//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2025] QCA 139
procedural. The notice of appeal was struck out. The appellant was directed to file and serve any fresh notice of appeal within 21 days, failing which the appeal would be dismissed. The appellant's...
Bradley JA did not decide the underlying dispute about the mortgage or the merits of the Townsville proceeding. The issue was whether Robert's notice properly explained why the four interlocutory orders should be set aside. The Court found that it did not: the grounds were not shown to identify legal, factual or discretionary error, and no substantial injustice from the procedural orders was suggested. The notice was therefore struck out, but Robert was allowed 21 days to file a fresh notice with grounds directed to the orders. If he did not, the appeal would be dismissed.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,044 words · generated 07/10/2026
In Robert v National Australia Bank Limited [2025] QCA 139, Bradley JA considered an attempted appeal by Jamie Robert from four interlocutory orders made in proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The orders were made on 7 August 2024, 10 October 2024, 10 December 2024 and 30 January 2025. The judgment does not number its paragraphs, so the discussion below refers to the dates and passages in the reasons rather than assigning paragraph numbers.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The August order concerned directions for hearing competing interlocutory applications. The respondents sought to transfer a proceeding from the District Court in Brisbane to the Townsville Registry, to be listed and heard with a Townsville proceeding. Robert sought to dismiss the respondents’ application and sought other orders. The October order dismissed, with costs, Robert’s application seeking a declaration and orders based on his contention that the respondents might be held in contempt. The December order transferred the proceeding to Townsville, directed that it be heard with the Townsville proceeding, dismissed Robert’s contrary application, and gave directions for a hearing of the respondents’ summary judgment application. The January order gave directions for a hearing of Robert’s application to set aside the December order.
Robert filed his notice of appeal on 20 February 2025. He sought leave to appeal and an extension of time for the August, October and December orders, because the appeal was not commenced within 28 days of those orders. The Court also noted that the orders were interlocutory and concerned practice and procedure.
There was a further procedural complication. When Robert filed the appeal, he was still pursuing in the Townsville Registry an application to set aside the December order. That application was heard and dismissed on 10 March 2025. On the same day, the Northern Judge granted summary judgment to Irvine and Chronican, the second and third respondents, and removed them as parties to the Townsville proceeding. Bradley JA noted that there was no appeal from that judgment.
Bradley JA found that the appeal notice did not identify an arguable basis to set aside any of the four orders. The Court struck out the notice, but allowed Robert 21 days to file and serve a fresh one. If he did not, the appeal would be dismissed. The transcript records that the appellant’s application filed 24 April 2025 was dismissed. Bradley JA indicated that there was no point in dismissing the separate application for leave at that time, given the opportunity to file a fresh notice.
The central problem was not that Robert’s notice lacked allegations. It listed multiple matters. Rather, the notice did not explain how those matters showed an error in the particular orders under appeal. Bradley JA described grounds concerning an allegedly forged mortgage, the respondents’ standing, alleged judicial bias, the way orders were produced and signed, the Deputy Registrar’s constitutional status, alleged non-compliance with legislation, fraud, and general maxims. The reasons say that none of these grounds identified an arguable basis on which the decisions could be set aside.
The Court focused on the connection between a ground and the order challenged. A complaint about a mortgage, for example, does not by itself explain why a particular procedural direction or transfer order should be set aside. The notice must state a ground directed to the decision that is actually the subject of the appeal. Bradley JA said the appellant would need to “identify grounds of appeal that are directed at the orders that are actually the subject of the appeal”.
The judgment also applied the ordinary requirement to demonstrate appellate error. Citing Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 180–181, Bradley JA said an appellant must demonstrate that the order was vitiated by legal, factual or discretionary error. The judgment did not find that Robert had demonstrated any such error. It instead found that he had not identified one in his material or oral submissions.
A separate, additional difficulty arose because the challenged orders were about practice and procedure. Relying on Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd (2021) 9 QR 141 at 12–14, Bradley JA stated that appellate courts generally exercise restraint in relation to such decisions. The Court will generally not interfere unless there is an error of principle and the appellant demonstrates that the order will work a substantial injustice to a party.
The reasons found no suggestion that the orders worked an injustice to Robert. The judge also assessed the known context. The directions concerned the programming of interlocutory applications, and the transfer was to Townsville, where Robert had commenced proceedings. On that background, the judge considered it highly improbable that those matters would produce an appealable point involving substantial injustice. This was expressed cautiously: Bradley JA said the assessment was made “against the known background” and did not close the door to a properly identified ground.
The result was procedural rather than a determination of the underlying dispute. The Court did not rule on whether the mortgage was genuine, whether the respondents had standing, or whether the allegations of fraud or bias were true. It ruled that the notice, as drafted, was not an adequate basis for proceeding with the appeal.
The judgment presents the relevant legal framework as existing appellate procedure, not as a new rule. Before this decision, the cited principles were that a notice of appeal must state its grounds briefly and specifically, an appellant must demonstrate error in the challenged order, and appellate courts generally show restraint when reviewing decisions about practice and procedure. For that last category, the reasons state that intervention generally requires both an error of principle and substantial injustice.
The judgment does not purport to alter those principles. Its contribution in this case is their application to a notice containing allegations and legal-sounding statements that were not connected, in the Court’s view, to the specific decisions being appealed. The Court treated that lack of connection as a fundamental defect in the notice, rather than attempting to reconstruct possible grounds on the appellant’s behalf.
After the decision, the immediate procedural position was that the original notice had been struck out, but a new notice could be filed and served within 21 days. The decision therefore did not finally foreclose an appeal at that point. It required any continued appeal to be presented through grounds that identified an arguable error in the relevant orders. Failure to file a fresh notice within that period would result in dismissal of the appeal.
The judgment does not say that every appeal from a procedural order requires proof of actual prejudice in identical terms, nor does it decide what level of particularity will suffice in every case. Its language is expressly general: an appellate court “generally” will not interfere unless the stated requirements are met. The decision should therefore be read as applying the cited approach to the orders and notice before the Court, rather than as setting out a complete code for all interlocutory appeals.
The judgment explains that rule 747 requires a notice of appeal to state “briefly and specifically the grounds of appeal”. In plain English, an appellant needs to identify what was wrong with the decision being challenged, rather than simply list concerns about the broader dispute.
Bradley JA said an appellant must show that the order “was vitiated by some legal, factual or discretionary error”, referring to Allesch v Maunz. In practical terms, the appeal must identify a relevant mistake in the decision. The judgment does not treat disagreement with the outcome or repeating allegations from the underlying proceeding as a substitute for identifying that mistake.
The Court’s most vivid criticism was that it could not proceed “on the basis of Delphic maxims unconnected to any facts, matters or laws relevant to the decisions that are the subject of the appeal”. The plain-English point is that legal slogans or conclusions, without an explanation of how they relate to the particular order, do not provide usable appeal grounds.
On procedural orders, Bradley JA said appellate courts generally will not interfere without an error of principle and a showing that the order would work substantial injustice. That passage explains why it was not enough to point to an alleged defect in the process in the abstract. The alleged error needed to concern the order, and the appellant needed to explain the relevant injustice.
Finally, Bradley JA said, “If the appellant wishes to proceed with the appeal, he will need to do better.” This was not a final finding that no arguable appeal could exist. The judge expressly left open the possibility that a ground might be found within the broader challenge. The 21-day direction gave Robert an opportunity to present any such ground in a fresh notice.
The decision is most directly relevant where a proposed appeal challenges interlocutory directions or other procedural orders, but the notice relies on general accusations or matters from the wider dispute without explaining how they establish error in those orders. Examples within the judgment include allegations about a mortgage, standing, bias, fraud and the preparation or signing of orders. The Court’s point was not that those subjects could never matter on appeal. It was that the notice did not show how they supplied an arguable ground against the particular decisions before the Court.
It is also relevant where an appellant seeks review of a case-management or procedural decision. The judgment applies a restrained approach in that setting, including consideration of error of principle and substantial injustice. In Robert’s case, the impugned orders included directions for hearings and a transfer of proceedings between registries. The judge considered the circumstances of the transfer and the lack of an identified injustice when assessing whether an appealable point had been shown.
The case is less directly informative about appeals from final judgments, substantive findings after trial, or statutory appeals governed by different express tests. The reasons concern four interlocutory orders, the requirements for grounds in a notice, and the approach to procedural decisions. They do not decide the merits of the mortgage dispute or announce a rule resolving substantive claims about standing, fraud or judicial bias.
The supplied judgment contains no account of later cases considering or applying Robert v National Australia Bank Limited. It is therefore not possible, on the available source, to describe how subsequent courts have treated this decision.
The two authorities that Bradley JA did rely on are identified in the judgment: Allesch v Maunz for the requirement to demonstrate error in an order, and Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd for appellate restraint concerning practice and procedure. The judgment applies those authorities to the notice and orders before it. No other precedent relationship or later treatment is stated in the provided text.
The decision leaves open whether Robert could formulate an arguable ground in a fresh notice. Bradley JA expressly said it was not intended to close the door on the possibility of a ground within the broad scope of the challenge. The judgment records the 21-day opportunity, but the supplied text does not state whether a fresh notice was later filed or what happened afterward.
The reasons also do not resolve the substantive allegations about the mortgage, standing, bias, fraud, or the roles of the Deputy Registrar and the Northern Judge. Those matters were discussed as proposed grounds, but the Court found that they had not been sufficiently tied to the appealed orders. Their truth or legal effect was not determined in this judgment.
Nor does the judgment specify exactly what form or degree of detail would be enough in a fresh notice. It supplies the governing requirement, brief and specific grounds directed to the orders, and says those grounds must identify an arguable error. Whether particular wording meets that standard would depend on the grounds actually presented and the orders they challenge.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
[2025] QCA 139
COURT OF APPEAL
BRADLEY JA
Appeal No 700 of 2025
SC No 882 of 2024
JAMIE ROBERT****Appellant/Applicant
v
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED****First Respondent
ABN 12 004 044 937
ANDREW IRVINE, MANAGING DIRECTOR AND****Second Respondent
GROUP CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PHILIP CHRONICAN, NON-EXECUTIVE****Third Respondent
DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN
BRISBANE
WEDNESDAY, 30 JULY 2025
JUDGMENT
BRADLEY JA: On 20 February 2025, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court. By it, he sought leave to appeal against four orders that were made on 7 August 2024, 10 October 2024, 10 December 2024 and 30 January 2025. Each was an interlocutory order made by the Northern Judge in proceedings in the Townsville Registry.
The August order was in the nature of directions for hearing of two interlocutory applications. The first, filed by the respondents, was an application to transfer a proceeding from the District Court in Brisbane to the Townsville Registry, for it to be listed and heard together with a Townsville proceeding, and some other orders. The second was filed by the appellant. It was an application to dismiss the respondents’ interlocutory application, and for other orders.
The October order dismissed, with costs, an interlocutory application by the applicant for a declaration and orders based on a contention that the respondents might be held in contempt of court.
The December order transferred the proceeding from the District Court in Brisbane to the Townsville Registry, ordered that it be listed and heard together with the Townsville proceeding, dismissed the contrary application the appellant had filed, and made orders in the nature of directions for a hearing on 10 March 2025 of the respondents’ interlocutory application for summary judgment.
The January order was in the nature of directions for a hearing, also on 10 March 2025, of the appellant’s application to set aside the December order. He had filed this application on 6 January 2025.
When the appellant filed his notice of appeal from the four orders, he was still the moving party in his application to set aside the December order. So he was maintaining simultaneously, proceedings to set aside the same order in both the Townsville Registry and in the Court of Appeal. He did not discontinue his Townsville application or consent to it being dismissed. It was heard on 10 March 2025 and was dismissed. The same day, the Northern Judge granted the second and third respondents summary judgment and removed them as parties to the Townsville proceeding.
This brief history indicates some aspects of the appeal. The appellant failed to commence the appeal within 28 days of the making of the August, October or December order. He has applied for an extension of time to appeal. It is an appeal from interlocutory orders about matters of practice and procedure. So, the appellant has applied for leave to appeal. The time for compliance with the directions included in the orders, the subject of his appeal has passed. The parties appear to have complied with most of the directions. Lastly, in listing unusual features I would mention that the second and third respondents have had judgment against the appellant since 10 March 2025. There is no appeal from that judgment.
To commence a proceeding in the Court of Appeal, a party in the position of the appellant must file a notice of appeal. Rule 747 provides that the notice of appeal must state “briefly and specifically the grounds of appeal”. The appellant’s notice of appeal identifies grounds of appeal for what he calls “Decision 1” and “Decision 2”.
For “Decision 1”, there are four grounds. The first asserts that the mortgage the first respondent relies on is a forgery. The second is that the primary Judge did not direct the respondents to produce evidence of their standing to sue him. The third is also about the respondents’ standing. The fourth seems to be an allegation of bias against the Northern Judge.
For “Decision 2”, there are 10 grounds of appeal, but when read, there may not be quite that many. The first is a statement that the orders are void from when they were made.
The second is in relation to the 30 January 2025 hearing. It seems to allege the Northern Judge was, “Trying to railroad the appellant by unnecessarily delaying a decision that could have been made immediately…”.
The third is a statement that this conduct also occurred at the 10 December 2024 hearing.
The fourth is a quote attributed to the former Chief Justice Murray Gleeson about the oaths of Judges and their impartiality. It raises no ground of appeal.
The fifth is that the appellant says he has evidence of how orders were produced by the solicitors for the respondents and signed by the Deputy Registrar and not by the Judge.
The sixth is that the Deputy Registrar is not a judicial officer under the Australian Constitution.
The seventh is that the orders are said to not comply with a provision in the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld).
The eighth says, “It appears that such is ‘fraud upon the court’ hence.”
The ninth is a maxim that “out of fraud, no action arises”.
The tenth is “A man affected by both a void and a voidable Order has the right… to have the said Orders set aside.”
None of these grounds of appeal identifies any arguable basis upon which any of the decisions the subject of the appeal could be set aside. It is possible that within these brief perfunctory grounds of appeal, the appellant may have some point. His failure to identify any in his notice of appeal creates significant difficulty for the future conduct of the appeal. One cannot have parties proceed to a hearing of an appeal on the basis of Delphic maxims unconnected to any facts, matters or laws relevant to the decisions that are the subject of the appeal.
In order to succeed in an appeal to this Court, the appellant must demonstrate that the order, or any of the orders, made by the Northern Judge, was vitiated by some legal, factual or discretionary error.1 He does not identify any such error. Even if he could, it would be necessary for him to overcome the fact that the appeal seeks to have the Court review a decision on a matter of practice and procedure. These matters often call for a degree of appellate restraint against interference with decisions made in the trial division. Generally, an appellate Court will not interfere unless, in addition to some error of principle, the appellant demonstrates that the order will work a substantial injustice to one of the parties.2
There is no suggestion in any of the appellant’s material that the orders made by the Northern Judge could work a substantial injustice against him. I have considered the appeal notice as it stands. I have read the other material that the appellant relies upon, and considered his oral submissions made in court this morning. There does not appear to be the slightest suggestion that the orders, the subject of the appeal, worked any injustice.
If the appellant wishes to proceed with the appeal, he will need to do better. He will need to identify grounds of appeal that are directed at the orders that are actually the subject of the appeal. It is not clear at present that there is any prospect that he could do so, but I am not wishing to close the door on the possibility that there may be something that he could find within the broad scope of his challenge that might amount to a ground of appeal.
It seems highly improbable that such a ground could be found in respect of the programming directions made in the orders below. It seems equally improbable that the transfer of proceedings from the Brisbane District Court to the Townsville Registry could be thought to give rise to some appealable point that could cause a substantial injustice. I say that only against the known background. The appellant commenced his proceedings in the Supreme Court in Townsville, so that that does not seem to be an inconvenient forum for him as a party to litigation.
In the circumstances, the notice of appeal should be struck out. I will direct that, if the appellant wishes to persist with the appeal, he is to file and serve a fresh notice of appeal within 21 days. The appellant’s application to dismiss the respondents’ application was and is entirely unnecessary. It is the sort of cost and time-wasting exercise that is discouraged by the philosophy of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. That application should also be dismissed.
Mr O'Brien is there anything else you want to say?
MR O'BRIEN: Yes, your Honour. I provided a draft order. There is one typographical error, which I just identified in paragraph 2. Should be the application “24 April”, not 4. That was the date of the application to strike out – my client’s strike out application. And then you’ll see in order 3, your Honour, my instructions are no order as to costs are sought.
BRADLEY JA: Yes. Now, the appellant’s application of 5 March, he did not read that today, but that is a general application, is it not, for an extension of time?
MR O'BRIEN: Yes.
BRADLEY JA: So why should that be dismissed?
MR O'BRIEN: Well, it was sought to be dismissed in the context of the notice of appeal being struck out.
BRADLEY JA: Yes. But I have given him 21 days in which ‑ ‑ ‑
MR O'BRIEN: Yes.
BRADLEY JA: ‑ ‑ ‑ to produce another one, so I do not see any point in striking out or dismissing the application for leave.
MR O'BRIEN: Yes. So I think, your Honour, that means paragraph 2 would be, “The appellant’s application filed 24 April 2025 is dismissed.”
BRADLEY JA: Yes. I will direct that the appellant file and serve any fresh notice of appeal within 21 days. I will also direct that if the appellant does not file a fresh notice of appeal within 21 days, then the appeal is dismissed. Now, could your solicitors prepare a draft order in those terms?
MR O'BRIEN: Yes, your Honour.
BRADLEY JA: If you submit that to my Associate, I can arrange to have it issued through the registry.
MR O'BRIEN: Yes. Thank you, your Honour.
BRADLEY JA: Thanks. Adjourn the court.
Robert
National Australia Bank Limited [2025] QCA 139
(2000) 203 CLR 172
The notice of appeal was struck out. The appellant was directed to file and serve any fresh notice of appeal within 21 days, failing which the appeal would be dismissed. The appellant's application filed 24 April 2025 was dismissed. Bradley JA stated that there was no point in dismissing the application for leave in light of the opportunity to file a fresh notice. The transcript records that the respondents did not seek an order as to costs.