In Victoria the corresponding rule has been construed as enabling a plaintiff where alternative claims are made against the same defendant to enter judgment on one alternative claim on the footing that he thus abandons the others. That was so decided by Hodges J. in the case of Currie v. May [1] . But that was a case where alternative relief was claimed and was not a case where the same relief was claimed against alternative defendants. Moreover in this case the relief which has been obtained by the judgment is not that which is claimed in the statement of claim; because the judgment is for the recovery of the money sum against all the defendants jointly whereas the statement of claim sought relief against them alternatively only. In these circumstances I think there is, to say the least of it, a prima facie case made by the defendants for an order setting the judgment aside. Considerable delay, however, has occurred since the date of the entry of judgment, viz. 10th September 1956, and no step was taken by the defendants until the summons now before me was issued. It seems likely that the point was not present to the defendants' minds until Fullagar J. drew attention to it in the judgment which he delivered in a matter between the same parties on 20th May 1957. Furthermore an argument for the defendants was relied upon before his Honour based on the very existence of the judgment, an argument that it showed that a tenancy of the land by the defendants from the Commonwealth had been established. However, the argument was rejected. I have had some doubt as to the course I should take having regard to the delay and to the attempted use made of the existence of the judgment in the proceedings before Fullagar J. But I think that I ought not to allow the delay or the course taken by the defendants before Fullagar J. to operate to keep on foot against the defendants an irregular judgment imposing on them a liability jointly to which the claim did not extend. It is an irregular judgment and ought not to be on the records of the Court notwithstanding that I can see that the imposition of a joint liability is probably a matter which has no great practical importance. But I think that so far as the delay affected the course afterwards taken by the plaintiff I may take it into account in imposing terms and that I will proceed to do. A bill of costs was taxed under the judgment, although an allocatur was not signed, and from that bill of costs it appears that some costs were incurred after the date of judgment. I shall say that the defendants must as a condition of judgment being set aside pay all the costs which were incurred by the plaintiff in taxing costs or in any other respect after the signing of the judgment. They must also file a defence at once. I give the plaintiff liberty to amend the statement of claim and the defence must be filed within seven days of the delivery of the amended statement of claim.