Rowell v Michell

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

STEPHEN JOHN MICHELL (TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF THE ESTATE OF JEREMY STANLEY ROWELL, AFSA REF VIC 1403/25/9)

INNIS ANTHONY CULL AND PAUL ANTHONY ALLEN AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF TORBECKIN PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)

1. Any party or interested person seeking costs in relation to this application shall file and serve a schedule of costs claimed and a written submission (not exceeding 4 pages in length) in support of the claim by no later than 4.00 pm on 8 April 2026.
2. If the applicant opposes any party or interested person's claim for costs in relation to this application, he may file and serve a written submission (not exceeding 4 pages in length) in reply by 4.00 pm on 22 April 2026.
3. The question of costs will be determined on the papers.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. The applicant in this proceeding is Mr Jeremy Rowell. On 24 October 2025 an order was made by a registrar of this Court sequestrating Mr Rowell's estate. The petitioning creditors were Innis Anthony Cull and Paul Anthony Allen as joint and several liquidators of Torbeckin Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Liquidators). Mr Cull and Mr Allen are employees of PKF Melbourne.
2. Immediately upon the making of the sequestration order, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (AFSA) was appointed as the Trustee in Bankruptcy for Mr Rowell's estate. On around 4 December 2025, responsibility for the administration of the estate was transferred to Mr Stephen Michell of PCI Partners. Mr Michell is the respondent to this application. The Liquidators are named in the proceeding as interested persons.
3. By an application filed on 4 December 2025 and amended on 8 December 2025 to recognise the change in identity of the trustee, Mr Rowell seeks an order pursuant to s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act) that his bankruptcy be annulled. Mr Rowell contends that the sequestration order made on 24 October 2025 should never have been made. Mr Rowell advances various reasons in support of this contention but at its core, his case is that the debts which supported the making of the sequestration order have already been paid such that they could not have supported the making of the order.
4. The path to final hearing of the annulment application has taken many detours. This is because Mr Rowell has filed several interlocutory applications seeking different forms of relief, most of which have only passing relevance to the annulment application, but which the Court has nonetheless been required to deal with. The hearing date of the annulment has been adjourned (principally to accommodate Mr Rowell) on two occasions.
5. The most recent adjournment involved the relisting of the final hearing from 3 February 2026 to 17 March 2026. On 4 February 2026, the Court made orders that Mr Rowell file and serve any further material in support of his amended application by 18 February 2026. Both the applicant and the interested persons were required to file and serve an outline of submissions by 4 March 2026.
6. These orders were varied on 12 February 2026 so that Mr Rowell was now required to file and serve any further material by 4 March 2026 and the date for submissions was extended to 11 March 2026.
7. On 11 March 2026, the Liquidators filed submissions.
8. On 12 March 2026, a Registrar of the Court made orders extending to 13 March 2026 the date by which Mr Rowell was to file and serve any further material. A request to further extend this time made informally to chambers on 13 March 2026 was refused.
9. According to the orders made on 12 March 2026, Mr Rowell was required to file and serve his submissions by 10 am on 16 March 2026. Mr Rowell did not file any submissions by the time this deadline had passed.
10. At the hearing on 17 March 2026, Mr Rowell appeared and represented himself. The Trustee, Mr Michell, was represented by solicitor, Dr Hannan, but took no active role in the proceeding, other than to update the Court as to the status of the administration of Mr Rowell's bankrupt estate. The Liquidators opposed the annulment application and were represented by Mr Cull.
11. At the beginning of the hearing Mr Rowell indicated that he was not ready to proceed and instead made an application to adjourn the substantive hearing of the annulment application, as well as an application for a suite of procedural orders. In reasons given orally at the time I dismissed the application for an adjournment and the necessity for the other relief fell away.
12. Mr Rowell and the Liquidators then presented arguments and sought to rely upon material in respect of the annulment application that is described below.
13. Having considered the evidence and submissions, I made an order dismissing Mr Rowell's annulment application. I indicated to the parties that I would shortly produce written reasons for this decision, which are contained in this document.

1. Subject to objections as to relevance from the Liquidators, I received the following material into evidence for Mr Rowell.

(a) His affidavit affirmed on 3 December 2025 (First Rowell affidavit);

(b) His affidavit affirmed on 16 December 2025 (Second Rowell affidavit);

(c) His written submissions filed on 16 December 2025;

(d) A copy of an invoice issued by PKF Melbourne to the Administrator of Clover Risk Funding dated 26 September 2024 for funding to cover disbursements for Torbeckin in the amount of $68,637.95;[1] and

(e) A table prepared by Mr Rowell that recorded debits from the Torbeckin Administration Account held with Macquarie Bank across the period 8 December 2023 to 13 January 2026.[2]

1. The Liquidators did not object in principle to the tender of the documents referred to at [14(d) and (e)] but submitted that neither document had any relevance to Mr Rowell's annulment application.
2. The Liquidators relied on an affidavit of Mr Cull filed on 16 January 2026 (Cull affidavit) and written submissions filed on 11 March 2026.

1. In order to understand the case put by Mr Rowell it is necessary to record some historical matters that contextualise his complaints.
2. Torbeckin Pty Ltd (now in liquidation) (Torbeckin) was established by Mr Rodney Rowell (the applicant's father) and incorporated on 24 July 1984. Mr Rodney Rowell was the sole director of Torbeckin until 17 May 2022. On this date, Mr Rowell (the applicant) was appointed a director and on 25 July 2022, his partner Emma Domino, was also registered as a director of Torbeckin, appointments they have held until the present day.
3. On 6 December 2023, Torbeckin was wound up by order of the Supreme Court on the application of one of its creditors. On this day Mr Cull was appointed, along with Mr Bradd as joint and several liquidators of Torbeckin. On 6 September 2024, Mr Allen was appointed as a joint and several liquidator of Torbeckin when Mr Bradd's appointment ceased due to change of employment.
4. The principal asset of Torbeckin is land and a building located at 392 Victoria Street, Richmond, Victoria (the Richmond property). It is encumbered by a first registered mortgage held by Secure Funding Pty Ltd (Secure Funding) (which trades as Liberty Financial).
5. In May 2023, Torbeckin defaulted on this mortgage and Secure Funding is now owed in the vicinity of $3.3 million. The circumstances of the default and in particular, who should be held responsible, is a matter that has been mired in controversy and generated significant litigation between Mr Rowell, Ms Domino and Mr Rowell's father, as well as related litigation, much of which has been commenced in the Supreme Court of Victoria. Mr Rowell, Torbeckin and the Liquidators are parties to, or otherwise involved in, at least four proceedings in the Supreme Court, including the Secure Funding Proceeding (S ECI 2023 02679) by which Secure Funding sought orders for possession of the Richmond Property and the Torbeckin Proceeding (S ECI 2024 03825) by which Mr Rowell sought production of information and documents in connection with the liquidation.
6. The issues to be addressed in this application arise from demands made by the Liquidators that Mr Rowell pay them a series of six separate costs orders that were incurred in various of the Supreme Court proceedings and a proceeding that was finalised in this Court. The total value of the costs orders is $81,710 which comprises:

(a) $21,450 by order made on 4 October 2024 in the Secure Funding Proceeding;

(b) $7,550 by order made on 7 February 2025 in the Secure Funding Proceeding;

(c) $18,670 by order made on 14 March 2025 in the Torbeckin Proceeding;

(d) $8,550 on 19 May 2025 in the Torbeckin Proceeding;

(e) $6,900 on 20 May 2025 in the Secure Funding Proceeding; and

(f) $18,590 on 10 July 2025 in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia proceeding MLG1424 of 2025.

1. Relying on these outstanding costs orders the Liquidators caused to be issued to Mr Rowell a bankruptcy notice on 16 April 2025. Mr Rowell's application to have the bankruptcy notice set aside was dismissed on 10 July 2025. Then on 11 July 2025, the Liquidators filed a creditor's petition. On 24 October 2025, Registrar Edwards made a sequestration order and fixed the costs of the Liquidators (as petitioning creditors) in the sum of $30,955.24. On 30 October 2025, Judge Bingham dismissed Mr Rowell's review application and affirmed the sequestration order.
2. Mr Rowell then on 4 December 2025 (and amended on 8 December 2025) made his application for annulment of his bankruptcy that is before the Court.

1. The primary order that Mr Rowell seeks is for the Court to annul his bankruptcy pursuant to s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.
2. In his submissions filed on 16 December 2025, Mr Rowell identified the "central issue" as whether the petition debt was, in substance, satisfied before sequestration.
3. Mr Rowell submitted that his case turned on whether the petitioning creditor's debt (constituted by the costs orders referred to above at [22]) was, in substance, satisfied prior to the sequestration hearing by debits charged to Torbeckin's mortgage loan account with Secure Funding/Liberty (including "Legal Service" debits), such that there was no genuine unpaid petition debt founding sequestration.
4. Mr Rowell submitted that if his case was correct, this would involve double (and now an attempted triple) recovery from the same underlying wealth, which he described as the equity in the Richmond property and the mortgage loan account. This was said to have occurred by first charging the loan account as litigation progressed, second, by charging the loan account again in an amount consistent with satisfying the petition debt, and third by continuing to press recovery through administration of Mr Rowell's bankrupt estate by the Trustee.
5. In substantiating his case for annulment, Mr Rowell relied upon what he described as statements for Secure Funding's Torbeckin loan account, which recorded significant "Legal Service" debits, including (relevantly):

(a) 2 September 2025: $43,239.90;

(b) 1 October 2025: $87,106.50;

(c) 7 November 2025: $38,994.62; and

(d) 4 December 2025: $22,281.21.

1. Mr Rowell submitted in respect of these entries - which were contained in a loan account statement for Liberty reproduced as part of an annexure to his affidavit[3] - that:

(a) The 2 September 2025 debit aligned with the period in which the Liquidators were actively pursuing litigation steps affecting Torbeckin's principal asset, despite their repeated position that the liquidation was "without funds";

(b) The 1 October 2025 debit aligned with satisfaction (in substance) of the creditor's petition debt comprised solely of the Liquidators' costs orders plus interest) prior to the sequestration hearing;

(c) The 7 November 2025 debit aligned with the sequestration costs order made on 24 October 2025 (and the additional review hearing on 30 October 2025), such that the amount was consistent with those bankruptcy costs being shifted onto the loan account; and

(d) The 4 December 2025 debit aligned with substantial activity in related Supreme Court proceedings concerning the proposed sale/lease position affecting the Richmond property thereby providing a comparator for what a substantial month of mortgagee legal work would look like (as against the larger October and November charges not corresponding to commensurate mortgagee enforcement steps).

1. Mr Rowell also relied on the Annual Administration Return lodged by the Liquidators and covering the period 6 September 2024 to 5 September 2025[4] and his own "comparison schedule" which he said showed a close correlation between the Liquidators' legal fees in the Secure Funding proceeding S ECI 2023 02679 and the timing/quantum of the "Legal Service" debits on the mortgage loan account as bankruptcy steps against him progressed.[5]
2. In his affidavit affirmed on 3 December 2025, Mr Rowell sought to explain that this schedule showed that:

(a) The number of actual court hearings in 2025 was modest, mostly short directions or interlocutory applications;

(b) The largest "Legal Service" debit, $87,106.50 on 1 October 2025, did not coincide with any hearing on or around that day; and

(c) Secure Funding's solicitors themselves repeatedly described the proceeding as adjourned or "effectively stayed" against him for much of 2025, while large legal-fee debits continued to be charged to the mortgage.

1. Mr Rowell in his affidavit asserted that these entries established a pattern whereby:

(a) The Liquidators would seek or obtain costs orders against him in the Torbeckin litigation and Secure Funding would agree to "fund" the liquidators or related steps;

(b) Large "Legal Service" amounts were then debited to the Torbeckin mortgage loan account, often in sums similar to or greater than the costs orders; and

(c) The effect was that the petitioning creditor's costs, and other litigation costs, were paid out of the mortgage facility secured over the Land, consuming Mr Rowell and his partner, Emma's, equity.

1. Mr Rowell submitted that his bankruptcy should be annulled because (on the theory articulated above), the economic burden of the petitioning creditor's costs orders against him had been shifted to the mortgage facility attached to the Richmond property and had effectively extinguished the previously unpaid, personal debt owed by him to the Liquidators.
2. When invited to make oral submissions at the hearing of his application, Mr Rowell's case took on a new form and was, respectfully, very difficult to follow. More significantly, it was a case that was unsubstantiated and bordering on the fantastical. It is unnecessary to say much more about this new case save that it reflected Mr Rowell's apparently genuinely held belief that documents produced on subpoena disclosed a further and different layer of appropriation of funds on account of legal fees, that should operate to extinguish any personal liability he might have to account for the costs orders.
3. As I understood Mr Rowell's submissions, his case essentially was that from a review of the Liquidators' Macquarie Bank statements for the Torbeckin administration account that he had obtained on subpoena, he had identified evidence of double recovery by the Liquidators of amounts referable to the costs orders that underpinned the creditor's petition. This analysis reflected the identification of amounts debited to the account in respect of invoices that were referable to the costs orders (for example, payments to Barristers clerks) and the identification of further amounts for legal spend for which no invoice had been identified and that when combined came to $158,575.91. It was Mr Rowell's contention that this last amount "near on added up to" the amount produced when one combined the total costs of the creditor's petition, plus interest, plus the costs of the sequestration order and the costs orders that the Liquidators had obtained in Ms Domino's proceeding in the Supreme Court. The differential was said to be $5,074.20.
4. Mr Rowell submitted that the Court should find that this analysis revealed that the Liquidators had covered their legal costs (as evidenced by the payment out of the account of amounts supported by invoice numbers) and had recovered them again "under the guise of debits with no invoice numbers".
5. At hearing, I raised with Mr Rowell my concerns that this case was both far removed from its original articulation (whereby the Liquidator had received litigation funding from Secure Funding) and speculative in nature. Mr Rowell protested that: "And I'm sorry, but this is mathematically complex, and it requires some explanation. It is not a simple straightforward, 'It was paid from there', scenario. That is the issue, and that's what the subpoenas started to show, and that's why the remainder of the subpoenas were required".[6]

1. The Liquidators identified the issues before the Court as:

(a) Whether Mr Rowell has established that, on the true facts existing at 24 October 2025, the sequestration order "ought not to have been made" within s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act; and

(b) If the threshold in s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act was met, whether the discretion should nonetheless be exercised for the annulment of Mr Rowell's bankruptcy.

1. The Liquidators submitted that there was no sufficient reason for the Court to go behind the six costs orders that founded the petition debt. This was in circumstances where the orders were made in different proceedings, in different courts, and after repeated opportunities for Mr Rowell to contest the positions advanced by the Liquidators.
2. It was the case - a matter that was not disputed by Mr Rowell - that none of the six costs orders had been stayed, set aside, appealed away, or paid. Although Mr Rowell had sought stays of various of the costs orders, these applications had been refused.[7]
3. The Liquidators submitted it to be relevant and significant that Mr Rowell's argument that costs liabilities had been somehow discharged because Torbeckin's funds were used to pay legal fees had already been raised and rejected in other forums.[8] The Liquidators noted in particular, that when dismissing Mr Rowell's application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, Registrar Ellis of this Court had rejected the proposition that the costs orders had been satisfied because the Liquidators, acting for Torbeckin, had caused it to pay its solicitors or barristers. The Registrar held that such payments were not a satisfaction of Mr Rowell's obligation to pay the Liquidators.[9]
4. The Liquidators submitted that when assessed against these parameters and events it was clear that Mr Rowell's case was far removed from one in which there was a demonstrated reason to distrust the underlying judgments or orders. Instead, the Court should be satisfied that the six orders carried the practical guarantee of reliability referred to in decisions such as Lowbeer v De Varda [2018] FCAFC 115 at [53]- [57] and Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Comptom [2017] HCA 28; (2017) 261 CLR 132 at [68]- [71]. The Liquidators submitted that in substance, Mr Rowell's annulment application sought to relitigate points already ventilated in earlier proceedings and earlier bankruptcy steps. It did not expose a proper basis to go behind the judgments.
5. The Liquidators submitted that even if the Court was persuaded to go behind the six costs orders, Mr Rowell's case failed on the evidence. This was because the Liquidators had placed before the Court direct sworn evidence that neither Mr Rowell, nor Secure Funding, nor any third party had paid any amount in satisfaction of any of the orders or the fixed costs of the creditor's petition. In the Cull affidavit at [104]-[111] Mr Cull deposed:
   1. In his affidavits filed 5 December 2025 and 16 December 2025, Mr Rowell alleges that legal costs associated with the Liquidators' enforcement of the costs orders (including steps leading to the sequestration order) have been paid or otherwise recovered from a mortgage loan account held by Secure Funding (which trades as Liberty) and secured over the Richmond Property.
   2. I deny that allegation. Neither I nor Mr Allen have received any payment from Secure Funding, their solicitors, or any other third party in satisfaction of any of the costs orders ....or in satisfaction of the Liquidators' fixed costs of the creditor's petition....
   3. Mr Rowell also alleges that Liquidators' legal costs have been "paid" because the Company has paid legal fees from funds of the winding up and he contends that those payments should be treated as satisfying the costs orders. I deny that contention. The Liquidators have incurred legal costs in the course of conducting the winding up and responding to proceedings and applications brought by Mr Rowell and Ms Domino. Those legal costs have been paid from moneys received into the liquidation in the ordinary course and are disclosed in the Company's Annual Administration Return...
   4. Relevantly, the Annual Administration Return discloses (among other things) receipts into the winding up (including rent receipts and investigation funding) and payments from the winding up, including payments described as "Legal Fees". Those payments are payments made by the Liquidators from the liquidation account to the Liquidators' legal service providers. They are not payments received by the Liquidators from Mr Rowell, Secure Funding, or any other third party in satisfaction of the costs orders.
   5. On 11 November 2025, Secure Funding provided to me a loan statement for the period from 11 May 2025 to 11 November 2025....That statement records amounts said to be secured under its mortgage, including amounts described as interest and legal costs.
   6. I do not have personal knowledge of how Secure Funding calculates or applies any legal costs recorded on that statement, and I have not requested Secure Funding to pay, and Secure Funding has not paid, any part of the costs orders..
   7. As at the date that the sequestration order was made on 24 October 2025 and Mr Rowell's application for review was dismissed on 30 October 2025, no amount had been received from Mr Rowell or any other person in reduction of the costs orders and they remained wholly unsatisfied...
   8. After making enquiries and reviewing the records in the Liquidators' possession, including the Company's liquidation bank account records and our solicitors' invoices and payment records, I verily believe no amount has been received from Mr Rowell or from any other person in reduction of the costs orders and they remain wholly unsatisfied.
6. The Liquidators submitted that the NRFA invoices, that had been produced in response to subpoenas issued on Mr Rowell's application, did not prove payment of Mr Rowell's personal liability to the Liquidators. Instead, the invoices disclosed on their face that they were issued by NRFA to Secure Funding Pty Ltd, rather than to the Liquidators, the Liquidators' solicitors, or to Torbeckin. It could be inferred that they were evidence of Secure Funding's own legal costs, not payment of Mr Rowell's separate indebtedness under the six costs orders.
7. The Liquidators submitted that as far as the Annual Administration Return was concerned, it did not assist Mr Rowell's case theory. This was because - a matter referred to by Mr Cull in his evidence - the entries for "Legal Fees" in the Return were payments made out of the liquidation account to the Liquidators' own legal service providers in the ordinary course of winding up. They were not payments received into the liquidation from Mr Rowell, Secure Funding, or any third party in reduction of the six costs orders.
8. The Liquidators submitted that at its highest, Mr Rowell's case showed only that Secure Funding had incurred legal costs of its own, that those costs might have been capitalised to its secured account, and that the Liquidators separately incurred and paid legal costs from company funds in the ordinary course of the liquidation. The Liquidators submitted that none of this established payment of the petition debt and neither did it establish any appropriation of any amount against the six costs orders. The asserted "double recovery" or "triple recovery" thesis should be understood as nothing more than an inference drawn from timing and correlation, rather than proof of satisfaction.
9. The Liquidators submitted that to the extent that Mr Rowell sought to ventilate a new case theory at the hearing, it should be understood at its highest, as a complaint that legal fees had been incurred and paid by the Liquidators and that on the face of the Macquarie Bank statements it was not evident precisely how such legal fees had been paid.

1. Section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that if the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ought not to have been made, or in the case of a debtor's petition, that the petition ought not to have been presented or ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy.
2. If the Court finds that a sequestration order "ought not to have been made", it has a discretion as to whether to grant relief under s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act.[10] One matter that is relevant to the discretion to annul is the solvency or insolvency of the bankrupt.[11]
3. In Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia[12], Tracey J set out the relevant principles:[13]

(1) An order can be made under s 153B(1) of the Act notwithstanding that the applicant has been discharged from bankruptcy: Re Oates; ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 17 FCR 402.

(2) An applicant who seeks annulment of his or bankruptcy "carries a heavy burden". It is incumbent on an applicant "to place before the Court all relevant material with respect to his or her financial affairs so that the Court may be properly informed and may make a judgment that is based on the actual circumstances of the applicant": Re Papps; Ex parte Tapp [1997] FCA 1031; (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531.

(3) In determining whether or not a sequestration order "ought not to have been made" the Court is not confined to a consideration of whether the order should have been made on the facts known to the Court at the time at which it was made. The Court must take account of facts, known at the time at which the sequestration order was made and at which it determines an annulment application, even if those facts were not before the Court at the time at which the sequestration order was made: Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2001] FCA 639; (2001) 183 ALR 239 at 243; Re Raymond; ex parte Raymond [1992] FCA 495; (1992) 36 FCR 424 at 426.

(4) A sequestration order "ought not to have been made" if: on the facts known at the time of the annulment application the Court would have been bound not to make the sequestration order: Re Frank; ex parte Piliszky (1987) 16 FCR 396.

(5) The Court will be so satisfied if it is established that the debtor was not at the time the sequestration order was made, indebted to the petitioning creditor: Re Deriu (1970) 16 FLR 420 at 422.

(6) If the Court is so satisfied, it is no precluded from annulling the bankruptcy because the bankrupt had not sought to have the default judgment set aside or failed to oppose the creditor's petition or failed to seek a review of the sequestration order: Re Raymond; ex parte Raymond [1992] FCA 495; (1992) 36 FCR 424 at 426.

(7) The power conferred on the Court by s 153B(1) is discretionary in nature. Even if persuaded that the sequestration order ought not to have been made, the Court can, in appropriate circumstances, decline to annul the bankruptcy: Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2001] FCA 639; (2001) 183 ALR 239 at 243.

(8) Considerations which may have a bearing on the exercise of discretion include unexplained delay in the making of the application, whether or not the applicant is solvent, whether or not the applicant has made full disclosure of his or her financial affairs and a failure by the bankrupt to oppose the creditor's petition and attend the hearing at which the sequestration order was made: Re Williams (1968) 13 FLR 10 at 24-5; Boles at 247; Re Papps; ex parte Tapp [1997] FCA 1031; (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531; Rigg v Baker [2006] FCAFC 179 at [79]; Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCA 1115 at [7]. Additional considerations are collected in D.A. Hassall, "Annulment of Bankruptcy and Review of Sequestration Orders" (1993) 67 ALJ 761 at 766".

1. Mr Rowell bears the onus on the substantive question of whether the sequestration order ought not to have been made and on the separate question of whether the Court should exercise its discretion to annul his bankruptcy, assuming the first question is answered in his favour. Mr Rowell has not persuaded me on either matter.
2. As to the primary articulation of his case, which is reflected in his filed materials and to which the Liquidators prepared their response, Mr Rowell asserts that the Liquidators and Secure Funding, have conspired to agree an arrangement pursuant to which the Secure Funding mortgage facility would be used as a cash reserve to fund the Liquidators' own legal fees. This assertion however does not withstand scrutiny when evaluated against Mr Cull's unambiguous evidence. Mr Cull's sworn evidence, which Mr Rowell did not directly challenge, was that no such arrangement had been orchestrated and importantly, at the time that the sequestration order was made on 24 October 2026 and maintained following the dismissal of Mr Rowell's review application, the six costs orders remained unsatisfied by Mr Rowell or anybody who might be understood to represent him or his interests.
3. I have been given no sound reason to question Mr Cull's evidence. The postulated nefarious relationship between the "Legal Service" entries that appear in the mortgage account maintained by Secure Funding and the dates on which events that incurred costs in the bankruptcy proceeding occurred, is based purely on conjecture. Mr Rowell's efforts to uncover further documents that might assist him in shoring up such a relationship have been wholly unsuccessful.
4. Furthermore, his case is antithetical to the responsibilities that inhere in the office of liquidator. As Dodd-Streeton J explained in Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Edge [2007] VSC 170 at [44]:

The extensive powers vested exclusively in the liquidator entail a corresponding vulnerability in the creditors, members and the public. The liquidator is a fiduciary on whom high standards of honesty, impartiality and probity are imposed by the [Corporations] Act and the general law. As an officer of the company, the liquidator has a statutory duty of care, diligence and good faith.

1. If the first iteration of Mr Rowell's case is properly characterised as speculative, the second iteration (as sought to be advanced at hearing) is within the realm of fantasy. It was abundantly clear that Mr Rowell was jumping at hypothetical shadows and seeking to draw links on dubious and imperfect correlations between funds debited to the account maintained by the Liquidators for the Torbeckin insolvency. I reject the claim that the Liquidators have done anything other than pay from the funds brought into the administration account the various legal fees incurred in the discharge of their duties.
2. It is unremarkable that the Liquidators would seek to make payments in respect of these legal fees and not wait for their recovery through payment of a series of costs orders, whose payment continues to elude them. It is further unremarkable that the legal spend for the Liquidators would be significant and increasing, considering the amount of litigation that Torbeckin and those associated with it, have generated.
3. It is important to recall that in this proceeding, Mr Rowell has levelled very serious charges against the Liquidators (and Secure Funding) including that they have engaged in the "practical equivalent of corporate theft" of his and Ms Domino's equity.[14] I have found that these claims are misconceived and unsubstantiated. A fundamental problem with Mr Rowell's case is that it has relied on arguments previously ventilated and/or which he has sought to enlarge or adapt as new material has come to light. His case offends the injunction that a bankrupt who alleges grounds for the annulment of his or her bankruptcy should not advance grounds that cannot be proven by evidence already known to, or in the possession of, the bankrupt. This is especially so when the grounds for annulment include allegations of fraud or other wrongdoing. Relatedly, and a matter which resonates with particular force in this application, the annulment proceeding ought not to be commenced in the hope that such evidence might somehow emerge, by compulsive processes or otherwise.[15]
4. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the sequestration order ought not to have been made. I am satisfied, as Registrar Edwards and Judge Bingham were previously, that the six outstanding costs orders provided a proper foundation for the making of the sequestration order.
5. If I am wrong about the merit of Mr Rowell's substantive claim, I would nonetheless have refused to exercise my discretion to annul his bankruptcy for the following reasons.
6. First and foremost, Mr Rowell has not placed before the Court any evidence that would permit a finding that he is presently solvent. To the contrary, Mr Rowell's affidavit contains the acknowledgment that "on its face" his estate appears to have no free assets, apart from ordinary household items.[16] I acknowledge that Mr Rowell also claims that this position is misrepresented because it does not account for "potential claims arising from falsified documents, misappropriation of funds and phoenix-style dealings" as well as the matters that I have ruled on in this proceeding.[17] This is not evidence of solvency and certainly not present solvency. At best, it is evidence that Mr Rowell asserts a basis upon which to unwind certain transactions that might or might not result in an alteration of the present distribution of legal and equitable entitlements.
7. Second, the Trustee informed the Court - and Mr Rowell acknowledges this himself - that he has not filed a statement of affairs, which document he was required to have filed within 14 days of having been notified of his bankruptcy: s 54(1) Bankruptcy Act. This date would have fallen back in November last year. Mr Rowell asserts that there are good reasons why he has not provided this document, however this is not the occasion to interrogate these reasons. The failure of Mr Rowell to comply with this obligation is a further reason why it would not be appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to annul his bankruptcy.
8. The application filed on 4 December 2025 and amended on 8 December 2025 is dismissed.

1. I propose to determine the question of costs (if any) on the papers.
2. I will give any party or interested person seeking costs in respect of this application an opportunity to file and serve a schedule of costs claimed and supporting submissions (not exceeding four pages) by 4 pm on 8 April 2026.
3. If the applicant opposes any party or interested person's claim for costs in relation to this application, he may file and serve a written submission (not exceeding four pages) in reply by 4 pm on 22 April 2026.

I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Symons.

[3] Pages 121-126 of Annexure JR-1 the First Rowell affidavit.

[4] Pages 34-42 of Annexure JR-2 to the Second Rowell affidavit.

[5] See [37] of the Second Rowell affidavit and p 43 of Annexure JR-2.

[7] See Re Torbeckin Pty Ltd (in liq) (Stay) [2025] VSC 234, pp 494-513 of Annexure IAC-1 to the Cull affidavit; Re Torbeckin (in liq) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 13 October 2025) pp 451-483 of Annexure IAC-1 of the Cull affidavit.

[8] Re Torbeckin (in liq) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 13 October 2025) pp 451-483 of Annexure IAC-1 of the Cull affidavit.

[9] Registrar Ellis, ex tempore reasons for judgment, Rowell v Allen (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), MLG 1424/2025, 10 July 2025) pp 210-217 of Annexure IAC-1 of the Cull affidavit.

[10] Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 307 at [12].

[11] Pollock v Deputy Federal Cmr of Taxation (1994) 94 ATC 4148; Re Finn; Ex parte Amoco Australia Ltd [1982] FCA 49; (1981) 41 ALR 487; 58 FLR 54.

[12] [2007] FCA 307 at [12].

[13] In a passage endorsed by the Full Court in Francis v Eggleson Mitchell Lawyers [2014] FCAFC 18 at [16].

[15] Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 88; (2017) 252 FCR 267 at [22] (North, Perry and Charlesworth JJ).