Reynders & Travere (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 85 (16 February 2026)

C PTY LTD ACN [...] (and others named in the Schedule)

1. The first respondent shall pay the applicant wife's solicitors within 48 hours:

(a) the amount of $156,000, being the balance of the amount of $160,000 as required by the orders made on 7 November 2025; and

(b) interest from 28 November 2025 to the date of actual payment by the first respondent.

1. In the event the first respondent fails to comply with Order 1 the property at and known as F Street, Suburb G NSW [...] ("[Suburb G] Property") be sold, in the following way:

(a) within 3 days, the applicant is to provide to the first respondent a list of 3 conveyancing solicitors and a list of 3 registered real estate agents;

(b) within a further 3 days, the first respondent is to select one of the conveyancing solicitors ("Nominated Vendor Solicitor") and one of the real estate agents ("Nominated Agent") from the lists provided by the applicant;

(c) in default of 2(b) above, the applicant shall select one of the conveyancing solicitors ("Nominated Vendor Solicitor") and one of the real estate agents ("Nominated Agent") from the list provided to the first respondent;

(d) in the event the parties are unable to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of the contract for the sale of the Suburb G Property within 7 days, the parties agree to be bound by the decision of the Nominated Vendor Solicitor who shall determine the disputed terms;

(e) the parties shall instruct the Nominated Vendor Solicitor and the Nominated Agent to prepare contracts for, and hold, an open auction for the sale of the Suburb G Property on or before 42 days from the date of these orders, on terms which provide for completion of the sale no later than 6 months from the date of these orders;

(f) the parties shall agree on the marketing, reserve price, and other particulars of the sale of the Suburb G Property and in the absence of agreement shall follow the advice provided in writing by the Nominated Vendor Solicitor in respect of the terms of the contract for sale and the advice provided in writing by the Nominated Agent in respect of marketing, reserve price, and other particulars of the sale; and

(g) in the event the Suburb G Property does not sell at auction as a result of bids not reaching the reserve, the parties shall follow the advice of the Nominated Agent to achieve a sale of the Suburb G Property on the same day of the date of the auction at the best available price and on the best available terms (in the reasonable opinion of the Nominated Agent).

1. The second respondent is to withdraw the caveat numbered [...] registered on the title of the Suburb G Property within 7 days from the date of these orders.
2. The parties are to do all things and sign all documents reasonably required to sell the Suburb G Property or otherwise to give effect to these orders and in default the Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia shall be authorised to execute any such documents on behalf of the party in default.
3. The first respondent is to vacate the Suburb G Property within 21 days from the date of these orders and to cause any person residing in the property to vacate.
4. Upon vacating the Suburb G Property, the first respondent shall ensure that the property is left in a clean and tidy condition, including removing all personal belongings, rubbish, and debris, and leaving all rooms, gardens, and common areas in a reasonably clean state.
5. The parties have liberty to restore the matter within 14 days of an exchange of contracts of the Suburb G property to address the balance of the relief sought in the Application - Enforcement filed 22 December 2025.
6. If the first respondent complies with Order 1 prior to an exchange of contracts, he is at liberty to seek the matter be relisted for consideration as to whether the order for sale of the Suburb G property should be discharged.
7. The Application - Enforcement filed 19 January 2026 is dismissed.
8. The Application in a Proceeding filed on 28 January 2026 is dismissed.

1. By consent orders are made in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 6 of a document titled "Minutes of Orders" filed 16 February 2026 (marked as Exhibit 1) as set out hereunder:
   1. The time for the second respondent to file her evidence in the proceedings, including evidence responsive to order 24 of the 7 November 2025 orders, be extended until 8 May 2026.
   2. Within 7 days of these Orders, the Second Respondent shall (by herself, her servant or agents) do all things necessary and sign all documents required by the NSW Land Registry Services for her to withdraw the lodgement of the following mortgages (lodged by the Second Respondent on 29 December 2025):
      1. Mortgage [...] over folio identifier [...] known as [M Street] [Suburb N] NSW [...];
      2. Mortgage [...] over folio identifier [...] known as [K Street] [Suburb L] NSW [...]; and
      3. Mortgage [...] over folio identifier [...] known as [H Street] [Suburb J] NSW [...].
   3. Subject to the Second Respondent's interests over the properties set out below by way of registered caveats, on a without admissions basis, and pursuant to s 114 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Second Respondent is restrained from taking any step, or causing or permitting any step to be taken to lodge, procure the lodgement of, register, procure the registration of, complete, perfect, or otherwise give effect to any second mortgage or other encumbrance over the following properties:
      1. Mortgage [...] over Folio Identified [...], being the property known as [M Street] [Suburb N] NSW [...];
      2. Mortgage [...] over Folio Identified [...], being the property known as [K Street] [Suburb L] NSW [...]; and
      3. Mortgage [...] over Folio Identifier [...], being the property known as [H Street] [Suburb J] NSW [...];
      4. Property located at [Q Street], [Suburb R] NSW [...] Folio Identifier [...];
      5. Property known as [F Street], [Suburb G] NSW [...] Folio Identifier [...];
      6. Property known as [O Street] [City P] NSW [...] Folio Identifier [...].
   4. Within 7 days of these Orders, the Applicant file and serve written submissions on the issue of costs limited to three pages.
   5. Within 7 days thereafter, the Respondent file and serve written submissions on the issue of costs limited to three pages.

6. The question of costs is to be determined on the papers and in chambers.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Reynders & Travere (No 3) has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. By Application - Enforcement filed 22 December 2025, the applicant wife ("wife") seeks orders for the sale of a property in Suburb G owned by the first respondent husband ("husband"), to enforce compliance with orders for interim costs. The proposed orders for the sale of the property are opposed by several of the other respondents.
2. In preparation for the hearing, procedural orders were made on 22 December 2025 requiring each of the respondents to file and serve, by 16 January 2026, any documents on which they intended to rely. Relevant to this application those orders were not complied with by either the husband, the second or the tenth respondents. As a consequence of that non-compliance, the Court did not read any evidence filed by them contrary to those directions.
3. In addition to the above Application - Enforcement, the wife filed a further Application - Enforcement on 19 January 2026 in relation to a Binding Child Support Agreement, and on 28 January 2026 filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking injunctions. The wife's counsel conceded that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the Application - Enforcement concerning the Binding Child Support Agreement, in circumstances where it had been filed in the wrong Court. The wife's counsel also advised that agreement had been reached with senior counsel for the second respondent in relation to the application filed 28 January 2026. Consequently, both of those applications will be dismissed.
4. These reasons explain why the orders for the sale of the Suburb G property, as sought in the Application - Enforcement filed 22 December 2025, will be made.

1. On 7 November 2025, in reasons for judgment anonymised as Reynders & Travere (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 797, the Court made orders for the husband to pay to the wife's solicitors within 21 days pursuant to s 114UB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), the sum of $160,000 (Order 8) and further ordered that he pay the wife interim spousal maintenance of $625 per week (Order 13(20)).
2. The reasons for judgment relevant to this application record the following matters:
   1. Central to the Pt VIII proceedings is the wife's contention that the husband and his third wife, [Ms Hettie] ("the second respondent") entered into a series of transactions which had the effect of divesting the husband of significant matrimonial assets. The transactions involved the transfer of shares in companies previously owned by the husband, the resignation of himself as director of those companies, and the appointment of the second respondent as shareholder and director and the payment of large sums of money to her. It is also suggested that she has then divested herself of some of those assets. Each of the transactions undertaken are challenged by the wife as a sham or liable to be set aside.

37 In her affidavit filed 2 July 2025 she asserts the following:

1. During our marriage, the husband and I transferred more than AUD $20 million from China into Australia. These transfers took place over a span of several years and were facilitated through a complex network of remitters and intermediaries, as direct international fund transfers were subject to restrictions under Chinese foreign exchange laws. I was actively involved in the transfer process and have direct knowledge of how these transactions were carried out. Specifically, I was the one who contacted the remitters in China, communicated with them via WeChat, and provided them with the necessary instructions on how much to remit, to which Australian account, and under whose name. I also followed up regularly to confirm whether each remittance had been processed and provided the relevant banking details and references for each transaction. From round 6 August 2022, under the husband's instructions, [Ms Hettie] began communicating directly with the currency exchange agents. However, I also followed up from time to time.
2. In many instances, the remitters would divide large sums into multiple smaller transactions to avoid detection or regulatory scrutiny. I would coordinate the timing of these transactions, keep track of the amounts, and ensure that the funds arrived in Australia in accordance with the husband's directions. I have retained WeChat records of these communications, which include conversations with remitters, confirmations of transfers, and screenshots of payment receipts. As such, I have first-hand knowledge of the remittance process and the individuals involved in facilitating these transfers on behalf of the husband.
3. I am also aware that the source of most of those fund are the net sale proceeds of ...properties registered under the husband's name in China...
4. The husband transferred the sale proceeds of the properties...to various individuals, including but not limited to his third wife, [Ms HETTIE], [Mr MM], and [Ms NN]. These individuals acted as informal conduits or remittance agents, receiving funds originating from the husband and subsequently transferring them to Australia. This arrangement appears to have been structured to break down large sums into smaller, less traceable transactions.

...

1. I have financial records reveals that between April 2021 and February 2025, at least 215 separate transactions were made into Australian bank accounts controlled by the husband and myself. These included accounts held with the Commonwealth Bank, Westpac, ANZ, and accounts of [C Pty Ltd]:

2. Based on the loan agreements provided by the husband, it appears that on 30 August 2023 and 20 February 2024, sums of AUD $2 million were transferred on each occasion through [Ms Hettie], totalling AUD $4 million. I was not involved in the transfer of these funds. Many of these payments coming into Australian accounts listed in No. 36 above were disguised as business payments or personal remittances and often referenced multiple unrelated names. Some payments were made using money exchange services that allowed the conversion of [Currency OO] into Australian Dollars without formal banking channels.

3. The aggregate total of these banked Australian Dollar funds exceeded AUD $20,832,402, with approximately AUD $18,554,803.00 identified as having been deposited into personal accounts held directly under the husband's name (including under his English name, [Mr Travere]), based on the bank statements and transaction descriptions.

4. The remaining balance was deposited into my account or [C Pty Ltd's] company account, then used to purchase real estate in Australia in cash, without any borrowings at the time of purchase. These acquisitions were subsequently leveraged by the husband, through mortgages or other encumbrances, for his personal financial benefit or to effect asset transfers.

...

1. To the best of my knowledge, all the properties were originally purchased unencumbered using a total of $20,832,402.00, which the husband transferred from China to Australia through various senders. Subsequently, the husband mortgaged these properties to third-party financiers in order to draw down on the equity. I do not know where the proceeds from these equity withdrawals have been retained or how they have been applied.

...

1. [Ms HETTIE] is the husband's third wife. According to the husband, they divorced in or around early 2016. At the time of their divorce, the husband transferred a property to her and agreed to pay her [Currency OO] 1 million, allegedly at a rate of [Currency OO] 100,000 per year-although only approximately [Currency OO] 500,000 was paid. The remaining [Currency OO] 500,000 was given to [Ms Hettie] as a discount on the purchase of a property developed by the husband. Despite their divorce, she has remained financially dependent on the husband. He continued to pay her a monthly salary of [Currency OO] 10,000 through a company under his control, even though she performed only domestic duties such as child transportation and housework.

2. During our marriage, the husband repeatedly informed me that [Ms HETTIE] was merely a figurehead or nominee used for the purpose of holding and managing his assets and financial affairs. He made it clear to me on numerous occasions that although certain properties, funds, or business interests appeared to be in [Ms HETTIE'S] name, she had no real ownership or control over them. According to the husband, [Ms HETTIE] was acting at his direction and solely for his benefit. He stated that this arrangement was necessary to minimise exposure to legal or financial risk, both in China and in Australia, and to facilitate the transfer of funds internationally. I was led to believe that [Ms HETTIE] was not involved in decision-making regarding these assets and that she was not entitled to any beneficial interest in them.

3. The contentions advanced by the wife are denied by the husband and the second respondent. They each contend that the transactions entered into between them were as a consequence of the repayment of various sums of monies owed by the husband to the second respondent or in accordance with the provisions of a Divorce agreement made in 2016.

...

1. The wife contends that the husband exercises control over assets in the second respondent's name and that consequentially he has failed to disclose his true wealth.
2. In relation to his current financial position, his Financial Statement identifies the second respondent meets his ordinary living expenses of $1,935 per week. His Financial Statement fails to disclose how he meets his stated outgoings of $7,607 per week.
3. He states he has borrowed from the second respondent monies referred to at Item 50 of the Financial Statement but elects not to disclose how much. The note to item 50 is equally opaque asserting the following:

The loans referred to in this Item also include the monies I have borrowed from [Ms Hettie] for the repayment of the mortgages over the properties located at [Suburb G] and [Suburb R]. I continue to repay these mortgages using monies lent to me by [Ms Hettie].

1. He fails to identify how much it is that he has actually borrowed from her. He also identifies a personal liability to the second respondent being a personal loan for the payment of his legal costs in the proceedings said to total $250,000. The husband has also filed two affidavits but does not provide any explanation as to the quantum of monies that he has borrowed from the second respondent, despite now three opportunities to do so.
2. The Costs Notice filed by the husband dated 3 November 2025 discloses his solicitors hold $184,372 in trust. The Costs Notice fails to comply with the Rules in that it fails to disclose how he will meet his estimated future costs of $543,000. An earlier Costs Notice disclosed he held $237,913 in trust. Both memorandums fail to explain where the reduction in funds has gone. The husband also holds approximately $40,00 in his bank accounts. The husband thus has funds at his disposal exceeding $224,000.
3. I am satisfied that the second respondent represents a financial resource of the husband. She has not suggested at any time that she will not continue to fund the husband. What actually is the true nature of their financial relationship is a matter for a final hearing.
4. I am satisfied that the husband has failed to comply with his obligations of disclosure. I am satisfied he has the capacity to meet the order sought by the wife in proposed order 7 and that the making of such an order is proper pursuant to s 114 of the Act for the purposes of preserving the equity in the home.
5. The wife seeks a payment totalling $509,410 by way of either partial property settlement or interim costs. The sum sought by the wife accords with the affidavit of her solicitor and is for the wife's costs for the purposes of the proceedings. There was no challenge to the evidence of the estimate.

...

1. I am satisfied that the husband has the capacity to meet a payment to the wife but am not satisfied at this stage that it is just to order a sum in the magnitude sought by the wife.
2. I am satisfied that a just sum to meet the wife's costs at this stage is represented by a payment of $160,000. I am satisfied for the reasons given above that the husband has the capacity to meet such a sum. Such an order does not prevent the wife from seeking a further order by way of lump sum or on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

1. It is not in issue that the husband has failed to comply with the order to pay the wife's solicitors the interim costs order. The wife's counsel said the amount outstanding was $156,000.
2. In the wife's affidavit in support of the Application - Enforcement she said the following:
   1. On 3 November 2025, these proceedings were listed for a hearing of various applications in a proceeding. I was present at this hearing and observed, and was also later advised by my solicitors, that during this hearing, his Honour Schonell J confirmed with senior counsel for the Respondent Husband that the amount of $184,372.55 was being held in the trust account of the solicitors for the Respondent Husband, as set out in the Costs Notice filed by him on that date...

13. Below is an excerpt of the Transcript from page 73 between lines 12 to 31:

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Just before you sit down, Mr Lawrence, your client's costs notice identifies that there is $184,000 held in trust.

MR LAWRANCE: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: That would be a source of funds about which I could make an order, isn't it? It's his money.

MR LAWRANCE: Yes, your Honour is, with respect, correct. It's his money. It may have been - the evidence is that it's money that has been lent to him by [Ms Hettie], therefore it's his money sitting in his solicitor's trust account. Your Honour might take into account that it has been advanced to him for a particular purpose by [Ms Hettie]. But - - -

HIS HONOUR: Is there a loan agreement that identifies any of this?

MR LAWRANCE: There's no documented loan agreement. There is only the evidence in the affidavit and the financial statement as to the purpose for which the moneys were advanced. But the question your Honour asked me was, is it his money? And the answer to your Honour's question is, yes, it is.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Right. Thank you, Mr Lawrance. Mr Fermanis.

1. It is not in issue that on 7 November 2025 the husband paid his solicitors the sum of $184,372.55. Counsel for the wife invites the Court to conclude that the timing of that payment, given the exchange with his senior counsel, was more than coincidental.
2. At paragraph 46 of her affidavit in support of the Application - Enforcement, the wife deposes that the husband owns multiple properties, but only two are held in his personal name being the Suburb G property and a property at Suburb R which she indicates she wishes to retain on a final basis. Both properties are secured by a mortgage to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.
3. Mortgage statements annexed to the wife's affidavit reveal that, as at 30 June 2025, the indebtedness to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia was some $4,588,396. The wife also annexed to her affidavit market appraisals in relation to the Suburb G property which indicated a market value in the range of $5,400,000 to $5,900,000.
4. It is not in issue that secured against the title to the Suburb G and Suburb R properties is a mortgage to FF Pty Ltd (the tenth respondent), securing an advance of approximately $2,000,000. The advance is also secured against other properties.
5. The wife contends that the debt to FF Pty Ltd is a sham.
6. Counsel for the wife indicated that the wife would be prepared to allow the husband a further four weeks to comply with the interim costs order, failing which the Suburb G property should be sold.
7. King's Counsel for the husband, whilst conceding that the husband has not complied with the order, initially sought that the sale of the Suburb G property be deferred for a period of eight weeks to enable the husband to explore alternative means of raising the funds. However, by the time of final submissions that changed, and he sought a period of 12 weeks.
8. Senior counsel for the second respondent opposed the sale. He submitted that the combined debt to the bank and other respondents exceeded $7,000,000 and that, in those circumstances, a sale would lack utility. He submitted that the Court should not make orders for sale at this stage but instead relist the matter in the event of the husband's default, depending upon whatever further period the Court gave the husband to comply. Senior counsel also submitted that his client and her son reside in the property, and that a sale of the property would be disruptive to their living arrangements.
9. The tenth respondent's solicitor adopted the submissions of the second respondent.

1. Section 105(1) of the Act provides as follows:

Subject to this part, to the regulations, and to the applicable rules of court and all decrees made under this Act may be enforced by any court having jurisdiction under this Act.

1. In Suris & Suris (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1F 89 Carew J observed as follows:

1. In McMillan & McMillan, Tree J provides a helpful overview of the relevant authorities at [37] - [60] and I adopt, with respect, his Honour's conclusions as to the applicable principles which I summarise as follows (citations omitted):

(a) The nature of the power to enforce is discretionary as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in s 105 of the Act; > > (b) Only the facts or circumstances arising since the date of order sought to be enforced will inform the discretion to be exercised pursuant to s 105 of the Act; > > (c) The Court may refuse to enforce an order if it would be "inequitable" to do so; > > (d) When considering whether or not it would be inequitable to enforce the order, the Court is primarily concerned with "general notions of fairness"; > > (e) The party submitting that it would be inequitable to enforce the order bears the onus of so establishing;

(f) Delay in bringing an application for enforcement is a relevant factor.

1. Adopting her Honour's useful summary of the law, I accept that the exercise of power to enforce orders of the Court are discretionary and the Court may refuse to enforce an order if it would be inequitable to do so. The respondent bears the onus of establishing to the satisfaction of the Court that it would be inequitable to enforce the orders.
2. The husband seeks a further indulgence of 12 weeks within which to comply with the order but does not oppose a sale of the property thereafter. The wife does not oppose a further four weeks while the second and tenth respondents oppose any sale.
3. I do not propose to grant the indulgence the husband seeks which expanded over the course of submissions from eight weeks to 12 weeks. He has failed to comply with an order and there is no evidence that a further period, even of four weeks, will ensure compliance with the orders. The absence of evidence is a direct consequence of his failure to comply with orders made on two occasions firstly on 22 December 2025 and then on 19 January 2026 directing the filing of evidence.
4. In his Case Outline, King's Counsel for the husband submits as follows:
   1. The First Respondent has not failed to comply with the financial orders deliberately or contumaciously. The non-payment relied upon by the Applicant arises from the First Respondent's present financial incapacity, lack of liquidity, and the existence of substantial secured and unsecured liabilities, rather than any refusal to comply.
5. I do not accept that submission. In the knowledge of the exchange at Court with his then senior counsel, as referred to above, he set in train a sequence of events which had the effect of divesting himself of his only liquid asset. His conduct displayed breathtaking arrogance.
6. Further, in opposing a sale, (albeit a position seemingly abandoned by his King's Counsel's submission that he did not oppose a sale after a period of 12 weeks), his Case Outline raised issues as to the value of the Suburb G property. The only available evidence before the Court as to value is that contained in the market appraisals annexed to the wife's affidavit, which indicate a market range between $5,400,000 and $5,900,000. A sale of the property will resolve the issue of value and save the parties the cost of obtaining a valuation.
7. The husband's King's Counsel, in his Case Outline, submits as follows:
   1. The Court's enforcement jurisdiction is discretionary, and at an interim stage must be exercised cautiously, particularly where the relief sought would permanently alter property rights before contested issues are resolved.
8. I accept that the exercise of power to enforce orders of the Court are discretionary and the Court may refuse to enforce an order if it would be inequitable to do so. In this case, due to the husband's repeated failure to comply with orders, there is no evidence that it would be inequitable to him to sell the property, noting his King's Counsel's submission that a sale should only occur after a further 12 weeks. I accept that the Court should act cautiously in making interim orders, but the Court also has an obligation to ensure compliance with its orders. I am satisfied that it would be inequitable to the wife to allow the husband to rely upon his repeated non-compliance with orders as a basis for which to exercise the discretion not to enforce. To do so would be to reward his failure to comply.
9. The second respondent opposed a sale of the Suburb G property. The second respondent also failed to comply with the orders for the filing of affidavits in relation to the Application - Enforcement.
10. This is not the first occasion on which the second respondent has failed to comply with orders. On 7 November 2025, the Court made the following order by consent directed to the second respondent:
    1. ...

...

1. Within 14 days of the date of these Orders, the Second Respondent, [Ms Hettie], is to file and serve an affidavit setting out the full circumstances of the purported Deed of Loan dated 1 March 2024 between [Ms Hettie], the husband, and [D Pty Ltd], including but not limited to:

a. the source of the funds;

b. all transfer records; and

c. all relevant bank statements.

1. The second respondent has failed to comply with the order she consented to, which required compliance within 14 days.
2. On 21 January 2026, the wife received notice that the second respondent sought to register mortgages over various properties, including the Suburb G property. The wife's Application in a Proceeding filed 28 January 2026 sought to restrain the second respondent from registering those mortgages.
3. In response to that Application, her senior counsel's Case Outline submitted:
   1. In relation to the application filed by the Applicant Wife on 2 February 2026 [sic], the second respondent's position is that orders 4 - 7 need not be made in circumstances where she accepts that there are injunctive orders in place prohibiting her from registering second mortgages over the properties that are the subject of the present dispute. The second respondent will not seek to register second mortgages over the properties. She has communicated her position to the Applicant Wife's solicitors. The second respondent has asked the Applicant Wife to withdraw her application in the circumstances.
4. I note the terms of Exhibit 1, tendered by the second respondent's senior counsel, and that the second respondent has subsequently resiled from such contumelious conduct.
5. Parties who fail to comply with orders and their disclosure obligations do so at their peril. The jurisprudence of the court on this issue is well settled. The observations of Hutley J many years ago in St John v St John (1979) 6 Fam LN N14 are apposite where his Honour stated:

... faced with the party whose affairs were tangled and who did not give the assistance within his power to disentangle them the trial Judge in my opinion was well entitled to simply take the view that it lies upon that party to devise means to comply with the order. If the burden is impossible, he cannot complain as he is the author of his own misfortune.

1. While in Wei & Xia (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 679; (2023) 67 Fam LR 421, Harper J observed:
   1. The jurisprudence in this Court about the consequences of breach of the duty by incomplete or inadequate disclosure are relevant to the assessment of evidence, the drawing of inferences and ultimately may bear on the question of discharge of an onus of proof.

...

1. A failure to disclose in financial proceedings in this Court may lead to unfavourable inferences against the defaulting party very similar to the adverse inferences which may be drawn in accordance with the Blatch v Archer principle discussed above, in the sense of having the effect of discounting the evidence of the non-disclosing party. They are separate bases which can lead to the same or similar result.

1. I am satisfied that the second respondent has not only failed to comply with orders, but also her disclosure obligations enshrined in the Act and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
2. The second respondent submits that a sale of the home would disrupt her occupation and that of her son. I am not satisfied that this is a relevant consideration, in circumstances where there is no evidence that her occupation of the property is anything other than with the husband's consent, and he does not oppose a sale if he is granted a further indulgence.
3. Senior counsel for the second respondent submits that the Suburb G property cannot be sold without prior notice having been given to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and an opportunity for them to be heard on the application. Beyond the submission there is no evidence to support the proposition.
4. The second respondent also submits that a sale would be of no utility, as it would not raise sufficient funds to pay out the secured mortgages to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and the tenth respondent. Her counsel submitted that the combined debt was approximately $7,000,000.
5. It is not clear to me how that sum is calculated. The available evidence indicates that the debt to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia is approximately $4,588,000 and the debt to the tenth respondent is $2,000,000 giving a total of approximately $6,600,000. That sum is secured against two properties being the sSuburb G and Suburb R properties. Assuming a sale of the Suburb G property at even the lowest end of the market range, and after discharging the Commonwealth Bank of Australia debt there would be a surplus of about $800,000 in addition to the Suburb R property, which is not proposed to be sold at this stage. The surplus could be significantly higher depending on the sale price.
6. The wife puts in issue the bona fides of the loan entered with the tenth respondent, contending that it is a sham. Her application seeks to defer any payment to the tenth respondent until a final hearing. To accede to such a request may have the effect of ignoring the interests of a secured creditor. As the extent of any surplus will only become apparent after exchange of contracts, I propose to order a sale but have the matter return to Court prior to settlement.
7. In that respect, the Case Outline of the tenth respondent sought three orders, each expressed in the alternate, the last two of which impliedly consented to a sale. To ensure that a sale can proceed, I propose to order the removal of the caveat lodged by the second respondent, as the basis for its lodgement has not been disclosed. No submissions were advanced by her senior counsel as to why such an order should not be made.
8. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that it would be inequitable to decline to enforce the order by refusing to order a sale of the Suburb G property. In the event the husband pays the interim costs to the wife's solicitors, he can seek the matter be relisted for consideration as to the continuation of the order for sale.

1. Other than a general opposition to the sale of the property and submissions regarding the time allowed for the husband to vacate, no submission was made by any respondent in relation to the specific terms of the sale order. In those circumstances, I propose to make orders substantially in the terms of the wife's Application - Enforcement filed 22 December 2026, with provision for the matter to be relisted within 14 days of any exchange of contracts. I will also provide for the husband to relist the matter in the event he makes the required payment to the wife prior to an exchange of contracts.

I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.