Rice v State of Queensland

Review of non-permanent employment - Directive 02/23

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10

Goodall v State of Qld & Anor [2018] QSC 319

Katae v State of Queensland & Anor [2018] QSC 225

Power v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Tourism and Innovation) [2021] QIRC 053

[1] Ms Lynne Rice ('the Appellant') is employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) ('the Respondent') in the ICT Investment and Performance Group, Strategy Investment and BSS, ICT Operations, Frontline and Digital Division ('FDD') as a Senior Investment & Performance Officer.

[2] The Appellant received a letter from Ms Stacey Parker, Director HR Services, HR Division ('the decision-maker') advising that the Appellant was not being converted to permanent employment on the basis that the position is temporary in nature with a specified end date.

[3] Further, the decision-maker stated that there was no continuing need for someone to be employed in the role the Appellant is currently employed in, or a role that is substantially the same since the role is temporary for a specified period and purpose.

[4] The Appellant appeals against the decision pursuant to s131(1)(a) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act').

[5] The Appeal must be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against.[1] Because the word 'review' has no settled meaning, it must take its meaning from the context in which it appears.[2] An appeal under ch 11 pt 6 div 4 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') is not by way of rehearing,[3] but involves a review of the decision arrived at and the decision making process associated therewith.

[6] The stated purpose of such an appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.[4] The issue for determination is whether the decision to deny conversion of the Appellant's employment to permanent was fair and reasonable. Findings which are reasonably open to the decision maker are not expected to be disturbed on appeal.

What decisions can the Industrial Commissioner make?

[7] In deciding this Appeal, s 562C of the IR Act provides that the Industrial Commissioner may:

1. set the decision aside and substitute another decision; or

1. set the decision aside and return the issue to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.

Relevant provisions of the PS Act and the Directive

[8] Section 115 of the PS Act relevantly provides:

1. Chief executive must review status after 2 years of continuous employment

(1) If a public sector employee mentioned in section 112(1) has been continuously employed in the same public sector entity for at least 2 years, the employee's chief executive must decide whether to -

(a) continue the employee's employment according to the terms of the employee's existing employment; or

(b) offer to convert the employee's employment to a permanent basis.

(2) The employee's chief executive must make the decision within the required period after -

(a) the end of 2 years after the employee has been continuously employed on a non-permanent basis in the public sector entity; and

(b) each 1-year period after the end of the period mentioned in paragraph (a) during which the employee is continuously employed on a non-permanent basis in the public sector entity.

(a) section 114(3) and (4) applies to the employee's chief executive; and

(b) the employee's chief executive must have regard to the reasons for each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section or section 114 in relation to the employee during the employee's period of continuous employment.

(4) If the employee's chief executive decides not to offer to convert the employee's employment to a permanent basis, the chief executive must give the employee a notice stating -

(b) the total period for which the employee has been continuously employed on a temporary basis for a fixed term or on a casual basis in the public sector entity; and

(c) how many times the employee's employment on a non-permanent basis has been extended; and

(d) each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section or section 114 in relation to the employee during the employee's period of continuous employment.

(5) Subsection (4)(c) does not apply in relation to employment on a casual basis.

(6) If the employee's chief executive does not make the decision within the required period, the chief executive is taken to have decided not to offer to convert the employee's employment to a permanent basis and to continue the employee's employment according to the terms of the employee's existing employment.

(7) For working out how long the employee has been continuously employed in the public sector entity -

(a) all periods of authorised leave are to be included; and

(b) the employee is to be regarded as continuously employed even if there are periods during which the employee is not employed in the entity, if the periods of non-employment in the entity total 12 weeks or less in the 2 years occurring immediately before the time when the duration of the person's continuous employment is being worked out.

(8) The commissioner must make a directive about the making of a decision under this section.

(a) the matters a chief executive must consider in deciding the hours of work to be offered in converting a person's employment under subsection (1)(b); and

(b) the circumstances in which a person may appeal against the decision about the hours of work offered in converting the person's employment under subsection (1)(b).

(10) This section does not limit or otherwise affect section 113.

required period, for making a decision under subsection (1), means -

(a) the period stated in an industrial instrument within which the decision must be made; or

(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply - 28 days after the end of the period mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b).

[9] The Appellant is appealing the Respondent's decision to decline her request for conversion of her temporary employment to permanent status under ss 131(1)(a) and 133(1)(a) of the PS Act and the Review of non-permanent employment - Directive 02/23 ('the Directive), submitting that the decision is not fair and reasonable.

[10] The Appellant submits that she meets this Appeals' eligibility criteria as she has continuously occupied the position of Senior Investment & Performance Officer for more than two years, forming part of a total of eight years of continuous service in the role - approximately four years as a contractor and four years as a temporary employee.

[11] The Appellant further submits that her suitability for the role is well demonstrated because:

• she was originally appointed through a merit-based recruitment process (reference QLD/367239/21, dated 26 March 2021);

• since then, the Appellant has consistently received positive feedback from supervisors and senior management; and

• her strong performance was expressly acknowledged in the Director of HR's letter declining the conversion request.

[12] The Appellant submits that the role itself remains an ongoing requirement within the organisation because it provides essential financial and accounting expertise to support the delivery of ongoing and evolving projects.

[13] Additionally, the Appellant submits that as policing needs continue to change and technology advances, there will be a sustained demand for upgrades, integrations, and related support from project accountants and similar positions. Further, the program of work has grown steadily over the past decade and is expected to expand further in preparation for the 2032 Brisbane Olympic and Paralympic Games.

[14] The Appellant submits that her eight years of continuous service - including six fixed-term contracts directly with the Respondent since June 2021, and five prior contracts through Eden Ritchie Recruitment from October 2017 - further confirms the enduring need for the position. Furthermore, the Appellant argues that despite multiple organisational reviews, elections, and machinery-of-government changes, the role has remained part of the agency's establishment.

[15] Moreover, the Appellant submits that conversion of similar project-based roles to permanent positions is also not without precedent within the agency.

[16] The Appellant currently supports approximately 14 active projects, with no indication that these will not proceed through to completion, where both the Appellant's manager and director have emphasised the critical importance of continued support for these projects to ensure full accountability and transparency in their delivery.

[17] Overall, the Appellant concludes that her eight years of dedicated service in the role clearly highlight both its ongoing necessity and her sustained, valuable contribution.

[18] The Commission issued a Directions Order calling for submissions from both parties following receipt of the Appeal Notice. The submissions are summarised below.

[19] The Appellant submits that she had no substantial new information to add beyond what was included in her Appeal Notice because the Respondent provided very limited details in their letter declining her request for conversion.

[20] The Appellant maintains that she is eligible for conversion and that the Respondent has raised no concerns about her suitability. She further submits that the decision not to convert her employment to permanent status is neither fair nor reasonable, for the following reasons:

• the Respondent failed to consider the history of the role and its ongoing operational requirements;

• the decision letter lacked sufficient detail to properly justify the refusal; and
• undue weight was placed on the current end date of the role, despite all previous extensions also having specified end dates.

[21] The Appellant also submits that she requested from HR the outcomes or any details of previous mandatory reviews required under s 115 of the PS Act but HR was unable to provide any meaningful information in response.[5]

[22] The Appellant notes her understanding that s 14.3 of the Directive requires that, in the event of a deemed decision not to offer conversion to permanent employment, the employee must be provided, within 14 days, with information about the relevant appeal processes.

[23] The Appellant submits that had she not proactively initiated her conversion request, she would never have received this information about her appeal rights.

[24] The Respondent submits that the Appellant is employed as a non-permanent employee under s 81(1) of the PS Act.

[25] In response to the background of the Appeal and the Appellant's submissions, the Respondent submits that:

• the PS Act requires employers to review temporary employees' status after two years of continuous service where specifically, under s 115(3) and (4), the chief executive may offer conversion only if there is a continuing need for the role (or a substantially similar one), the employee is suitable, and any industrial instrument requirements are met;

• If the above conditions are satisfied, conversion must be offered unless it is not viable or appropriate due to genuine operational requirements of the public sector entity;

• Section 9 of the Directive emphasises that the chief executive is responsible for determining the entity's genuine operational requirements when applying the relevant decision-making criteria under ss 114-117 of the PS Act; and

• Reliance is placed on the Public Sector Principles in s 39 of the PS Act, which include ensuring accountability, integrity, and support for the public interest, as well as the work performance and personal conduct principles in s 40, which require the effective, efficient, and appropriate use of public resources. This imposes a duty on the chief executive to make accountable decisions that promote efficient resource use.

[26] The Respondent additionally submits the following regarding the 100-day Review Implementation:

• The Respondent bases its position on genuine operational requirements arising from the 100-Day Review authorised by the Queensland Police Commissioner in March 2025 and conducted between March and June 2025;

• The review assessed organisational alignment with the legislative mandate under s 2.3 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990, focusing on refocusing on core policing functions, enhancing workforce wellbeing and capability, improving organisational efficiency and leadership, and rebuilding trust and morale;

• The emphasis on improving organisational efficiency is particularly relevant, with the review concluding that a structural rebalancing is required to align corporate functions with operational needs;

• That Recommendations 50, 56, and 60,[6] include establishing a locally led frontline support model, undertaking a holistic review of approved growth and vacant positions, and redesigning the Queensland Police Service ('QPS') IT operating model (including an enterprise systems strategy and exploration of cloud-based opportunities);

• The QPS is currently undergoing service-wide organisational restructuring, including redesign of the IT operating model, as evidenced by communication from the Deputy Commissioner dated 13 November 2025,[7] where this process, which will take time to implement properly, includes considering the realignment of the Appellant's position, along with others in her team, from FDD to the QPS Finance Division;

• This proposed move reflects that the Finance Division already provides similar functions service-wide, except within FDD, where the current arrangement is unsustainable and inefficient. Transferring the function (and potentially the entire team) to Finance could realise efficiencies and allow absorption of the roles, though the exact future requirements for these positions remain uncertain at this stage;

• The Respondent cites Adams v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) ('Adams'),[8] which states that the Commissioner of Police holds responsibility for the efficient and proper administration, management, and functioning of the Service, including decisions on transferring positions to achieve efficiency, ultimately exercising managerial prerogative authorised by the Commissioner;

• Further, the Respondent submits that Adams notes that, absent statutory or contractual restrictions, tribunals should not interfere with a lawful exercise of managerial prerogative unless it seeks something unjust or unreasonable,[9] with the same principle applying here in that the Respondent's restructuring for proper and efficient management is a legitimate exercise of prerogative, and declining conversion in this context is neither unjust nor unreasonable;

• That currently, FDD is reviewing its operational model, and the temporary contract extension to 31 March 2026 allows time for proper consideration, potential movement of positions, and realisation of efficiencies, where appointing someone permanently to a role with uncertain ongoing need would contradict the PS Act's principles of efficient resource use. Further, directing permanent appointment could limit the organisation's ability to achieve efficiencies, a key government priority, potentially diverting resources from frontline policing;

• That this approach aligns with the QPS' Government Commitments,[10] and the Minister for Police's Ministerial Charter Letter,[11] which emphasise bolstering police resources for proactive policing by streamlining services and redirecting surplus positions and funding to the frontline; and

• That until the future need for the role can be genuinely determined, conversion is not viable or appropriate.

[27] In conclusion, the Respondent submits that, under the Directive and the PS Act, genuine operational reasons make it neither viable nor appropriate to convert the Appellant to permanent employment at this time.

[28] The Appellant submits that as noted in her Form 89, she previously performed the same role as a contractor through a labour hire company starting in October 2017 (initially with the Public Safety Business Agency, now part of QPS), resulting in approximately eight years of continuous service in the position.

[29] The Appellant submits that the decision letter dated 30 September 2025 stated that conversion was declined because "there is no continuing need for you to perform your current role because the role is temporary for a specified period and purpose."[12] However, the Respondent's written submissions introduce a different reason, that being reliance on genuine operational requirements arising from the implementation of the 100-Day Review.[13]

[30] The Appellant raises several concerns about the decision and the Respondent's submissions being that:

• the Respondent's submissions fail to address the Appellant's earlier points on why the decision is unfair and unreasonable, provide no evidence of any investigation into similar roles (including details of roles considered and reasons for rejection), and offer no response to the Appellant's claim that no previous mandatory reviews under s 115 of the PS Act have occurred;

• Appendix B to the submissions, announcing the Rebalance Initiative as part of the 100-Day Review, is dated 13 November 2025, which is after the decision date and as such indicating limited or no contemporaneous evidence supporting the original refusal;

• Section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 and s 2.1 of the non-permanent conversion checklist require or recommend providing evidence underpinning such decisions, yet none was supplied with the decision letter to substantiate that her role was temporary for a specified period and purpose;[14]

• The Appellant's work history in the decision letter shows appointment over four years ago with multiple extensions, which she submits indicates the role is not truly temporary in nature;[15]

• She has performed the role continuously for eight years, five fixed-term contracts as a contractor and at least four extensions as an employee, surviving multiple machinery-of-government changes, elections, and organisational reviews, underscoring the role's ongoing need;

• No evidence supports the assertion that the role was originally created as temporary for a specified period and purpose, and the decision maker appears to have placed excessive weight on its initial temporary status without considering the history of extensions;

• The Respondent states they are only considering realignment of the appellant's position,[16] but provide no evidence of when or if this will occur;

• It is neither fair nor reasonable to refuse conversion based on speculative future changes that have not materialised despite years of continuity;[17]

• The decision letter contains an inconsistency because it acknowledges the need to consider a continuing need for the role "or a role that is substantially the same," yet concludes there is no continuing need for the current role because it is temporary, without any evidence of considering substantially similar roles as required under the PS Act;[18]

• Despite the legislative requirement for reviews under s 115 of the PS Act, the Appellant has received no information on any previous (deemed) decisions since commencing in June 2021, including appeal rights,[19] where an earlier notification might have allowed a prior appeal;

• Public Sector Appeal decisions must be based on evidence before the decision maker at the time, where the Respondent's submissions do not expand on the original decision but introduce a new reason tied to the 100-Day Review;

• Even if considered, the submissions provide no evidence that the review will impact the Appellant's role and that her position has endured past major changes, including the disestablishment of the Public Safety Business Agency and transitions involving QFD and QAS;

• Appeals in Catterall v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service),[20] and Gatla v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service),[21] successfully challenged refusals based on uncertain future organisational changes, requiring demonstrated impacts at the decision time, which was a principle reaffirmed in Singh v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service),[22] where it seems that the Respondent appears not to have applied lessons from these cases; and

• The Respondent has not adhered to the public sector principle that permanent employment is the default.[23]

[31] Regarding suitability, the Appellant submits she is suitable, as evidenced by her merit-based appointment, consistent positive feedback, and the decision letter's acknowledgment that she has demonstrated the requirements for the role since 21 June 2021.[24]

• she satisfies the eligibility criteria with no suitability concerns raised;

• the Respondent has not addressed her concerns from the Form 89 or first submission;

• the review process placed excessive weight on the role's initial temporary status without evidence of its creation for a specified period and purpose, failed to consider substantially similar roles under the PS Act, relied on speculative organisational change without contemporaneous evidence, and lacked support for the refusal at the time of decision; and

• overall, the Appeal should be allowed, the decision set aside, and substituted with an order for her permanent appointment to the AO6 Senior Investment and Performance Officer position.

[33] This Appeal requires consideration of whether the decision issued on 19 September by the Director, HR Services, to not convert the Appellant's employment to permanent was fair and reasonable.

[34] I note the Appellant's submissions relating to deemed decisions in previous years after which she was not subsequently informed of her appeal rights as required by cl 14.3 of the Directive. It is beyond the scope of this appeal to consider that deficiency, however, these concerns may be raised via other processes.

[35] A decision of this type requires the decision maker to consider whether the Appellant is suitable to perform the role, and whether there is a continuing need for the Appellant to perform the role or a role that is substantially the same.

[36] It is not in dispute that the Appellant is suitable to perform the role.

[37] Section 115 (4) of the PS Act states the following:

(4) If the employee's chief executive decides not to offer to convert the employee's employment to a permanent basis, the chief executive must give the employee a notice stating -

(b) the total period for which the employee has been continuously employed on a temporary basis for a fixed term or on a casual basis in the public sector entity; and

(c) how many times the employee's employment on a non-permanent basis has been extended; and

(d) each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section or section 114 in relation to the employee during the employee's period of continuous employment.

There is no continuing need for you to perform your current role because the role is temporary for a specified period and purpose.

[39] The decision does not provide any information about the role, the specified period, or the purpose of the role. It does not provide any details about consideration given to the criteria of whether there is a continuing need for the Appellant to perform the role beyond an assertion that the role is 'temporary for a specified period and purpose'.

Any notice provided to the employee must comply with section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 to:

(a) set out the findings on material questions of fact, and

(b) refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

[41] I am not satisfied that the reasons provided comply with cl 13.1 of the Directive in that they do not set out the findings on material questions of fact or refer to the evidence on which those findings were based. Whilst the written submissions address the reasons in more detail, a Respondent cannot rely upon submissions on appeal to cure a significant deficiency with respect to the requirement to provide adequate reasons.

[42] The decision-maker thanks the Appellant for their performance in the role "from 21 June 2021 to the present". I am satisfied that this broadly complies with the requirement in s 115(4)(b) to state the total period for which the employee has been continuously employed on a temporary basis.

[43] The decision included a table described as 'Employment summary' that appears to contain dates of the Appellant's previous extensions, although the text in the table is indecipherable. It may be the case that this table was included to address the requirements of s 115(4)(c), however the decision is required to state, 'how many times the employee's employment on a non-permanent basis has been extended'. A screen shot table from a computer program does fulfil this requirement.

[44] The decision indicates that consideration was given to whether there is a continuing need for someone to be employed in the role in which the Appellant is currently employed. However, the decision does not demonstrate that consideration was given to whether there was a continuing need for the Appellant to perform a role 'that is substantially the same'. As determined in Katae v State of Queensland & Anor,[25] consideration must be given to whether there is a continuing need to perform a role that is substantially the same as the one currently occupied by the Appellant as part of the statutory criteria. The decision in this matter does not demonstrate that any such consideration was given to identifying a role that may fulfil this criterion. In the absence of such consideration, the decision cannot be considered fair and reasonable.

[45] In Power v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Tourism and Innovation) Commissioner Dwyer stated:[26]

An evaluation of whether a decision is 'fair and reasonable' within the meaning of s 562B of the IR Act may be informed by any number of matters. Each matter will turn on its own peculiar facts. However, where the PS Act now compels mandatory content in such decisions, the presence of that content is an incontrovertible prerequisite for a conclusion that the decision is fair and reasonable.

[46] I adopt Commissioner Dwyer's observation and consider that the inclusion of mandatory content in the decision is necessary to determine that the decision is fair and reasonable. Minor deficiencies may not be fatal for a decision of this type, however, in this matter the significant failure to comply with the requirements of the PS Act and the Directive resulted in the Appellant being unable to assess the genuine reasons for the decision. As has been stated many times in this jurisdiction, an employee should not have to file an appeal in order to obtain reasons as to why a decision was made not to convert their employment following a review.

[47] For the reasons outlined above, the decision was not fair and reasonable. I consider the most appropriate course of action is for the decision to be set aside and returned to the decision maker for a fresh review.

1. The decision appealed against is set aside.

1. The issue is returned to the decision maker along with a copy of this decision and they are directed to:

(a) conduct a fresh review of the Appellant's employment status within 14 days of the date of this decision in accordance with the Public Sector Act 2022 the Directive 02/23_;_ and

(b) upon completion of the fresh review of the Appellant's employment status, issue a notice in compliance with the Public Sector Act 2022 and the Directive 02/23.

[1] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(2) ('IR Act').

[2] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10.

[3] Goodall v State of Qld & Anor [2018] QSC 319, 5.

[4] IR Act s 562B(3).

[5] The Appellant's Submissions filed on 31 October 2025 ('The Appellant's Submissions'), Appendix 1.

[6] The Respondent's Submissions filed on 14 November 2025 ('The Respondent's Submissions'), Appendix A.

[8] [2020] QIRC 110 ('Adams'), [13] and [64].

[10] The Respondent's Submissions (n 6), Appendix C.

[12] Form 89 - Appeal Notice - Public Sector Act 2022 filed on 16 October 2025 ('The Appeal Notice'), Attachment.

[13] The Respondent's Submissions (n 6), [16].

[16] The Respondent's Submissions (n 6), [23].

[17] Singh v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) ('Singh') [2024] QIRC 275, [40].

[18] Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act'), s 144(3)(a)(i); The Appeal Notice (n 13).

[20] [2021] QIRC 360.

[21] [2022] QIRC 436.

[25] [2018] QSC 225.

[26] [2021] QIRC 053, [44].