RJC v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 23

[5] There are five grounds of appeal. The first four grounds concern:

1. the misapplication of s158(2)(d);
2. an error of finding pertaining to section 158(2)(e);
3. an error of finding pertaining to section 158(2)(f); and
4. an error in discretion pursuant to section 158A.

[6] The fifth ground concerns error in the exercise of discretion pursuant to section 158B.

[7] Counsel for the appellant conceded that if I dismissed the appeal on the first four grounds, then the last ground does not require addressing given the structure of the Justices Act.

[8] That concession is appropriate as section 158B deals with the capacity to award costs at a higher amount after being satisfied that special difficulty, complexity or importance exists. Although this was also sought by the appellant at first instance, his Honour did not consider the provision following the initial refusal of costs under section 158.

[9] For reasons that follow, the grounds of appeal are to be dismissed.

[10] The appellant was charged with breaching bail, namely a condition of curfew.

[11] Evidence was called by the prosecution. Senior Constable Perrin gave evidence that police arrived at the appellant's address at 1:55am on 13 June 2025. They drove into the driveway area with high beams shining onto the property. Senior Constable Perrin approached the front door. He knocked loudly several times and waited for about 60 seconds. He looked through a window and saw no movement. After knocking again and waiting for another 30-45 seconds, he left the property. By 2:02am, the appellant was reported for the breach. Although three vehicles were sighted at the property, no inquiries were made regarding those.

[12] Senior Constable Stuckey gave very similar evidence. He remained in the car whilst Senior Constable Perrin knocked on the door. The engine of the car remained running.

[13] On the 14th of June 2025, the appellant reported to a police station as part of his bail obligations and was arrested. The appellant stated that he was at home asleep when police attended that morning. He had left the external door unlocked, and the internal doors were also open.

[14] Appellant's counsel argued that the phrase 'when police ask he must answer the door[1]' was such that it required the appellant's awareness of the exercise of that police power.

[15] His Honour dismissed the charge after reciting the evidence. His Honour found that compliance with the condition required that the defendant first be asked. In the absence of that requirement, the charge could not be established, as it could not be proven that the appellant was not at the property.

[16] The appellant's counsel relied upon the argument in paragraph [15] and the appellant's explanation, arguing that the prosecution be dismissed not on a technical ground, but an overall failure to properly investigate the matter. The argument extended to the appellant's actions, namely that he did not bring suspicion onto himself, that he provided an explanation which exonerated him, that he did not unnecessarily prolong the proceedings, and that he was not convicted of any charge.

[17] The Magistrates Court was empowered to require costs to be paid pursuant to sections 157, 158 and 159 of the Justices Act.

[18] In this case, his Honour, after dismissing the complaint, was fully aware of the provisions of sections 158, 158A and 158B. His Honour received written submissions (in addition to oral ones) from the appellant's counsel about the same.

[19] His Honour found that the proceedings were conducted in good faith. His Honour did not dismiss the charge on technical grounds, appreciating the narrow nature of the prosecution case.

[20] The appeal is brought pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act. Any such appeal, subject to new evidence, is by way of rehearing on the original evidence.

[21] Although there is an application to lead new evidence by the appellant, it will not be necessary, for reasons that will become self-explanatory, to consider that evidence for the purposes of disposing of this appeal.

[22] The appellant is required to show that 'some error has been made in exercising the discretion'.[2]

"158A Exercise of discretion in relation to an award of costs

(1) Despite section 158(1), justices who dismiss a complaint may make an order for costs in favour of a defendant against a complainant who is a police officer or public officer only if the justices are satisfied that it is proper that the order for costs should be made.

(2) In deciding whether it is proper to make the order for costs, the justices must take into account all relevant circumstances, including, for example -

(a) whether the proceeding was brought and continued in good faith; and

(b) whether there was a failure to take appropriate steps to investigate a matter coming to, or within, the knowledge of a person responsible for bringing or continuing the proceeding; and

(c) whether the investigation into the offence was conducted in an appropriate way; and

(d) whether the order of dismissal was made on technical grounds and not on a finding that there was insufficient evidence to convict or make an order against the defendant; and

(e) whether the defendant brought suspicion on himself or herself by conduct engaged in after the events constituting the commission of the offence; and

(f) whether the defendant unreasonably declined an opportunity before a charge was laid -

(i) to explain the defendant's version of the events; or

(ii) to produce evidence likely to exonerate the defendant;

and the explanation or evidence could have avoided a prosecution; and

(g) whether there was a failure to comply with a direction given under section 83A; and

(h) whether the defendant conducted the defence in a way that prolonged the proceeding unreasonably; and

(i) whether the defendant was acquitted on a charge, but convicted on another.

(3) If an order for costs under section 158 is made against a complainant who is a police officer or public officer (within the meaning of this subsection), the clerk of the court is to give to the defendant a certificate signed by the clerk showing the amount of costs awarded.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), the defendant is entitled to be paid by the State the amount shown in the certificate within 2 months after payment is claimed.

(5) If an appeal against an order for costs is made under section 222

(a) payment of the amount shown in the certificate is stayed until the appeal is decided; and

(b) payment is to be made of the amount (if any) ordered or confirmed by further order made on the appeal.

(a) an officer or employee of the public service of the Commonwealth; or

(b) an officer or employee of a statutory body that represents the Crown in right of the Commonwealth; or

(c) an officer or employee of a local government."

[23] The section specifies factors that must be considered when exercising the discretion pursuant to section 158.

[24] There is a constraint placed upon such costs when the complainant is a police officer or public officer. It permits such costs to be ordered 'only if the justices are satisfied that it is proper that the order for costs should be made.'

[25] In those circumstances, the onus is on the party seeking costs to satisfy the Court of that having regard to the non-exhaustive statutory criteria pursuant to section 158A.

First ground - the learned Magistrate misapplied s 158A (2)(d) of the Justices Act 1886

[26] The appellant's counsel submits that as the dismissal was not on 'technical grounds', his Honour should have exercised the direction in favour of costs.

[28] A factor that may favour exercising statutory discretion in a particular direction does not compel that it be exercised in that way. A discretion is not a one-dimensional concept.

[29] His Honour made an undisputed finding that the prosecution case was not made on technical grounds. That was an agitation before his Honour. It was also a mandatory criterion pursuant to section 158A(2)(d).

[30] Despite that finding and that consideration, his Honour did not award costs. I cannot infer a misapplication of section 158(2)(d) in those circumstances.

Second and third ground - Error in finding that sections 158(2) (e) and 158(2)(f) were not relevant considerations

[32] Sections 158(2)(e) and 158(2)(f) (as extracted above) deal with the conduct of a defendant and their level of co-operation with the administration of justice. One is focused on conduct that might bring suspicion on themselves and the other on the evidence regarding their version or other explanations.

[33] His Honour found that neither matter was relevant in the proceeding.

[34] As I have outlined, the appellant did provide a version to the police which was said to be exculpatory in nature.

[35] There was no evidence that he conducted himself in a way that would have brought suspicion on him.

[36] His Honour was well aware of this factual assessment, having referred to the appellant's version given to the police and to the circumstances of his interaction with them when dismissing the charge. That part of the reasoning cannot be neatly dissected from the reasoning for costs.

[37] It is submitted that his Honour erred because the finding of those factors in favour of a defendant, together with his other exemplary conduct during the investigation, supported the exercise of discretion to award costs. And in oral argument, his Honour's error was also said to discernible because this provision 'should have actually operated in a positive way'.[3]

[38] That first submission is correct as a matter of law. However, the appeal cannot succeed on that basis. His Honour's finding that these factors were not relevant meant that his Honour found that they reflected positively on the appellant. And this was all in the context of his Honour finding that the prosecution was brought in good faith.

[39] His Honour's finding of these factors as 'irrelevant' demonstrates that his Honour turned his mind to them yet again, without repeating the factual features underlying them.

[40] Irrespectively, his Honour's reasoning is not one infected by error simply because his Honour's discretion was exercised differently. That was an available conclusion given the entirety of the proceeding and the findings made by his Honour.

[41] No error can be discerned in the application of these provisions. These two grounds are dismissed.

Fourth ground - an error of discretion in not finding that it was 'proper' for an award of costs under section 158A

[42] The error pleads that his Honour had to determine the matter in favour of the appellant due to three factors: the apparent lack of success in the prosecution case; the appellant's conduct and explanation about being asleep; and that the dismissal was based on the lack of evidence of an element of the offence.

[43] His Honour was aware of the test to be applied. His Honour used the words of the statute.

[44] His Honour had the prosecution case freshly in his mind when assessing the issue of cost. No arguments have been made that his Honour was wrong about any of the factual conclusions.

[45] His Honour's reasoning must be understood in the context of the dismissal of the charge: it was not on technical grounds, but on the basis that the proceedings were conducted in good faith.

[46] His Honour's dismissal of costs is harmonious with the conclusion that the prosecution was conducted in good faith. Counsel for the respondent conveniently points out that the appellant's account of having been asleep was a matter that may or may not have been believed by the police. It is therefore factually not an irresistible conclusion that they would have 'avoided prosecution'.[4]

[47] Given this was an exercise of discretion and his Honour considered all the relevant features, I cannot discern an error in that discretion. No doubt another judicial officer may have come to a different view in that same exercise of discretion. But that does not infer error.[5] I cannot conclude based on the material before me that his Honour's conclusion about the costs order was 'unreasonable or plainly unjust'.[6]

[48] In those circumstances, this ground is dismissed.

Fifth ground - error pertaining to section 158B

[49] Given my findings regarding the four grounds of appeal above and the appellant's concession about this ground, it is no longer necessary to consider this ground.

[50] It is also no longer necessary to consider the application for further evidence given my conclusions.

[51] The appeal is dismissed, and the order of the Toowoomba Magistrates Court is confirmed.

[1] The actual phrase in the bail condition stated that "During the hours of my curfew, I must answer the door to a police officer when I am asked to".

[2] House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499, at 504-505.

[4] Paragraph 17 of respondent's outline.

[5] House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499, at 504-505.