Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)

NUISANCE; BY-LAWS - whether installation of hard flooring breaches noise by-law and/or creates a nuisance

Act, ss 167, 180, 281

• [1] Sonya Law, owner and occupier of lot 51 since October 2016, brings this application against Rachel Cockrell, the owner and occupier of lot 56 since July 2023, in relation to noise transference from lot 56 to lot 51. The applicant claims to be experiencing noise from lot 56 that breaches by-law 17 and constitutes a nuisance under section 167 of the Act. The unreasonable noise transference is said to be due to the installation of new hard flooring in lot 56 in September 2023, which the committee approved.
• [2] The applicant has submitted a detailed 10-month log documenting noise events, which she claims cause sleep deprivation due to frequent disturbances during the night from thuds and dropped items; and hearing constant noises like bangs, taps and thuds makes daily activities distressing and unenjoyable. Often, she says she leaves the lot to escape the noise and once a month stays with immediate family members for more than a week for relief. She says she has been prescribed sleeping tablets from her GP due to the noise disturbances.
• [3] Further, the applicant complains of unreasonable noise from lot 56 specifically when using the balcony, which she also claims breaches by-law 17 and section 167 of the Act. Finally, she complains of debris in lot 51's bathroom ceiling which she says is because lot 56's bathroom demolition contravened section 167(b) of the Act. The applicant says she seeks an order under section 281 of the Act in this regard.
• [4] Ms Law seeks orders that the respondent:
  1. Regarding the hard flooring within the lot:

a) Place 5mm Regupol rubber under the current flooring to cease unreasonable noise transference between lot 56 and 51; > > b) Place adequate floor covering with underlay throughout the lot to cease unreasonable noise transference; > > c) Produce acoustic results confirming the flooring properties of all rooms.

2. Regarding the balcony, place 7-10mm rubber waterproof tiles on the balcony under all items and high traffic areas; 3. Regarding the debris in lot 51's bathroom ceiling, pay for a suitably licenced tradesperson to remove the debris, and replace ceiling insulation if full of debris.

• [5] According to the respondent, River Plaza was built in the 1980's as a hotel for World Expo '88 and converted to apartments in 1999. Titles Office records show the scheme was established in November 1999 with the registration of Survey Plan 123092, a building format plan of subdivision. The scheme contains 67 lots (65 of which are residential) in a 15-storey building in South Brisbane.
• [6] Lot 51 is on level L, directly below lot 56 on Level M. Both lots share an identical footprint over the same area (96m2, including a 16m2 North-facing balcony).
• [7] Submissions were sought from the respondent owner and occupier of lot 56, the committee and all owners. Submissions were received from 9 owners, including the respondent. The committee did not make a submission. The applicant inspected the submissions and submitted a further 74-pages of material, replying to each submission individually.

• [8] The respondent made a detailed 12-page submission plus 37-pages of attachments. Her position can be summarised as follows:
  1. She installed high-grade flooring that exceeded the body corporate's requirements.
  2. She notes that no breach of the hard-flooring by-law is being asserted and argues that rather than the noise transference being unreasonable, the applicant is particularly noise sensitive.
  3. She claims that the applicant has a pattern of targeting her (for example, following her, videoing her and over-documenting in her noise log).
  4. She says that noise during certain log entries could not have come from lot 56 due to it being vacant at the time, or the timing of the entries (eg when her and her daughter were sleeping).
  5. Says that numerous other units nearby were undergoing renovations and a major lift refurbishment was occurring during the logging period, likely contributing to noise and indicating the alleged noise may not have originated from lot 56.
  6. The respondent says the applicant claims the application is based on the change of flooring in lot 56, but admits, upon moving into lot 51, complaining of noise transference to the building manager and committee concerning the previous flooring in lot 56. The respondent provides testimonials from two sets of previous tenants of lot 56[1] to demonstrate that the noise perceived by the applicant when the previous flooring was in situ was such that the applicant considered the noise transference unreasonable then.
  7. The flooring the respondent installed in lot 56 was both above the level approved by the body corporate in her renovation application and the standard in the lot and the building at the time from its previous combination tile on concrete and carpet with potentially inadequate underlay.
• [9] The other submissions, which were generally supportive of the respondent were to the following effect:
  1. Noise is inevitable in apartment living. Most acknowledge intermittent noise but find it reasonable and expected.
  2. Sound transference is common in River Plaza due to its construction which includes only 150mm thick concrete slabs and no suspended ceilings.
  3. Many have installed hard flooring (including with underlay) and still hear everyday noises, suggesting that flooring cannot eliminate sound transfer.
  4. Several argue the applicant's expectations are unrealistic and suggest she may not be well-suited to apartment living.
  5. Some suggest that sound may travel through bathroom air vents, not floors, as the source of sounds is often hard to pinpoint.
  6. Point to short-term lets, traffic and external events (eg helicopters landing at nearby hospitals and River Fire) as major contributors to overall noise.
  7. Expressed concern that if this application is successful, others who have also installed hard flooring may be required to replace theirs.
  8. One submitter suggested the application was the result of some history of conflict between the applicant and respondent.

• [10] The applicant says the submitters discuss the types of noises experienced in a general manner without going into specifics as to the frequency and duration of the noises heard. Nor do they describe how the noises are unreasonable or interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of their lots.
• [11] Regarding noises generated from other lot renovations and the lift renovations, the applicant says she has accounted for that noise.
• [12] References to noise from renovations, short-term stayers, out of control parties and external noises do not form part of the application and should be excluded as irrelevant. External noise is not an issue. Renovations are restricted to certain days and times so as not to impede on the use and enjoyment of occupiers.
• [13] The applicant disagrees that she is an overly sensitive person and is not suited for apartment living. She says there is no evidence of this and for 6 years she resided in 2 other lots (lot 62 and 52) within the scheme without having any issue with noise transfer.
• [14] Previous flooring complaints made by the applicant should be disregarded as the submitters cannot substantiate that the previous flooring in lot 56 did not breach the legislation.
• [15] The applicant stands by her noise log as an accurate representation of the noises heard from lot 56.
• [16] The applicant does not expect silence or the levels of peace when residing in a standalone house but does expect not to be exposed to frequent and intrusive noise of significant volume and frequency from above that intrudes on her ability to reside in her apartment. Every day activities are very audible and intrusive and affect the applicant's ability to sleep, watch TV, listen to music, and read.
• [17] The applicant rejects any risk of a precedent being set if the orders she seeks are granted and says if other lot owners experience the same issue, it is up to them to resolve the issue themselves.
• [18] The applicant denies that the application is vexatious. Instead, she argues that it is based on merit and evidence to resolve this matter in a professional and respectful manner.

• [19] The respondent submits she was not aware of this issue prior to this application, other than notes about balcony noise on renovation dates as items were moved in and out of the unit to accommodate the new flooring install.
• [20] The respondent submits that all balconies in the building are concrete and are only 1.3 metres wide. There are no 'high traffic areas' as these are small spaces and the ambient noise makes this claim absurd. Most residents would agree that the constant hum from the freeway traffic, regular helicopters commuting to the hospital, numerous emergency vehicles and nighttime revving of motorbikes and cars mixed with the music thumping from party boats and the River Stage tend to cover up any noise made by anyone outside, unless it is in the middle of the night.
• [21] The matting the applicant is requesting be laid would be a dangerous tripping hazard. The building has low railings that barely meet the 1m building code requirement.
• [22] Another owner submitted that most owner occupiers are sound conscious and would have noise eliminator stoppers adhered under the legs of any balcony outdoor settings.
• [23] In her reply to the submissions, the applicant disagrees that noise emitting from balcony chairs being moved cannot be pinpointed. She says noise from moving chairs on a concrete balcony is easily pinpointed to its locality for those in proximity.

• [24] The respondent says there is no physical possibility for debris from her renovation to be located in the applicant's apartment in the way stated in her application.
• [25] She says the smallest part of the largest piece of tile examined (Attachment 13) is 30mm in diameter. This means that at a minimum the hole through which it fell would need to be greater than 30mm wide. A hole this large would be obvious to both the workers above in Unit 56 and the owner of Unit 51 if they looked up into the ceiling cavity but no hole has been seen. The subfloor is substantially harder than the tile bedding that was being worked on during the renovation period and even at only 150mm thick, it would be almost impossible to get through with the size of the tools used.
• [26] Since none of the plumbing fixtures including drains were moved from their original location, there is no chance that this contributed to the 'debris' found in Unit 51. Therefore, there are only two possible explanations: 1) that there were older tiles, rubble and a screw that were adhered to the walls/subfloor of the cavity that shook loose during the upstairs renovation vibrations, and these fell onto the inside of the ceiling and were discovered when the manhole was moved for whatever reason. This would not be impacted by the repairs done to leaking pipes in Unit 51's ceiling as plumbers would not be removing old pieces of adhered tiles etc. 2) the less charitable possibility is that that the items of debris were placed there for effect by the applicant. There are pictures of the unit 56 skip bin provided in Appendix 31 of the Application with the bathroom debris proving that the applicant did have access to the materials that were later 'found' in whichever location they were.
• [27] To further substantiate this rebuttal, a statement was included from the qualified, licenced builder who undertook the renovations including those of the bathrooms.[2]
• [28] In her reply to the submissions, the applicant disagrees that the debris in the bathroom ceiling could have been there from the original build. She says lot 51's bathroom ceiling was replaced in 2019 and there was no debris present. Nor was there any debris present when in 2021 the plumbers fixed the leak from lot 56's bathroom.

• [29] There is a combination of alleged by-law and Act breaches referred to by the applicant. There is a possible breach of by-law 17 (Noise) and section 167 of the Act (Nuisances).

• [30] As recorded in the current CMS, by-law 17 provides as follows:

a) An owner or occupier of a Lot, their guests, servants or agents shall not make or permit any noise likely to interfere in any way with the peaceful enjoyment of other owners or occupiers of Lots or of any person lawfully using the common property. In particular no owners or occupier of a Lot shall hold or permit to be held any social gathering in his/her Lot which would cause any noise which unlawfully interferes with the peace and quietness of any other owner or occupier of a Lot, at any time of day or night and in particular shall comply in all respects with the Noise Abatement Act 1979, as amended.

b) In the event of any unavoidable noise in a Lot at any time the owner or occupier thereof shall take all practical means to minimise annoyance to other owners or occupiers of Lots by closing all doors, windows and curtains of his/her Lot and also such further steps as may be within his/her power for the same purpose.

c) Guests leaving after 11.00 pm shall be requested by their hosts to leave quietly. Quietness also shall be observed when an owner or occupier of a Lot returns to the dwelling late at night or early morning hours.

• [31] The applicant says the purpose of the by-law is to deter occupiers and invitees from generating noise likely to interfere with the peace and enjoyment of other occupiers. She acknowledges, with reference to cases such as Coolangatta Gold[3] and Burradene[4] that it may be inconsistent with section 180 of the Act because it does not limit the nature or the source of the noise, or degree of interference that may constitute a breach. However, under section 180(1) of the Act, a by-law that is inconsistent with the Act or regulations is void to the extent of the inconsistency. She therefore submits that the nuisance provision of the Act applies.
• [32] By-law 17(a) is worded similarly to the noise by-law the subject of the decision in Burradene in so far as it prohibits any noise likely to interfere in any way with the peaceful enjoyment of other owners or occupiers. The comments made by Adjudicator Rosemann in that case of that by-law, that on its face, it was very broad and that there was no stated limitation on the nature or source of the noise, or the degree of interference that could give rise to a breach, such that any noise, however normal or minor, could breach the by-law if it was likely to affect another even slightly, and regardless of the sensitivities of the person affected, are also applicable here.
• [33] Arguably, as with the noise by-law in that case, by-law 17(a) would be inconsistent with section 167 of the Act (and invalid to that extent) if it purported to impose a significantly higher standard of conduct and purported to prohibit low levels of noise with only minor impacts.
• [34] The applicant acknowledges the potential invalidity of by-law 17(a) to the extent it is inconsistent with section 167 and says it is therefore appropriate to construe by-law 17 as only prohibiting noise that is likely to interfere unreasonably with the peaceful enjoyment of another lot or common property.

• [35] Section 167(1) of the Act relevantly provides that the occupier of a lot must not use or permit the use of the lot in a way that (a) causes a nuisance; or (b) interferes unreasonably with the use or enjoyment of another lot included in the scheme.
• [36] As pointed out by the applicant, nuisance and interferes unreasonably are not defined in the Act.[5] It has been held that is it useful to look at common law, under which a private nuisance is an unlawful and unreasonable interference with an occupier's use and enjoyment of land or of some right over, or in connection with it.[6] What is considered unreasonable, depends on the prevailing circumstances.[7] A nuisance, must result in a substantial degree of interference according to what are considered reasonable standards for the enjoyment of ... premises.[8] The test under section 167, therefore, is objective and ... to be measured against the needs and circumstances of a neighbour of ordinary sensitivity.[9]
• [37] What a substantial degree of interference will mean, therefore, will mean different things in different circumstances when applying an objective standard. In Oldham v Lawson (No 1),[10] Harris J held:

What are reasonable standards must be determined by common sense, taking into account relevant factors, including what the Court considers to be the ideas of reasonable people, the general nature of the neighbourhood and the nature of the location at which the alleged nuisance has taken place, and the character, duration and time of occurrence of any noise emitted, and the effect of the noise.

What is considered unreasonable depends on the prevailing circumstances in each case but the nuisance, these decisions show, needs to be an inconvenience that materially interferes with the ordinary notions of a 'plain and sober' person, and not merely the 'elegant or dainty' habits of the complainant: See Walter v Selfe [1851] EngR 335; (1851) 64 ER 849 at 851. [11]

It needs to be a nuisance that is of such volume or frequency that it would interfere unreasonably with the life of another lot owner of ordinary sensitivity.[12]

• [39] The applicant says that adjudications have held that everyday activities could be a 'nuisance' or 'unreasonable interference' if the volume, duration, and frequency is such that it would interfere with a resident of ordinary sensitivity. In attempting to establish 'nuisance' or 'unreasonable interference', the applicant relies on:
  • Her noise log for the period 19/9/23 - 25/7/24
  • Her history of complaints made on 7 September 2023, 6 October 2023, 26 October 2023 and giving the committee a Form 1 on 1 December 2023.
  • The fact that the acoustic properties of the new flooring are unknown; the results detailed in the Koikas Acoustics Pty Ltd Report of 30 June 2023 for the 9.5mm Elegant Hybrid flooring are not indicative of lot 56's installation.
  • The negative effect of noise transference on her which includes interference with every day activities including, reading, watching television, doing yoga, listening to music, cooking and generally occupying the lot. Sleep deprivation is also noted.

• [40] The applicant argues the noise log produced, the history of complaints and details of the noises' negative effects are sufficient evidence to prove that the noise emanating from lot 56 is causing a nuisance or unreasonable interference. I disagree for the following reasons.
• [41] Previous complaints made by the applicant concerning noise transference from lot 56 before the current flooring was installed, as evidenced in the minutes of the committee meeting held on 25 September 2018[13] and the communication supplied by the respondent from two previous sets of tenants of lot 56 regarding complaints the applicant made against them regarding noise, suggest to me that the applicant may be a person with a heightened sensitivity to noise, as suggested by some submitters. In any event, the previous complaints demonstrate that the applicant had issues with noise transference before the respondent installed new hard flooring in September 2023.
• [42] The noises complained of (both from inside the lot and the balcony), regardless of their alleged effect on the applicant, result from nothing other than ordinary domestic activities. In such circumstances, there is precedent to suggest that there can be no nuisance or unreasonable interference.
• [43] Of the numerous cases cited by the applicant, she did not mention Tamworth Court [14] in which Norbury v. Hogan was cited as follows:

In residential areas, the cases show, the principle of 'give and take, live and let live' is customarily applied[15] so that the 'ordinary and accustomed use' of premises will not be considered a nuisance, even if some inconvenience to a neighbour is caused[16].

• [44] In Tamworth Court, the adjudicator held that the noises of concern to the applicants were the sounds of the ordinary and accustomed use of a residential lot. The sounds consisted of conversation, laughter, mobile phones, footsteps, chopping food, and other sounds of unremarkable domestic activities. Accordingly, the adjudicator held, based on Norbury v. Hogan, that he could not find an occupier of the lot responsible for creating a nuisance based on noise of this nature.
• [45] A similar finding was reached by the adjudicator in the earlier case of Kooba Court[17] where the evidence established that significant noise was being transmitted to another lot due to structural inadequacies of the building, but the source of the specific noise was the normal use of a toilet for its intended purpose. The adjudicator concluded that this ordinary and accustomed use of the premises was incapable of being a nuisance even though it significantly interfered with the enjoyment of a neighbouring lot.
• [46] The reason the ordinary and accustomed use of premises cannot constitute a nuisance - that is, cannot constitute a substantial and unreasonable interference - is because the use is not unreasonable. It is not because the interference that is created is not substantial.
• [47] The degree of interference caused by the ordinary and accustomed use of premises is irrelevant to whether it can be considered a nuisance. Provided the dwelling house is used as a dwelling house, the noise and inconvenience created may be more or less and it will still not amount to a nuisance. It is not a question of whether substantial interference with the use of land is arising, but whether it is arising from an activity that is unreasonable under the circumstances. Thus, the ordinary and accustomed use of premises fails the "unreasonable interference" component of the "substantial and unreasonable interference" test. It follows that the ordinary and accustomed use of residential premises cannot offend section 167(1)(b) of the Act either, given that "unreasonable interference" is common to both limbs of section 167.
• [48] The adjudicator in Tamworth Court acknowledged that this decision put him at odds with a number of previous adjudicators' orders, including some of those cited by the applicant[18].
• [49] Tamworth Court has subsequently been followed in The Aurora Tower[19] and Skyline Terraces Bowen Hills[20]:

Even if substantial levels of noise have been transmitted to Lot 37 from Lot 47 (which the applicant has not substantiated), arguably it could not be concluded that the noise constituted a nuisance or an unreasonable interference because the applicant has not demonstrated that the respondents have engaged in anything other than the normal domestic use of the lot. An adjudicator has previously concluded that the ordinary use of a residence will not constitute a nuisance or an unreasonable interference because it is not an 'unreasonable' use of the lot.[21]

• [50] More recently, Tamworth Court was followed in Green Meadows[22]:

Some complaints refer to what might be thought of as noise incidental to the usual use of a unit, such as closing doors loudly, playing music, audible sex, or emptying glass bottles into a recycling bin. There are two relevant principles to understand in assessing this sort of noise: the first is the ordinary and an accustomed use of a lot cannot cause unreasonable interference, regardless of the degree of inconvenience caused, and the second is the amount of interference experienced must be unreasonable but does not need to be substantial.[23]

• [51] Again, in Pacific Crest Coolum the adjudicator said The adjudicator in Tamworth Court found that an ordinary and accustomed use of a premises cannot constitute unreasonable interference, even where the interference caused is substantial, because the use is not unreasonable.[24]
• [52] Even more recently, in Denton the adjudicator held that section 167 does not apply to the use of premises in an 'ordinary and accustomed manner'[25].
• [53] Whilst the applicant acknowledges she doesn't have expert evidence in the form of an acoustic report measuring the transference of noise from lot 56, she says according to Pacific Plaza[26] an acoustic test is not critical in proving that a nuisance or unreasonable interference occurred if there is other sufficient evidence produced in the form of noise logs and complaints. The applicant in that case failed to establish that the committee acted unreasonably in refusing to issue a by-law contravention notice for an alleged breach of the noise by-law. The committee was not satisfied that the acoustic report provided by the applicant was, by itself, sufficient evidence that a nuisance, or unreasonable interference was being caused to the applicant. The adjudicator agreed that the applicant had not produced sufficient evidence (which included an acoustic report) to the committee to prove its assertions.
• [54] I have read the other decisions cited by the applicant in support of her case[27] (which are at odds with the Tamworth Court decision). In each of those cases, the adjudicator had before them objective evidence, in the form of acoustic test results from an appropriately qualified professional, demonstrating that new flooring which had been installed by an owner/occupier failed to meet the minimum requirements of the applicable building code such that even the ordinary and accustomed use of the lot was found to be likely to generate a level of noise resulting in unreasonable interference with the use of the lot below by a person of ordinary noise sensitivity. It was described this way in Contessa Condominiums[28]:

I am willing to accept that Ms Martin could be held to have contravened section 167 of the Act if any nuisance or unreasonable interference that is arising is a consequence of the changes she made to the floor of lot 13 while she was an occupier. That would amount to a use of the lot by an occupier in a way that is now causing a nuisance or unreasonable interference. Further, changing the floor goes beyond the ordinary and accustomed use of residential premises and hence does not automatically qualify for the exemption discussed from paragraph 27 above onwards. It is an optional alteration to the lot that many people choose to make, but equally many do not. It is not an inevitable and essential part of life in a residential setting in the same way as walking or using furniture. So, in principle, it is capable of offending reasonable standards for the enjoyment of the premises, although of course it need not necessarily offend them depending on precisely how it is done (e.g. the choice of flooring product, the quality of acoustic underlay, and the resulting impact upon other owners).[29]

• [55] In Chevron Sails[30], the adjudicator cited other examples of instances where the acoustic performance of newly installed hard flooring fell well short of established minimum standards and was found to be within a range that adjudicators have found gives rise to contraventions of section 167 through the normal use of the lot.[31]
• [56] In this case, I have no such objective evidence of the acoustic performance of the new flooring in lot 56 before me. I agree with the applicant that neither the acoustic properties described by Koikas Acoustics Pty Ltd in its 'Certificate of Performance' dated 30 June 2023 for the 9.5mm elegant hybrid flooring produced by Riverhill Floors Pty Ltd and sold to the respondent by The Flooring Guys, nor the Palmer Acoustics Pty Ltd Report dated 12 September 2024 for the same flooring installed in unit 808 at 9 Christie Street, South Brisbane, are of any relevance in determining the acoustic performance of the flooring actually installed in lot 56 in September 2023.
• [57] I note that one of the orders sought is to require the respondent to Produce acoustic results confirming the flooring properties of all rooms. I am unsure whether these results are sought for the flooring currently laid, or for after any alterations sought by the applicant are made. Regardless, I considered making an order requiring the respondent to obtain an acoustic report for the flooring currently laid, but decline to do so in circumstances where the applicant did not request this prior to making application with this office.
• [58] I note that the only self-resolution attempts that occurred prior to making application with this office were by the applicant communicating with the committee and building manager. There has been no attempt at any resolution with the respondent, apart from the letter from the 3rd party mediator engaged by the applicant[32]. I note from that letter that none of the outcomes sought in this application were put to the respondent. Arguably, in my opinion, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that she reasonably attempted internal dispute resolution before making application with this office.
• [59] In any event, it is a matter for the applicant to substantiate her case. If she were to request the respondent to permit access to lot 56 for the purpose of obtaining an acoustic report, I am of the view that that report should be at the applicant's expense.
• [60] In the absence of any objective evidence that the new flooring fails to achieve minimum standards of noise attenuation, and that the only noise complained of is the result of the ordinary and accustomed use of lot 56, I must dismiss the application in so far as it relates to noise from inside lot 56. I must also dismiss the application in so far as it relates to the noise said to come from the balcony of lot 56. There is no suggestion that the balcony flooring has been changed by the respondent, so there can be no breach of by-law 17 or section 167 for the ordinary and accustomed use of the balcony, even if there were objective evidence that its acoustic properties fail to meet minimum standards.
• [61] Regarding the debris said to exist in the ceiling of lot 51 allegedly because of a breach of several by-laws and section 167(1)(a) by the owner of lot 56 during bathroom renovations, I consider the application to be without substance and dismiss it for that reason. The applicant has failed to satisfy me that there is any debris currently in lot 51's ceiling, or that even if there was, it is attributable to any breach of legislation by the respondent, a prerequisite for any order to be made under section 281 of the Act.

• [62] The only noise complained of is the result of the ordinary and accustomed use of lot 56. In the absence of any objective evidence, in the form of acoustic test results from an appropriately qualified professional, demonstrating that the new flooring installed in lot 56 by the respondent in September 2023 fails to meet the minimum requirements of the applicable building code, such that even the ordinary and accustomed use of the lot is likely to generate a level of noise resulting in unreasonable interference with the use of the lot below by a person of ordinary noise sensitivity, I can find no breach of by-law 17, or section 167(1)(a) or (b) of the Act and decline to make any of the orders sought regarding the flooring of lot 56.
• [63] Regarding debris said to exist in the ceiling of lot 51, I am not satisfied of any breach of legislation by the respondent which would entitle the applicant to any orders under section 281 of the Act.
• [64] The application is dismissed in its entirety.

[1] See letter from Heather Scriven dated 20 December 2023 whose family occupied lot 56 from August 2022 to mid-July 2023 and undated correspondence from Dr Shankar and Dr Jhava, occupants of lot 56 from February 2020 to February 2022.

[2] See the letter dated 16 March 2025 from Stephen Winter of Buildeco Pty Ltd

[3] [2018] QBCCMCmr 599

[4] [2022] QBCCMCmr 383

[5] Norbury v Hogan [2010] QCATA 27, para [10].

[6] Norbury v Hogan, para [13]. This and the other definitions from Norbury v Hogan that immediately follow here regarding nuisance were approved in Miles & Anor v Gough & Ors [2017] QCA 190, paras [6]-[7], [13].

[10] [1976] VicRp 69; (1976) VR 654, at 655, cited in Norbury v Hogan, para [16].

[13] See Item 7 Correspondence re formal noise complaint from Lot 51 - Sonya

[14] [2018] QBCCMCmr 79 @ [24]

[15] See Bamford v Turnley (1862) 122 ER 27 @ [32] - [33].

[16] Clarey v The Principal and Council of the Women's College [1953] HCA 58.

[17] [2016] QBCCMCmr 47 @ [22] - [29].

[18] Villa Sirene [2010] QBCCMCmr 24; Into Ballymore [2012] QBCCMCmr 166; Kooba Court [2016] QBCCMCmr 47.

[19] [2019] QBCCMCmr 316

[20] [2019] QBCCMCmr 231 @ [41]

[21] Tamworth Court [2018] QBCCMCmr 79, particularly paras [25] - [28]

[22] [2024] QBCCMCmr 77

[23] Clarey v Principal & Council of Women's College [1953] HCA 58; (1953) 90 CLR 170; Miles v Gough [2017] QCA 190. See also Tamworth Court [2018] QBCCMCmr 79 at [25]- [28] for a summary of both

[24] [2024] QBCCMCmr 59 @ [53]

[25] [2024] QBCCMCmr 211 @ [23]

[26] [2019] QBCCMCmr 547 @ [58]

[27] Beau Monde [2011] QBCCMCmr 548, Into Ballymore [2012] QBCCMCmr 166, Coolangatta Gold [2018] QBCCMCmr 599 and Burradene [2022] QBCCMCmr 383

[28] [2018] QBCCMCmr 98

[29] [2018] QBCCMCmr 98 @ [30]

[30] [2019] QBCCMCmr 62

[31] See para [12] where Focus [2012] QBCCMCmr 525 at [19], [28] & [31], 18 Kingsford Street [2016] QBCCMCmr 78 at [12], [28], [32]-[33]

[32] The email of 21 November 2024 from Chris Irons