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“1 An order that the order striking-out these proceedings made on 18 May 2026 by the Hon Justice Kunc be vacated.

2 An order that the orders made by the Hon Justice Slattery on 23 February 2026 and by the Hon Justice Kunc on 10 April 2026, restraining the publication of the T9 and T11 investigation reports, be continued until further order of the Court, or the determination of these proceedings.

3 An order that these proceedings be removed from the Expedition List, and transferred to the General List (Equity Division) or the Administrative and Industrial Law List (Common Law Division).”

3. For the reasons which follow, the motion will be dismissed with costs.

Procedural history

4. As will be apparent from the motion, at the heart of these proceedings are the plaintiff's concerns about two Code of Conduct investigation reports, referred to as the T9 and T11 investigation reports. Those reports have their statutory basis in the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (LGA).

5. These proceedings were commenced by summons filed in court before Slattery J, sitting as Duty Judge. Given what has happened since then, it is revealing that the summons contained no final relief, but sought this interlocutory relief:

“4. An Order pursuant to r 25.11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), that until the earlier of:

i) by the written consent of the Plaintiff and Defendant;

ii) further order of this Court or;

iii) final determination of the proceedings commenced by the Plaintiff in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal of File Number 2026/00068586 (NCAT) seeking review of the internal review decision under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) concerning the Defendant's conduct the subject of these proceedings (the NCAT Review Proceedings); and

iv) or other Order as made in the course of the NCAT Review Proceeding

that the Defendant whether by itself, its councillors, officers, employees, serva agents be restrained from:

a. Tabling, disseminating, providing, or circulating at any meeting of the Liverpool City Council, or any committee meeting, the report titled 'Code of Conduct Investigation Report (T9)' or any other Code of Conduct Report regarding the plaintiff and any attachment, annexure, appendix or draft of such reports (together, the Report)

b. Publishing, releasing, providing, disclosing or otherwise disseminating the Report, or any part of the Report, to any Councillor, person, or organisation other than the Defendant's external legal representatives for the purposes of obtaining legal advice, until the earlier of:

i. further order of this Court

ii. written agreement between the parties

c. Making any statement that reproduces, summarises or conveys the substance of the Report, or any part of it, whether in writing or orally including by email, website, social media, media release or communication to any journalist or media outlet

d. Permitting access to the Report by uploading it to any document management system, agenda portal or public register, or otherwise making it available for inspection by councillors, staff, members of the public or media other than as permitted by Order 3(b)

5. Alternatively, the Defendant provides to the Court an undertaking not to release any Report concerning Code of Conduct matters concerning the Plaintiff until final determination of the NCAT Proceedings.”

6. Ex parte relief was granted. Unsurprisingly, his Honour also ordered that an amended summons be filed, which occurred on 20 February 2026. It sought this final relief:

“5A An order in the nature of prohibition, pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), prohibiting, preventing or otherwise restraining the Defendant from:

(i) tabling, disseminating, providing, or circulating at any meeting of the Liverpool City Council, or any committee meeting, any Report (as defined in paragraph, 4a, above);

(ii) publishing, releasing, providing, disclosing or otherwise disseminating the Report, or any part of the Report, to any Councillor, person, or organisation other than the Defendant's external legal representatives for the purposes of obtaining legal advice;

(iii) making any statement that reproduces, summarises or conveys the substance of the Report, or any part of it, whether in writing or orally including by email. website, social media, media release or communication to any journalist or media outlet;

(iv) permitting access to the Report by uploading it to any document management system, agenda portal or public register, or otherwise making it available for inspection by councillors, staff, members of the public or media, other than as permitted above.

5B. Further or alternatively, a declaration, upon the facts and matters stated in the affidavit of Peter Ristevki sworn on 19 February 2026 (and such further evidence that the Plaintiff may be advised to read in these proceedings) that any Report (as defined in paragraph, 4a, above) was procured and/or prepared and/or compiled by the Defendant (whether by itself, its councillors, officers, employees, servants or agents) in breach of the Defendant's Information Protection Principle (IPP) and/or the Defendant's Code of Conduct.”

7. Critically for present purposes, Mr Maroya conceded that, as matters presently stood and without further discovery, his client today cannot show a serious question to be tried of an entitlement to the final relief sought in the amended summons. It is also convenient to record at this point that in what follows, the Court intends no criticism of Mr Maroya, who at all times acted with the exemplary propriety and candour upon which the Court depends from those appearing before it, including where necessary by making concessions against their client’s interests.

8. I also intend no criticism of the solicitor whose affidavit was read in support of the motion by observing that much of that affidavit read as the kind of affidavit which the Court is accustomed to see in applications for preliminary discovery. The affidavit sought to set out in some detail the categories of discovery that would be required to be given before the plaintiff would be in a position to inform the Council or the Court of the precise legal basis upon which the final relief set out in the amended summons would be sought.

9. On 20 February 2026, Slattery J made orders in chambers, including:

“The Court directs that:

1. Until further order of the Court, the Defendant be restrained from:

a. tabling, disseminating, providing or circulating at any meeting of the Liverpool City Council, or any committee meeting, the report entitled ‘Code of Conduct Investigation Report T9’ including any attachment, annexure, appendix or draft of such report (Report); and

b. publishing, releasing, providing, disclosing or otherwise disseminating the Report or any document reproducing, summarising or conveying the substance of the Report to any person other than to the Defendant’s external legal advisors for the purposes of obtaining legal advice, or to a regulator such as the Office of Local Government, if required by the regulator.

2. Orders made on 19 February 2026 by Slattery J are vacated.

3. The hearing on 23 February 2026 is vacated.

4. The proceedings be transferred to the Expedition List in the Equity Division but subject to the decision of the Expedition List judge as to whether they will be expedited.”

10. Since then, I have had the conduct of these proceedings as the Expedition List judge. On 6 March 2026, I made orders including:

“1 Proceedings expedited. …

5 Plaintiff to file and serve points of claim by 4:00pm on 25 March 2026.

6 Defendant to file and serve a defence by 2 April 2026.

7 Plaintiff to file and serve any additional evidence by 10 April 2026.

8 Defendant to file and serve its evidence by 24 April 2024.”

11. On 25 March 2026, in compliance with those orders, the plaintiff filed points of claim, which included:

“3. On about 25 October 2025, Mr Ristevski made an application to the Council for an internal review under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) (the PPIP Act), in relation to personal information regarding himself; particularly relating to Code of Conduct matters held by the Council and its processes that might be in breach of the PPIP Act, including:

a) allegations relating to security (Information Protection Principle (IPP) 5/s12 PPIP Act;

b) allegations relating to use of information (IPP 10/s 17 PPIP Act);

c) allegations relating to disclosure (IPP 11/s18 PPIP Act);

d) allegations relating to retention of information (IPP5/s 12 PPIP Act).

…

8. In the T9 letter, the Council stated that a final investigation report would be presented to the Council's governing body at the ordinary Council meeting proposed to be held on 25 February 2026, and that the investigation undertaken by Ms Jennifer Perry (of Centium Pty Ltd) contained findings that Mr Ristevski had (allegedly) breached the Council's Code of Conduct, and recommended that Mr Ristevski be formally censured (the T9 report).

9. On 11 March 2026, Mr Ristevski received an email from Mr David Day, Head of Governance at the Council, attaching a letter (also dated 11 March 2026) concerning a "Code of Conduct investigation report (T11)" (the 11 March letter).

10. In the 11 March letter, the Council stated that:

a) a final investigation report (the T11 report) would be presented to the Council's governing body at the ordinary Council meeting proposed to be held on 25 March 2026;

b) that the investigation contained findings that Mr Ristevski had (allegedly) breached the Council's Code of Conduct;

c) recommended that Mr Ristevski be formally censured for the breach under se 440G of the Local Government Act 1993 and the matter be referred to the Office of Local Government for further action under the misconduct provisions of the Local Government Act 1993.

…

12. By ss 3(1)(f) and 21(1) of the PPIP Act, the Council is "[a] public sector agency [that] must not do any thing, or engage in any practice, that contravenes an information protection principle applying to the agency."

13. Mr Ristevski:

a) apprehends that any pending reports, investigations or related Council processes, such as Code of Conduct investigations pursuant to the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) concerning him, may have been affected by, informed by or undertaken in circumstances that are tainted by the Council's contravention of s 12 of the PPIP Act, on the footing of unauthorised access to Code of Conduct material, as outlined above, and the Council's own characterisation (in the 9 January letter) of the incident as a data security breach for the purposes of s 12 of the PPIP Act; and

b) says that such pending reports, investigations or related Council processes, such as Code of Conduct investigations pursuant to the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) concerning him are a nullity.

14. Mr Ristevski says that in the circumstances outlined above, the T9 and T11 Reports are amenable to a grant of relief under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970; alternatively, that they may be declared to have been prepared in breach of the Information Protection Principles in the PPIP Act and/or the Council's Code of Conduct.”

12. Again, with no disrespect intended to the author of the points of claim, it is difficult to see how the conclusion in paragraph 14 follows, as a matter of law, from the preceding allegations. A constant theme in the appearances before me that was advanced on behalf of the Council was that the plaintiff had failed to articulate the cause or causes of action upon which he relied. As matters have turned out, that criticism was well made.

13. On 10 April 2026, I made orders including:

“1 The Defendant, by its solicitors, undertakes to the Court that, until further order of the Court, or should these proceedings not be listed for a hearing on a date/s in May 2026 per paragraph 2 below, whichever may come first, it will not:

a. table, disseminate, provide or circulate at any meeting of the Liverpool City Council, or any committee meeting, the report entitled 'Code of Conduct Investigation Report T11', including any attachment, annexure, appendix or draft of such report (Report); and

b. publish, release, provide, disclose or otherwise disseminate the Report or any document reproducing, summarising or conveying the substance of the Report to any person other than to the Defendant's external legal advisors for the purposes of obtaining legal advice, or to a regulator such as the Office of Local Government, if required by the regulator.

2 The proceeding is listed for hearing on 21 May 2026 at 9:30am

2A By 19 May 2026 the parties are to provide in soft copy to the associate to Kunc J a chronological table of facts in three columns:

(a) agreed facts;

(b) facts contended for by the plaintiff but not agreed by the defendant;

(c) facts contended for by the defendant but not agreed by the plaintiff.

…

3 By no later than 19 May 2026, the parties are to provide to the Associate to the Trial Judge, two copies of a Court Book which is to contain, in separate sections:

a. latest process and pleadings;

b. affidavits (excluding annexures and exhibits which consist of primary documentation);

c. in a separate volume or volumes documentary evidence - which is to be placed in chronological sequence so far as is practicable and consecutively numbered (without tabs unless the Court otherwise directs). If there are a significant number of emails, the chains should be dismembered and placed in chronological sequence.

…

6A The plaintiff is to serve and file in soft copy by email to the associate to Kunc J an outline of submissions by 12 May 2026.

6B The defendant is to serve and file in soft copy by email to the associate to Kunc J an outline of submissions by 18 May 2026.”

14. The plaintiff fell into non-compliance with those pre-trial directions. On Monday of this week, the parties relisted the proceedings before me. Mr Maroya sought a vacation of the hearing on the candid basis that was finally set out by his solicitor in the affidavit that was filed in support of the motion:

“Apology for delay and the Plaintiff's position as to the interlocutory regime

7 I apologise to the Court for the delay in compliance with the Court's timetable. The delay was not intended to cause prejudice to the Defendant nor inconvenience to the Court.

8 The delay has arisen because instructions were unable to be taken from our client for some period on account of substantial outstanding legal bills and because the material produced and served by the Defendant included a lengthy confidential affidavit and exhibit bundle concerning the investigation reports and the Council's internal investigation into the data breach. It has been necessary for my firm to review that material, take instructions, identify the specific forensic connection between the data breach and the pleaded grounds, and to formulate proposed discovery categories with sufficient precision.

9 The Plaintiff is committed to the proceedings being heard in the General List or the Administrative and Industrial List, if appropriate, and has also made arrangements to enable him to resource the proceedings henceforth.

10 The Plaintiff desires to maintain the interlocutory regime in its current form. In particular, the Plaintiff seeks to preserve the present position in which the subject reports of these proceedings are not tabled, disseminated, published, released, disclosed or otherwise acted upon pending the determination of the issues raised in these proceedings, or until further order.

11 In my view, maintaining the present interlocutory regime is necessary to preserve the utility of the proceedings. If the reports are tabled or disseminated before the questions concerning procedural fairness, apprehended bias, unlawful access and contamination are determined, the reputational, electoral and professional consequences for the Plaintiff may not be capable of being undone, despite a grant of relief favourable to the Plaintiff.”

15. By reason of the plaintiff's non-compliance with the pre-trial directions, and the plaintiff's inability, even at this late stage, to articulate what the basis of his case was for the final relief to be sought, I made these orders:

“1 The proceedings are struck out.

2 The plaintiff to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

3 These orders are stayed until 21 May 2026.

4 By 10am on 20 May 2026, the plaintiff is to file and serve any Notice of Motion and outline of submissions regarding the stay and the interim relief granted by Slattery J on 20 February 2026 and Kunc J on 10 April 2026.”

16. For the purposes of this chronology it is also necessary to say something about the plaintiff's proceedings in NCAT.

17. On 18 February 2026, the plaintiff filed an Administrative Review A****pplication F****orm in NCAT with himself as applicant and the Council as respondent, complaining about a decision which was attached to the application, made on 9 January 2026. That decision was the completion of an internal review of complaints made by the plaintiff under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) (PPIPA).

18. The grounds for the application included:

“1. The Notification of completion of Internal Review dated 9 January 2026 of the Respondent ("Internal Review") substantiates that the respondent contravened Information Protection Principle 5, s 12 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), because the respondent failed to protect the applicant's personal information by taking security safeguards that were reasonable in the circumstances against unauthorised access, use, modification or disclosure.

2. The Respondent in the Internal Review substantiates the breach which breach arose from unauthorised access by staff who did not have an authorised role to access the relevant Code of Conduct records, including multiple records and multiple access events. This indicates a serious failure to implement and maintain reasonable security safeguards as required by s 12(c) of the Act.

3. This application is made under Part 5 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), and in particular s 55(1), because the applicant is not satisfied with the findings of the Internal Review and or the action taken by the respondent in relation to the application. The applicant seeks orders the Tribunal considers appropriate under section 55(2). In support of the above, the applicant notes the respondent has proposed uplift activities and controls following the breach, which underscores that the pre-existing safeguards were inadequate.

4. The applicant raises a further concern that pending reports, investigations or related Council processes, such as Code of Conduct investigations, concerning the applicant may have been affected by, informed by or undertaken in circumstances tainted by the respondent's contravention of section 12 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), given the unauthorised access to Code of Conduct material and the respondent's own characterisation of the incident as a data security issue addressed by IPP 5. The applicant seeks such consequential relief as the Tribunal considers appropriate under section 55(2)(g).” (emphases added)

19. As to paragraph 4 of those grounds, it will be observed that they are, at best, expressed "faintly" (Mr Maroya’s description), or, I would say, tentatively or speculatively. The application does not set out the relief that would be sought from NCAT beyond the statements highlighted in the previous paragraph referring to such orders or relief “as the Tribunal thinks appropriate”.

20. The parties accepted that what has since happened in relation to the plaintiff’s NCAT proceedings is accurately set out in these paragraphs of the Council's supplementary submissions:

“11. On 20 February 2026, Council’s solicitors wrote to the Plaintiff’s lawyers requesting that the plaintiff specify what findings of Council’s internal review he was not satisfied with, and what action taken by Council he is not satisfied with. That letter also noted that the application did not specify what relief the plaintiff sought, and asked for specification of the relief sought.

12. No response has been provided to that letter.

13. The NCAT proceeding was the subject of a case management conference before Senior Member Ziegler on 13 April 2026. Counsel for the Council informed the Senior Member that the plaintiff’s application did not disclose the basis for that application.

14. At the case management conference, Senior Member Ziegler made the following orders in the NCAT proceeding:

…

2 The applicant is to file and serve points of claim, evidence and submissions on or before 11 May 2026.

Note: the applicant's materials must address:

- the application for an extension of time for the filing of the application;

- the alleged conduct; and

- the remedies sought.

If the applicant is claiming compensation, his materials must address the financial, psychological or physical harm allegedly suffered because of the conduct.

15. The NCAT proceeding is currently due to be heard on 24 July 2026.

16. Despite repeated requests from the Council’s solicitors for the same, the plaintiff has not complied with the order above. Council does not currently know the basis for the plaintiff’s application in NCAT, if any. Nor does it know what relief is sought.”

21. By reference to that material, Mr Maroya submitted that the NCAT proceedings had been afflicted by the same difficulties which have beset these proceedings, and which I have set out in [14] above.

Today’s application

22. Given the concession referred to in [7] above, Mr Maroya put the plaintiff’s application today on two bases.

23. First, he submitted that the Court’s order striking out the proceedings should be vacated because his client was now in a position to prosecute his claim. That the plaintiff was now in that position may be accepted.

24. Second, and critically, it was submitted for the plaintiff that this Court should now exercise its jurisdiction to grant the interlocutory relief sought in prayer 2 of the motion (see [2] above) to preserve what was said to be the arguable entitlement of the plaintiff to obtain a final order in his NCAT proceedings to prevent the publication of the reports.

25. Mr Maroya submitted that there was no doubt that the Supreme Court could issue an injunction which was deemed to be necessary to further the proper administration of justice. He drew to attention, for example, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246, in which McHugh JA (with whom Street CJ and Priestley JA agreed) said at 251:

“However, the reasoning expressed in the decisions of the highest courts in England, Canada and New Zealand seems equally applicable to the administration of justice in New South Wales. In the absence of a contrary decision of the High Court on the point I think that this Court, as a superior court of justice, has inherent power to prevent an abuse of procedure in instituting or continuing proceedings in both civil and criminal cases. It is not necessary in the present case to determine whether the disciplinary tribunal itself had jurisdiction to stay the proceedings before it. For I am strongly of opinion that not only has this Court the inherent power to stay its own civil and criminal proceedings for abuse of process but its general supervisory and protective power extends to protecting inferior courts and tribunals from abuse of their procedure in relation to civil, criminal and disciplinary matters.”

26. Drawing on that passage, I inquired of Mr Maroya what abuse of the procedure of NCAT did his client seek to prevent by invoking the general supervisory and protective power of this Court. Mr Maroya submitted that this was not a case where there was a particular abuse to be prevented, but that the principle in Herron was to be understood as having a wider application. I understood that to be a generally protective jurisdiction in relation to a party's particular rights in another tribunal. He submitted that, in this case, there could be no doubt that the preservation of the subject matter of his client’s NCAT proceedings was an appropriate basis for the grant of the interlocutory relief sought.

27. I do not accept those submissions, and prefer those advanced for the Council. To put the position succinctly, I will assume in the plaintiff’s favour that such a jurisdiction exists. The essential difficulty for the plaintiff is that he does not have, and cannot show, what he claims in the NCAT proceedings that would be susceptible of such protection. While I accept Mr El-Hage's submissions, I express the Court’s reasons as follows.

28. First, as a preeminent discretionary matter, the plaintiff has had a more than adequate opportunity for the urgent determination of his claim in this Court, whatever his claim may be. That opportunity – being a final hearing originally fixed for today - has now passed. There is a public interest in the reports, which concern a public official, being dealt with publicly in accordance with the law governing the consequences of such reports. It is important to note that even if the reports are published, the assertion of whatever rights the plaintiff has in NCAT in relation to those reports - and, for the reasons which follow, I do not accept that there are any such rights - would not be precluded by publication.

29. Second, in this Court, the plaintiff has had three months to identify a cause of action - presumably, one or more of the well-understood categories of administrative law challenge - and has failed to do so. He now accepts that he cannot do so without what is, in effect, preliminary discovery. I accept that description is my words and not the plaintiff’s but, in my respectful opinion, that is the effect of what the plaintiff's solicitor foreshadows as being required for the plaintiff to be able to identify if he has a cause of action for final relief in this Court.

30. Third, insofar as relief is now said to be sought to preserve an entitlement to relief in NCAT, the simple position is that there is presently no relief sought in NCAT. The Application Form does not specify what relief is sought. As with the proceedings in this Court, it would appear that the plaintiff has been unable to articulate the relief that he might seek in NCAT, and why.

31. Fourth, I accept Mr El-Hage's argument that, in any event, NCAT does not have jurisdiction in relation to complaints about the reports. There can be no doubt that NCAT has jurisdiction in relation to claims of breaches under the PPIPA:

“52 Application of Part

(1) This Part applies to the following conduct—

(a) the contravention by a public sector agency of an information protection principle that applies to the agency,

(b) the contravention by a public sector agency of a privacy code of practice that applies to the agency,

(c) the disclosure by a public sector agency of personal information kept in a public register. …

53 Internal review by public sector agencies

(1) A person (the applicant) who is aggrieved by the conduct of a public sector agency is entitled to a review of that conduct.

(1A) There is no entitlement under this section to the review of the conduct of a Minister (or a Minister’s personal staff) in respect of a contravention of section 15 (Alteration of personal information).

(2) The review is to be undertaken by the public sector agency concerned.

(3) An application for such a review must—

(a) be in writing, and

(b) be addressed to the public sector agency concerned, and

(c) specify an address in Australia to which a notice under subsection (8) may be sent, and

(d) be lodged at an office of the public sector agency within 6 months (or such later date as the agency may allow) from the time the applicant first became aware of the conduct the subject of the application, and

(e) comply with such other requirements as may be prescribed by the regulations.

(4) Except as provided by section 54 (3), the application must be dealt with by an individual within the public sector agency who is directed by the agency to deal with the application. That individual must be, as far as is practicable, a person—

(a) who was not substantially involved in any matter relating to the conduct the subject of the application, and

(b) who is an employee or officer of the agency, and

(c) who is otherwise suitably qualified to deal with the matters raised by the application.

(5) In reviewing the conduct the subject of the application, the individual dealing with the application must consider any relevant material submitted by—

(a) the applicant, and

(b) the Privacy Commissioner.

(6) The review must be completed as soon as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances. However, if the review is not completed within 60 days from the day on which the application was received, the applicant is entitled to make an application under section 55 to the Tribunal for an administrative review of the conduct concerned. …

(8) As soon as practicable (or in any event within 14 days) after the completion of the review, the public sector agency must notify the applicant in writing of—

(a) the findings of the review (and the reasons for those findings), and

(b) the action proposed to be taken by the agency (and the reasons for taking that action), and

(c) the right of the person to have those findings, and the agency’s proposed action, administratively reviewed by the Tribunal.

55 Administrative review of conduct by Tribunal

(1) If a person who has made an application for internal review under section 53 is not satisfied with—

(a) the findings of the review, or

(b) the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application,

the person may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the conduct that was the subject of the application under section 53.

(1A) A person (the applicant) who is aggrieved by the conduct of a Minister (or a Minister’s personal staff) constituting a contravention of section 15 (Alteration of personal information) may apply to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of the conduct.

(2) On reviewing the conduct of the public sector agency concerned, the Tribunal may decide not to take any action on the matter, or it may make any one or more of the following orders—

(a) subject to subsections (4) and (4A), an order requiring the public sector agency to pay to the applicant damages not exceeding $40,000 by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered because of the conduct,

(b) an order requiring the public sector agency to refrain from any conduct or action in contravention of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(c) an order requiring the performance of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(d) an order requiring personal information that has been disclosed to be corrected by the public sector agency,

(e) an order requiring the public sector agency to take specified steps to remedy any loss or damage suffered by the applicant,

(f) an order requiring the public sector agency not to disclose personal information contained in a public register,

(g) such ancillary orders as the Tribunal thinks appropriate. …

32. Mr Maroya accepted that his client was presently unable to say what conduct will be alleged against the Council that would fall within any of the categories identified in s 52(1) of the PPIPA. While he has suspicions, and would clearly wish to do so, after three months the plaintiff has been unable to show any connection between such conduct - whatever it may be - and the reports.

33. In any event, by reference to Part 1 Div 1 of Ch 14 of the LGA which, as I have noted, is the statutory source of codes of conduct and the reports (see, for example, ss 440, 440AAA and 440AA), I accept Mr El-Hage's submission that while some aspects of the conduct of councillors and council staff can be the subject of proceedings in NCAT (see, for example, ss 440J, 440L and Pt 3 of Ch 14), there is no such provision in relation to codes of conduct and code of conduct investigation reports.

34. NCAT is undoubtedly a body of strictly statutory jurisdiction. If a statutory conferral of jurisdiction on NCAT is unable to be found, then it does not have that jurisdiction. Mr Maroya fairly accepted that he had been unable to find any express conferral of jurisdiction on NCAT in relation to complaints about documents such as the reports.

35. In other words, the Court finds that there is no jurisdiction in NCAT to make an order suppressing publication of the reports of the kind that is said to be the right which the plaintiff wishes to protect by an injunction in this Court. Even if this Court otherwise had jurisdiction to make such an order, the Court concludes that there is no such right or entitlement in the plaintiff in respect of which an injunction would be laid to protect.

36. Finally, I record that even if I have erred in finally determining the question of NCAT’s jurisdiction in relation to the reports, I would have reached the same result on the motion by concluding, as I do, that as an interlocutory issue the argument that NCAT has jurisdiction to deal with the plaintiff’s complaints (whatever they may be) about the reports is very weak.

Conclusion

37. The motion will be dismissed and I will hear the parties as to costs.

**********