RM -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 81 (16 March 2026)

(1) communicate or attempt to communicate with the person protected (his ex-wife) by any means whatsoever including SMS or text messages or any other electronic means;

(2) behave in an intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive manner towards the person protected;

(3) approach or remain within 50 metres of the person protected.

1. The terms of the FVRO permitted the appellant to 'communicate with the Person Protected by email, SMS, text message or by any other written electronic means, solely to make arrangements to spend time with or communicate with any child or children of the Person Protected and [the appellant], or about the welfare of such children.'[1]

1. On 30 May 2024 the appellant was charged with four breaches of the FVRO contrary to s 61(1) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (Initial Charges). The Initial Charges related to four electronic communications made by the appellant to his ex-wife that were characterised as 'intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive' towards the appellant's ex-wife.
2. On 25 April 2024, the appellant sent his ex-wife the following WhatsApp message:[2]

Hi [S],

Kids have finished dinner and I am ready to drop them off. I cannot release the children however, until I receive the TKD payment screenshot and your confirmation of the [address] drop off tonight. If you cannot do the above by 8 pm latest, I will put the children to sleep here and I will drop them off around 7:30-8am at [address] tomorrow morning.

1. 'TKD' is a reference to Taekwondo. This was the first offence and the subject of charge PH 1113/2024 (Charge 1).
2. The second of the Initial Charges was a discussion over WhatsApp between the appellant and his ex-wife on 5 May 2024.[3] The appellant and his ex-wife were exchanging messages about the children's pick‑up arrangements and the appellant asked for his ex-wife to return his laptop to him. The appellant's ex-wife sent him a message at 7.00 pm saying 'The kids should have been home an hour ago ... is everything ok? Please bring them back asap.' The appellant did not respond. At 8.03 pm, the appellant's ex-wife sent him a message saying 'I'm worried about the kids. It's now 2 hours late. When will you be coming here?' The appellant did not respond. At 9.03 pm, the appellant's ex‑wife sent a message saying 'It's now 3 hours past the due time and I'm worried about the kids. Please respond.' The appellant responded at 9.08 pm 'Have you got my laptop to give me?' The appellant's ex‑wife responded 'Am I to understand you are holding our kids ransom until you get your laptop back?' The appellant responded 'No, they are more than happy to stay the night here. I have been asking many times now and you keep ignoring my requests whilst I keep complying with yours.' This was charge PH 1114/2024 (Charge 2).
3. The third and fourth offences relate to email messages sent by the appellant on 25 and 26 May 2024 with the subject line 'Null and VOID interim parenting plan.' On 25 May 2024, the appellant emailed his ex wife 'Until this is decided upon, I will not be releasing the children until...' followed by several ultimatums.[4] On 26 May 2024, the appellant emailed his ex‑wife[5] 'I have decided not to play this immature tit‑for‑tat game of withholding the children.' These emails were the subject of charges PH 1115/2024 and PH 1116/2024 respectively (Charges 3 and 4).
4. The appellant was charged with the Initial Charges on 4 June 2024. On 2 October 2024 the appellant pleaded not guilty to the Initial Charges and entered into a bail undertaking which contained a protective bail condition prohibiting the appellant from approaching or being within 100 metres of his ex-wife.[6]
5. The Initial Charges were listed for trial on 29 May 2025. On 29 May 2025, the trial could not proceed due to insufficient time and was adjourned to 4 December 2025.[7]

1. On 5 July 2025, while on bail for the Initial Charges, the appellant was charged with an additional breach of the FVRO, and breach of the protective bail condition contrary to s 51(2a) of the Bail Act 1982 (WA) (Subsequent Charges).
2. The Subsequent Charges relate to an incident that occurred on 1 July 2025. The appellant's daughter was playing in a netball game at Shelley Reserve. The appellant drove through the carpark of the reserve and along Koolan Drive then parked on a hill from where he could observe his daughter's netball game. The appellant did not leave his car. The appellant's ex‑wife was at Shelley Reserve and saw the appellant driving through the carpark. She videoed the incident with her mobile phone[8] and reported the incident to police. The appellant was within 50 metres of the appellant which was in breach of the FVRO and the protective bail condition. These are charges PE 39646/2025 and PE 39647/2025 (Charges 5 and 6 respectively).
3. The appellant was arrested and charged with the Subsequent Charges on 5 July 2025. The appellant appeared in the Perth Magistrates Court on 6 July 2025 and applied for bail. Bail was refused and the appellant was remanded in custody.

The hearing before the learned magistrate on 23 July 2025

1. The Initial Charges and the Subsequent Charges were originally listed in the Perth Magistrates Court for mention on 11 July 2025, which was adjourned to 23 July 2025 at the request of the appellant's counsel. The appellant was remanded in custody from 5 July 2025 to 23 July 2025.
2. At the hearing on 23 July 2025, the appellant pleaded guilty to the Initial Charges and the Subsequent Charges. The learned magistrate read each charge out to the appellant and asked, before taking his plea of guilty, 'do you understand that charge?' to which the appellant responded 'yes' on each occasion.[9]
3. At the hearing, the prosecutor described the offending behaviour as intimidating to the victim. While the learned magistrate accepted that the WhatsApp messages and emails were civil, her Honour described them as being 'controlling'.[10]
4. In sentencing the appellant, the learned magistrate said:[11]

I've also heard what has been said on your behalf by your counsel ... that these breaches could be considered to be at the lower end of the scale, but the type of behaviour that you have displayed is persistent. You've sent text messages which in my view, and I think would be in many people's view, are clearly intended to be controlling and coercive in relation to getting what you want from [your ex-wife].

1. Although counsel for the appellant did not make a formal application for a spent conviction order, the following exchange took place between the learned magistrate and the appellant's counsel on 23 July 2025: [12]

[Counsel for the appellant]: Yes, so really he needs to be released today, we would say, your Honour, and based on the overall background of all the facts, we would say that your Honour can deal with the matter without considering a term of imprisonment, either suspended or otherwise. Obviously, it's most - I know he would like a spent conviction, and I simply note that, but he has got no really substantial record, but the problem is there's a number of breaches, and I see your Honour's nodding, so I'm not going to press that further. (emphasis added)

1. The learned magistrate imposed a global fine of $2,000 for the six offences, and ordered the appellant pay costs of $141.50.

1. Part 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CA Act) governs appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction. The appellant requires leave to appeal in respect of each ground of appeal.[13] The court must not grant leave to appeal unless it is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.[14] In order to satisfy this requirement, the ground of appeal must have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding, that is it must have a real prospect of success.[15] If leave to appeal is refused, the appeal is taken to be dismissed.[16]
2. I turn first to consider ground 1 which requires me to determine whether the appellant should be permitted to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

1. The appellant seeks leave to appeal on two grounds:[17]
   1. The appellant suffered a miscarriage of justice upon being convicted on his plea of guilty to the charges.

(i) The appellant had an arguable defence to each of the charges with reasonable prospects of success; and

(ii) the appellant did not intend to admit guilt.

1. The appellant suffered a miscarriage of justice due to a spent conviction order not being granted.

(i) The appellant was of prior good character;

(ii) The appellant was unlikely to commit the offences again; &

(iii) The convictions would have a substantial detrimental effect on the appellant's ability to obtain employment in the future.

1. In accordance with s 39(1) of the CA Act the appeal court must decide the appeal on the evidence and material that was before the lower court. However, s 39(1) does not affect this court's power as contained in s 40(1)(e) of the CA Act to 'admit any other evidence' for the purposes of dealing with an appeal.[18]
2. The appellant sought to adduce additional evidence by way of two affidavits sworn by him on 4 November 2026 and 15 December 2026 respectively. The first affidavit summarises the legal advice the appellant received in relation to his plea of guilty to the Initial Charges and the Subsequent Charges and deposes to matters relating to his defences to those charges. The second affidavit annexes video footage of the appellant's daughter's netball game that he attended on 1 July 2025.
3. The respondent did not object to the admission of the additional evidence. I admitted the additional evidence on the basis that it is relevant to the issues arising in the appeal. The appellant gave evidence at the hearing of the appeal and was cross-examined.
4. The respondent also sought to adduce additional evidence by way of the affidavit of Stephanie Jun Keat Teoh sworn on 19 November 2025. Ms Teoh's affidavit annexes the FVRO, the appellant's email that was the subject of one of the Initial Charges, the appellant's bail undertaking, mobile phone video clips and an estimate of distance relevant to the Subsequent Charges. I admitted this additional evidence on the basis that it is relevant to the issues arising in the appeal.

1. The appellant submits that he suffered a miscarriage of justice upon being convicted on his pleas of guilty for the following reasons:

(1) he did not intend to admit guilt - he only pleaded guilty to be released from prison as he was advised by his lawyer that he would remain in prison for four to six months awaiting trial;

(2) he had an arguable defence with reasonable prospects of success to the Initial Charges - that being the communications with his ex-wife fell within the exception to the FVRO that permitted him to communicate with his ex-wife for the purpose of making arrangements to spend time with the children or about their welfare. The communications did not constitute behaviour that was objectively intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive; and

(3) he had an arguable defence with reasonable prospects of success to the Subsequent Charges - he went to watch his daughter's netball game at her request and made no attempt to advance, approach or communicate with his ex-wife. He left the scene as soon as he saw his ex-wife.

1. The CA Act, by s 7(1), allows an aggrieved party to appeal to a single judge of this court, in respect of a decision made by a court of summary jurisdiction. Those grounds include where there has been a miscarriage of justice.[19]
2. Section 8(2) of the CA Act provides that an appeal may be commenced against a decision made after a plea of guilty or an admission of the truth of any matter.
3. However, an appellate court will not set aside a conviction based on a plea of guilty unless the appellant satisfies the court that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.[20] While the circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice may occur are not closed, there are three well recognised grounds for allowing a change of plea:[21]

(1) where the applicant did not understand the charge or did not intend to plead guilty;

(2) where on the admitted facts the applicant could not in law be guilty of the offence; and

(3) where the plea of guilty has been obtained by inducement, fraud or intimidation.

1. It is the appellant who bears the onus of establishing that he should be permitted to withdraw his pleas of guilty. Where a person entered a plea of guilty when he or she had legal representation and the benefit of legal advice, it is not easy to establish a miscarriage of justice has occurred.[22] That is because there is strong public interest in the finalisation of court proceedings and a plea of guilty to considered to be an admission of each of the elements of an offence.[23] The court must scrutinise closely a submission that an accused did not intend to admit guilt where he or she was legally represented, being alive to the possibility that an accused may later regret the plea of guilty and seek to falsely blame his or her plea on inadequate advice or improper pressure from his or her lawyer.[24]
2. It is not enough for an accused to demonstrate that he or she is innocent of the offence or even that he or she has an arguable defence. That is because an accused may decide to enter a plea of guilty for reasons other than a belief that he or she is guilty of an offence. A person may, for example, plead guilty to avoid publicity, anxiety, inconvenience, or in the hope of obtaining a more lenient sentence. That is not an exhaustive list of reasons. A plea of guilty entered for such a reason is valid and a court will only permit it to be withdrawn where the accused otherwise establishes that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.[25] Where the accused relies upon an arguable defence to justify withdrawing a plea of guilty, he or she must still persuade the court that there was a miscarriage of justice by reason of that defence not being advanced through mistake, inadvertence, or some other good reason.[26]
3. There is a distinction to be drawn between an equivocal plea of guilty and an unequivocal one. If it appears to the judicial officer who is sentencing the offender that the plea of guilty is equivocal (that is, the person does not understand the plea or does not intend to admit guilt) then the plea must not be accepted and a plea of not guilty must be entered.[27] Where a plea of guilty is clear and unequivocal, there is no reason for the sentencing judicial officer not to accept it. A miscarriage of justice will only be established if the plea was not genuine or the accused could not in law have been guilty of the offence.[28]

1. The appellant says he did not receive any substantive legal advice as to the elements of, or available defences to, each of the charges. The appellant says he had three different lawyers over the course of the proceedings and received legal advice that his only option, upon being remanded in custody, was to plead guilty to all the charges or face a lengthy wait in prison until a trial was listed for charges that ultimately would not warrant a custodial sentence.[29]
2. The appellant says, due to being charged with the Subsequent Charges, he was 'caught by the operation of Schedule II of the Bail Act' and this meant he was left with no choice, when bail was refused, but to plead guilty to the charges. A plea of not guilty would have meant that he would have remained in prison until 4 December 2025, approximately five months. The appellant says this was not an option at all given he and his new partner had just experienced the death of their newborn child.[30]
3. The appellant says he did not at any time intend to admit guilt. Rather, his pleas of guilty were entered for the sole reason of avoiding being remanded in custody for five months for offences that did not warrant a custodial sentence.[31]

1. In relation to Charge 1, the appellant says he sent the message 'I cannot release the children however, until I receive the TKD payment screenshot and your confirmation of the [street address] drop off tonight' to his ex-wife because he was concerned that she had unilaterally rearranged the children's activities to suit her and deny him time with his children. The appellant says to ensure his ex‑wife would commit to allowing his daughter to attend the Taekwondo tournament he asked her to make the payment for the competition. The appellant says that he gave his ex-wife an alternative: he would make the payment if his ex-wife agreed to him picking up the children for the tournament.[32]
2. In relation to Charge 2, the appellant says he made nearly 30 requests between 3 April 2024 and 25 May 2024 to his ex‑wife for the return of his laptop. He said he asked for his laptop so that he could stream Disney movies to watch with his children when they came to his apartment and it contained cherished photographs of his children. The appellant says his ex-wife attempted to 'frame my multiple polite requests for my laptop as a ransom threat', when in fact they were requests made in the context of his ex-wife frequently stating that she would not give permission for the children to spend nights at his apartment.[33]
3. In relation to Charges 3 and 4, the appellant says the context of his communication must be viewed having regard to the fact that his ex‑wife unilaterally withheld contact from his children from 12 May 2024 to 25 May 2024 and did not reply to 17 WhatsApp messages from the appellant pleading to see his children. The appellant's lawyer sent a request to his ex-wife to have contact with the children. His ex‑wife's lawyer responded to the appellant's lawyer stating that his ex‑wife 'will not be releasing the children without a signed parenting plan in these terms.' The appellant says the letter was a threat to withhold access to his children until he signed a very restrictive parenting plan. The appellant says his emails on 25 and 26 May 2024 were an attempt to use his ex-wife's own strategies to encourage her to agree to mediation.[34]
4. The appellant contends each of the communications relied upon in the Initial Charges concerned his children's arrangements or welfare, and his behaviour was not objectively intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive. The appellant says when he used the word 'release' in relation to the children, it mirrored his ex‑wife's own language.
5. In relation to the Subsequent Charges, the appellant says he went to his daughter's netball game because she had pleaded for him to go and told him that she would be taking the school bus. The appellant says he knew there was 'less chance of crossing paths' with his ex‑wife.[35] The appellant says when he arrived at Shelley Reserve he drove around the car park areas to check that he could not see his ex‑wife or her car. He then drove his car up to a hill, approximately 80 metres from his daughter, stayed in his car and watched the netball game. He says he then saw a female figure approaching the car videoing on her phone and he left immediately. The appellant says he made no attempt to approach his ex‑wife, advance towards her or communicate with her.[36]
6. The appellant submits, given the prosecutor read out the appellant's explanation to police which was 'as soon as I saw her, I left', he could not have been guilty of the Subsequent Charges and the guilty pleas should not have been accepted by the sentencing magistrate.[37]

1. The appellant's plea of guilty to each of the Initial and Subsequent Charges was clear and unequivocal. When asked if he understood the charge, the appellant said yes and then proceeded to plead guilty. He repeated this process for each charge. The appellant properly concedes that his guilty pleas were unequivocal.[38]
2. The appellant's lawyer was not called by either side to give evidence as to whether he gave advice to the appellant about the elements of the breach charges, the evidence or available defences. However, the evidence of the appellant himself is that he spoke to his lawyer on 11 July 2025 when he was in custody and his lawyer told him:[39]

(1) he had been caught by Schedule II of the Bail Act and there were really no options to seek bail in those circumstances;

(2) if he maintained his plea of not guilty, he would need to stay in Hakea until his trial date, which would likely be a stay of four to six months;

(3) option two was to plead guilty to all six charges and he asked his lawyer if he could plead guilty to only the Subsequent Charges and get bail, but his lawyer told him he would still have no chance of bail because of the Schedule II circumstances;

(4) it was his lawyer's strong opinion that he should plead guilty to all of the charges; and

(5) his lawyer was confident he could employ his skills of advocacy to obtain, at the very most, a couple of spent convictions for the matters as they were at the very low end.

1. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the Initial Charges on 4 October 2024 and they were listed for trial (which ultimately had to be relisted due to insufficient time). Clearly, the appellant understood the availability of a defence to these charges given his initial pleas of not guilty. I find that this is consistent with the appellant understanding the elements of the charges and the availability of any defence.
2. The appellant had an interest in pleading guilty on 11 July 2025 to resolve the proceedings quickly. This is a legitimate reason for him to plead guilty, even if he did not subjectively believe he was guilty of the offences. There is no assertion from the appellant his lawyer's advice was flawed or misleading or that his lawyer sought to pressure him to plead guilty. The fact the appellant's lawyer pointed out the advantages of pleading guilty and offered an opinion in relation to pleading guilty does not amount to conduct that compromises the voluntary nature of the appellant's pleas of guilty.
3. The evidence is consistent with the appellant's deliberate and clear intention to plead guilty to each of the offences. I find there has been no miscarriage of justice occasioned on the basis that the appellant did not intend to admit guilt.
4. I turn now to consider the appellant's assertion that he had an arguable defence in relation to each of the Initial and Subsequent Offences and whether a plea of guilty, in such circumstances, gives rise to a miscarriage of justice.
5. The appellant must show not only that he has an arguable defence, but also that he had wrongly understood he had no arguable defence at the time he entered his guilty pleas.
6. Having considered all the affidavit evidence and the oral evidence of the appellant in relation to the circumstances surrounding the alleged offending, I am not satisfied the appellant had a reasonably arguable defence to any of the charges. That is for the following reasons.
7. First, in relation to Charge 1, it is clear from the appellant's WhatsApp message that he was ready to return his children to his ex‑wife but said he would not release them until he had proof of the Taekwondo payment. In my view, that message was objectively characterised as communication to his ex-wife which constituted behaving in an intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive manner and in breach of the FVRO.
8. Second, in relation to Charge 2, the appellant's message requesting return of his laptop was sent in the context of him agreeing to return the children three and a half hours earlier and providing no explanation to his ex-wife as to why he did not. The return of the appellant's laptop was not part of an arrangement to spend time with his children or to communicate with his children. In my view, it is also objectively characterised as communication to his ex‑wife which constituted behaving in an intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive manner and in breach of the FVRO.
9. Third, in relation to Charge 3, the appellant's email states he will not release the children until certain conditions are met. In my view, this email is objectively characterised as communication to his ex‑wife which constituted behaving in an intimidatory, offensive or emotionally abusive manner and in breach of the FVRO.
10. Fourth, in relation to Charge 4, the email contains language which is objectively emotionally abusive in that the appellant suggests his ex‑wife is immature and engaging in retaliatory behaviour. It not necessary for the appellant to communicate in this way to address concerns he may have had about his children. In my view, this communication is objectively in breach of the FRVO.
11. Finally, in relation to the Subsequent Charges, mobile phone video footage taken by the appellant's ex‑wife shows that the appellant remained within 50 metres of his ex-wife while he was watching his daughter's netball game. In cross‑examination at the appeal hearing, the appellant said he took precautions by staying in his car in case his ex-wife was at the netball game.[40] The appellant gave evidence in re‑examination there was definitely a likelihood his ex‑wife may have been at the netball game and that is why he took steps to go through the parking lot to see if she was there and parked at the top of the hill.[41]
12. Further, given my finding the appellant did not have an arguable defence, the submission that the appellant could not, at law, have been convicted of the Subsequent Charges is without merit.
13. Given my findings that the appellant did not in fact have a reasonably arguable defence to each of the charges, no miscarriage of justice is established by his pleas of guilt. However, even if I am wrong about that and he did have a reasonably arguable defence to any or all of the charges, no miscarriage of justice arises because he did not wrongly understand he had no arguable defence at the time he entered his guilty pleas. As I have outlined, the appellant pleaded guilty despite his belief he was not guilty.
14. For all of those reasons, the appellant has not suffered a miscarriage of justice upon being convicted on his pleas of guilty to the Initial and Subsequent Charges. The appellant should not be permitted to withdraw his pleas of guilty. Ground 1 has no reasonable prospects of success and leave to appeal in respect of ground 1 is refused.

1. The power to make a spent conviction order is found in s 39 (2)(a)-(d) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act). Section 39(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act provides that, where a fine is imposed, the court may make a spent conviction order.
2. Section 45 of the Sentencing Act sets out the conditions for the making of a spent conviction order and relevantly provides:

(1) Under section 39(2), a court sentencing an offender is not to make a spent conviction order unless -

(a) it considers that the offender is unlikely to commit such an offence again; and

(b) having regard to -

1. the fact that the offence is trivial; or
2. the previous good character of the offender, it considers the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender.

1. The court can only grant a spent conviction if the following three pre‑conditions in s 45 of the Sentencing Act are satisfied:

(1) the offender is unlikely to commit such an offence again; and

(2) the offence was trivial or the offender is of prior good character; and

(3) having regard to the pre-condition that the offence is trivial or the offender is of previous good character, the court must be of the view that the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender.

1. Even if the preconditions are met, the court has a power, but not a duty, to make a spent conviction. The court must consider all the circumstances of the offence and the offending, as well as the public interest. In R v Tognini [42] Murray J said:

In my opinion it is appropriate to conclude that having regard to its effect on the ordinary operations of the Spent Convictions Act, the discretionary power to make a spent conviction order conferred by s 45 of the Sentencing Act should be regarded as being of an exceptional character. If the necessary pre-conditions are established, the court should go on to have regard to the seriousness of the offence before it in the circumstances of its commission and in the circumstances personal to the offender. It should take as the ordinary rule the fact that a conviction will be a matter of record with all the consequences that may entail into the future. It should therefore look to see whether there is some particular circumstance to show that it would be desirable, not only from the point of view of the offender but also, having regard to his or her rehabilitation, from the point of view of the community, why the adverse effect of the conviction should be immediately set aside.

That may often be found in the fact that the conviction, if not declared to be spent, might be a particular impediment to the offender following a particular career, practising a particular profession or undertaking particular employment. It may be that it will be the case that that would be productive of exceptional hardship to the offender and his family, or it may simply be that it can be seen that to relieve the offender of the adverse effects of the conviction would positively aide that person's rehabilitation in a way which may be seen to best accord with the interests of the community. The court may be aided to reach that conclusion if it thinks that there is no pressing public interest in being able to continue to have access to the fact of conviction as part of the process of securing the protection of the community.

1. When considering the public interest, the court should have regard to the public interest in maintaining the community's confidence in the judicial system and ensuring general deterrence by the public recording of convictions.[43]
2. The question I must determine is whether the failure to make a spent conviction order has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.[44] I may substitute my own opinion for that of the learned magistrate merely because I exercise my discretion in favour of making a spent conviction order.[45]

1. The appellant submits that spent convictions should be granted in relation to each of the offences because he is unlikely to commit an offence of that nature again, he is of prior good character, the offences are at the lowest end of the scale of seriousness, and the convictions will have an adverse effect on his future employment. The appellant does not submit the offences are trivial.
2. The offences the subject of the Initial and Subsequent Charges are the appellant's only convictions. It is aggravating that the Subsequent Charges relate to offending behaviour while the appellant was on bail and involve the breach of a protective bail condition. However, the Initial Charges were all charged on the same date and the Subsequent Charges relate to a different type of conduct. Since the appellant was charged with the Initial Charges, he has not offended in the same manner towards his ex-wife. The appellant also spent several weeks in custody for offences which were determined ultimately not to warrant a custodial sentence.
3. I am satisfied in these circumstances the appellant is of prior good character and is unlikely to commit an offence of such a nature again.
4. Having satisfied the first two preconditions, the question remains whether the appellant should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect the convictions may have on him.
5. In my view, the objective seriousness of the offending is a very important consideration. I consider that these offences are at the lowest end of scale of seriousness of these types of offences.
6. The appellant has adduced evidence about the effect the convictions may have on his future employment. He has been a dentist for over 20 years. The appellant says he expects there is a real prospect his dental license will be deregistered as a result of his convictions for these offences and this would mean he cannot practice as a dentist in Australia or overseas.[46]
7. The relevant legislation[47] requires the appellant to disclose to the relevant regulatory board that he has been the subject of a finding of guilt for an offence punishable by imprisonment, including any spent convictions.[48]
8. While the appellant does have to inform the relevant regulatory board of the fact of a spent conviction, the fact it is a spent conviction is something the board can consider. I am satisfied if he were to seek future employment as a dentist, these convictions may have an adverse impact on him.
9. It is a balancing exercise - on the one hand there are the adverse effects of the convictions on the appellant to consider, and on the other hand there is a public interest in an employer or potential employer being aware of the conviction insofar as the conviction may be relevant to assessing the offender's reliability or suitability for a particular type of work.
10. The appellant has a demonstrated work history as a dentist of over 20 years and has not been convicted of any offences during that period. The nature of these offences is that they occurred in the context of a marriage breakdown and are the lowest end of the scale of these types of offences. I therefore, do not consider that it is in the public interest for a future employer to be aware of these convictions.
11. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied it is in the appellant's and the community's interest for the appellant to be immediately relieved of the adverse effect the convictions may have on him. I find the failure to grant spent conviction orders occasioned a miscarriage of justice and the appellant ought to be granted spent convictions.

1. I make the following orders:
   1. The appellant's application to admit additional evidence granted.
   2. The respondent's application to admit additional evidence granted.
   3. Leave to appeal on ground 1 refused.
   4. Leave to appeal on ground 2 granted.
   5. Appeal on ground 2 allowed.
   6. Spent conviction order made in relation to PH 1113/2024, PH 1114/2024, PH 1115/2024, PH 1116/2024, PE 39646/2025 and PE 39647/2025.
2. Given the appellant was unsuccessful on ground 1 and successful on ground 2, my preliminary view is that there should be no order as to costs. In the event that either party seeks an order as to costs of the appeal, they should file a minute of proposed orders within seven (7) days of this decision.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Affidavit of Stephanie Jun Keat Teoh affirmed 18 November 2025 (Teoh Affidavit) [3]; Annexure 'SJKJ1', page 16.

[2] Affidavit of RM sworn 4 November 2025 (First Appellant Affidavit) [56]; Annexure 'B', page 31.

[3] First Appellant Affidavit [70]; Annexure 'C', pages 42 - 43.

[4] Teoh Affidavit [3]; Annexure 'SJKT1', page 8.

[5] First Appellant Affidavit [99] - [101]; Annexure 'E', page 55.

[6] Teoh Affidavit [4]; Annexure 'SJKT2', pages 26 - 27.

[7] First Appellant Affidavit [18] - [22].

[15] Samuels v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56].

[17] Appeal notice filed 19 August 2025.

[20] Meissner v The Queen [1995] HCA 41; (1995) 184 CLR 132, 157 (Dawson J); Snook v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 29 [102] (Buss JA, Mazza JA and Hall J agreeing) (Snook).

[21] Borsa v The Queen [2003] WASCA 254 [20] (Murray ACJ, Steytler J and Hasluck J agreeing); Webster v The Queen [2015] WASCA 20 [57] (McLure P, Buss JA and Mazza JA agreeing); Snook [102].

[23] Turner v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASC 490 [18].

[26] Glover v Reyne [2001] WASCA 305 [57].

[27] Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501, 511.

[28] Douglas v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASCA 11 [36].

[29] First Appellant Affidavit [6] - [42].

[30] First Appellant Affidavit [44] - [45].

[32] First Appellant Affidavit [57] - [62].

[33] First Appellant Affidavit [65] - [81].

[34] First Appellant Affidavit [83] - [95].

[35] First Appellant Affidavit [106].

[36] First Appellant Affidavit [106] - [108].

[42] R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31 [27] - [28].

[43] Brewer v Bayens [No 2] [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510 [18].

[44] Rawle v Collins [2022] WASC 452 [59].

[45] Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 [15].

[46] Appellant's First Affidavit [109] - [111].

[47] Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Western Australia) (National Law).

[48] National Law ss 130(1), 130(3)(ii), 130(3)(b)(ii).