Failure to deal with the oral evidence
26 The first Larrakia grievance referred to at [25] was propounded in two quite different ways. In their written submissions it was contended that in concluding that there had been a substantial interruption in the acknowledgment and observance of traditional law and custom, the primary judge failed to consider the oral evidence for the period from about 1910 to the start of the war. It was said that the 'interruption' finding depended on an inference drawn from the documentary record that at some time before the war the continued practice of traditional laws and customs was on the wane, and continued to decline over the succeeding two decades, but that the practice was revived in the 1970s. It was then noted that his Honour said that the view he took of the documentary record for the period from about 1910 to the start of the war was subject to the oral evidence to which he would refer shortly, and that he would defer his conclusions until he recorded his findings in respect of the period following the war. It was then contended that his Honour failed to return to the oral evidence for those two periods. Rather his consideration of the oral evidence was directed to the "contemporary nature of the Larrakia people's society, as it has been presented over the last decade or so to the present". It was said that his Honour's ultimate 'interruption' conclusion could not be reached without dealing with the oral evidence relating to the period in which the interruption was supposed to have occurred.
27 In oral argument the first ground of appeal was put differently. The claim was that the primary judge had failed to consider and evaluate a potentially significant and very large body of evidence bearing on whether there was a substantial interruption during "the period of 30 or 40 years in the middle of the 20th century". This period was more precisely identified as 1940 to 1970. We propose to deal with the ground as it was put to us in oral argument. It will be apparent from what follows that this is the only basis upon which the argument addressed to us can be understood. See in particular what we record at [29] to [31].
28 Larrakia relied on the observations of Samuels JA in Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725 at 728:
"it is an incident of judicial duty for the judge to consider all the evidence in the case. It is plainly unnecessary for a judge to refer to all the evidence led in the proceedings or to indicate which of it is accepted or rejected. The extent of the duty to record the evidence given and the findings made depend, as the duty to give reasons does, upon the circumstances of the individual case. Accordingly, a failure to refer to some of the evidence does not necessarily, whenever it occurs, indicate that the judge has failed to discharge the duty which rests upon him or her. However, for a judge to ignore evidence critical to an issue in a case and contrary to an assertion of fact made by one party and accepted by the judge - as the defendant's denial of having consumed alcohol - may promote a sense of grievance in the adversary."
29 In support of Larrakia's case on the primary judge's failure to consider and evaluate the oral evidence, Mr Gageler SC produced a chart headed Timeline (the chart). As its top line shows, it covers the period 1890 to 2005. The upper half of the chart contains the names of Larrakia elders, all deceased, who were active in the period of the land claims. The blue colouring, within which their names appear, shows the duration of their lives. All were alive in part of the period from 1940 to 1970, during which, according to Larrakia, the primary judge must have found that the laws and customs fell into desuetude. Thus King George was still alive in the early 1940s. Nipper Ranken, Captain Bishop, Tommy Lyons, Ababa, Topsy Secretary, Dolly Garinyi, Topsy Kurramanak, Prince of Wales, Victor Williams, Norman Harris and Bobby Secretary were alive throughout the thirty year period. Kathy Secretary, Olga Lyons, Gabriel Secretary, Johnny Fejo and Fred Waters were alive in the later part of the period. The lower half of the chart contains names encased in ochre colouring, showing the life span, in nearly all cases continuing, of witnesses at trial. Topsy Secretary is the only person who appears in the upper and lower parts of the chart.
30 The object of the chart is to show that 13 of the 30 witnesses were alive during the whole of the 30 year period and the others during the second half of the period. Counsel's explanation was as follows:
"[His Honour] deals only with the oral evidence as to contemporary society in the last decade, and simply does not deal with that significant period in between … if you just line up that period between … 1940, if you like, and 1970. That is the period within which the laws and customs, according to his Honour's findings must have ceased to exist, and just look at who was around during that period and the blue lines were the significant figures of the land rights era, and in … ochre colour, the witnesses before his Honour, and it was in the period of all of those people's lives, that his Honour must have found this cessation to have occurred …."
31 And later counsel added that in the 30 year period:
"when, on his Honour's findings, the tradition had ceased or, at least, dwindled to a point where it could no longer be said to be the tradition of a society, one had these - just looking at the blue for a moment - these Lyons of the Land Rights movement presumably in their prime.
… his Honour has just failed to address the critical question as to what was occurring in the lives, or the collective lives, of this society within that period.
He has really, by confining himself in the oral evidence to the contemporary, failed to address a critical body of evidence concerning the interruption that he says must have occurred during that period."
32 The primary judge's statement that he would shortly refer to the oral evidence appears at the conclusion of his consideration of the documentary evidence relating to the period from 1910 to the war. His Honour said he would defer his conclusions in respect of the cultural practices of the Larrakia people until he had recorded his findings and the significant evidence in respect of the "period between WWII and the present, and about the contemporary status of the Larrakia cultural practices". It seems clear, therefore, that the primary judge intended to deal first with the evidence relating to the period from the end of the war up to the present (2004). The layout of his Honour's reasons shows that this was to be done in two parts. First, the evidence relating to the period from the war until 1970. That was the last of the several historical periods suggested by the Territory, whose historical structure the primary judge adopted at [95]. The second part was the evidence disclosing the contemporary nature of the Larrakia cultural practices. Together those periods covered the interval between "WWII and the present".
33 His Honour did what he said he would do. The first part referred to at [32] appears at [342] to [372] under the heading The Period WWII‑1970. The second part is at [527] to [793] under the heading Current Larrakia Society. The promised conclusions are at [802] to [843] under the heading Conclusions Regarding s 223(1) of the Native Title Act. What his Honour said immediately under Current Larrakia Society bears this out. This is the (final) "section of my consideration of the evidence and my findings" about the contemporary nature of Larrakia society "as it has been presented over the last decade or so to the present". This is clearly a reference to the evidence that had been presented to the Court and earlier to the Commissioner in the Kenbi claim, and not to evidence pertaining to the last decade or so.
34 It is simply a misreading of the primary judge's reasons for counsel to say, as recorded at [30] and [31], that his Honour "deals only with the oral evidence as to contemporary society in the last decade". It is also wrong to say that his Honour confined himself "in the oral evidence to the contemporary". Although his consideration of the documentary evidence was divided into time zones, that approach was not adopted when at [527] he turned to Current Larrakia Society. Here there are no timelines. Rather the methodology shifts to topics - cultural organisation and practices, economy and resource use, spirituality and so on. His Honour makes this clear at [531] where he says:
"The following findings are intended to give an overview of various aspects of the current Larrakia society based on the evidence. I have endeavoured to address the various topics under the following headings: Cultural Organisation & Practices; Economy and Resource use and Spirituality. It is not the role of the Court to provide a comprehensive history of the claim group nor a complete discussion of the intricacies of the Larrakia society, and I have not sought to do so. Where I refer to the evidence of specific witnesses, it is not meant to be an exclusive exercise. That which follows is, as I have said, merely an overview."
We understand the penultimate sentence to mean that his Honour's reference to a witness' evidence is not to be taken to suggest that that was all the witness had to say or was the only evidence to which his Honour had regard. (It may be that "exhaustive" rather than "exclusive" would have more accurately rendered his intention.) His Honour said at [528] and [529] that he had the benefit of direct primary evidence from many members of the Larrakia people, he thought them all truthful, and his findings were "based on all their evidence".
35 We now turn to the substance of Larrakia's complaint that the oral evidence to which the primary judge referred at [339] was not considered and evaluated. Mr Gageler told us that it was not part of Larrakia's case that on the totality of the evidence the primary judge could not have come to the conclusion he reached.
36 Mr Gageler took us to but one example of what was said to be the primary judge's failure to consider the critical body of evidence. This was the witness statement of Jim Fejo Senior, who lived from 1930 to 2001. Counsel highlighted what the witness said about his father and his uncle Smiler being ceremony men, travelling with Smiler in a bush canoe, things he learnt from him, family dreaming, Sunday corroborees at Cullen Bay and Bagot, learning to dance and sing songs, getting painted up for a burial ceremony, learning to gather bush food, making crab hooks out of mangrove sticks, and making a canoe out of a milkwood tree. This was said to be evidence spanning the period within which the primary judge inferred interruption, and was presumably selected by Larrakia as a good example of the primary judge's failure to refer to the life story of an older witness during the interruption period.
37 Jim Fejo Senior was not much of an example of the primary judge's alleged delinquency. His Honour referred to his evidence on seven occasions, covering the following topics: ceremonies, painting bodies with ochre for ceremonies, Smiler making him a milkwood canoe when he was 7 or 8 and teaching him to make spears, hunting crabs with a crab hook or crab stick, making crab hooks from mangrove sticks, Fejo family dreaming (his was a whitish brown frog), his father and uncle being ceremony men, knowledge of a particular site, and that he had not been taught anything about dreamings.
38 As is apparent from the foregoing, the primary judge referred to eight of the ten topics highlighted by counsel, and others that were not. The Jim Fejo Senior example in no way establishes the contention in support of which it was advanced, presumably as the best example on offer, namely that the primary judge failed to refer to the life stories of the older witnesses during the period of interruption.
39 Putting Jim Fejo Senior aside, there are 29 witnesses in the ochre part of the chart. The primary judge referred to the evidence of all of them, some on many occasions: Topsy Secretary (10 times), JF (10), Barbara Raymond (13), Yula Williams (13), LC (17), Richard Barnes (23), Dorothy Fox (10), Maureen Ogden (28), Roslyn Walker (8), Rosemary Parfitt (8), Pauline Baban (37), Bill Risk (49), Roque Lee (12), Annie Risk (26), Donald Baban (13), Lawrie Raymond (8), Florence Devine (2), Gabriel Hazelbane (2), Mary Lee (3), Lorna Talbot (2), David Mills (4), Alice Briston (4), Mary Raymond (6), John McLennan (1), Robert Browne (4), Rona Alley (1), Judith Williams (3), Freddie May (1) and Jocelyn Archer (5).
40 We will initially take three senior and important witnesses as examples of the way in which the primary judge dealt with the evidence of those named at [39]. Barbara Raymond made a witness statement and gave oral evidence. The primary judge recorded the substance of most of the matters to which she deposed: watching corroborees when she was young, going walkabout, the prohibition on women entering Larrakia Barracks (Gundul), the use of kinship terms, that she was a Danggalaba clan member, Larrakia customs (sharing resources, prohibition of waste and greed), traditional method of cooking goose, Old Man Rock (a spiritual being who looks after Larrakia), the seaward boundaries of Larrakia country, playing in banyan trees when young, the location of White Stone (which may have been a sacred or significant site), and her conception dreaming (her mother burnt a crab she was cooking on Vestey's Beach, and when Barbara was born she had a crab shaped mark on her back).
41 Barbara Raymond gave evidence about other matters that the primary judge did not specifically attribute to her. Many of those topics were covered in the evidence of other witnesses, such as fishing with her parents and collecting bush food. Other evidence related to genealogy, which was not relevant to the question of interruption. His Honour was not obliged to record or summarize everything the witness said. Having read Barbara Raymond's witness statement and the transcript of her evidence, we are in no doubt that his Honour's references to her evidence disclose that he was conversant with the evidence as a whole, and had regard to it. The fact that he mentioned specific aspects of it does not mean that he did not have regard to the whole of it.
42 JF made a witness statement and gave oral evidence. Again, the primary judge did not summarise the whole of her evidence. As did other witnesses, she gave genealogical evidence which his Honour had no occasion to record, and other evidence that, having regard to the way the case proceeded, did not have particular relevance. However, his Honour did record the essence of her evidence about Larrakia laws and customs: corroborees, the occasions when they were held (such as days when a person died and happy days), sites prohibited to women (such as Larrakia Barracks), avoiding the use of a deceased's name, punishment for infringement of that rule, initiation ceremonies, women's business, instruction in law and customs, parents and grandparents speaking Larrakia language, Old Man Rock, her limited knowledge of sites, her instructions in Larrakia law by non‑Larrakia people, and her limited knowledge of the extent of Larrakia country.
43 JF gave evidence about other matters, to which his Honour did not specifically refer, that would not have assisted Larrakia's case on interruption: Larrakia can't live off the land around Darwin any longer, can't find a tree to camp under now, don't know any places where Larrakia can hunt or fish on country now, kids don't speak Larrakia any more, learnt Larrakia things at the Kenbi claim that she hadn't heard before, lost trace of Larrakia people when she went to work at age 12, and that against the law women now dance at bone burials.
44 JF also gave evidence about matters covered by many other witnesses: Larrakia must look after their land, not over‑fish, gather or hunt, and that she lived off the sea when a child.
45 Yula Williams gave extensive oral evidence. The primary judge noted her evidence about women's inability to enter Larrakia Barracks or Daramanggamaning, her use of kinship terms, her skin grouping, that she no longer fishes in the Darwin area, her salt water crocodile dreaming, ceremonies, her knowledge of sites and limited knowledge of their significance and of rules relating to them, her lack of knowledge of the words of the frog song, that her mother had not told her about sites or dreamings on the Cox Peninsula, that she heard her parents and grandparents speaking Larrakia language, her limited knowledge of the boundaries of Larrakia country, and Mindil Beach burials.
46 Yula Williams gave other evidence, not specifically recorded by the primary judge, that would not have assisted Larrakia's case on interruption: she used to know a lot about Larrakia law and custom but when she came back to Darwin after the war she no longer knew much, although she sang in language at corroborees she didn't know what she was singing about, she picked up only a few words of language, all kinds of tribes (not just Larrakia) used to go to Cameron Beach and Kulaluk, at Bagot Reserve there were lots of different mobs with their different languages, she had not been to Bagot Creek since the war, lots of crabbing places were now gone because of buildings, when she was growing up there were lots of other non‑Larrakia Aboriginals in Darwin who hunted and fished there without asking permission, her mother spoke mainly English to the kids, and that a long time ago there used to be full‑blooded Larrikia but "there's nothing here now".
47 Yula Williams also gave evidence about matters covered by many other witnesses, such as cooking fish and mussels, harvesting crabs and about the best places for gathering bush tucker.
48 Putting aside the topics in [42], [44], [46] and [47], the primary judge recorded most of the relevant evidence each witness gave. In respect of none of them can it be said that he failed to refer to their life stories during the interruption period. It is true that his Honour does not devote consecutive paragraphs to any witness' life story. But his references to their evidence, as it becomes relevant to the various topics with which he deals, leave us in no doubt that he has had resort to the essential parts of it.
49 We have gone to the whole of the oral evidence before the primary judge given by Barbara Raymond, JF and Yula Williams in order to understand his Honour's modus operandi. We do not propose to do that in relation to the other witnesses named at [39]. Rather we will assess the claim made in Larrakia's written submissions that particular evidence given by some of them was not taken into account.
50 However, before we do that, we should refer to the specific parts of the evidence of JF, Barbara Raymond and Yula Williams that his Honour is said not to have taken into account. The specific parts of JF's witness statement are covered by what we have said at [42] and [43]. So are the specific parts of her oral evidence. The specific parts of her evidence in the Kenbi claim, so far as presently relevant, are also covered by what we have said earlier.
51 The specific parts of Barbara Raymond's oral evidence are covered by what we have said at [40] and [41].
52 The specific parts of Yula Williams' oral evidence are covered by what we have said at [45] to [47]. The specific parts of her Kenbi claim evidence were repeated in her oral evidence before the primary judge.
53 We have dealt at [36] and [37] with the contention that Jim Fejo Senior's evidence was not taken into account. Specific parts of his written statement are said to have been overlooked. They were not. The part of his Kenbi claim evidence to which we were referred concerned a frog dreaming at Bagot when he was young. It is repeated in his witness statement, and was mentioned by the primary judge. See [37].
54 The remaining witnesses, specific parts of whose evidence was said to have been overlooked, were Mary Raymond, Maureen Williams, Pauline Baban and Topsy Secretary.
55 Mary Raymond made a witness statement and gave oral evidence before the primary judge and in the Kenbi claim. In the parts of the witness statement relied on in the present connection, she deposed to accompanying her uncle and aunt on visits to Lee Point Beach where her uncle would spear fish and her aunt would forage in the scrub for goanna. She was then about seven years old (1946). Together the family gathered periwinkles, crabs and sea urchins. She also deposed to having seen corroborees and smokings at Bagot when she was about eight years old (1947). The primary judge did not refer to either of these parts of her evidence.
56 Apart from the two topics referred to at [55], the parts of the witness' oral evidence before the primary judge that were relied on in the present connection dealt with the practice of not taking more from land or waters than was needed, sharing things, a sacred site at White Stone the location of which she was unaware, hunting geese, men's business at Larrakia Barracks, Old Man Rock, Black Jungle men's site, changes around Darwin precluding the gathering and foraging that used to be done there, and that she could not recall having seen a corroboree since the ones she saw at Bagot when she was young. The parts of Mary Raymond's Kenbi claim evidence relied on dealt with some of the matters contained in her oral evidence before the primary judge.
57 The primary judge mentioned cooking goose that had been shot, collecting mangrove worms, and the Black Jungle and White Stone sites the locations of which the witness was not aware. The primary judge did not give as full an account of Mary Raymond's evidence as he did of that of the other witnesses to whom we have referred. However, it is to be remembered that many other witnesses gave evidence about instruction received from their elders when the witnesses were young: hunting, fishing, foraging, sharing and avoiding waste. His Honour was not obliged to record the name of every witness who said something about those uncontroversial topics on pain of the accusation of having ignored the evidence. In our view his Honour's references to Mary Raymond's evidence showed that he did not fail to take it into account. Once again it must be pointed out that Larrakia's contention is not that his Honour was not entitled on the evidence to conclude as he did. It is that he did not take parts of it into account. It does not follow from a judge's failure to mention something that it was not taken into account. Especially is that so when the evidence is extensive, several parts of it are referred to and the judge's evidentiary modus operandi supports the view that he made a thorough examination of the evidence.
58 Maureen Williams made a witness statement, and gave evidence before the primary judge and in the Kenbi claim. In her witness statement she mentioned watching corroborees at Bagot, catching and cooking geese, foraging and fishing. In the parts of her oral evidence before the primary judge that are said to have been ignored or overlooked she referred to Larrakia Barracks (men's business), her forbear Sam's mosquito dreaming, Black Jungle (men's business), Old Man Rock, hearing older people speaking language, and her non‑Larrakia father's entitlement to enter and use Larrakia land because he was married to her mother. Her Kenbi claim evidence mentioned unnamed men's business locations and cheeky yam dreaming. Otherwise she referred to some of the matters covered by her oral evidence before the primary judge.
59 The primary judge referred to her evidence about Larrakia Barracks (men's business), Old Man Rock, mosquito dreaming, her parents and older people speaking language, and her father's entitlement to enter Larrakia land by reason of his marriage to her mother. Although his Honour did not record all aspects of the evidence, in the light of the topics to which he did draw attention, it cannot be said that he failed to have regard to her evidence.
60 Topsy Secretary, who was born in 1928 and died in 1999, did not give evidence before the primary judge. Her evidence in the Kenbi claim was tendered before his Honour. It dealt with the places where her family had lived, travelling with her relations when she was a little girl, her father catching fish and turtle, going to Kalaluk for coconuts when she was a kid, corroborees, that there are no corroborees or dancing men now, but sometimes other tribes are invited to come and dance.
61 The primary judge referred to her evidence about corroborees, the fact that they were no longer held and that other tribes were invited to come and dance. The other topics referred to above related to Topsy's early life (variously when a little girl or a kid) and to things her father did at that time. All that was before the interruption period. The primary judge referred to many aspects of her evidence other than those specifically relied on for interruption purposes. It cannot be said that his Honour failed to have regard to her evidence as a whole. Such part of it as was relied upon for interruption purposes was simply not relevant to that issue.
62 Pauline Baban gave a witness statement and oral evidence before the primary judge. In her witness statement she referred to her Larrakia membership through the bloodline of her ancestors, her granny Ababa fishing, being taught to catch crabs and forage, watching Ababa making baskets out of pandanus leaves, a burial ground at Mindil Beach - Mindil‑ang‑gwa, collecting bush tucker with Ababa, medicinal fruits and remedies, prawning, the proper way to cook goose by singing its feathers first, Larrakia Barracks (men's business), Old Man Rock, Shoal Bay, sharing resources, not wasting resources, use of certain Larrakia words, learning Larrakia customs from non‑Larrakia people (Limilgan), and a men's business place at Rapid Creek.
63 In those parts of her oral evidence before the primary judge to which we were referred, in addition to some of the matters contained in her statement, she referred to a women's business place near Mandorah which she heard about when doing the Kenbi claim, which was after the interruption period.
64 The primary judge recorded the witnesses' evidence about her granny Ababa, being taught to weave pandanus baskets, learning how to gather bush foods, the Mindil Beach burial ground, a women's only place she learnt about during the Kenbi claim, her use of kinship terms, that the main criterion for Larrakia membership is bloodline, the development of Darwin restricting Larrakia's ability to hunt and forage, sharing of bush resources, prohibition of waste and greed, medicinal remedies for headaches and jellyfish stings, cooking fish etc on the fire, calling upon deceased relatives in time of stress, learning Larrakia customs from non‑Larrakia persons, a men's business place at Rapid Creek, and Mindil‑ang‑gwa‑ the shoulder of Old Man Rock at Mindil Beach.
65 As is apparent from the foregoing, the primary judge's detailed summary of much of Pauline Baban's evidence requires the rejection of the contention that his Honour failed to take it into account or ignored it.
66 It is important to record that while the witnesses dealt with at [36] to [64] were alive during the period or parts of it in which the interruption occurred, the evidence of many of them was in large part about their childhood and growing up experiences: playing, chasing crabs, gathering with their parents, and instruction by the elders, in the period preceding the interruption period or in its earliest phase, and not to any real extent about their practice of those laws and customs during the period in which the interruption occurred. This evidence was relevant to his Honour's overall task, but did not significantly bear on the 30 year interruption period. Rather it formed the largely undisputed starting point with which a comparison of the post‑war years was to be made.
67 Our attention has not been drawn to any particular parts of the evidence of the other ochre witnesses. On any appeal it is incumbent on the party asserting error to establish it to the satisfaction of the court. Where it is claimed that the judge ignored relevant evidence, that evidence should be identified and its relevance explained, as has been done with the witnesses dealt with at [36] to [64]. Only then can an appellate court address the ground of appeal. It is not the court's function to attempt to determine from the evidence what the appellant might consider to be relevant, and then determine whether the judge overlooked it. A fortiori in a case such as the present, where the transcript of proceedings occupied 7,915 pages.
68 It is to be remembered that the ground of appeal under consideration is not that the evidence before the primary judge did not entitle him to conclude that there had been an interruption. As counsel said, it was not part of Larrakia's case that on the totality of the evidence his Honour could not have come to the conclusion he reached. Rather the ground is a process‑type complaint, that his Honour did not refer to what Larrikia considered to be critical evidence, which it was said showed that he did not consider or take it into account.
69 We have noted at [28] Larrakia's reliance on Mifsud v Campbell. There is nothing to indicate that the primary judge failed to consider all the evidence. Indeed, what we have said at [36] to [65] indicates that he did consider it. It is true that his Honour did not record or refer to all of it. But he was not obliged to. He did, however, make copious reference to the essential parts of the evidence of most of the ochre witnesses, and some reference to the evidence of all of them.
70 The primary judge had before him a complex case. There were 47 Aboriginal witnesses, many expert witnesses, and a great deal of documentary material. The hearing lasted 68 days. The Full Court has referred to the special features of native title cases in connection with a claimed failure on the part of the trial judge to take into account various parts of the evidence. In Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 at [202]‑[203] Branson and Katz JJ said:
"His Honour's finding that there was a period of time between 1788 and the date of the appellants' claim during which the relevant community lost its character as a traditional Aboriginal community is not to be lightly disturbed on appeal to this Court. A finding that an indigenous community has lost its character as a traditional indigenous community involves the making of a judgment based on evidence touching on a multitude of factors. The hearing before his Honour was long and complex .... The preparation of a written judgment that explicitly rehearsed and evaluated every part of this evidence would have been an exceptionally burdensome task.
It is not to be expected that, following a hearing of the length of the trial of this matter, the judge at first instance will make reference in his or her judgment to every matter which influenced his or her findings on a complex issue such as the maintenance of a traditional indigenous community. We see no reason to conclude from the failure of his Honour expressly to refer to, or evaluate, particular aspects of the evidence, that he did not take them into account."
71 Their Honours went on to say that in cases such as Yorta Yorta, considerable caution is appropriate before the Full Court infers that crucial evidence was not evaluated and necessary findings of fact were not made.
72 Their Honours' observations are applicable to the present case. For the avoidance of doubt, we add that we do not in this case need to resort to admonitions of caution, for we are clearly of the view that the primary judge amply discharged his duty to consider all the evidence, and referred in his reasons to such parts of it as were relevant to the resolution of the issues that were before him. He did not ignore evidence crucial to those issues.