people or peoples. Languages, or even mixtures of them, are placed in the landscape by the founding acts of the Dreamtime heroes. From that point on, the relation between language and territory is a necessary rather than a contingent one.' (A Rumsey, 'Language and Territoriality in Aboriginal Australia', Language and Culture in Aboriginal Australia (M Walsh and C Yallop eds), Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1993, p 204)
278 Sansom in his main report expressed a similar view:
'The territories of language groups are entities because people share in the same Dreaming tracks. All the members of a language group have an interest in the proper management of each and every part of the country as mismanagement may elicit a response from offended Dreaming and everyone will then suffer.'
279 Sansom accepted that Yawuru (or dialects within the Yawuru language) was spoken throughout the Yawuru claim area:
'MR BELL: Yes. Do you accept that Yawuru is the language spoken by the people traditionally from Willie Creek to the southern extremities of the claim area?
PROF SANSOM: And that there are dialects within Yawuru, yes.
MR BELL: And there are dialects within that language?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MR BELL: Three, according to Hosokowa?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MR BELL: But there is not a shadow of doubt, is there, that the language is Yawuru?
PROF SANSOM: There is one language, yes.'
280 Worms consistently recorded the Yawuru tribe as a linguistic entity residing in 'Yawuru country', being a place to which the people of the tribe belong. However, he also recorded some of the Yawuru clans as having 'their country'.
281 The evidence of the indigenous Yawuru witnesses called by the Yawuru claimants, offers strong support for the anthropological view expressed by Dr Rumsey of the 'necessary' relation between 'language and territory'. In that regard, it is also significant that senior 'law men' of other tribes practising the southern tradition, and who speak the tribal languages prescribed by that tradition, both recognise and respect the linguistic boundary of Yawuru country. An underpinning of the relation between the Yawuru language and Yawuru territory is the linking of 'the law' to tribal boundaries and spiritual connection to country, which is referred to in [263].
(d) Membership of the Yawuru community
282 In Rubibi, the anthropologists were in disagreement about membership of the Yawuru community. The State's anthropologist, Dr Kolig, stated that the relevant community was based on a clan model with 'primary rights' in land conferred by patrilineal descent. The applicants' anthropologist, Dr Sullivan, on the other hand, contended that a patrilineal clan based model is inapplicable to Yawuru country. I concluded that it was unnecessary to make a finding as to whether the traditional community at the time of the acquisition of sovereignty was determined by patrilineal or ambilineal descent, because I stated at 441 [142] that I was satisfied that 'even if there was, originally, a patrilineal model, the evolution to an ambilineal model was part of a process of the community's evolution to its present traditional form, rather than the creation of a new community.' The role of descent continued to be controversial at the present hearing.
283 Palmer detailed the two ways a person can be deemed to belong to country:
'An individual may gain spiritual correspondence to areas of country by at least two mechanisms. The first is through descent from the father or mother, in all cases, the second by virtue of the origin of a person's spirit conception. As a consequence of these beliefs, the relationship to specific areas of country is a matter of birth-place, manner or parentage. A person cannot, so it is understood, gain these spiritual associations by virtue of long-term residence, or by selection.'
284 Palmer said in his main report that 'ancestry is the prime driver of cultural identity and that being Yawuru is a matter of descent (in either the male or female line, or a combination of both)'. In his evidence Palmer stated that the shared language, culture and laws of the Yawuru people enabled the word 'Yawuru' to be applied 'to a language, a people and a country'.
285 Palmer said during the course of his evidence:
'Well, the community is understood to have been ordained and to have come from the creative activities of the - of the Dreaming, and that - that collectivisation which is, you know, a representation of a people's identity, is understood to pass down from generation to generation via descent.'
286 Palmer pointed out in his supplementary report in reply to Sansom that descent was 'an operative principle that runs through the fabric of the community'. Palmer noted in his main report that traditional anthropologists like Radcliffe-Brown considered the descent group to be patrilineal. Palmer also noted that in a culture in which there is 'much esoteric male restricted knowledge, following the father has some obvious advantages'. Palmer's view however, was that the fact of exogamy made the flexible model of cognatic descent more likely. He stated that cognatic descent was not arbitrary because a person's identification was constrained by traditional considerations such as residence, ritual and community recognition.
287 Sansom stated:
'Disregard for descent in the matter of landholding is exceptional in Australia. In my view, it is highly unlikely that the Yawuru, living in contact with representatives of both the maritime culture of their Northern neighbours and the culture of the desert people to the South, constructed a system in which descent did not traditionally feature…I cannot say that such a development was impossible; but it goes against the grain.'
288 In his reply to O'Connor's report, Palmer stated:
'In a system where rights to country are gained through both matri and patri-filiation, a child of parents from two different language countries can potentially exercise rights in both countries.'
289 Sansom in his initial report contended that whilst Aboriginal society was traditionally patrilineal, in recent times it has tended towards being cognatic or ambilineal. Sansom accepted that this move is a product of an evolutionary process because:
'…developed systems of customary law generally contain sets of contingency provisions. In Aboriginal Australia, contingency provisions exist as secondary rules that allow people to become full members of local groups and establish connection to group lands even though they do not qualify for group membership on normal and primary grounds of kinship which are grounds for the entering of clans that cannot be gainsaid.'
Sansom noted that membership of a clan country may be ceded to a 'non-agnate' (someone without descendants from that clan) on a number of grounds including: the location of 'conception dreaming' (rai); birthplace or site of initiation in the clan territory; by formal adoption; by coming to knowledge of a country or ceremonies for the country and long residence there; by virtue of some kin connection; the birth of one's child or location of one's childrens' 'conception dreaming place' in country; and by burial of one's ancestors in a country. Sansom named some other factors and stated that his list was probably not exhaustive. He observed that generally in the classic systems of Australia, the major principles for the recruitment of persons to the membership of land-owning groups are supplemented by a set of 'contingency provisions' which permit a suitably qualified person to be admitted to membership of the group.
290 Sansom considered that matter in relation to Yawuru society and said:
'In the Yawuru case, cognatic reckoning of kinship together with the conceptualisation of Yawuru lands as constituting a single "language country" are, in my view, related developments that are products of an (unconscious) evolutionary process whereby a new and flexible system grew out of classic landholding arrangements based on the division of country either into "horde countries" or into patriclan estates. In that evolutionary process, the contingency provisions of the classic Yawuru system were joined together and combined with the normal rules for recruitment of persons to groups and the assertion of connection with land to yield:
[i] an ambilineal (or cognatic) system of kinship and
[ii] a system of land tenure in which the internal boundaries dividing sub-divisions of land within a "language country" have tended to fall away (often to the degree that sub-divisions are wholly eliminated and become [as Hosokawa says] "defunct").'
Sansom repeated the above statement in his 'Conclusions and Issues for Further Consideration' and added that this process of evolution may or may not have become germane to developments among the adjoining Karajarri people, and that there is a general trend towards the emergence of cognatic systems of kinship across all regions of Aboriginal Australia with increasing urbanisation. This process of evolution, Sansom describes as being:
'…processes of the evolution of customs observed and traditions acknowledged by people who, through the generations, have maintained connection with the "language countries" of their forebears. Further…the evolutionary processes rely on the further elaboration of possibilities that (as provisions for contingencies) were always inherent in traditional laws and customs as these were enunciated and put into practice in classic times.'
291 As pointed out in [264]-[265], Sansom's initial report was explained by him in his oral evidence. In my view, Sansom proffered a persuasive explanation of how any patrifiliation descent principle has evolved under traditional law and custom to a cognatic or ambilineal principle. I also accept Palmer's observation that the result of that evolution is not an arbitrary principle because other traditional considerations, such as residence, ritual and community recognition, still have a role.
292 O'Connor, on the other hand, declared that membership of the Walman Yawuru group is via descent through the matriline. O'Connor pointed out that all the available anthropological evidence suggests patrilineality, but suggested that, within the Walman Yawuru, a crisis situation arose post contact with the death of male clanspersons and the marriage of female members to non-Aboriginals, and that this:
'…social crisis …resulted in a change from patrilineal inheritance of land to an adoption of the pre-existing parallel matrilineal system. It is also my opinion that, given the dangers of life in pre-contact Aboriginal Australia and the small population numbers involved, this crisis management system may have been utilised in the past, before the modern crisis triggered by European settlers.'
293 A shift to a matriline excludes Walman Yawuru men from passing on their rights in Walman Yawuru country to their children (unless their mother is also Walman Yawuru). However, the oral evidence of the Walman Yawuru witnesses did not support this proposition, with several of the male witnesses claiming that their children would receive rights in Walman Yawuru country by reason of their descent from a Walman Yawuru parent whether that parent be the child's mother or father.
294 More importantly, however, the matriline proposed by the Walman Yawuru witnesses appears to be merely a hypothesis on their part. I am not satisfied that there is evidence that I am prepared to accept that there was any change to traditional laws and customs relating to the descent of any members of the Yawuru community or of the Walman Yawuru clan that resulted in a matrilineal descent principle. As I have already explained, those laws and customs are the traditional laws and customs of the Yawuru community and I do not accept that there is a matrilineal descent principle under those laws or customs.
295 A further difficulty with the matrifiliation claim is that such a principle is not needed under the traditional 'contingency provisions' as those provisions need go no further than a change or adaptation to ambilineal descent, which would result in Mimi's descendants through either sons or daughters, being regarded as Walman Yawuru clan members.
296 Also relevant is Sansom's response to O'Connor's claim of matrifiliation, which was that in modern Aboriginal society many factors have led to 'a string of events of matrifiliation through the generations' and this can have the appearance of matrilineal kinship, however:
'…repetitive matrifiliation is accidental in that it is a product of contingencies and the result of a particular history. Repetitive matrifiliation does not constitute a principle of matrilineal descent.
…
Hence, in my view, the Walman Yawuru form one cognatic stock or family among the set of cognatic stocks that make up the Yawuru "tribal" or "language-owning" grouping.'
297 The evidence amply justifies the view expressed by Sansom.
298 There was also evidence as to adoption and incorporation into the Yawuru community. Joseph 'Nipper' Roe gave evidence of adoption under traditional law and custom. Patrick Dodson said that Joseph Roe's grandfather, who had Nygina ancestors, and was born in and had his rai in Yawuru country, was a member of the Yawuru community because he:
'…carried out responsibilities, was steeped in the law, understood those things, and behaved in this country in a responsible manner in terms of the sustaining and the keeping alive of the - of Yawuru culture and - and the responsibilities in relation to law.'
Under cross-examination in respect of that issue, Patrick stated:
'There's no rule in the Yawuru law system that says you cannot include that person as part of your community. There's no rule. And in fact if that person is involved in the ceremonies, and in defence of the sacred places like Kunin and other places in this Broome area, then there's no reason that that person doesn't have the full benefits of the Yawuru and the Yawuru decide that.'
However, Patrick later agreed that there is probably a difference between being a Yawuru person and being a member of the Yawuru community, and that you could be a part of the Yawuru community but not be a Yawuru person.
299 Joseph Roe, when speaking of his grandfather, Lulu, said that Lulu was part of the Yawuru community although he didn't have Yawuru ancestry, because he was born in, and his rai came from, Yawuru country; he spoke Yawuru; he performed responsibilities for 'the law' in Yawuru country; and he maintained and looked after Yawuru people and areas. When asked if his grandfather, Lulu, was a Yawuru person, Joseph Roe responded 'only by his responsibilities'. Later, Joseph Roe was asked:
'HIS HONOUR: Is the essence of what you're saying is that if a person who may not strictly be a Yawuru person holds responsibility for law in Yawuru country that makes him a member of the Yawuru community?
JOSEPH ROE: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: Would it also make him a Yawuru person, or is that a more difficult question to answer?
JOSEPH ROE: Oh, that's a difficult one; you'll have to ask Richard when he comes, because I can't…'
300 Gajai said that Lulu was a member of the Yawuru because of his actions in participating in 'law ceremonies'. He described the way a person who was not Yawuru by ancestry could come to be a member of the Yawuru:
'The elders, they look at you. They see what that man can do for people and their place. He look after the ground and he's been there that long, more or less he's like an Yawuru elder to us. We feel that he's one of us, so he should be.'
301 Gajai also said that a person who had been accepted into the Yawuru community could speak for Yawuru country if given the right to do so by the 'law men'. There was also evidence of other senior 'law bosses' (Tommy Edgar and Susie Gilbert) being incorporated into the Yawuru community.
302 Plainly, there is a serious question as to the nature and extent of the operation of the principles of adoption and incorporation spoken of by the witnesses under traditional law and custom. Although I need not resolve those issues in these reasons for judgment they demonstrate the difficulty inherent in ascribing to traditional law and custom any strict or rigid definition of a traditional community.
(e) Clan estates
303 The clan estate issue, which was closely related to the descent questions discussed above, was also strongly contested in Rubibi, where I made the following observations at 438-442 [129]-[142]:
'Dr Sullivan contended that the traditional community originally held land communally as a regional group. He stated that the area around Broome is an arid area and that the conclusions in the ethnographic literature in relation to patrilineal clan-based holdings are inapplicable to the traditional community because they are based on a model of social organisation that does not apply to an arid region. Dr Kolig disputed that proposition but Dr Sullivan stated that it would make very little difference to his conception of the Yawuru community if the evidence were not able to establish ambilineal descent in times past. He stated that this was because there are other important aspects of being a member of the Yawuru community. Of course, even if the patrilineal social organisation of traditional Aboriginal society were accepted, it does not follow that the gradual shift to the ambilineal social organisation of that community results in the cessation of continuity between the pre- contact community and the present community.
Dr Kolig said that the relevant community at sovereignty was based on a clan model and that primary rights in land were conferred by patrilineal descent. Such clans were said to be exclusive in their territoriality in the sense of being a politically organised landholding group. The estate was said to be held by the relevant community in the broader Kunin area because the patri-clan occupied a given territory, speaks mutually intelligible dialects, has a common kinship system and generally shares the performance of ceremonial rights of interest to them. Dr Kolig insisted that continuity of the patri-clan model of traditional Aboriginal society is a precondition to recognition of the Yawuru community as descendent from the traditional Aboriginal community that maintained any traditional connection with the broader Kunin area in 1829.
Dr Kolig accepted, however, that the historical ethnographic literature was "neither clear nor unambiguous" that estate ownership was necessarily by reference to patri-clan membership. He stated that a distinction was to be drawn between primary rights to land, being rights arising by membership of a patri-clan, and secondary rights to land which may arise by membership of a broader society having an attachment to that land. The primary rights relate to the right to use and occupy the land in question to the exclusion of others. The secondary rights related to access to and assembly at certain locations for ceremonial gatherings and short term exploitation of surrounding areas for subsistence purposes. Thus, so Dr Kolig argues, persons who may in a wider sense be members of a particular community by reason of linguistic, social or other associations only enjoy secondary rights which are not inconsistent with the prerogatives of the holders of the primary rights.
It may be that it was in the context of secondary rights that Dr Kolig accepted that ambilineal descent may have become part of traditional community organisation after European contact. He said:
"Following European contact, as might be expected, a relatively new modus of land attachment has evolved among Broome Aborigines more congenial to conditions in post-contact times. In fact the new traditions of owning and using land which have developed may deviate more or less significantly from pre-contact patterns, but nonetheless have the flavour of "tradition". Descent may now have become ambilineal, attachment to place may be determined less by descent than by spirit origin, custodianship of sacred myth and ritual, perhaps even residence alone (of self and even parental and grandparental residence) may now be seen to confer rights in land. In fact, Sullivan (1998:103) appears to be saying a person may claim attachment to more than one place. General recognition of an individual's personal claim depends solely on consensus among respected elders (Sullivan 1998:103)."
He later added:
"However, through the impact of western civilisation, sustained since the mid-19th century, profound changes in "tradition" or what is considered such, have taken place. Broome Aborigines, perhaps more than other groups, had suffered very early already a profound disruption of local organisation, displacement and dispossession, militating for the evolvement of new forms of some kind of land attachment. Not surprisingly strict patrifiliation with local clans became an untenable requirement. A greater degree of fluidity evolved allowing at first outsiders to gain residency and then, on the basis of traditional mechanisms of acquisition, develop a sense of land-holding."
Ultimately, Dr Kolig contended that the community he defined that existed in 1829 had broken down to such an extent that it was no longer an identifiable community in anthropological terms. He accepted that identification of the same traditional community from time to time must allow for "reasonable change" as a result of the community structure and its culture continuously responding to the shifting needs of each generation. But he claimed that the broad criteria proffered by Dr Sullivan went beyond what might be accepted as reasonable change. In essence, Dr Kolig's view appeared to be that, while he may not disagree with the proposition that the Yawuru community defined by Dr Sullivan might constitute a reasonable sociological construct of the present day community, it was not the same community that had a traditional attachment to Kunin as a traditional law ground in 1829. Rather, he argued that the current Yawuru community is substantially a response to the post World War II urbanisation of Broome and the removal of traditional Aboriginal communities from surrounding pastoral stations, and in particular, Thangoo, to camps around Broome.
Dr Kolig queried whether the mechanisms relied upon by Dr Sullivan to define the relevant community (ambilineal descent, spirit origin (rai), initiation, custodian of religious knowledge (sacred sites), ritual, dreaming tracks, and in some instances, residence) have evolved as part of a traditional cultural response to new forces or whether they have been created as new traditions and therefore have broken the chain of continuity.
Ultimately, the substantive dispute between the two anthropologists was less than it might appear to be. Both accepted that it is not possible to have a definition of a traditional community that is frozen in time. Rather, they agreed that the definition must recognise the process by which a community's traditional laws and customs evolve, respond and adapt to change.
…
In my view the question is not one of reasonable change but rather whether the [evidence] establishes that the present community is the community that has substantially maintained its traditional connection with Kunin in accordance with traditional laws and customs. In that context I do not find it necessary to make a finding on whether the relevant traditional community in 1829 was based on a patrilineal or an ambilineal model because I am satisfied that even if there was, originally, a patrilineal model, the evolution to an ambilineal model was part of a process of the community's evolution to its present traditional form, rather than the creation of a new community. It was clear from the evidence that white contact had a significant effect on the traditional community. For example, evidence was given that an ambilineal community model evolved in part to bring within the community the children of Yawuru women who were fathered by the white settlers. More importantly, I am satisfied that the traditional Yawuru community, in accordance with its evolving but traditional laws and customs, accepted as its members persons who became a member by ambilineal, rather that patrilineal, descent.'
304 The dispute in Rubibi related to the continuity, since sovereignty, of a community that had a traditional connection to the 'law ground' at Kunin, rather than as to whether traditional landholding in the claim area was based on a clan estate model. Nonetheless, the anthropologists in the present case were also in disagreement over whether, in pre-contact Aboriginal society, landholding estates in the Yawuru claim area were clan or people based. Palmer declared that the Yawuru community as a whole had rights to Yawuru country. O'Connor's view was that there were specific clan based estates in the respective claim areas and Sansom claimed that the preferable view is that traditional rights 'in country', which included the respective claim areas, were conferred by way of patriclan estates.
305 Elkin described patriclans as a local patrilineal clan, that is exogamous (members must marry outside the group) and patrilocal (women live in the local countries of the men to whom they are married). However, he pointed out that in areas, which are rich in food resources, boundaries are not of 'great practical importance' and there may be 'criss-crossing of ownership of areas in each other's countries, and also of dialects.' (AP Elkin, The Australian Aborigines, Fully Revised Edition, pp 76-80)
306 In order to understand the longstanding anthropological disagreement over the patriclan estate issue it is necessary to examine some of the anthropological concepts that have been developed in respect of Aboriginal land ownership and social organisation. At the broadest level of traditional Aboriginal society there is the tribe or language community, and within that group there are clans (local descent groups) and bands (hordes). Radcliffe-Brown described the 'horde' as:
'…a body of persons who jointly possess, occupy and exploit a certain defined area of country. The rights of the horde over its territory [are] that no person who is not a member of the horde has the right to any animal, vegetable or mineral product from the territory except by invitation… This exclusive use of territory by a horde is modified by obligations of hospitality.' (AR Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society, Cohen and West, London, 1952, pp 33-34)
307 In his second report Palmer states that Berndt said that Radcliffe-Brown had not differentiated between two different types of units, the first being the economic and social unit (the horde or band) and the second being the local descent group or clan. (RM Berndt, 'The Concept of 'The Tribe' in the Western Desert Australia', Oceania, vol 30, no 2, 1959, p 81 at 95) Generally speaking, the anthropological view developed at that time was that the local group or clan had spiritual attachment to a number of sites in an area which comprised the 'clan's estate', and, generally speaking, it was the local group that was the 'land-possessing group'. (ibid at 103). There was, however, also a 'land-using group', namely the band, made up of people from members of various local groups, comprising one or more families. Palmer explained:
'A person was both a member of a local group and a member of a band. Over time, a person might be a member of several bands (as choice and circumstances dictated), but could never be a member of any other local group than the one into which he was born.'
308 Professor Stanner provided a concise articulation of the 'clan based estate'. He attempted to summarise in a 'generalized' way the research into Aboriginal landholding undertaken by anthropologists 'over the last century'. Professor Stanner accepted as a true anthropological statement the Aboriginal conception that 'people belonged to the land rather than that the land belonged to the people' but stated that the purpose of his paper was to give that statement 'a fairly precise legal formulation'. (WEH Stanner, op cit pp 1-3)
309 Professor Stanner observed that the Aboriginal ideas of title and ownership were derived from the 'historic-genetic relation of a particular kind of grouping of persons to a particular territory in animum'. Sansom explained that the 'historic' related to the clan totem and the 'genetic' related to the 'conception totem'. Professor Stanner's view was that the clearest and most unequivocal landholding relationship was that 'between a patrilineal descent group (clan) or similar group and a more or less definite tract or region or set of localities or places.' (ibid p 3)
310 Professor Stanner explained that:
'In Aboriginal understanding human corporeal life was indivisibly in pair with spiritual life. Land was the physical vehicle, and a medium of symbolic expression, of the connection between the two components.' (ibid p 4)
311 The corporeal and spiritual elements are believed to cohere so indissolubly that the conception of a person or clan or similar groups necessarily included land or territory as intrinsic to their definition. The members of the group were related to the locality jointly, which meant that for each and every person of the group there was unity of title, of possession, of interest and of time. Professor Stanner developed this relationship as a conception of an 'estate' in land, which entitled the group members to an acknowledged dominion over a territory. (ibid pp 4-5)
312 Professor Stanner stated that '[i]n ordinary circumstances ownership of such an estate could not be taken away, given away, lost, or abandoned.' He explained that that was 'the reason why the Yirrkala clans will listen with incredulity to any assertion that the Crown "owns" their land.' However, he accepted that it was possible for a group to share, and in some circumstances even to relinquish, possession in a de facto sense. It was in that context that Professor Stanner accepted that, in order to exploit a countryside, the Aborigines formed bands of variable size and persons, which necessarily had a mixed clan membership because of clan-exogamy. He also said that other causes led to a mixed composition. Bands of that kind hunted, foraged, camped, took part in the ceremonies and participated in other activities on - in other words, used and occupied - a countryside without apparent necessity to make the operations of living on and within a region coincide with the pattern of legal ownership and legal possession of it. Professor Stanner observed that, as a consequence, the actual occupation and use of land did not have to accord strictly with the legal pattern of ownership and possession of the land, but occupation and use were conducted under 'colours of rights'. However, as with ownership, legal possession was central and crucial to much of the religious, social and institutional life because of its reference of body and spirit to a particular territory and, through the territory, to the formation of the world and the ontology of human existence. Professor Stanner stated that the doctrine of ownership and possession:
'…formed the anatomy of a plan of reference for personal identity, group membership, kinship relationships, descent, marriage, religious and some non-religious observances, and even some mundane transactions of life.' (ibid pp 5-7)
313 A clan, being unable to subsist sole, had to subsist through families and larger bodies, resulting in the use of clan land by non-clan members for a number of purposes. However, Professor Stanner observed that such use was restrained by the recognition, either tacitly or expressly, of a clan's legal rights of ownership and possession of particular tracts and places. (ibid pp 7-8)
314 The further consequence of the exogamy and non-exclusivity of clan life was stated by Professor Stanner as follows:
'At the same time, as a necessary incident or consequence of life the estate was subject either in animum or in rem to several classes of less precise rights or colours of rights which lay with people who were not of the true joint owners. Certain classes of secondary right-holders can be distinguished.
(a) Clan-wives, though in no sense "owners" of their husbands' lands, had virtually an unconditional right of residence on and occupation and use of their husbands' lands in rem;
(b) a husband had a clear but probably somewhat less express right to visit, occupy and use his wife's clan lands;
(c) a woman's children had an express right to visit, live on, occupy and use the lands of her patrilineal clan and in many cases they had as well some degree of right to the lands in animum;
(d) particular men and women with acknowledged ritual duties (e.g. in initiatory or commemorative rituals) involving persons or categories of persons in another clan (and especially in another moiety) had several kinds of rights, which have probably been analysed insufficiently, but included
(i) an express right in personam over the subjects of the rituals,
(ii) an express right to "manage" the rituals,
(iii) possibly a right in rem over the rituals themselves insofar as they were incorporeal hereditaments of the clan whose affairs were being managed, and
(iv) a right of entry into that clan's domains and, while there, to support from the resources of that clan;
(e) a somewhat undifferentiated general public right to limited visitation, occupation and use by the owners' consent.' (ibid pp 8-9)
315 It is clear from Professor Stanner's paper that, although he believed that the general principles he stated had a fairly close application to Yirrkala, the extent to which they may apply elsewhere had to be ascertained by reference to the particular area in question. Professor Stanner, expressed one of his conclusions as follows:
'I hope to have made it appear probable that there were anciently established concepts of ownership, title and estate; that there was a code of rights in land; that the rights were vested, not severally in individual persons, or in common between persons, but jointly in a particular kind of kinship group; that the rights went beyond usufruct; that proprietary right was recognized; and that the qualifications of proprietary rights in no way prejudiced legal ownership and possession but were practical concessions to a rational ordering of activities and the well-being of people in a particular form of society.' (ibid p 9)
There was little dispute between the anthropologists about the principles enunciated by Professor Stanner. The dispute between them related to whether those principles applied generally throughout Australia but, in particular, whether they were applicable to the Yawuru and the Walman Yawuru claim areas. The parties were also in dispute about whether, under traditional law and custom, Professor Stanner's dichotomy between the holder of primary and 'secondary rights' did not apply to the Yawuru community because it was an ambilineal or cognatic community with rights in respect of land devolving primarily by descent from either parent.
316 Understandably, the focus of Professor Stanner's paper was traditional Yirrkala society. Section 223(1) focuses on the communal, group or individual native title rights and interests possessed under traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the claimant community or group. Thus, Professor Stanner's analysis, while helpful, cannot provide the criteria for determining whether the rights and interests in issue are possessed under the traditional laws and customs that are acknowledged and observed in relation to the respective claim areas. Also, Professor Stanner's paper was primarily concerned with an overarching proprietorial title or ownership. Thus, he regarded 'rights of spouses' and of the other persons referred to in [314] as 'secondary rights'. Stanner's analysis in that regard is similar to Sansom's analysis of membership of a clan country being ceded to a 'non-agnate' in a number of circumstances, thereby giving that person rights or interests in clan country (see [289]). However, the definition of native title 'rights and interests' in ss 223(1) and 253 does not distinguish between 'primary rights' and 'secondary rights'. Thus, there is a significant difficulty in the State of Western Australia's endeavour to apply Professor Stanner and O'Connor's patriclan estate analysis to a claim for native title rights and interests in the Yawuru claim area.
317 Nonetheless, in addressing the actual situation in the Yawuru claim area it is appropriate to start with the views expressed in the early 1930's by Elkin and the Piddingtons concerning patrifiliation in or near the Kimberley region in Western Australia. Elkin observed that patrilineal descent of the totem (and therefore, implicitly if not explicitly, to the spiritual connection to the totem's country), which prevails in most of the Kimberley Division, is dependent on the fact that 'children belong to the horde-country of their father and therefore to the totem or totems associated with it'. However, Elkin states that more research remains to be done 'before the roles of the father and the locality in totemic descent can be finally determined'. (AP Elkin, 'Social Organization in the Kimberley Division, North-Western Australia', Oceania, vol 2, no 3, 1932, p 296 at 330)
318 At about the same time as that Elkin's article was published, the Piddingtons suggested that the clan/horde ownership model did not appear to apply to a certain sub-group of the Karajarri where any horde may go on hunting expeditions on the territory of other hordes without asking permission. (M Piddington and R Piddington, 'Report of Field Work on North-Western Australia', Oceania, vol 2, no 3, 1982, p 4342 at 351) Later R Piddington responded to criticism of his earlier field work by stating that Karajarri sub-tribes in the coastal areas 'never had any' horde boundaries or objections to trespass, unless the latter were determined by factors extraneous to land tenure and utilization, such as accusations of sorcery or the theft of women. (R Piddington, 'A Note on Kardjeri Local Organization', Oceania, vol 41, no 4, 1971, p 239 at 240)
319 The area involved in the Piddington's report appears to be one in which the southern tradition was practiced. In his later note, R Piddington was critical of the emphasis placed by some writers on European conceptions of ownership, rather than on Aboriginal conception. He stated:
'Aboriginal conceptions…are generally based on sacred spots marking points in the tracks of or the doings of culture heroes of the Dream Times. These spots mark the spiritual centres of local groups in a manner which might be compared with gravitational fields. Groups might wander for a distance around their sacred spots, often crossing into the margin of the "gravitational fields" of other groups but always remaining spiritually attached to their own.
Though Aboriginal land tenure thus defined is primarily a spiritual concept, it also had an economic basis. As Radcliffe-Brown pointed out many years ago, the Aborigines' knowledge of their environment was very largely a localized knowledge of the topographical distribution of supplies of food and water. The further a group wandered from the spiritual centre of its activities the more limited would this essential kind of specialized knowledge become.' (ibid)
320 Sansom accepted that there are examples of 'shared country' and agreed with the observation of Peterson and Long that the Radcliffe-Brown model, with its exclusive focus on patrilineal rights and interests is too group-oriented and ignores the variety of individual interests in estates and their regional variation. (N Peterson and J Long, Australian Territorial Organization A Band Perspective, Oceania Monograph, University of Sydney, 1986, p 64) Sansom also agreed generally with the observation of Sutton that:
'In particular, the evidence for the dominance of patrilineal descent groups or similar formations was not as widespread as Stanner had considered it, and even groups which formerly had such structures have in many or most cases now modified them in a range of ways. Furthermore, the extent to which bands were, in bush times, constituted of a strong core or nucleus of people from a single estate and hence of a single descent or totemic group focusing its residential pattern on that estate, for example, is greater even in Stanner's formulation than the empirical evidence will support.' (P Sutton, 'Aboriginal Country Groups and the 'Community of Native Title Holders'', National Native Title Tribunal Occasional Papers Series, no 1, 2001, p 19)
321 In his main report, Palmer set out his views of the rights of the band and of the local group:
'Anthropologists are generally agreed that the band used the land over which they ranged. By this it is understood that its members exploited freely the resources of the land: vegetable, meat, fish, mineral, everything that was necessary for normal daily living. There is no evidence that the members of the band deferred to local group representatives of the land upon which they happened to be gaining their subsistence. The distinction between a land using group and a land owning group implies that the latter have a higher form of title than the former. Just how this might be so has not been explained. The legitimate use of a resource necessarily implies a right to that resource. A right is a concomitant of some form of ownership. Band members exercised these rights, and therefore can be said, in this sense, to be owners of the country over which they ranged.
…
The answer to the question, "who owns the country?" is then dependent upon the precise subject of the right of the owner. Rights to an area's resources, are (and were), in my view, the prerogative of a community comprising a number of bands whose members together traversed the land when using its economic resources. The land was linguistically bounded by reference to mythological ordained enculturation and manifest in sites that marked the beginning or end of the community's cultural territory. Rights to the intellectual properties of the land, on the other hand, as are articulated through religious belief and practice, reside in component parts of the bands which are local groups…The bands, together, as a community, contained within the parameters of a language or cultural territory, used the country and had rights to do so. To argue otherwise would be to reify local groups and ascribe to them an economic function and reality they clearly never had.'
322 Palmer's view is that the range of band members was determined by economic necessity (as well as by social, cultural and ritual demands), so that in an area of relative plenty, such as in Yawuru country, travel in the course of gaining a livelihood need not have been extensive. Palmer noted that:
'It is likely that, in normal times, those living in the far south of Yawuru country, for example, would not have much occasion to visit areas in the far north and north west of Yawuru territory, and vice versa. However, the right to visit more distant parts of one's cultural country were present, dormant or latent for the most part. However, these rights could be activated in difficult circumstances, such as an extreme weather conditions, a period of prolonged drought or flooding, neighbouring hostilities, ritual demands, marriage alliances and so on.'
323 Palmer stated that the relevant community could be described as follows:
'[P]rior to 1829, the Broome area would have been occupied by a community that probably called itself, Yawuru, by reference to its language and cultural territory. The community was comprised of numerous labile bands, some of which were named, or some of which together were named, whose members had a binding and fundamental spiritual attachment to special places in the country. Together, these bands were recognised by all others (neighbouring language communities) as having the rights to use and occupy Yawuru cultural territory. Senior band members, as representatives of local groups, had responsibility for the intellectual property that concerned spiritually potent sites within the country and with which they had a special and passionate relationship, which included a duty to physically care for the sites and adjacent areas.'
324 Palmer accepted that individuals had, and continue to have, a strong emotional and spiritual tie to certain places, and also accepted that identifiable groups of people lived in particular geographic areas. In his supplementary report in reply to Sansom, Palmer observed:
'Since an important means of recruitment to ownership of land is via descent…membership of a descent group also implies rights to country. In this sense, then, it is members of the local descent group (but operating as band members) who exercise rights to country. In Yawuru religious belief, however, rights to specific sites or areas are activated through ritual inductions for a Yawuru person or gained from spiritual association through the rayi [principle].'
In his main report, Palmer stated that he does not accept that the anthropological evidence shows that groups of people with special connections to particular parts of country demonstrate the existence of exclusive land-owning groups.
325 Palmer concluded that '[r]ights are exercised with due regard for an individual's spiritual attachment to country, but are not subject to them.' He concluded that 'rights to the cultural territory reside in an aggregation of the groups in the form of a community rather than in each group with respect to small parcels of land. I consider that this modern arrangement is founded upon a traditional tenure system.' Palmer noted in his fourth report, that when 'clan exogamy and cognatic descent are the norm multiple attachments to a number of areas will be the consequence.' He rejected the view to the contrary of the early ethnographers stating that they failed to 'provide clear evidence of a system bounded clan estates'. Palmer also rejected his previously expressed view in which he had accepted the clan based estate approach. Palmer agreed that clan descent groups had relationships with particular Yawuru areas or places but rejected the proposition that under traditional law and custom those relationships conferred the right to exclude other Yawuru people from those areas or places. Palmer drew a distinction between a Yawuru person informing a clan member of a visit as a 'courtesy' and a Yawuru visitor only being entitled to visit if 'permission' to do so is granted.
326 Palmer subsequently qualified the analysis in his main report, noting that it is not possible to ascertain exactly how the pre-contact society operated, but stated the propositions that he put forward 'constitute a view as to how things might have been' based on the work of other scholars. He concluded by contending that the views he put forward 'are not unreasonable, in the circumstances'.
327 O'Connor's evidence focused on the Walman Yawuru as a community in its own right. Thus, he considered the laws and customs of the Walman Yawuru people on the basis of Yawuru merely being seen as a language and Walman Yawuru being a dialect of Yawuru. O'Connor concluded that Walman Yawuru is a clan and that the community who spoke the Yawuru dialects was not a land-owning community because land was owned by individual clans. O'Connor contended that the Walman Yawuru continue to have a connection with Walman Yawuru country, as they occupy the traditional lands and have a duty to teach the next generation the correct traditional method of collecting the fruits of the land and waters in order to perpetuate the spirituality of the land. In his third report, O'Connor stated that the Walman Yawuru do not recognise an overarching communality with the applicants, but rather, see themselves as having a distinct heritage, history and dialect.
328 O'Connor emphasised the clan nature of the Walman Yawuru and stated that the Walman Yawuru:
'…are adamant that, in accordance with traditional law and custom amongst the peoples who spoke dialects of the Yawuru language, permission should be sought from members of the relevant clan group before going onto their clan lands for the purposes of residence, temporary or permanent, or carrying out traditional practices, including food gathering.'
O'Connor saw that as a form of permission as it gives the other party the right of refusal, and involves 'delicate issues of manners and expected or appropriate behaviour'.
329 O'Connor states in his third report that:
'…certain groups of people, by virtue of association with particular natural species and descent from ancestors who were the living embodiment of the spiritual essences of those species, were tied to specific tracts of land in perpetuity.'
330 When asked about the source of the right of the Walman Yawuru clan to 'speak for country', O'Connor stated that the 'right to speak comes from their religion'. He was then asked:
'HIS HONOUR: Now, have any of the Walman Yawuru respondents claimed that the source of their right to speak for country is the southern tradition?
MR O'CONNOR: No, they claim that their right to speak for country is their birth in the land and the fact that they carry the spirit of that land within them.'
331 O'Connor's general advocacy of the Walman Yawuru case on the basis of his unquestioning acceptance of what he was told sits uncomfortably with the detailed 'Report on the Broome Aboriginal Heritage Study' that he prepared in 1992 after engaging in 'wide-ranging regional consultation [with] Aboriginal elders' in field trips over three months. One conclusion O'Connor drew from those consultations was that the 'Yawuru people are the traditional owners of the Broome area' and that certain named Yawuru elders (who were not members of the Walman Yawuru clan) had the right to speak for the Broome region. That conclusion is consistent with the History Report in the present case of Dr Fiona Skyring which explains how, when Aboriginal elders were given their first chance to speak publicly about their country and its importance to them, they claimed 'that Broome and the surrounding areas were Yawuru'. Those conclusions are also supported by the evidence of Joseph 'Nipper' Roe, Paul Sampi and Barrett to the effect that, notwithstanding their long association with the Broome area, prior to native title being an issue they had only heard people speak of the Yawuru people, rather than of any of the clans of the Yawuru people. For example, Barrett, an anthropologist who worked in the Broome area with the Yawuru community for a number of years, gave evidence on behalf of the applicants that:
'In the years that I've worked here, nobody has ever talked about clans. The oldest people, such as Susie Gilbert's husband that passed away, Cissy's [Djiagween's] brother that passed away, would have been born around 1920. There would have been people around then born in 1860. They were always very emphatic that it was one people. When I've worked in other areas, people talk about clans: they don't talk about them here.'
332 I regard the information set out above in O'Connor's 1992 report as being more reliable than the views he expressed on the basis of the information he received from the Walman Yawuru witnesses. The report was based on extensive consultations with 'Aboriginal elders' and field trips 'over three months' and preceded any native title claim.
333 Sansom, in his first report, posited the question: 'Was the Yawuru system originally a system of tenure based on the patriclan estate or has it always been a "flexible" system of the Western Desert type?' Sansom observed that in the Western Desert, a flexible model of land tenure was required because of the harsh conditions, which required people to move around constantly in line with the seasons. He stated that necessity for a wide-ranging use of the land 'precludes the development of restrictive and possessory forms of land tenure'. Yet, in richer zones less prone to drought, Sansom's view was that flexibility is not a necessity, and there was every reason to maintain the clan estate, which was the basis of the older male's power.
334 Sansom then posed the question: 'Did the Yawuru have it hard?', because he reasoned that, if Yawuru country is rich country, then a normal restrictive system should have applied. In his initial report, Sansom considered the problem that the Yawuru faced was water shortages at certain times of the year, and stated that it was speculation to respond that this meant that the law of trespass did not apply. Sansom's initial view was that 'Yawuru land was classically sub-divided into sub-countries and that the sub-countries thus distinguished were associated with sub-groupings of the Yawuru peoples.' He concluded that he was not persuaded that the Yawuru people experienced so much difficulty and privation that a reversion to the system of desert emergencies was called for. In his main report Sansom concluded that traditional Yawuru country was well endowed, and his anthropological expectation was that such a country would be divided into clan estates in which 'primary rights' would be held by members of the totemic clan.
335 Sansom noted that if exclusive ownership and possession of land is asserted, then there must be a law of trespass, which is characterised as entering another's land without permission. He contended that it is a general feature throughout Aboriginal Australia that to be granted permission the stranger needed to be made known to the 'Dreaming Power'. Sansom said in respect of that permission:
'PROF SANSOM: Yes. The essential point that I make about the giving, or withholding of permission, indeed, is that, in my understanding, in all the places and situations I know about or have read about, the granting of permission entails bringing the stranger into a relationship with the powers of the Dreaming. It is not a matter of just saying yea or nay to access the country; it is a matter of bringing people to the Dreaming, and therefore transforming them by creating a relationship between them and the Dreaming by virtue of a ritual act.'
336 Sansom argued that fixed 'Dreaming spots' are essential to any tenurial system:
'They answer this problem: How can a people often thinly spread over extensive territories, patrol and keep their borders and so enforce the law of trespass by keeping interlopers out? …an answer to the problem was found in religion. If trespass is made a major act of sacrilege, then Dreamings may punish the trespasser.'
337 Sansom also looked at the anthropological evidence in respect of the neighbouring Karajarri tribe because a number of anthropologists, most notably the Piddingtons, researched Karajarri culture in the 1930s. Sansom stated that by the time the Piddingtons came to do research among the Karajarri, 'they dealt with a remnant population'. Sansom also states that the research showed that there were inland and coastal dialects. He claims that the Piddingtons found that in the coastal territory, the inland Karajarri applied no rule of trespass, with each horde or band hunting freely 'over the territory of any other horde, without asking the permission of the owners, who would not object'. (M Piddington and R Piddington, op cit p 351) He claims that the Piddingtons accepted that, although the general Australian practice is that each horde owns a specific territory over which its members may hunt, but over which no other horde members may hunt or camp without permission, this rule does not apply to coastal territory in Karajarri country. The point Sansom appeared to make is that the coastal territory is merely an exception.
338 Sansom examined Palmer's model in relation to connection to country and stated:
'The Palmer model allows Yawuru to own Yawuru country just by being conceived and just by being born; and ties with country are intensified by:
[i] just living consistently on the land; and if one is lucky,
[ii] the fact that one's birth-site happens to be within the bounds of the Yawuru domain.
The natural system characterised above requires neither detailed knowledge of song nor rite nor traditions to sustain those "spiritual associations which are common to all members of the community."'
339 Sansom agreed with Palmer that clans or local groups were seldom seen as an actual group (Palmer called them a 'virtual' group). But Sansom said that the clan existed behind all the material activities of life.
340 However, in considering O'Connor's version of the Walman Yawuru as a land-owning clan, Sansom observed:
'This is a region in which men of ceremony are active and in which land-ownership is ratified through ceremony and through the holding of sacra. I believe that the sacra that relate to sites in the land claimed as Walman Yawuru and Minyirr country, may be in the keeping of lawmen who may or may not be Walman Yawuru. Mr O'Connor does not deal with ceremony in a region where any landholding group must somehow fit into and participate in the regional rounds of ritual performance.
In my view, the Walman Yawuru grouping in its isolation does not constitute a traditional grouping with a distinct and independent system of law and custom and, therefore, does not, by and of itself, qualify to be recommended for consideration as a community of native title holders.'
341 Sansom later considered the transmission of knowledge and noted that adult male band members were never all equal with equal economic access to country:
'Management of the land proceeded from authority, the authority of the holder of higher rather than lesser rights to knowledge of the country and its Dreamings.
Just as rights in country all flow from spiritual connection, so authority either to speak for country or to care for country flows from the holding of transitive rights to knowledge by a person who rightfully exhibits the marks of status. There is no divorce between Rights Temporal and Rights Spiritual; all rights are laid down in the Law and the activation of those rights is grounded in ritual endowment right through from the minor rite that is the granting of permission to the major and time-absorbing rites of endowment in which the authority of elders is grounded degree by degree.'
342 Sansom criticised Palmer's theory because it privileged the act of using the land by hunter-gatherers, which is a theory based on land use that applied to people who can no longer be seen as living in bands and using the land in the old ways. He concluded:
'Because the primary tie with land is a spiritual connection and because ownership does not derive from a particular pattern of use but from spiritual responsibility, Aboriginal ownership can be sustained as long as people are active in perpetuating that armature of things spiritual that make people and country one.'
343 Sansom concluded his report by answering a number of enumerated questions. He identified the existing society which was connected to the land through traditional laws and customs at the time of sovereignty as the Yawuru. He stated:
'1. The attested existence of the distinct Yawuru language and its dialects together with Yawuru names for sites, places, features and products of the determination area taken together with myths in the Yawuru language pertaining to these sites, place, features and products, leads one to conclude that the determination area was associated with a speech community whose members maintained and communicated with one another in the Yawuru language and its dialects at the time of sovereignty.
2. The dialects of Yawuru were, in all probability, associated with dialectal sub-groups of speakers who, in turn, were probably associated with distinguishable sub-countries within an encompassing Yawuru country.
3. Furthermore, the existence of separate Yawuru lands is and was acknowledged by neighbouring peoples who enjoy and enjoyed ceremonial relationships with Yawuru. Association with land is expressed in land-related myths. Those with title to land sing or tell those parts of the myth cycle that pertain to their own respective countrysides and have the exclusive right to tell or sing those parts of the myth cycle that pertain to their own respective countrysides. In this way, Yawuru title to land is asserted against the world.
4. The society connected with the claim area at the time of sovereignty may be identified as the grouping of people who own the Yawuru language and through ownership of this language assert ownership of the countryside whose aspects are designated in the Yawuru tongue and whose land-related myths are sung or told in Yawuru.'
344 It should be noted that Sansom's four propositions accord with the 'oral history' evidence given by the Yawuru claimant's witnesses and with the conclusions I have expressed thus far in relation to the matters the subject of those propositions.
345 Sansom then went on to identify what he considered were the traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the identified society at the time of sovereignty. The laws and customs he identified included marriage rules, connection through rai and place of birth, rites for the disposal of the dead, male initiation rites, gender restricted knowledge and the importance of 'increase sites'. Sansom also argues that the northern and southern traditions are distinct and pertain to 'distinct and distinguishable countries'.
346 Sansom conceded that the part played by descent, the existence of clan estates and the patrilineal clan as the land owning group was in dispute, and concluded '[f]or my money, the Yawuru probably had clan estates.' Sansom differentiated between a clan and a tribe:
'MS WEBB: Is there - there is a difference between a clan and a tribe, Professor Sansom.
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MS WEBB: Is that the case?
PROF SANSOM: Yes, clans to be groupings with exogamy. They have to marry out.
MS WEBB: And what is the situation with tribes?
PROF SANSOM: Tribes are married to communities. They tend to be - tend to be endogamous. Most of the marriages of their members tend to be within.'
347 However, in observing 'the law', Sansom said there is a close link between the clan and the tribe. Sansom stated:
'HIS HONOUR: But what would happen if, on one of the clan estates, the rituals were disrespected? What would the right or interest be of the members of the adjoining clan estate to take measures?
PROFESSOR SANSOM: They could take measures, and they'd rally a crowd, and come up and do something.
HIS HONOUR: Without permission?
PROFESSOR SANSOM: There's an override rule when you've got sacrilege. Oh, and I think too, lawman can move between law grounds - which is not a right to another estate - on law business.
…
HIS HONOUR: In other words, there's an interest in surrounding clans for respect of the rituals that the Dreamtimes may require.
PROFESSOR SANSOM: Yes.'
348 Sansom accepted that identification of a person with a traditional tribal community involved, inter alia, descent, community acceptance and spiritual connection. In respect of community acceptance he stated:
'PROF SANSOM: Yes. Community acceptance being very important, and as we noted with the fact that a clan can't exist sole, it simply means that, in a sense, everything that lawfully happens within a clan estate has to find its ratification in the community of consensus; otherwise they'll be baled up for doing it wrong way.
And so the community, and I like to call it a jurisdiction in a non-legal sense, but the jurisdiction to which these people are referred is - is always made up of a (therality) of clans and might be a sub-section of a tribe or it might be a whole tribe. So there is a communal oversight and interest, and you know, I say that it's reactive.
People don't interfere with you if you're doing things right or don't have the right to do so, but if you - if you do things wrong, they have the right to arraign you and call on the rest of the community to support them in their accusation and progress towards correcting wrong.'
349 Also, Sansom explained his distinction between primary and secondary right holders in clan estates:
'MS WEBB: And you've referred to primary and secondary holders in clan estates. Who are the primary right holders in clan estates?
PROF SANSOM: The members of the patri-clan.
MS WEBB: And what persons have secondary rights in a clan estate?
PROF SANSOM: Matrifiliates, people with conception Dreamings in the clan land, people who are on the same Dreaming track as the track associated with the clan totem. Those are the major categories.
MS WEBB: Would you - I think you've just said it, but can I just confirm: would you have primary rights in a country not your clan estate if you had your conception place there?
PROF SANSOM: Not primary rights.
MS WEBB: Would you have secondary rights?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MS WEBB: Yes. And what are secondary rights, Professor Sansom?
PROF SANSOM: There are two kinds of secondary rights. One is based on a spiritual connection, and that is the conception Dreaming connection. In this country it's a rai connection. And that is a relationship with the clan country - as Stanner puts it "in anima". And the other people do not have spiritual connection with the clan country if they come through the matri-line.
They are connected to the people of the clan, and for Stanner, and this is the point of his distinction, they have rights in personam in clan members. Then, the other class I distinguish is the other main class in matters of succession, persons who are on the same Dreaming track as the totem that is contained in the clan, such persons do have a spiritual link with the clan but it is of a weaker or diluted kind.
MS WEBB: You say they have a spiritual link with the clan.
PROF SANSOM: Yes. And the clan totem.
MS WEBB: And the clan totem.
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MS WEBB: What are their rights in the clan country?
PROF SANSOM: They have an interest of oversight in the clan land because they will be damaged in themselves if the keeper of the clan country fails in proper looking after duty for country, and allow sacrilege to happen on that land. The people with the totemic link to that clan are endangered, and this is -and so they have a real interest in watching over and making sure that their neighbours don't make a mess of things.'
350 In respect of the clan model, Sansom makes the following observations:
'Whether we use a clan estate model, or the Western Desert model, or the language group model of Rumsey, or the somewhat incomplete and problematic model proposed by Dr Palmer, the community of Native Title holders turns out the be the same - everyone Yawuru is included in it.
…
In terms of the clan model, it is also so on the anthropological grounds that are specified above; namely, that the clan estate is not exclusively owned by those with patrifilial connection to it. Other kin have secondary rights that the patrifiliates may not gainsay. Those with an interest in a patriclan estate include kin not born to the estate by patrifiliation.
The territories of language groups are entities because people share in the same Dreaming tracks. All the members of a language group have an interest in the proper management of each and every part of the country as mismanagement may elicit a response from offended Dreamings and everyone will then suffer.
The existence of this generalised interest does not cancel or interfere with the specific work and rights of the custodians of particular places.'
351 After becoming aware of the State of Western Australia's evidence in relation to Worms and, in particular, the evidence relating to totems, rai and camping places of named clans, Sansom gave notice of a change in the earlier views he expressed in his written reports concerning clan estates. Sansom's change of view was that he was now satisfied that the clan estate model he discussed in his report was 'reliably established', rather than merely probable.
352 Van Gent's conclusions, which were relevant to the change of view, on the recorded ethnographic data of Worms, were stated by her to be as follows:
'…I consider that Worms recorded ethnographic data which documents the spiritual connection between Yaoro people and their country. This link is prominent in his discussion of totemic identities. Worms provides evidence for the existence of personal totems that were inherited in the patrilineal line and located in the father's country, as his Yaoro informant Raphael D'olagora explained it so aptly to Worms.
To find out the totem of a person, one asks "What banmin you got?" Banmin is the totem, the area where the man was born. Raphael's banmin is pinden (Stingray). His "country" is Walderi-nari, not far from Edgar Station, approximately 35 [km] east of Broome. If blacks want to catch stingrays in his country, they come first to Raphael and ask him to help them to catch stingrays. "He dreams (bugari) about the place where stingrays are", and leads them to the coast where they can be killed. He, Raphael, is allowed to eat only a little bit from it. The rest is for the others. All of his ancestors in the male line belong to pinden, that is to the same totem of the stingray. That means this is connected to the totemic centres of the horde-country. (Notebook, p. 17)
Worms also acknowledges the existence of clan specific totems and clan specific country for the Yaoro (Worms 1940, p. 231, footnote 2):
The Yaoro tribe, whose country extends approximately 30 miles from Broome south west along the coast, has 4 clans:
- The Walman clan with the golebel or turtle totem. They have six camping places. The main camping place is called Manalagon, circa 8 miles east of Broome.
- The D'olbai clan with the bindah - or stingray totem. They have 14 camping places. The main camping place is called Yalanbanan, a hill close to Thangoo or Edgar station.
- The Leregen clan with the garabolo or white kangaroo totem. They have 13 camping places. The main camping place is called Rambanale, that is the area in Broome where today houses of the company "Streeter and Male" are built. It means literally "yams" (rambag) and "swamp" (nale).[…] The Leregen have several totems, because they are in contact with eastern tribes.
- The Menere, with the barambara or parrotfish totem. They have six camping places. The main camping place is called Godelragal. Today the movie theatre of Broome is erected there.
And finally, Worms gives examples of the totemic ancestor's traces on the landscape itself. For example, for Ganen: "A short stretch of land on the south bank of the inner Roebuck Bay, opposite Broome. It belongs to the Yaoro tribe, Walmandyano local clan with the turtle (golebel) totem. A big oval stone on the beach represents this local totem." (Worms, 1944, no. 32) or for the so called Dog Stone (Yelangrainaman), "a group of overgrown boulders in the bush a few miles north-west of Broome" that is the location of the totems of young dogs. (Worms, 1944, no. 49).
Worms shows that rights, interests and duties to the land were also taught during initiation ceremonies. In his discussion of Yaoro initiation ceremonies, Worms points out that during the second degree of the initiation, a boy is instructed by four old men from different tribes in the law, wamba godyara, the borders of tribal countries, the location of totemic places and the hunting and fishing grounds. (Worms, 1938, p. 167)
Worms also attempts to link myths with the local geography. In his 1940 publication on myths in the Kimberley, he provides numerous references to clarify the exact geographical position of the localities mentioned in the narratives.
Worms gives also the location of an important Yaoro ceremonial ground as "on a cleared patch in the bush close to Broome." (Worms, 1942, p. 224)
I have come to the conclusion that although Worms was not an academically trained anthropologist and his ethnographic work does not show the systematic and critical approach of contemporary anthropology, he was nevertheless able to clearly identify individual groups and their territorial affiliations. Most significantly, this included names of four Yaoro clans, their camping grounds and their totemic identities.'
353 Worms recorded the camping grounds of each of the clans. Although he gave little information as to the interaction between the camping grounds, he does give such information in respect of the different tribes and, in particular, in relation to their adjoining borders. Also, while the sites Worms has described as 'Walman sites' fall largely within the Walman Yawuru claim area, the area also has camps of other clans (Minyirr and Djulbayi) located in it. Van Gent said she could find no 'hints' in Worms' material concerning who holds clan country under Yawuru tribal law. The lack of specificity on that issue may be explained on the basis that, although Worm's ethnographic data records significant information, he did so as a missionary and linguist, rather than as a British trained anthropologist for whom social organisation would have been a focus. I do not accept that the evidence in relation to Worms' records and reports establishes a clan estate model at sovereignty.
354 However, there is a more fundamental problem confronting the argument that a clan estate model can be relied upon to reflect native title rights and interests at sovereignty. As explained above, the traditional anthropological distinction between the 'primary rights' of patriclan members and the 'secondary rights' of non-members at sovereignty is based on a view of an overarching title or ownership in respect of clan country that confers exclusive possession on clan members. However, that approach admits to numerous exceptions, which include spouses, children, band or horde members and 'law business'. Such exceptions were discussed in [289], [314] and [349]. As I have explained, those exceptions may fall within the definition of native title rights and interests under ss 223(1) and 253 (see, for example, the exceptions in [316]). Thus, the nature and extent of the acknowledged 'secondary rights' undermines the premise of clan exclusivity or, put another way, of a rule of trespass in respect of clan country. The problem in respect of such a rule was pointed out in Gumana at [227]-[228] where, in response to a submission of the Commonwealth that only a spiritual connection to land can give rise to a native title right or interest, Selway J observed:
'If this submission were correct then its effect would be that the right under Yolngu tradition and custom of spouses to enter onto the land of the relevant clan could not be reflected in a determination made under the NTA. Indeed, presumably the "native title holders" could rely upon the determination to seek damages from a spouse for trespass in seeking to exercise the rights that he or she possessed under Yolngu law. For my part I think it would be surprising if Parliament had legislated to achieve that result.
Of course it has not done so. The problem with the Commonwealth submission is that it treats comments in the cases about what is a factual inquiry as reflecting some legal test. It is probably true to say that the connection between the Aboriginal group and its country in accordance with Aboriginal tradition and custom is ordinarily a "spiritual" connection. It is also true that that connection is usually reflected in the physical occupation of the relevant land. This does not mean, however, that every right or interest enjoyed by every Aboriginal has to have a "spiritual" aspect to it. "Cultural" and "social" connections may also be sufficient: see Yanner at 373[38] where the majority comment that "an important aspect of the socially constituted fact of native title rights and interests that is recognised by the common law is the spiritual, cultural and social connection with the land". Nor does it mean that every right must be reflected in the physical occupation and use of the land. In this case there is no doubt that the relevant spouses have a "connection" with the land - most of them live on it. Whether or not the right or interest is a "spiritual" one is not to the point. As the Commonwealth accepted, the right or interest is one enjoyed under the traditions and customs of the Yolngu people. That, combined with the physical and social connection that the spouses undoubtedly have, is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statutory test.'
355 Further, the focus of s 223(1) of the NTA is on the rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws and customs of the relevant community or claim group. I have not accepted that the 'oral history' evidence of the Walman Yawuru witnesses establishes that a rule of trespass has ever applied to, or that permission was ever required to enter upon, the Walman Yawuru claim area under the traditional laws and customs of the Yawuru community. Indeed, I did not accept that the evidence of the Walman Yawuru witnesses established that Walman Yawuru clan members possessed native title rights and interests under those traditional laws and customs in their capacity as clan members. However, that conclusion was subject to the anthropological evidence that was said to support the existence of such rights and interests that were said to be exclusive rights and interests at sovereignty. I accept that the anthropological evidence might justify such a finding in some parts of Australia. However, I am not satisfied that such a finding is warranted in respect of the Walman Yawuru or the Yawuru claim areas. Understandably, the anthropological view in support of the patriclan estate model appears to be based on a general view about land ownership or landholding in certain traditional indigenous societies, rather than on a specific analysis of the native title rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws and customs that confer such rights and interests in a particular society. It is the latter, rather than the former, that is the subject matter that is to be considered under the NTA.
356 Turning to the society in question in the present case, I am satisfied that the 'oral history' evidence and the anthropological evidence I have accepted, is unequivocally against the existence of patriclan estates under the traditional laws and customs now acknowledged and observed by the Yawuru community. Of course, I accept that those laws and customs might have evolved from traditional laws and customs that provided for landholding to be akin to that of a patriclan estate model at or prior to sovereignty, but there is sparse evidence to support that view in relation to the respective claim areas. While I accept that that view is possible, and even a reasonable, hypothesis, I am not satisfied that it is the most likely hypothesis. The more likely hypothesis is that at sovereignty clan members had special attachments to, and responsibilities for, the areas with which the clan members were traditionally associated. While it is likely that those attachments and responsibilities would have generally led to Yawuru persons, who were non-clan members, informing clan members of their presence in such areas as a matter of courtesy and respect, I regard it as unlikely that there was a clear rule of trespass or a requirement for permission in respect of Yawuru persons who are not clan members. Plainly, the numerous exceptions referred to above are against such a rule or requirement. I would add that that conclusion is consistent with the research and views of the Piddingtons in relation to the analogous Karajarri coastal areas.
357 Accordingly, for the above reasons, I do not accept that the exclusive native title rights and interests claimed by the Walman Yawuru claimants were held by clan members at sovereignty. It does not follow from that conclusion that the Walman Yawuru clan members do not have any native title rights and interests in their clan areas in their capacity as clan members. Rather, the conclusion has the consequence that any such rights and interests are not the exclusive rights and interests they claim to possess because I am not satisfied that such rights and interests were possessed under the relevant traditional laws and customs at sovereignty. I also do not accept that the evidence establishes that such rights and interests are possessed under any subsequent evolution of those traditional laws and customs. Of course, these conclusions are limited to any rights and interests claimed by the Walman Yawuru clan members as such, and are not concerned with any native title rights and interests those members may possess as members of the Yawuru community.
358 It remains to consider the anthropological evidence as to how the traditional laws and customs have evolved since sovereignty. Although the Yawuru claimants disputed the patriclan estate theory at sovereignty, their alternative position was that, whatever might have been the position at sovereignty concerning the primary/secondary rights dichotomy, any distinction between the two traditional levels of rights disappeared with the evolution of the Yawuru community into its ambilineal form. The evolution was said to be an example of the traditional 'contingency provisions', of which Sansom spoke, being at work. In the course of his written and oral evidence, Sansom accepted that, under traditional law and custom, a clan ownership system or structure may evolve into a language group ownership system or structure.
359 Of course, there could be little dispute that, even if a patrilineal system existed at sovereignty, it was unable to the survive the progressive colonisation and urbanisation of the Kimberley region. In that regard, Mardiros stated:
'A few comments need to be made about general principles of kinship reckoning in Aboriginal Australia. As Hiatt (1982) points out, traditional patrilineal descent principles are no longer strictly applicable in much of Aboriginal Australia. Because of depopulation, disruption and other factors affecting traditional estate groups, principles of affiliation are more commonly cognatic (that is, tracing descent through male and female links) rather than unilineal. The Yawuru elders consulted in the preparation of this report trace their affiliation on such a cognatic basis.' (D Mardiros, 'Report Regarding Crocodile Farm', Yawuru Aboriginal Corporation, 1992, p 10)
360 Sansom recognised these influences on traditional life (see [289]-[291]). Ultimately, his requirement was that any evolution must 'be shown to be traditional with a link to the traditional formation'. However, Sansom dealt with that very issue in his interim report where he, relevantly, expressed his 'Conclusions and Issues for Further Consideration' as follows:
'1. … classic Yawuru patterns of landholding were probably based on the definition of "horde countries" or patriclan estates.
…
3. Ambilineal (or cognatic) reckoning of kinship together with the conceptualisation of Yawuru lands as constituting a single "language country" are, in my view, related developments that are products of an (unconscious) evolutionary process whereby a new and flexible system grew out of classic landholding arrangements based on the division of country into patriclan estates. [The alternative possibility, namely, that Yawuru tenure is a version of Western Desert tenure, is rejected in (13) below.]
4. Evolution proceeded in a manner that I recognise as a more widespread process whereby the contingency provisions of a classic system are joined together with the normal rules for recruitment of persons to groups and assertion of connection with land to yield:
[i] an ambilineal (or cognatic) system of kinship and
[ii] a system of land tenure in which the internal boundaries dividing sub-divisions of land within a "language country" tend to fall away (often to the degree that sub-divisions are wholly eliminated and become [as Hosakowa says] "defunct").
5. Processes of evolution referred to in (3) and (4) above may or may not have also become germane to developments among "Karadieri" people associated with the coastal region South of Broome.
6. However, there is a general trend towards the emergence of cognatic systems of kinship in all regions of Aboriginal Australia. With increasing urbanisation, this trend accelerates.
7. It is to be expected that the kinship of those Karadieri people whose traditional country lies to the South of Broome but who are now largely urban dwellers, will "go cognatic".
8. Processes of evolution referred to in (4), (5) and (6) above, are processes of the evolution of customs observed and traditions acknowledged by people who, through the generations, have maintained connection with the "language countries" of their forebears. Further, (as explained in the text of this report) the evolutionary processes rely on the further elaboration of possibilities that (as provisions for contingencies) were always inherent in traditional laws and customs as these were enunciated and put into practise in classic times.
9. On the basis of the published evidence (I have not read Elkin's field notes), I accept Glowczewski's repeated contention that there is the possibility that Elkin only collected indicative rather than definitive data from Yawuru people and then merely "extended his Karajari model" to the Yawuru. Therefore one should neither rely on Elkin to establish the nature of Yawuru kinship nor use his work to derive the rules that govern Yawuru landholding.
…
14. If there has been progressive evolution of traditions and customs as suggested above, then all present arrangements for coastal tenure derive from a classic formation the patrilineal emphasis of which has tended to disappear as the contingency provisions of the classic system have been more and more regularly applied with the progress of the years.
…
16. The Piddingtons demonstrated that there had always been distinct inland and coastal systems contained within Karadieri country, the inland system contrasting with the coastal in that the [inland] system had no law of trespass and seems, furthermore, to have been characterised in general by those features of flexibility that (since Berndt's essay of 1959) we have come to attribute to the system characteristic of "the Western Desert Bloc".
17. The division between the Nadja [inland] and Nagu [coastal] groupings of the Karajeri may have disappeared…' [emphasis in original]
361 In the course of his cross-examination, Sansom generally adhered to the above views. In particular, he gave the following evidence at the hearing concerning para 8:
'MR BELL: Paragraph 6 refers to the:
"…emergence of cognatic systems of kinship in all regions of Australia."
Does it not?
PROF SANSOM: Yes.
MR BELL: Paragraph 8 says:
"Processes of evolution referred to in 4, 5, and 6 above are processes of evolution of customs observed and traditions acknowledged by people who through the generations have maintained connection with the language country of their forebears. Further, as explained in the text of this report, the evolutionary processes rely on the further elaborations of possibilities as provisions for contingencies were always inherent in traditional laws and customs as these were enunciated and put into practice in current times - in classic times."
Now, you've already indicated to the court that you maintain the view expressed in that paragraph. That seems to me to say, in black and white, that the process that you have observed among the Yawuru as described in - relevantly, in 3, 4, and 5, is traditional. Is that not so?
PROF SANSOM: No.
MR BELL: Why is that not so? Why does 8 not mean that?
PROF SANSOM: There's been a certain continuity with tradition, but if you transform the system because of a contact - a culture contact situation, you don't have, in totality a traditional system as you had in the past.
MR BELL: Undoubtedly, that's true. But that's not what paragraph 8 says, is it?
PROF SANSOM: What paragraph 8 says is that the people have maintained connection with the language countries of their forebears.
MR BELL: Yes.
PROF SANSOM: And that's what I said at the time.
MR BELL: Well, you say a lot more than that. I'm not going to read it again, Professor Sansom.
PROF SANSOM: Mm. That - - -
MR BELL: Have you, in fact, changed your view?
PROF SANSOM: I haven't changed my view.
MR BELL: Let's go through it - - -
HIS HONOUR: Professor, maybe the stumbling block lies in the second sentence. As I understand the second sentence of paragraph 8, what you seem to be suggesting is that the traditional processes of Aboriginal society themselves contain provisions for contingencies. And you seem to be suggesting that the evolution which you've described in the first sentence can be regarded as one of the kind of contingencies that were inherent in traditional laws and customs. That's what you seem to be saying. Is that right or wrong?
PROF SANSOM: That is correct. As I said, it's further elaboration. And so, what you're dealing with is very rapid and unprecedented change.
MR BELL: Well, no - - -
HIS HONOUR: Yes, go on.
MR BELL: I'm sorry.
No doubt, Professor, I've already conceded that, but what I'm putting to you is that that's not what you advert to in these conclusions. What you advert to is the way in which traditional societies evolve in response to change by reference to inherent mechanisms, traditional in form. And what you say in paragraphs 3, 4, and 8 is, in effect, that Yawuru social organisation now is the product of that kind of evolution.
PROF SANSOM: I say that, yes.
MR BELL: You do say that.
PROF SANSOM: Yes.'
362 As explained above, I have not accepted Sansom's view that at sovereignty Yawuru society followed the patriclan estate model or a model with a rule of exclusive possession. However, I have accepted that it is likely that the Yawuru clan members had particular attachments to, and responsibilities for, areas with which the clan was traditionally or historically associated. However, the attachments and responsibilities, under the traditional laws and customs of the Yawuru people, did not amount to exclusive possession. Subject to that qualification, I otherwise accept that Sansom's evolutionarymodel, as explained in paras 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 14 of his interim report, is borne out by both the 'oral history' evidence of the Yawuru claimants' witnesses and the anthropological evidence of both Palmer and Sansom.
363 That conclusion is significant because it confirms the view I have formed that the present cognatic or ambilineal structure and definition of the Yawuru community is in accordance with the traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the Yawuru community. It also confirms that, whatever the precise structure and traditional definition of the Yawuru people at sovereignty might have been, a change from a community similar to a patrifileal clan-based community at or before sovereignty to a cognatic or ambilineal based community is a change of a kind that was contemplated under the 'contingency provisions' of those traditional laws and customs.
364 It would follow that WAFIC's contention that, an evolution from a clan-based estate and exclusive possession system at sovereignty to a community-based model after colonial contact was so fundamental that it cannot be a change contemplated by traditional law and custom, must be rejected for two reasons. First, the evidence has not established the clan based and exclusive possession estate system suggested by WAFIC. Second, the evolution to the present cognatic and ambilineal system was a change that was contemplated by traditional law and custom.
- Conclusions
365 I now turn to the three questions set out in [30]. However, it is appropriate to emphasise that the conclusions set out below, which are based on the findings I have already made, do not determine any of the matters set out in [31].
- Whether the Yawuru community is a recognisable body of persons united in and by traditional laws and customs which, since sovereignty, have constituted the normative system under which the native title rights and interests in issue are being claimed?
366 I am satisfied that the present Yawuru community, as generally defined in the genealogies, is a recognisable body of persons who are likely to be descendants, on an ambilineal or cognatic basis, of members of the Yawuru community at the time of colonial contact, and therefore at the time of sovereignty (see [177]-[181], [266], [291] and [362]-[363]). As I have concluded that a definition of the Yawuru community on the basis of ambilineal or cognatic descent is in accordance with the traditional laws and customs of the Yawuru community (see [181], [266], [290]-[291] and [362]-[364]), it follows that the present Yawuru community is not a new community or society or one whose members are not descended in accordance with traditional law and custom from the members of the Yawuru community at sovereignty.
367 The source of the Yawuru community's traditional laws and customs, is the southern tradition, as laid down in the Bugarrigarra (see [53]). The holding, passing on and receiving of the Yawuru community's traditional knowledge and 'law' has been as laid down in the southern tradition. The southern tradition formed part of the traditional laws and customs of the Yawuru community at sovereignty and is still acknowledged and accepted by the Yawuru community as governing all aspects of the traditional life of the community (see [79]). My findings concerning the role in the Yawuru community of the traditional laws and customs relating to rai (see [90]), the Yawuru language (see [96]), 'skin', kinship and malinyanu laws and customs (see [109]), traditional stories (see [122]), name traditions (see [131]), hunting and bush foods (see [136]), 'looking after country' and 'speaking for country' (see [153]), 'increase sites' (see [159]) and permission requirements (see [173]), when considered cumulatively, demonstrate that the present Yawuru community still acknowledges and observes the traditional laws and customs which, since sovereignty, have constituted the normative system under which the native title rights and interests in issue are being claimed.
368 The additional findings I have made in relation to the anthropological evidence concerning 'the law' (see [263]-[266]), the role of rai (see [272]-[274]), the connection between language and tribal boundaries (see [280]-[281]) and the evolution of the traditional Yawuru community at sovereignty to its present form, both corroborate and confirm the findings set out in [366]-[367], insofar as those findings were made on the basis of the evidence of the Yawuru claimants' witnesses. Of course, in a number of the findings, I observed that the present form and practice of the traditional laws and customs has changed in significant respects from the form and practice of those laws and customs at sovereignty. However, I am satisfied that the changes are of a kind that would fall within 'the contingency provisions' referred to in Sansom's evidence (see [264]-[266] and [289]-[291]). Those provisions are premised on the undoubted fact that traditional laws and customs are not fixed and unchanging. Rather, they evolve over time in response to new or changing social and economic exigencies to which all societies adapt as their social and historical contexts change. While such changes can have the consequence that the adaptation results in the laws and customs no longer being traditional laws and customs, as is apparent from my findings I am satisfied that the changes to the traditional laws and customs of the Yawuru community are of a kind contemplated by those laws and customs and that those changes have not been such as to result in those laws and customs no longer being properly characterised as 'traditional'. More specifically, the changes or adaptations are not of a kind that would result in it being able to be said that the native title rights and interests asserted are not possessed under the traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the Yawuru community (see the first de Rose decision at 381 [174]).
369 Further, the genealogies also support the inference invited by the Yawuru claimants to be drawn of continuity of the Yawuru community that existed at the time of sovereignty through to the present time (see [177]-[181]). Having regard to all of the evidence I am satisfied that the Yawuru community has continued to be in existence throughout that period. On the basis of the above findings I am also satisfied that, allowing for the evolution of traditional laws and customs, the Yawuru community at the time of sovereignty acknowledged and observed a body of traditional laws and customs which have normative content and which have continued in existence to the present time. Those laws and customs have plainly been transmitted from generation to generation, find their origins in the pre-sovereignty norms and, notwithstanding their evolution over time, have had a continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty (see the first de Rose decision at 378 [165]). Accordingly, the first question is to be answered in the affirmative.