Re SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution decides that the payment of the adjusted sole parent pension should be with effect from 8 April 1993.

In the reasons for decision delete "respondent" as appearing in paragraph 69 and "respondent" and "respondent's" as appearing in para 74 and substitute therefore "applicant" and "applicant's" as appropriate.

SOCIAL SECURITY - Sole Parent Pension - Departmental error in calculation of pension - whether request for review of error - date of effect

Social Security Act 1991 s 285 (1), (2), (5), 259(1), 293, 299(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (9), ss 299(a), s 1066-E5), 1239(1), (4), 1240, 1243

Re Belcher & DSS (1995) 39 ALD 797

Re Azzopardi & DSS (1997) 50 ALD 254.

Re DSS & Marsh (1996) 42 ALD 639

1. The applicant refused to pay arrears of sole parent pension to the respondent before 29 April 1997. The Social Security Appeals Tribunal decided that arrears were payable from 25 June 1992. This Tribunal, as then constituted, decided that the arrears were payable from 8 April 1993. On appeal the Federal Court set aside the Tribunal's decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be determined according to law and the Court's reasons.

2. As Cooper J made clear in his judgment the issues before the Federal Court concerned the construction of section 299 of the Social Security Act 1991 ("the Act") and reflected the decision of the Tribunal and its reasons for decision. In the course of his Honour's judgment the following appears:

"41. I am satisfied that the letter of 29 March 1993 was a sufficient notice for the purposes of s 299 of the Act. I am also satisfied that procedural fairness was extended to Mrs Rogers and that she had the opportunity to obtain a full explanation as to the reasons for the decision and to attempt to persuade the decision maker that the decision was incorrect and should be changed. She also had a right to have the decision reviewed and she was clearly advised of this right. There is no want of procedural fairness if that opportunity is not availed of.

42. The appeal in this Court was argued on the basis that either subsections 299(3) or (4) was the relevant and operative provision. Each of the subsections requires in paragraph (a) that the person applies to the Secretary under s 1240 for review of the previous decision. In Mrs Rogers' case that is review of the decision communicated to her by letter dated 29 March 1993 advising her that a decision had been made to reduce her pension to $153.70 per fortnight to commence on 8 April 1993. The AAT made no finding that Mrs Rogers made a request for review of that decision pursuant to s 1240 of the Act. The finding made in paragraph 62 of the AAT reasons was that Mrs Rogers telephoned Centrelink on 1 September 1997 seeking a review of the Department's decision to limit payment of arrears. The AAT treated this request as satisfying the requirements of subsection 299(4)(c) of the Act. This is clearly not correct. It was a request by Mrs Rogers seeking review of a different and later decision of the Department as to the date of effect of the determination made under s 293 on or about 29 July 1997. It was not a request for review of the "previous decision" required by subsections 299(3) and (4).

43. The question of whether there had been a request for a review under s 1240 of the Act was a live issue before the AAT. Counsel on behalf of Mrs Rogers had submitted that the filing of a Sole Parent Review form on 10 June 1993 constituted a sufficient request for review of the decision to reduce her pension to satisfy the requirements of s 299(2) or s 299(4) of the Act. The Departmental advocate had submitted that there was no request for review made by Mrs Rogers of the previous decision and that the lodgement of completed periodic Sole Parent Review forms does not constitute a request for review under s 1240. In his written submissions the Departmental Advocate had submitted that the date of effect of the determination under s 293 fell to be determined in accordance with s 299(9) of the Act. The issue is canvassed in paragraphs 23-27 inclusive and 40-43 inclusive of the AAT's reasons, but was not determined by the AAT.

44. The proceeding before me was limited to the question whether or not sufficient notice of the decision to reduce the pension of Mrs Rogers, because of the inclusion of the dependent quarterly benefit in the calculation of her combined yearly income, had been given for her for the purposes of s 299(3). The question of whether there was a request for review of that decision under s 1240 of the Act was not argued. That is a matter which can be investigated by the AAT when the matter is remitted, as it must be, having regard to the error made by the AAT as to the requirements of a valid and effective notice for the purposes of subsections 299(2), (3) and (4) of the Act."

3. At the rehearing of the matter Mr Kanowski represented the applicant and Mr Johnson instructed by Welfare Rights Centre appeared for the respondent. The documents lodged in the Tribunal pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 were before the Tribunal as the T documents and a further document was tendered and marked as an exhibit. Oral evidence was given by the respondent.

4. Document T5 is a copy of a claim for pension lodged by the respondent with the Department of Social Security ("DSS") on 11 June 1992. The claim was made shortly after the respondent's husband was killed in an industrial accident. The claim is properly filled out; it disclosed two dependant children and resulted in payment of full pension from 2 July 1992 [T7].

5. Document T8 is a copy of a Sole Parent Review form signed by the respondent on 9 July 1992. Because the form was said by DSS to have not been returned by 9 July 1992 the DSS stopped payment of pension [T10] but resumed payment on 13 August 1992 with payment of arrears. The papers before me do not suggest any basis in fact for the temporary cessation of payment.

6. On 17 August 1992 the respondent provided DSS with a payslip evidencing her part-time employment and a letter from the Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland explaining details of compensation payments in relation to her husband's death [T13].

7. On 4 September 1992 the respondent lodged with DSS copies of Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland advices regarding dependant quarterly benefits payable to the respondent in respect of her two children in an amount of $27.12 per child per week [T16]. Document T16 includes a DSS worksheet indicating that the payments for the children were to be deleted from calculation of the respondent's income.

8. Document T14 is a copy of a Sole Parent Review form signed by the respondent on 21 September 1992 in which she disclosed income from part-time employment but did not disclose any compensation payments; albeit she disclosed a substantial bank deposit which, it might be inferred, included the compensation payment.

9. On 30 September 1992 the respondent again provided DSS with copies of payslips and advices from the Workers' Compensation Board about payment of compensation for the children [T18]. In a Sole Parent Review form dated 1 October 1992 the respondent disclosed her wages income and an amount received from the Workers' Compensation Board [T19]. Payment of pension was continued taking into account wages income and bank interest [T21].

10. On 24 December 1992 the respondent lodged a further sole parent review form again disclosing wages income and bank deposits but not disclosing any payment from the Workers' Compensation Board [T22]. Payslips were given to DSS. Pension was continued after taking into account the wages income and bank interest [T23 & T25].

11. Document T26 is a copy of a further Sole Parent Review form lodged with DSS on 19 March 1993. The respondent disclosed wages income and $712.86 received from the Workers' Compensation Board [T26]. DSS annualised this figure to $2851 and assessed it as income of the respondent [T27]. Document T28 is a letter by DSS advising the respondent of her pension payment from 8 April 1993. The letter shows the amount of $2851, described as compensation, included in the calculation of combined yearly income. Document T28 was dated 29 March 1993 and is the letter referred to in paragraph 41 of the judgment of the Federal Court.

12. There is no dispute that the amount of $2851 included as the respondent's income was not her income although it was money received by her. It was the income of her children and had initially been recognised as such by DSS. The result of this error was that payments of pension were underpaid in amount as from 8 April 1993 and I so find.

13. Document T33 is a copy of a completed Sole Parent Review form lodged with the applicant by the respondent on or about 10 June 1993. The completed form answers the question "Do you get money from any other source?" by notifying the receipt of compensation from the Workers' Compensation Board of a quarterly amount of $696. Notwithstanding that advice the applicant continued to assess $2851 as the respondent's income from compensation [T34].

14. As previously the respondent was advised by letter dated 16 June 1993 as to the amount of pension payable. She was also advised the amounts taken into account to determine her "Combined Income Yearly Income". Included in those details was "Compensation $2851" [T35].

15. That situation continued through a number of reviews without any separate request for review of the calculation by the respondent. The respondent continued to disclose receipt of moneys from the Workers' Compensation Board and an amount of $2851 continued to be treated as the respondent's income without query by the respondent.

16. That changed on 27 October 1994. On that day the respondent lodged a Sole Parent Review form making a full disclosure of her income and an amount of $726 as compensation with copies of pay slips. By letter of the same date DSS again advised payment of pension with details of income taken into account to determine the amount of pension. A figure of $2905 was included and described as compensation [T53]. Exhibit 1 is the original of the DSS letter sent to the respondent. It is in different format to document T53 but nothing turns on this.

17. Exhibit 1 includes an aide memoire in the respondent's handwriting of a telephone conversation she had with a DSS officer after receiving the letter. She says, and I accept, that she queried the amount of income attributed to compensation. She says that she identified herself to the female DSS officer including giving her file number. There is no record of the telephone conversation in the T documents but I have no reason to doubt the respondent's evidence about the telephone call and her aide memoire in relation to it. I am satisfied that she queried the amount of the increase in the compensation amount on or about 29 October 1994. I am also satisfied that neither the applicant nor the respondent took any further action in relation to the respondent's query.

18. That the applicant and its predecessor was aware that the respondent was receiving payments from the Workers' Compensation Board is made clear by document T54. That document consists of three hard copies of computer frames with notations making it clear that a deduction for children was being denied because of payments of compensation for the children.

19. Document T72 is a hard copy of computer frames covering the period December 1996 to April 1998. In particular the document records that an officer of Centrelink decided on 30 July 1997 that the compensation payments received by the respondent should be "coded off". The explanation shows that this meant that the compensation payments should not be coded as income of the respondent. A consequential affect on child deduction amount was noted. The explanation also includes the following:

"as client has not sought review within 3 months of prev. update arrears cannot be paid. See section 299(3) SSA".

20. By letter dated 25 August 1997 [T73] the respondent was advised that her pension would be increased from 29 July 1997. It was said that arrears could not be paid beyond that date because of section 299(3) of the Act. That decision was subsequently affirmed on review [T74].

21. On 1 September 1997 the applicant made an oral application for review of the decision not to pay arrears [T75].

22. By letter dated 10 November 1997 an authorised review officer notified a new decision which provided for payment of arrears for three months [T79].

23. It is clear, and I find, that the correction of the payment of pension initially by an officer of Centrelink, as amended on review by the Authorised Review Officer, was not as a result of a request for review by the respondent. The decision was varied because of a request for review but the original decision was a decision on own motion by an officer of Centrelink acting on behalf of the applicant.

24. The Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("SSAT") decided to set aside the Authorised Review Officer's decision not to pay arrears beyond 29 April 1997 (in this regard the SSAT misstated the date of effect as 29 July 1997). The SSAT substituted a decision that arrears are payable from 25 June 1992. As the above recital of the facts shows this is also an incorrect date because the compensation payments were first treated as the respondent's income with effect from 8 April 1993.

25. It is appropriate to set out the respondent's case first because the decision of the Federal Court effectively found for the applicant on the question as to whether there was a decision notified to the respondent and the consequential operation of sections 293 and 299 of the Social Security Act 1991 ("The Act"). I am bound to give effect to the reasons of the Court, with which I respectfully agree, so that it is no longer open to argue that the respondent was not notified of a decision to include the compensation payments as income of the respondent. It follows that the respondent did not exercise rights of review and section 299(9) of the Act therefore operates to determine the date of effect for a favourable determination under section 293 of the Act.

26. As I understood Counsel, the respondent accepts that her request for review of the date of effect of the increased payment of pension was a request within the terms of section 1240 of the Act and the resulting favourable decision was a determination within the terms of section 293 of the Act so that the date of effect is to be determined in accordance with section 299 of the Act.

27. The respondent points to two decisions. The first is evidenced by document T27 whereby an officer decided, erroneously, to treat the moneys received from the Workers' Compensation Board as income of the respondent in determining the rate of pension payable. The second decision identified by the respondent is the action of an officer on 30 July 1997 to correct the error by coding off the moneys from the Workers' Compensation Board as income of the respondent. In doing so the officer was acting on his own initiative in accordance with section 1239 of the Act.

28. There is then the further decision eventually made by an Authorised Review Officer as to the date of effect for payment of arrears of pension. That decision was ultimately made following a request for review by the respondent.

29. The respondent rightly did not seek to reargue the issue decided by the Federal Court. She did raise four issues one of which embraces the issue which caused the Federal Court to remit the matter to the Tribunal. The respondent raises the following issues:

(a) the action of the officer as a delegate of the secretary 30 July 1997 to code off the moneys received by the respondent from the Workers' Compensation Board was a decision within the terms of section 1239 of the Act not subject to the limiting provisions of section 299 of the Act, or

(b) the Sole Parent Review form [T33] lodged by the respondent on 10 June 1993 should be accepted as a request for review of the decision to include the compensation payments as income notified on 29 March 1993 [T28]; or

(c) the underpayment of pension to the respondent resulted from defective administration caused by a misfeasance of the DSS which should be compensated; or

(d) the respondent should be paid an act of grace/ex-gratia payment for loss arising from misfeasance by DSS.

30. As to (a) the respondent relies on decisions of the Tribunal in Re Belcher & DSS (1995) 39 ALD 797 and Re Azzopardi & DSS (1997) 50 ALD 254.

31. As to (b) the respondent supports the proposition that the lodgment of a completed Sole Parent Review form should be accepted as a request for review by relying on the decisions in Re DSS & Marsh (1996) 42 ALD 639 and Frost & DSS (decision no. 10360). The lodging of the completed Sole Parent Review dated 10 June 1993 should be accepted as an application for review under section 1240 of the Act in relation to the decision notified on 29 March 1993 [T28].

32. As to (c) and (d) the respondent submits that there was a perpetuation of error described as a litany of administrative errors or defective administration so as to entitle the respondent to compensation or an ex-gratia payment. I need say no more about (3) and (4) in view of my decision in this matter.

33. The applicant submitted that sub-section 299(9) of the Act applied on the facts of this case irrespective of whether the review was under section 1239 or 1240 of the Act.

34. A Sole Parent Review form is in effect a requisition for information with a return date. The completion and lodging of such a form does not constitute an application by the respondent under section 1240 of the Act for a review of a previous decision. It is but a response to a requisition for information and does no more than supply information to the applicant. The applicant seeks to assimilate this case with the decision in Re Stuart & DSS (1998) 54 ALD 241.

35. The Sole Parent Review forms lodged by the respondent merely supplied information and it should not be inferred that the respondent was seeking a review of a previous decision on behalf of the applicant.

36. The most that should be implied is that the respondent expected that the applicant would make a new decision in relation to payment of her pension and it should not be implied that the previous decision would be reviewed.

37. The applicant contends that it was only when a departmental officer detected the incorrect assessment and consequent underpayments and informed the respondent that she made a request for review by requesting payment of arrears.

38. The applicant also relies on the decision in Re DSS & Marsh (1996) 42 ALD 639, a case where DSS failed to adjust its records in respect of a reducing bank balance with consequential underpayment of pension. That was a case where the claimant for pension had regularly advised bank account details but the DSS failed to take the information into account maintaining an out of date and excessive bank balance figure for the purpose of calculating sole parent pension. Eventually the claimant sought review. The Tribunal held that the date of effect for the resulting increase in pension was determined by sub-section 299(3) ie from the day on which the claimant sought review.

39. As the applicant acknowledges, by its submission, in Marsh the Tribunal failed to consider whether the Sole Parent Review forms lodged with DSS could be treated as requests for review apparently because that issue was not put to the Tribunal.

40. The applicant submits that the only request for review made by the respondent is her request for review of the decision not to pay arrears - subsequently allowed in part by the Authorised Review Officer deciding to apply section 299(9) in lieu of section 299(3) as applied by the delegate [T73 and T79].

41. The applicant submits that Exhibit 1 only evidences a query by the respondent and not an application for review.

42. The applicant also submits that the provisions of section 299 do apply where the applicant reviews a decision within the terms of section 1239 of the Act.

43. Part 2.6 of the Act provided for payment of sole parent pension. Section 259(1) of the Act provided that a person who wanted to be granted a sole parent pension must make a proper claim for that pension.

44. Section 285(1) provided that the applicant may give a person to whom a sole parent pension is being paid a notice that required the person to give DSS a statement about a matter that might affect payment of the pension to the person. Section 285(2) prescribes information to be included in the notice.

45. The factors to be taken into account in determining a claim for sole parent pension are found in section 1066 of the Act. In particular Module E prescribes the ordinary income test. In applying the method statement (S1066-E1) it is necessary to determine the amount of the person's ordinary income on a yearly basis. It is also necessary to work out the persons ordinary income free area. Section 1066-E4 determines how to calculate a person's ordinary income free area using Table E in that section.

46. The ordinary income free area is adjusted by increasing it for additional free area relevant to each dependant or maintained child. The additional free area is reduced by the annual amount of any payment received by the person for or in respect of a dependant child for which an additional free area has been allowed. Section 1066-E7 provides that compensation paid in respect of a child is a kind of payment that results in a reduction of the additional free area.

47. Section 1239(1) of the Act provides that the applicant may review a decision of an officer under the Act. Sub-section 1239(3) provides that this power may be exercised notwithstanding that application has been made to the SSAT or this Tribunal.

48. In exercising the power to review decisions the applicant may affirm, vary or set aside a decision and substitute a new decision where a decision is set aside (s 1239(4)).

49. By contrast section 1240 provides for review of decisions on application by a person affected by a decision of an officer under the Act. Such a review is to be undertaken in accordance with section 1243 of the Act.

50. If the applicant is satisfied that the rate at which sole parent pension is being, or has been paid, is less than the rate provided for in the Act, the applicant is to determine that the rate is to be increased to the rate specified in the determination. (s 293).

51. The date on which a determination under section 293 ("the favourable determination") takes effect is worked out in accordance with section 299 (s 299(1)). In particular sub-section 299(2) reads as follows:

(a) a decision (in this subsection called the "previous decision") is made in relation to a sole parent pension; and

(b) a notice is given to the person to whom the pension is payable advising the person of the making of the previous decision; and

(c) the person applies to the Secretary under section 1240, within 3 months after the notice is given, for review of the previous decision; and

(d) the favourable determination is made as a result of the application for review;

the determination takes effect on the day on which the previous decision took effect."

"299(5) Subject to subsections (5A) and (5B), if the favourable determination is made following a person having advised the Department of a change in circumstances, the determination takes effect on the day on which the advice was received or on the day on which the change occurred, whichever is the later."

Sub-sections (5A) and (5B) are not relevant on the facts of this case.

53. Sub-section 299(9), relied on by the applicant, reads:

"299(9) In any other case, the favourable determination takes effect on the day on which the determination was made or on such later day or earlier day (not being a day more than 3 months before the determination was made) as is specified in the determination."

54. I am satisfied that the respondent has made full and true disclosures to the applicant in relation to her claim for pension. There is nothing in the material before me to suggest that respondent had been less than frank and honest in her dealings with the applicant. I formed the same impression in relation to her oral evidence before this Tribunal.

55. As Counsel pointed out the respondent was required to answer a question, which she did so truthfully. The significance of which, it may be inferred, was not understood by the officers of DSS who dealt with the respondent's file between March 1993 and July 1997. That question - "Do you get money from any other source?" was answered by supplying details of the compensation amounts payable to the respondent for her dependant children. She had made it clear to the applicant that this was the situation by separately supplying copies of advices from the Workers' Compensation Board. This was, in my view, self evident, as it was to the applicant's delegate "David ASO 4" who corrected the assessment in 1997 [T72 and T73].

56. The information was necessary for the purpose of determining the respondent's additional free area for the purposes of the income test (s 1066 - E5). It was not however otherwise income of the respondent. The applicant's assessments were clearly wrong because the correct information supplied by the respondent had been misapplied in calculating the respondent's pension entitlement.

57. At no relevant time did the applicant tell the respondent that Workers' Compensation payments had been applied to increase her income rather than reduce her additional free area for the purposes of the Income Test. Relevant advices to the respondent referred to "Your Combined Income Yearly Income" [T28, T32, T35] or "Your income" [T31, T36, T38, T41].

58. The Federal Court accepted that document T28 which is the letter of 29 March 1993 addressed to the respondent provided sufficient information to enable her to make a decision whether or not to seek a review if she thought it was wrong. I so find.

59. When the respondent lodged the Sole Parent Review form with the applicant on or about 10 June 1993 [T33], because she was required to do so by operation of section 285 of the Act, did she make a request for review of the previous decision notified in document T28?

60. It is clear enough that the review form was in effect a requisition for information. To not comply with the requirement was to risk the sanction in section 285(5) but of more immediate concern would be the risk of suspension of pension payments. The effect was that a person, such as the respondent, who believed they were entitled to payment of pension would be under a perceived obligation to supply the relevant information, as the respondent did.

61. It is reasonable, in my view, to infer that a person returning a complete Sole Parent Review form to the applicant would expect that the person's entitlement to a pension was being reviewed. I have difficulty in understanding that any other perception as to the purpose of the form is open. The word "Review" appears in the bold type heading of the form. Review was its stated purpose. What was being reviewed? The answer must be the person's entitlement to a pension, whether the pension was payable and the amount payable.

62. It is readily apparent from the material before me that the quarterly reviews of the respondent's entitlement were conducted on the basis of review of earlier decisions. This is made apparent by the fact that changes in the amount of compensation income were not reflected in assessments, the applicant adopting the previous decisions. There was, in my view, clearly a review of entitlement and payability.

63. It follows in my view that it should be accepted that the applicant sought review of her pension when she lodged the completed form on 10 June 1993. If she had not done so she risked suspension of pension and other possible sanctions. It is reasonable to infer that she lodged the form because she sought continued payment of pension in accordance with her entitlement and I so find.

64. To suggest that an informal telephone call or other indication is sufficient to constitute an application for review as the Tribunal did in Re Frost & Re Marsh but lodgment of a form entitled "Sole Parent Review" cannot be characterised as a request for review seems to me to be a proposition with little merit. I am satisfied there was a request for review within the terms of section 1240 of the Act.

65. The respondent lodged the form on 10 June 1993 which is less than three months after notification of the previous decision by letter dated 29 March 1993. Section 299(2) of the Act therefore operates so that the favourable determination eventually notified on 25 August 1997 should take effect from 8 April 1993, the date on which the decision notified on 29 March 1993 took effect.

66. In case I be wrong as to my finding that the form lodged on or about 10 June 1993 was a request for review within the terms of section 1240 of the Act I also deal with the respondent's alternative argument.

67. I am satisfied and find that the respondent contacted the Maroochydore DSS office after receiving Exhibit 1 [T53]. She made the contact because she was concerned that her pension had been reduced because of the compensation payments in relation to her children. The applicant, it may be inferred, did not record the conversation, but the respondent's aide memoire made at the time indicates there was a discussion as to detail.

68. If it was necessary to do so I would find that the respondent made an informal request for review of the assessment of her pension on or about 31 October 1994. There is no evidence that the applicant took any notice of the respondent's enquiry, nor did the respondent follow the matter up, although she did supply further information to the applicant in January 1995 apparently resulting in the additional free area calculation being adjusted to nil for the purposes of the income test [T54].

69. I turn now to the respondent's primary argument. On 30 July 1997 the applicant, by a delegate, decided to "code off" the compensation payments from the respondent's income. That decision was made on the delegate's initiative and not because of an application for review. It was a decision the applicant was empowered to make by virtue of section 1239 of the Act and it was made to correct a repeated error made by DSS and maintained on behalf of the applicant. That much is not in dispute.

70. The question is does section 299(9) apply to a decision following a review within the terms of section 1239.

71. Section 293 is a general power not confined to reviews under section 1240 of the Act. In my view it applies equally in relation to a review under section 1239 of the Act. Section 293 does not suggest that it is confined in its operation.

72. It follows that sub-section 299(1) will operate to determine the date of effect for a determination ("favourable determination) under section 293. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) in section 293 are confined in their operation to favourable determination following an application for review under section 1240. Sub-section (5) is not confined to such cases, nor, in my opinion, is sub-section (9). I do not read sub-section (9) as being confined to reviews within the terms of section 1240.

73. In so far as it was sought to rely on the decision in Re Belcher it is necessary to note that the relevant provisions were those relating to payment of disability support pensions and in particular section 115. That section has some similarity with section 299 but is not in the same terms and does not have an "in any other case" sub-section in terms similar to sub-section 299(9). Such a provision may have been perceived as not being necessary because of complementary provisions. However I need not explore that issue. Suffice it to say that Re Belcher deals with significantly different provisions to the present case. The same considerations apply to the decision in Re Azzopardi.

74. I am satisfied that where the respondent decided, on own motion, to review a decision of an officer under the Act (s 1239(1)) and to vary that decision (s 1239(4)) then that is a decision, in the context of this case, within the terms of section 293 of the Act and section 299(9) will determine the date the determination takes effect. The respondent's primary argument is therefore rejected.

75. For these reasons the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal will be set aside and I decide in substitution that the payment of sole parent pension should be adjusted with effect from 8 April 1993.

76. As already noted it is not necessary that I deal with the submissions regarding compensation and ex-gratia payment.

I certify that the 76 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr K L Beddoe (Senior Member)

Signed: .....................................................................................