Rinehart v Nine Entertainment Co Holdings Ltd

The Parties

1. I should say a little about the parties. In doing so, I should note that this application has come to the court in the duty list, and has been heard in circumstances of real urgency. The time available to me to prepare lengthy, extensive, well-drafted and carefully crafted reasons for my decision is non-existent. These reasons are necessarily shorter than otherwise would be desirable, but the simple fact is that it is in the interests of the parties that this matter be determined today.
2. The plaintiff is Georgina Hope Rinehart. I am told by the affidavit in support of her application, that she is the chairperson of the Hancock Group, a corporate group including Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd, which is a large investor and employer in Perth, Brisbane and the Pilbara. It is claimed to be the owner of the largest land-based mine construction project in Australia. The major project under construction is one which has both domestic and international implications, and has a number of major Asian companies as minority partners. The product of the Roy Hill Mining project is intended to be sold to Asia. Directly, and indirectly, the project employs over 5,500 Australian workers, and, by extension, many more contractors, sub‑contractors and small businesses, whose livelihood is derived from being directly, or indirectly, involved in such a project. Mrs Rinehart's solicitor, who has acted for her for a considerable period of time, says that her reputation is an essential component of her business.
3. The defendant is named as Nine Entertainment Holdings Limited. It is unclear whether that company, or other companies in the Channel Nine stable, such as TCN Pty Ltd and/or Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd, is the correctly named defendant. Senior counsel, who has appeared for the named defendant, has, entirely appropriately, not taken any issue with the precise name of the defendant (which will be provided to the Court as soon as is practicable) but, in all respects, senior counsel has put submissions on behalf of any, and all of the companies that might fall within the Channel Nine stable.
4. Channel Nine is the television network which broadcasts around Australia, and which is the group that intends to broadcast the program at the heart of this application.

The Program - "The House of Hancock"

1. For some considerable period of time there has been foreshadowed the broadcast of a program - variously called a telemovie, television movie, a six-episode mini-series, or something similar - entitled the "House of Hancock". In the promotions for the program "House of Hancock", it has been variously described as a drama, something which is based partly in fact and something which has been partly dramatised.
2. Mr Gyngell, who is the chief executive officer of the Nine Entertainment Company, in an email of 30 January 2015, described the program in these terms: "The program to which your letter refers is a dramatised account of events focusing on the personal relationships between family members, each of whom are iconic in the minds of the Australian public. It seeks to depict this chapter of Australian history, and the personal and professional achievements and struggles of the key players in an honest and entertaining way."
3. On 2 February 2015, Channel Nine's lawyers, in a letter of that date, described it in this way: "The mini-series is a dramatised depiction of the very public history of the Hancock dynasty. It is based upon extensive research and reliance upon reputable sources, including material from various court proceedings. In such a colourful family saga, there is no one version of what is the true story. The producers, however, believe the mini-series is a fair and balanced account of events."
4. The evidence establishes that the plaintiff has not been asked directly to give her account of any of the events, the subject of the mini-series or the show.
5. On 2 February 2015, the solicitors for Ms Rinehart wrote to Mr Gyngell, and described what they understood to be the content of the series, and expressed concern that the series is being marketed or advertised as a true story. The letter made a request for a pre-publication review of the series to "identify factual inaccuracies which will or are likely to impact or damage our client's valuable reputation and/or business relationships". In response to that letter, the letter of 2 February 2015 from the solicitors for Channel Nine was sent, which declined the request to undertake a pre-publication review, somewhat tangentially describing the request as one to, effectively, "edit the mini-series".
6. A further request was made by email at 1.44pm on Thursday, 12 February 2015. This request came at a time after the first of the two episodes of the "House of Hancock" story had been broadcast. A transcript of that show has been tendered in evidence. I have had occasion to read quickly through the transcript, which is an incomplete way of fully understanding what was shown in the first episode, but it is fair to say that the episode covered both the personal life of the plaintiff, her father and members of her family, and also features of the business, both past and present, of the Hancock Group.
7. With respect to the second episode, which is intended to be telecast this coming Sunday evening, 15 February 2015, the plaintiff asks the Court to draw inferences about the content of the show from a mixture of promotional material and public comments made by an apparently reliable, and apparently objective television critic, Mr Peter Ford. I say apparently reliable and apparently objective, because Mr Ford had been a guest on "A Current Affair"', a program broadcast by Channel Nine on Wednesday 11 February 2015, at 7.13pm, and made comments without demur, contradiction or protest from Channel Nine.
8. With respect to the second episode, Mr Ford and the producer of the program, Mr Cordell, made the following remarks on "A Current Affair". First, according to Mr Cordell the program is a drama, and the producers were not intending to make a documentary. Mr Cordell said that he was not at all surprised that some of the main players would be uncomfortable about the episode which he described in this way: "This is a big, explosive 'Dallas'-type drama, and a lot of it we did not have to make up. A lot of it is on the public record."
9. Second, the Channel Nine reporter, in the course of this show, introduced a segment of the "House of Hancock" with these words: "For those who doubt the authenticity of 'House of Hancock', here's a scene from the drama." She went on to say: "And here's the real thing." Immediately after that comment, the producer, Mr Cordell, is seen and heard to say: "We quite happily defend anything and everything in our film, even though parts of it have been created, as firmly grounded in truth".
10. Third, in the course of this interview, Mr Ford, in the presence of the Channel 9 host, Ms Tracey Grimshaw, and the producer of the "House of Hancock", Mr Cordell, said, amongst other things, the following: "This is a ripping yarn. Look, I think it's a great piece of television. It is gripping. You simply could not sit down and make this stuff up. It is straight out of 'Dynasty'." In his presence, Ms Grimshaw concluded the interview by saying: "Entertainment reporter, Peter Ford says 'House of Hancock' is one of the best dramas of the year, with even a more explosive conclusion this Sunday." Mr Ford added: "I think it is must-see television on Sunday night, except for Mrs Rinehart. She should definitely make plans to go out to dinner next Sunday night." The producer, Mr Cordell, added the following: "And I think by the end of series, you know, Australians will better understand her and hopefully will have a little more sympathy for the person she's become."
11. On the following day, Thursday 12 February 2015, at 8.22am, Mr Ford, who had been allowed by Channel 9 to view the second episode, either in its final form or in its near final form, was interviewed on a radio station. He said this: "Now, on Monday, I had to be somewhat cryptic about the 'House of Hancock' part 2, because I had signed an embargo, which is now lifted, and I can tell you, I have seen part 2 of 'House of Hancock', and if Mrs Rinehart was unhappy with what she saw last Sunday night, she should definitely go out to dinner next Sunday night, because it's like twenty times worse about her. They make her look like an obsessed, vindictive shrew. I felt very sorry for her. I actually don't know the woman at all. I've never met her. And I can't believe that somebody could truly be that sour about life. But that's the picture they have painted of her."
12. The radio interviewer asked, perhaps tongue in cheek, whether Mr Gyngell, the CEO of Channel Nine, ought be applying for any jobs at the Hancock Group. Mr Ford doubted that he should. Further, Mr Ford said this: "But there's a very final scene in the 'House of Hancock'. If you stick around to watch it, I reckon your jaw will drop. I reckon it's going to have everybody talking on Monday."
13. Earlier in the week, Mr Ford had made other comments about the second episode on Radio Station 6PR. He said that he was not allowed, by virtue of the embargo, to give away any details. But he did comment that if Mrs Rinehart was unhappy with last night show, "Boy, she should make some other plans for next Sunday night." He also said, when asked by the interviewer in what was somewhat curiously described as a "philosophical question", whether he thought that the average viewer watching a show like "House of Hancock" would think that what they were seeing is exactly what happened, or would they take it with a grain of salt. Mr Ford said: "In Perth, of course, you're very close to it, that it probably all seems very real. To people, I think, on the East Coast, it is still despite all the publicity, still seems like an episode of 'Dynasty'. So in that sense, now the point is, also when you are putting together a story like Mrs Rinehart's and Lang's and Rose's, you've got to take shortcuts. That's the reality. You cannot, you are not making a documentary, you are going to have to, you know, do hybrid characters. You are going to have to create scenes that perhaps never happened, and in doing so, there's no doubt you are going to hurt some people along the way. So it's almost collateral damage."
14. Further, he went on to say: "My gut feeling was most people would probably come away only having confirmed whatever it was they thought of Rose and Gina. I don't think anybody came away with any great revelations or different opinion. For better or for worse, I think next Sunday night will change people's opinion about her."
15. These revelations and comments about the show contained in the evidence filed by Mrs Rinehart, have not been the subject of any contradictory evidence put before the Court by the defendant.

Conclusions about the Program

1. Having regard to all of the evidence before the Court, it seems to me that the plain and obvious inference to be drawn from the totality of these remarks, and, in particular, the remarks made and broadcast by Channel Nine at 7.30pm on 11 February 2015 on "A Current Affair", is that there is a real prospect that statements will be made and published in the second episode of the "House of Hancock" which are not entirely accurate, perhaps, even probably, have been made up, and do not accurately reflect the truth. Accordingly, I draw an inference that some or all of what is to be published in the second episode may give rise to imputations defamatory of Mrs Rinehart's reputation.
2. I have couched this finding in hesitant terms. I have not seen the second episode, nor have the lawyers for Mrs Rinehart. However, I draw the inference, which I have spoken about, from what has been published in the promotional lead-up material, and in the absence of any contradictory material. It is an inference drawn solely for the purpose of this application, and in no way reflects what may be the fact from the script of the episode or from the viewing of it.
3. Accordingly, I conclude from this that the plaintiff has proved in this application, the existence of a real issue about whether the content of the program will be reasonably accurate and truthful, and whether statements which will be made are defamatory of the plaintiff's reputation.

Reasonable Inquiries

1. Subject, then, to the consideration of the phrase "reasonable inquiries" of r 5.3(1)(a) of the UCPR, I am satisfied that the plaintiff is a person who may be entitled to make a claim for relief against Channel Nine (or the relevant company within its group). That claim for relief would include the claim for a pre‑publication injunction. To satisfy the Court that the threshold issue of r 5.3(1)(a) has been satisfied, the plaintiff must show that she has made reasonable inquiries to obtain relevant information sufficient to enable her to make the decision discussed in that sub-rule.
2. By letters dated 2 February 2015 and 12 February 2015, the plaintiff made a request to the relevant people for access to both the first and the second episode of "House of Hancock". Those requests have either been refused, or else simply ignored.
3. The defendant's senior counsel has indicated that the defendant opposes the application for preliminary discovery. This approach maintains what appears to be a considered view that the applicant, Mrs Rinehart, is not entitled to and should not be given, in the absence of a Court order, access to the program, in particular the second episode. Senior counsel for the defendant submitted that I would interpret the phrase "reasonable inquiries" in r 5.3(1)(a) of the UCPR by having regard to the time at which any request was made. I accept that that is one relevant factor. Another relevant factor is that the applicant has to be able to come to the view that they are a person entitled to make a claim for relief in accordance with the rule. And accordingly, although the principal request was only made within the last few days, I do not think that the shortness of time before this application was brought means that any inquiry is unreasonable.
4. The fact is that regardless of when the inquiry was made, the defendant was not going to reveal the contents of the program to Mrs Rinehart before it was televised.
5. Accordingly, I am satisfied that each of the three threshold matters in r 5.3 of the UCPR have been established. However, that is not an end of the matter.

Discretion

1. In the way in which this application has been argued, it is probably the beginning, because, as authority makes plain, the Court has a discretion as to whether or not it should make an order that the prospective defendant must give discovery to the applicant of the claimed documents.
2. Wherever the Court is considering the exercise of its discretion, and the making of an order under the UCPR, it is obliged by the Civil Procedure Act to give effect to the overriding purpose set out in s 56(1) of the Act. The overriding purpose is in the following terms: "The overriding purpose of this Act and of the rules of court in their application to civil proceedings is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings." I will bear in mind the statutory requirements on the Court to seek to give effect to that overriding purpose.
3. The defendant argued that even if the first three threshold questions were established, the court would not, in the exercise of its discretion, make the orders sought. In so arguing, it relied upon the following matters.
4. First, that it was a practical futility to make the order for preliminary discovery, because there was only a very low or remote prospect of success of the plaintiff being able to obtain from the court an injunction to prevent publication of the second episode.
5. Secondly, the defendant submitted that that prospect of success was the same whether or not the pre-publication injunction was sought with respect to a claim in defamation, or a claim in injurious falsehood, both of which causes of action the plaintiff's counsel had described as being reasonably available on the material before the court.
6. Thirdly, the defendant argued that in considering the exercise of its discretion, the court would have careful regard to the importance of the principle of free speech, and the desirability of not restricting free speech in any way.
7. Fourthly, the defendant argued that the issues likely to arise in the second episode which may adversely affect the reputation of the plaintiff, Mrs Rinehart, were already in the public domain, and accordingly the interests of justice would not be served by making the orders sought. In making that submission, the defendant drew strength from the fact that, notwithstanding expressions of concern by Mrs Rinehart prior to the publication of the first episode of the "House of Hancock", she had not commenced any action for damages, nor had she claimed any defamation, or other cause of action, arising out of the first episode of the "House of Hancock" which was broadcast last Sunday night.
8. Finally, the defendant identified detriment to it from the making of the order for preliminary discovery with respect to the publication of the second episode. The defendant did not claim specific detriment in the sense that it would be complex, costly or otherwise an undue burden on it to provide a copy of the show to the lawyers for the plaintiff, accompanied by appropriate restrictions of confidentiality, but rather argued that any breach of the principle of free speech was of significant detriment to the effective maintenance of that principle in a free democracy.

Prospect of Success in Obtaining Pre-Publication Injunction

1. It is necessary, in considering the exercise of my discretion and these submissions, to return to the principal submission upon which much time was occupied in argument; namely, whether there is a remote or very low prospect of the plaintiff being able to obtain an injunction to prevent publication of the show. I will consider that issue by reference, initially, to any cause of action for such injunction based on an action for defamation.
2. Time does not permit a lengthy description of all of the legal principles which underlie whether or not a pre-publication injunction is available to combat a threatened defamation. It is appropriate to attempt to summarise those principles, which are further enunciated in the decision of the High Court of Australia in Australian Broadcasting Commission v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, at [18] and [19] in the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ and Crennan J, and, as well in the judgment of Kirby J at [142]-[144].
3. Putting it shortly, I accept that the test for whether an injunction prior to publication would be granted involves, first, the application of the ordinary principles for the grant of any interlocutory injunction; namely, a court will ask whether a plaintiff has shown that there is a serious question to be tried as to their entitlement to relief, whether they have shown that they are likely to suffer injury which damages would not be an adequate remedy, and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.
4. Second, to those general principles, I add, and take account of this statement in O'Neill, by Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [18]: "In the context of a defamation case, the application of those organising principles will require particular attention to the considerations which courts have identified as dictating caution. Foremost amongst those considerations is the public interest in free speech. A further consideration is that in the defamation context, the outcome of a trial is especially likely to turn upon issues that are by hypothesis unresolved. Where one such issue is justification, it is commonly an issue for jury decision. In addition, the plaintiff's general character may be found to be such that even if the publication is defamatory, only nominal damages will be awarded." (citations omitted)
5. It has been said in many earlier authorities that, with respect to pre-publication injunctions in defamation, the power of the court is exercised with great caution, and further, that if there is any real room for debate as to whether the statements complained of are defamatory, the injunction will be refused. As well, it has generally been said in the earlier authorities that if there is any real ground for supposing that the defendant may succeed upon a ground of defence, such as privilege or truth or public benefit, the injunction will be refused: see Stocker v McElhinney (No. 2) [1961] NSWR 1043 at 1048 per Walsh J,.
6. In Hatfield v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 69, each of the members of the Court said that in considering the exercise of its discretion, the Court should pay careful attention to the question of whether or not the chance of success in obtaining a pre-publication injunction can properly be described as low, extremely low, or remote. Sackville AJA said at [165] of that decision: "That the appellant's chances of obtaining an interlocutory injunction are extremely low or remote is in my opinion a powerful consideration militating against exercise in her favour of the discretion conferred by r 5.3."
7. Having regard to the urgent nature of this application, which is one for a form of preliminary discovery, the court is necessarily approaching the determination of whether the prospect of obtaining an injunction prior to publication is low, extremely low or remote or on the basis of quite limited material. For example, the court does not have the content of the proposed publication; it has merely comments about it. It does not have material which enables it to form a view, even on a prima facie basis, as to whether financial loss or damage may ensue.
8. But, as the decision in Hatfield makes plain, when considering an application of this kind, each case must clearly turn on its own facts. A good example of this is, that, in Hatfield, whilst preliminary discovery was being sought of episodes of a mini-series, called "Underbelly: The Golden Mile", the plaintiff was in possession of a book which had been published upon which the mini‑series was clearly based. On the facts of that case, that book and the intended broadcast were largely, if not entirely, based upon evidence which had been given in a publicly conducted Royal Commission. In addition, in that case the primary judge and the Court of Appeal were free to make their decision with a careful analysis of all of that material and with the benefit of some time, as the telecast of the mini-series was not imminent.

Discernment

1. I intend to approach this application by asking whether I am satisfied, on the material before me, that the prospect of the plaintiff obtaining a pre-publication injunction, based on claim in defamation, is so low or remote as to mean that there is a practical futility in the granting of an order for preliminary discovery. Regardless of where the legal onus lies, the defendant faces a much higher hurdle than does a plaintiff to satisfy the Court that the prospect of obtaining a pre-publication injunction is low, extremely low or remote.
2. If nothing else, if the comments of Mr Ford during, and the contents of "A Current Affair" broadcast on Channel Nine on 11 February 2015, and the later remarks of Mr Ford, are to be taken as being reasonable statements, objectively made, about the program, I am not persuaded that a suggestion that a broadcast of a program that makes an individual look like an obsessed, vindictive shrew could be regarded as having such low prospects of a pre-publication injunction as to fall within the description of low, very low or remote. Nor can I be satisfied by reference to anything else described by Mr Ford that the episode does not give rise to or may not give rise to imputations which are seriously defamatory of Mrs Rinehart's character.
3. I need also to consider, when considering whether or not a pre‑publication injunction should be granted, the issue of whether the defendant would seek to justify the contents of those imputations.
4. Senior counsel for the defendant submits that his client will, if sued, or alternatively in response to an application for a pre-publication injunction, rely upon a defence of justification of the matters to be published. Senior counsel points to the fact, that that is a matter of considerable weight to be taken into account in determining whether a pre-publication injunction should run. I accept the legal principles to which I have earlier made reference which require this Court, should it consider exercising its discretion to grant a pre-publication injunction, to be cautious in its approach, and particularly cautious about making a decision in the presence of, or the likely availability of a justification defence. As McColl JA said at [65] in Hatfield: "The court should also be cautious about making a decision about whether or not a defendant may be able to mount a justification defence in the absence of material indicating the nature of the allegedly defamatory material."
5. I accept that the evidence before this Court, primarily to be derived from annexures to the affidavit of the defendant's solicitor, indicate that there have already been a number of publications about the plaintiff. One, a particularly lengthy publication, describes her quest for respect and gratitude. There are other publications, the detail of which I have been taken to, and to which I have had regard. Whether or not that is the material upon which a justification defence would be based is, of course, unknown, and unable to be established at this stage.
6. I do not express any final or formed conclusion about the prospects of success of the plaintiff obtaining a pre-publication injunction, but, on the material before me in this case, I am not prepared to find that such prospects are low, remote or extremely low, or otherwise of a kind, which would mean that a claim for such relief is a practical futility.

Injurious Falsehood

1. The plaintiff also relied upon a claim for relief based upon the tort of injurious falsehood. The law relating to that tort is far from settled in respect of the extent of it. In those circumstances, and because it is unnecessary for me to express any view about it, I do not do so. It is unnecessary for me to have regard to that, in order to consider the exercise of the discretion in this case.

Principle of Free Speech

1. The defendant drew the attention of the Court to the proposition that, in exercising its discretion, the importance of the principle of free speech and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is to be considered and given prominence. I have not the slightest doubt that such principle is important, and I have paid careful attention to it. It must be said, in the Australian context, that it is not a wholly unconstrained principle. The tort of defamation provides a constraint, as does the very availability of a pre-publication injunction. However, I do carefully have regard to that principle in considering whether or not the order for preliminary discovery should be made. It will be necessary to weigh it in the balance with my conclusion on the likelihood of, or prospect of, obtaining pre-publication injunction relief.
2. The third matter upon which the defendant relied was that the issues likely to arise in the second episode are already in the public domain, and it is not in the interests of justice to make the preliminary discovery order. That submission was largely based upon the letter written by the plaintiff's solicitor on 12 February 2015, in which, based upon the promotional material and the statements to which I have earlier referred which had been made publicly. The defendant submitted that the reputational issues raised in the letter from the plaintiff's solicitor are already in the public domain.
3. As I have said, by reference to the annexures to the affidavit of the defendant's solicitor, there is no doubt that there have been many published stories about the plaintiff's character, reputation, personality, business affairs and private affairs. In that sense, and in the respects set out in those documents, the plaintiff is a public figure of some notoriety. No doubt, as a consequence of what has been previously been published, people will have a view about the plaintiff and her reputation.
4. However, the determination of whether the matters likely to arise in the second episode are already in the public domain is necessarily made on the basis of incomplete material. The defendant has not placed the second episode before the Court. It may in due course be tendered to the Court, and the contents of it, and other publicity about the plaintiff, may be a very good reason why a pre-publication injunction is not granted. But I must determine this application, at this preliminary stage, on the material I have. I am wholly unpersuaded that the sort of defamatory imputations which might arise in the second episode, are already in the public domain.
5. Finally, I note that the defendant submitted that there was a detriment to the defendant's position by any breach of the principle of free speech. To the extent that that is so, I take it into account.

Conclusion

1. I come, then, to consider by a balance of all of those matters, whether it is in the interests of justice to make the order sought, for preliminary discovery. I have, of course, weighed in favour of the order that Mrs Rinehart through her lawyers has put: that there is a possibility of a serious defamation; that they cannot determine whether they have a claim for relief unless they see the material; that the claim for relief upon which they rely is to be a pre-publication injunction; and that the plaintiff's reputation is important to her business and that her business is a substantial one. I note, although this has not been specifically addressed, that one factor which weighed in the discretionary balance in Hatfield was the financial capacity of the plaintiff in that case to proffer an undertaking as to damages which would be required in the event that a pre-publication injunction was to be made. That does not seem to me, in the context of this present application, to be a matter to which I should give any weight.
2. On the other side, as I have said in the exercising of the discretion, I am not persuaded that the prospect of obtaining a pre-publication injunction is so low as to indicate it is one of practical futility, nor am I persuaded that so powerful is the right to free speech, and so detrimental is any impact upon it, that it is sufficient to outweigh the balance in favour of making the order.
3. Accordingly, I conclude that I am satisfied, in the exercise of my discretion that an order under r 5.3 of the UCPR for preliminary injunction ought be made. I propose shortly to make it.
4. An issue arises, however, as to precise terms of that order, upon which I will now hear the parties. (Counsel addressed)
5. I make the following orders: 1. Pursuant to rule 5.3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, I order that the defendant forthwith discover, or cause to be discovered to the plaintiff a digital video disc of Episode 2 of the program "House of Hancock" ("the DVD") scheduled to be broadcast on the evening of Sunday, 15 February 2015. 2. I order that the DVD discovered to the plaintiff only be viewed by the plaintiff, senior and junior counsel presently retained by the plaintiff, Mr Mark Wilks and his associate solicitor presently acting, Ms Kim Hamilton, Mr Brad Ross and Mr Tad Watroba. 3. I order that the named persons have access to the DVD for the sole purpose of considering whether the plaintiff personally may be entitled to make a claim for relief from the Court against the defendant and whether or not she should commence proceedings against the defendant. 4. I order that the DVD provided by way of discovery is not to be copied or reproduced in any way unless: 1. essential for the purpose of the plaintiff and Mr Watroba viewing the contents of the program; and 2. only to the extent necessary to be reproduced in evidence to be tendered to this Court in any claim for relief which the plaintiff may bring. 1. I direct the parties to confer about whether there is a more efficient electronic means by which the contents of the DVD can be securely electronically transmitted to the plaintiff and Mr Watroba, other than by making a copy of it. 2. I order that any copy of the DVD not itself be copied or further distributed, and that the custody of such copy be limited to Mr Wilks and Ms Hamilton, unless essential for the obtaining of instructions from the plaintiff and the viewing of it by her and Mr Watroba. In such event, any such copy is to be forthwith returned to the custody of Mr Wilks. 3. I order that no later than 9.15pm tonight, the solicitors for the plaintiff are to notify the solicitors for the defendant by electronic mail of any decision to commence proceedings to make a claim for relief by way of pre-publication injunction with respect to the broadcast of the episode of the House of Hancock on Sunday, 15 February 2015. I order that any such notification also be provided to the Court through my Associate. 4. If the plaintiff intends to commence proceedings, I order that the solicitors for the plaintiff provide to the solicitors for the defendant no later than 8am, Saturday 14 February 2015, a copy of the pleadings to be relied upon and all evidence in support of such application. 5. I order that if the defendant wishes to rely upon any evidence or other material, it is to be provided by electronic mail to the solicitors for the plaintiff by no later than 11.15am, 14 February 2015. In the event that such application is made, or is to be made, I fix it for hearing before me at 12 noon tomorrow, 14 February 2015. I direct that a copy of any electronic exchange of pleadings or evidence be provided to my Associate. 6. I direct that a copy of Episode 2 of the "House of Hancock", which is to be discovered to the plaintiff, be provided to the Court in a securely sealed package by delivery to the Court security staff by 10am, 14 February 2015. 7. I reserve all questions of costs. 8. I stand over the balance of the relief sought in the Summons in these proceedings to 2pm Friday 20 February 2015.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 24 March 2015