Reynders & Travere (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 797 (7 November 2025)

FAMILY LAW - Interim orders - Costs - Where the wife sought the husband make various payments for her benefit - Where the husband opposed the order on grounds of a lack of financial capacity to make the payments - Consideration of s 114UB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) - Where the Court is satisfied that the husband has the capacity to meet a payment to the wife but not in the magnitude sought by the wife - Order made for the payment of $160,000 to the wife.

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY - Interim orders - Injunction - Where the eighth and ninth respondents consented to the injunction on a without admissions basis but sought to include a notice provision - Where the wife did not consent to the notice provision - Where the Court is satisfied that the wife has an arguable case and that if the injunction is not made the wife's case for final relief may be imperilled - Where the eighth respondent advanced no submissions as to prejudice - Where the wife has given an undertaking as to damages - Where the Court is satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction - Where the Court is not satisfied that the notice provision sought is necessary or proper.

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY - Interim orders - Injunction - Where the wife sought to restrain the putative tenth respondent from dealing with funds held by it on behalf of the various persons and entities identified - Where the interested parties consented to the injunction - Where the eighth and ninth respondents opposed the orders in so far as the orders sought to injunct each of the eighth and ninth respondents' property - Where the Court is satisfied that the wife has an arguable case and that if the injunction is not made the wife's case for final relief may be imperilled - Where the Court is satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt V11 and Pt VIII, ss 60CA, 60CC, 60CG, 69ZL, and s 114UB

Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654; [2015] FamCAFC 104

Fitzgerald & Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123; [2005] FamCA 158

Goode and Goode (2006) FLC 93-286; [2006] FamCA 1346

Marvel v Marvel (2010) 43 Fam LR 348; [2010] FamCAFC 101

Salvage & Fosse [2020] FamCAFC 144; (2020) FLC 93-966

Counsel for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents:

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

C PTY LTD ACN ... (and others named in the Schedule)

1. X born 2019 ("the child") shall live with the wife.
2. The child shall spend time with the husband as follows:

(a) In week one from afterschool Thursday (or in the event that it is not a school day from midday) to before school Friday (or in the event that it is not a school day to midday) commencing Thursday 13 November 2025 and each alternate Thursday thereafter.

(b) In week 2 from afterschool Thursday (or in the event that it is not a school day from midday) to 5pm Saturday and each alternate week thereafter.

1. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, changeovers are to occur by the wife transporting the child to the husband's Suburb G property at the start of the husband's time with the child, and the husband returning the child to the wife's home (currently at Q Street, Suburb R) at the end of the husband's time with the child.
2. The husband shall pay the mortgage and statutory outgoings of the Suburb R Property.
3. Mr GG, by himself, his servants, or agents, be restrained from transferring, disposing of, encumbering, further encumbering, increasing the indebtedness over, or otherwise dealing in any way with his shareholding in EE Pty Ltd.
4. FF Pty Ltd be and is hereby restrained from taking any step, whether directly or indirectly, to withdraw, transfer, disburse, redeem, or otherwise deal with any funds representing repayments or investments made to it by except upon giving the wife 20 business days' notice in writing:

(i) MR Travere (DOB: 1968)

(ii) Ms Hettie (DOB: 1986)

(iii) Ms AA

(iv) Ms CC

(v) Mr GG

(vi) D Pty Ltd (ACN: ...);

(vii) C Pty Ltd (ACN: ...);

(viii) E Pty Ltd (ACN: ...); and

(ix) EE Pty Ltd (ACN: ...).

1. HH Limited (ACN ...) and JJ Pty Ltd (ACN ...) be and is hereby restrained from permitting, authorizing or otherwise facilitating any withdrawal, disbursement, transfer or other dealing in respect of the funds invested with it by the following companies and individuals:

(a) Mr Travere (DOB: 1968)

(b) Ms Hettie (DOB: 1986)

(c) Ms AA

(d) Ms CC

(e) Mr GG

(f) D Pty Ltd (ACN: ...)

(g) C Pty Ltd (ACN: ...)

(h) E Pty Ltd (ACN: ...) and

(i) EE Pty Ltd (ACN: ...)

whether on the instructions of the companies or individuals listed (a) to (i) or otherwise.

1. Within 21 days from the date of these orders, the husband shall pay to the wife's solicitor trust account an amount of $160,000.00 pursuant to s 114UB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) by way of interim costs with such sum to be applied only by way of the wife's legal costs and disbursements.
2. In the event that the motor vehicle the wife drives is removed from her possession, the wife have liberty to apply on three days written notice.
3. The costs of all parties are reserved.
4. All outstanding interlocutory applications are dismissed.
5. The matter be referred to the chambers of SJR Turner for Case Management including the allocation of a Conciliation Conference.
6. By consent Orders are made in accordance with paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, and 42 of a document titled "Minute of proposed orders to be made by consent" filed 5 November 2025 as amended and set out hereunder:

1. That FF Pty Ltd A.C.N. ... be joined as tenth respondent in these proceedings.

1. That pending further order, the wife shall have the exclusive occupation of the property located at Q Street, Suburb R.
2. Provided that the husband pays the wife interim spousal maintenance pursuant to Order 20, the wife shall be responsible for the payment of utilities associated with the Suburb R Property for the duration of her occupancy.

1. Upon the wife continuing the Undertaking as to damages previously given in these proceedings:

8.1 That, until further order, the [...] Husband be restrained from taking any step, whether directly or indirectly, to cause funds invested with HH Pty Ltd by EE Pty Ltd to be withdrawn, disbursed or otherwise dealt with.

8.2 That, until further order, Ms AA, Ms Hettie, their servants or agents, be restrained from transferring, disposing of, encumbering, further encumbering, increasing the indebtedness over, or otherwise dealing in any way with his shareholding in D Pty Ltd.

8.3 That, until further order, subject to these orders, the [...] Husband, by himself, his servants, or agents, be restrained from transferring, disposing of, encumbering, further encumbering, increasing the indebtedness over, or otherwise dealing in any way with his shareholding in C Pty Ltd.

8.5 That until further order, the Second to Fifth Respondents, by themselves, their servants and agents, be restrained from withdrawing, transferring, or otherwise dealing with funds in any bank accounts that are under D Pty Ltd and C Pty Ltd, except for the following:

a. expenditure in the ordinary course of business; or

8.6. That until further order, the [...] Husband, the Second Respondent and the Fifth Respondent, E Pty Ltd, by themselves, their servants and agents, be restrained from withdrawing, transferring, or otherwise dealing with funds in any bank accounts that are in the name of E Pty Ltd, except for the following:

a. expenditure in the ordinary course of business; or

8.7. The husband, E Pty Ltd and D Pty Ltd are restrained from selling, encumbering, charging or otherwise dealing with the following properties, save for the City P Property may be leased:

H Street, Suburb J (Suburb J Property) Registered Owner: D Pty Ltd

K Street, Suburb L (Suburb L Property) Registered Owner: D Pty Ltd

M Street, Suburb N (Suburb N Property) Registered Owner: D Pty Ltd

8.9 On a without admissions basis, and until further order, EE Pty [Ltd] is hereby be restrained, by itself, its servants, or agents, from withdrawing, transferring, or otherwise dealing with the funds held by the company in any bank account (either jointly or solely) and its control except as follows:

a. Other than in the ordinary course of business; and

b. To pay legal costs in relation to these proceedings.

8.9A That the [wife], 8th and 9th respondents have liberty to restore this matter to the list upon the giving of 48 hours written notice in relation to the implementation or variation of these orders.

8.12. FF Pty Ltd is to inform the wife of such funds, being any funds received by FF Pty Ltd by way of repayment, loan, investment, or otherwise, from any of the entities listed in [Order 6] above within 3 business days of receipt and FF Pty Ltd be restrained from withdrawing, disposing or otherwise dealing with without the wife's written consent.

9. ...

11. ...

13. ...

14. ...

15. ...

16. ...

1. By way of interim spousal maintenance, the husband pays to the wife of the sum of $625 per week and the sum is to be paid on each Monday by 4:00pm.

1. That the Court grant leave to the wife to amend her Initiating Application once the husband has provided full and frank disclosure in respect of his financial position.
2. That within 28 days from the date of these orders, the parties shall provide full and frank disclosure of their financial circumstances to the other party in the manner required under rule 6.06 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
3. Without limiting the generality of Order 22 herein, the husband shall provide the wife with
   1. all his company's Business Activity Statements,
   2. Company Tax Return, profit and loss statements, balance sheets and bank statements for the last three years.
   3. All bank statements held in his name, whether solely or jointly, in China, Country Y, and Country Z; and
   4. All documents evidencing any property ownership, whether legal or beneficial, held by him in Country Y and Country Z.
4. Within 14 days of the date of these Orders, the Second Respondent, Ms Hettie, is to file and serve an affidavit setting out the full circumstances of the purported Deed of Loan dated 1 March 2024 between Ms Hettie, the husband, and D Pty Ltd, including but not limited to:

1. Within 14 days of the date of these Orders, FF Pty Ltd is to file and serve an affidavit setting out the full circumstances and provide copies of all agreements, records, or correspondence (whether written, electronic, or oral) relating to or evidencing the receipt, transfer, purpose of the following funds received from EE Pty Ltd and the destination of such fund (if it has been disposed or withdrawn), including but not limited to WeChat messages, text messages, phone records, and email communications (in English or Chinese):

1. Within 14 days of the date of these Orders, FF Pty Ltd is to provide the wife with copies of all bank statements (Australian and overseas) for any accounts held, operated, or controlled by its company, agent or any employees which show or record any transfer, withdrawal, deposit, or receipt of funds in connection with the transactions Order No. 25 above.

28. ...

29. ...

30. ...

31. ...

32. ...

33. ...

34. ...

1. That the [wife] shall not prevent the child from communicating with the [husband] on a daily basis and the [wife] shall facilitate video calls between the child and the [husband] by:
   1. ensuring the child has access to a communication device with the [husband]'s details with a video function available and switched on, and ready to receive calls from the [husband];
   2. giving the child privacy on the video call;
   3. assisting the child to phone the [husband] back if the call is disconnected;
   4. [ensuring] the device made available to the child for the purpose of communication is equipped with and connected to an active and functional network.
2. That notwithstanding any other Order, in the event the child fails to communicate with the [husband] on a daily basis, the [wife] shall facilitate the child communicating with the [husband] on Wednesday night between 5:30 pm to 6:00 pm (local to the time where the child is) and the [wife] is to facilitate video calls between the child and the [husband] by:
   1. ensuring the child has access to a communication device with the [husband]'s details with a video function available and switched on, and ready to receive calls from the [husband];
   2. giving the child privacy on the video call;
   3. assisting the child to phone the [husband] back if the call is disconnected;
   4. [ensuring] the device made available to the child for the purpose of communication is equipped with and connected to an active and functional network.

1. That notwithstanding any other Order, in the event the Child is spending time with the [wife] and the [husband] provides the [wife] with at least 7 days written notice then the [wife] shall make the child available to spend time with the [husband] on the following occasions:

1. That notwithstanding any other Order, in the event the Child is spending time with the [husband] and the [wife] provides the [husband] with at least 7 days written notice then the [husband] shall make the child available to spend time with the [wife] on the following occasions:

1. Each parent is to keep the other informed of their current residential address, mobile and landline telephone numbers and any available email addresses and advise the other parent of any change thereto within seven (7) days of such change.
2. In the event of the child suffering a childhood illness, accident or emergency and for which the child receives medical treatment, the parent with whom the child is must provide to other parent as soon as is practicable, but later than 72 hours, inform them of the nature of the illness, accident and/or emergency as well as any treatment the child has received and/or is receiving and each of the parents are authorised to communicate directly with the child's treating health professional and receive any and all information they may require in relation to the child's health

1. Sending or making any abusive and/or derogatory comments, texts, emails or other written or verbal communications to the other parent or member of the other parent's family or household.
2. Making any negative, critical, belittling, insulting or derogatory remarks about the other parent, the other parent's family or member of their household (including but not limited to, questioning or criticising the parenting decisions and/or parenting capacity of the other parent) to or in the presence or hearing of the child.
3. Questioning any of the children about the personal life of the other parent.
4. Using any of the children to deliver messages to the other parent or family member.
5. Discussing with or showing the children any document filed in or prepared in relation to these proceedings or allowing another person to do so.
6. Physically disciplining the children or allowing any other person to do so.

43. ...

44. ...

45. ...

46. ..."

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. The applicant wife ("the wife") and first respondent husband ("the husband") are involved in Part VII proceedings in relation to their one child, X, and complex Part VIII proceedings. Joined to the proceedings are nine respondents. Their joinder is limited to the financial proceedings.
2. There have been a number of interlocutory applications in the financial proceedings, one of which was heard ex parte. All extant interlocutory applications were listed to be heard on 3 November 2025.

1. The husband and wife were married in 2017. The Case Outline for the wife identifies that this was her first marriage whilst it was the husband's fourth marriage.
2. There is one child of their marriage, X, born 2019.
3. The parties initially separated on 1 April 2023 and separated on a final basis on 11 October 2023.
4. On 18 July 2024, the parties entered into what is described by the husband as a "Binding Financial Agreement". One of the issues in the financial proceedings is whether or not that document meets the statutory requirements sufficient to oust the court's jurisdiction to make orders pursuant to Pt VIII of the Act. Sensibly, senior counsel for the husband conceded for the purposes of the current applications that the "Binding Financial Agreement" was not an agreement that ousted the jurisdiction of the court.
5. In late 2024, the court made a divorce order and on 2 July 2025 the wife commenced financial proceedings.
6. On 11 September 2025, the husband filed a Response to that Application including, as part of the relief sought, parenting orders.

OVERVIEW OF THE INTERLOCUTORY PARENTING PROCEEDINGS

1. The ambit of the dispute devolves on the part of the wife to the husband's time with X being limited to every Wednesday from after school until 7.30 pm and each Saturday from 10.00 am to 5.00 pm. The husband seeks time each weekend from Friday at 5.00 pm to Sunday at 5.00 pm as well as time on special occasions. The husband also seeks an order for parental responsibility whilst the wife contends that such an order is unnecessary at this stage.
2. The wife asserts that during the relationship she was subjected to family violence. In her affidavit sworn 24 October 2025 she says the following:
   1. Throughout the course of our relationship, I have experienced repeated incidents of verbal abuse, emotional manipulation, and physical violence by the husband. The domestic violence began shortly after our marriage and escalated over time.

...

1. There were multiple similar instances of physical abuse in China. As we travelled together often, arguments were frequent, and physical violence would follow if I attempted to defend myself. After multiple incidents, he would call my mother and portray me as the cause of our problems, never mentioning his violent behaviour.

...

1. The husband's verbal abuse is constant and degrading. He has called me derogatory names in front of others, including our children. Once, in front of [Ms Hettie] and our two children, he referred to me as a "slut" and "worthless whore". My son, who was only three at the time, began repeating abusive terms he heard from the husband.

1. The parties initially separated in April 2023. The wife says:
   1. On 3 October 2023, during school holidays, we were staying at the [Suburb L] Property. I had prepared handmade noodles with my mother. When our child accidentally spilled hot water, the husband demanded to know who gave him the water. I remained silent, but he slapped me across the face, claiming I had endangered the child. Later that evening, I overheard him laughing with [Ms Hettie] in the bedroom. The next morning, I told him I wanted a divorce, he agreed that I could temporarily rent a place to live. I proposed moving into a separate apartment, but he refused and withheld financial support.
   2. [In] October 2023, after our child started school, I returned to China with my mother to recover emotionally and physically. It was an extremely difficult and heartbreaking decision for me to leave without [X], as I had never been separated from him before. At that time, I had no employment, no income, and no support network in Australia. I did not ask for the [husband]'s permission to take [X] with me because I knew he would not allow it, and he was withholding [X's] passport. I informed the [husband] of my departure only after arriving at the airport, as I feared that if I had told him earlier, he would have tried to restrict my movement or prevent me from leaving Australia.
2. Between October 2023 and March 2024 the wife was in China and X was in Australia in the care of the husband. Subsequent to the wife's return in March 2024, X returned to her care, and the parties put in place an arrangement for the husband to spend regular time with X.
3. In that respect, the wife sets out in her affidavit at paragraph 30 a table of the husband's time with X. That table would appear to disclose that between October and 24 December 2024 the husband spent time with X for about one and-a-half days a week. The wife in her affidavit concedes that between 25 December 2024 and 9 January 2025 the husband and X were overseas together.
4. Upon their return, between 17 January 2025 and 25 April 2025 the husband would appear to have spent periods of time with X of at least one and-a-half days a week and for a longer block period between 11 April 2025 and 17 April 2025 and again for about six days in July 2025 when he took the child to country W.
5. The wife seems to contend in her Case Outline that there are issues of risk in relation to the child in the care of the husband, albeit she does not seem to elevate that risk to one that is unacceptable. Her Case Outline records the following:

33. The [wife]'s evidence is that during 2025:

1. [X] has disclosed to the [wife] that when he spends time with the [husband], he is left alone, bored, spends time with the television and occasionally is taken to the park.
2. On 14 March 2025, when the [wife] dropped [X] to the [husband]'s home, [X] was reluctant for the [wife] to leave. The [husband] was angry with the [wife] and blamed her for [X's] poor upbringing.
3. On 21 March 2025, the [wife] told the [husband] that [X] was bored. The [husband]'s response was "If he's bored, then don't bring him back here again." An argument then took place.
4. From 2 May 2025 to 7 July 2025, the [husband] made the conscious decision not to spend time with [X].
5. [X] spent time with the [husband] on 30 and 31 August 2025. He disclosed to the [wife] that he witnessed the [husband] assault [LL] and his mother, [Ms Hettie] and that he felt scared.
6. [X] has disclosed that the [husband] has called [LL] and [Ms Hettie] names, sworn at them and called them stupid.
7. [X] has disclosed to the [wife] that he was comfortable seeing the [husband] during the day but did not want to stay overnight because he was too scared.

1. The husband denies the allegations of family violence. He says the child enjoys his time with him. His counsel submits in his Case Outline the following:
   1. During the spend time occasions, [X] is consistently happy, relaxed, and affectionate, often expressing how much he misses his father and enjoys their time together. The [husband] is capable to care for his son's developmental, emotional, psychological and cultural needs.
   2. There are no matters which would give rise to any concern about [X's] safety with the [husband].

19. There are no family violence orders or a history of family violence.

1. Consistent with the provisions of s 69ZL of the Act, I set out in short form my reasons.
2. Parenting proceedings are governed by Pt VII of the Act. In making a parenting order, s 60CA requires the Court to regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. In determining what is in the child's best interests, s 60CC(2) sets out the matters that are required to be considered. No one matter takes priority over the other. The matters to be considered are:

60CC How a court determines what is in a child's best interests

...

General considerations

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

1. In considering the matters in s 60CC(2)(a), the Court must, pursuant to s 60CC(2A), consider any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child together with any family violence order that applies in relation to the child or a member of the child's family.
2. Section 60CG of the Act requires the Court, when making a parenting order, to ensure the order does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence and is consistent with an existing family violence order.
3. Pursuant to s 60CC(2)(a), the Court must have regard to the arrangements which would promote the safety of a child and the person who has the care of the child. The word safety should, in my view, be given its ordinary meaning; that is, the orders should provide a degree of protection from the matters identified in the subsection to the extent necessary relative to the evidence and the risk of harm.
4. The Full Court in Goode and Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 ("Goode") set out the procedural steps in an interim application, noting that in interim proceedings there may be little uncontested evidence. Consistent with the guidelines outlined in Goode and to the extent relevant and necessary, I have in these reasons identified the competing proposals of the parties, the issues in dispute, and the contested facts.
5. In Marvel v Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 (which has been cited with approval by the Full Court in Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104; (2015) FLC 93-654), the Court observed:
   1. In SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 the majority (Boland and Thackray JJ) discussed at [88] of their reasons the care necessary to be exercised in making findings in interim parenting proceedings. Their Honours said:

[88] In our view, findings made at an interim hearing should be couched with great circumspection, no matter how firmly a judge's intuition may suggest that the finding will be borne out after a full testing of the evidence.

123. Later, at [100] their Honours amplified their comments and said:

[100] The intuition involved in decision-making concerning children is arguably of even greater importance when a judge is obliged to make interim decisions following a hearing at which time constraints prevent the evidence being tested. Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.

1. The wife has adduced evidence, albeit untested, that raises questions about the husband's attitudes towards women and his parenting capacity. Her evidence is the subject of dispute and not accepted by the husband.
2. These are interim proceedings and there has been no cross-examination. Conscious as I am that I cannot make findings on these disputed allegations I am equally conscious that I cannot simply ignore questions of possible risk and harm.
3. Family violence is a curse which affects not just the immediate victim, but also children, even if not directly observed by them. Children exposed to family violence may suffer from a range of emotional and psychological responses that impact upon their development into healthy well-functioning adults. As the Full Court observed in Amador & Amador [2009] FamCAFC 196; (2009) 43 Fam LR 268 at [95] "the consequences of placing a child under the supervision and/or care of a person who has been violent may be far reaching and very detrimental to the children's welfare." A perpetrator of family violence provides a poor role model to children as it reflects on every facet of their attitude to the responsibility of parenting.
4. Whilst the Court cannot ignore the serious allegations raised by the wife, the evidence reveals the wife has not acted in a manner consistent with the assertions of risk she now makes. There is a disconnect between the case advanced by the wife and the evidence.
5. As recently as the middle of this year, she was satisfied that it was appropriate for X to travel to Country W with his father for a block period of time and otherwise over the latter part of 2024 and into 2025 has permitted time every weekend including overnight time. The wife invites the necessary conclusion that there is a risk of harm to the child in the care of the husband, but that risk seems to now only arise at night. She does not adequately explain how the risk at night arises. There needs to be a cogent reason for concluding that the risk would be different at night rather than during the day to provide a logical and rational basis for making the orders sought by the wife.
6. There is little evidence as to the views of the child (s 60CC(2)(b)) and such evidence as there is carries little weight given his age. I am satisfied that it is to the benefit of the child to have a relationship with the husband (s 60CC(2)(e)) and that it is safe for the child and wife to do so (s 600CC(2)(a)) and it does not compromise the wife's capacity to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs (s 60CC(2)(d)).
7. I am not persuaded that there is a proper basis for concluding that there is a possibility of the existence of harm in overnight time. I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of this child for him to resume spending overnight time with his father as he done for the last 12 months.
8. I am not, however, persuaded that the time the husband proposes, in circumstances where the child is at school, is appropriate where it would mean that there is no weekend time between the child and the wife.
9. I am satisfied that the child's best interests are met by spending time with the husband both on weekdays and on weekends whilst ensuring that the child also spends time on the weekends with the wife. I am satisfied that this can be met by orders that provide for the child to spend time with the husband each Thursday from after school until Friday before school and each alternate week from after school Thursday to 5pm on Saturday.
10. The parties were at issue about the return of the child where a changeover does not occur at school. I am satisfied that it is appropriate and in the child's best interests for both parties to be involved in the delivery and return of the child. In circumstances where the wife is delivering the child to the husband's residence at the commencement of time that does not commence at school then the husband should return the child to the wife's residence on occasions where the return is not a school day.
11. I was not addressed on any matter of substance that required the making of a parental responsibility order or for that matter was I taken to any matter of substance that required an order restraining the parties from taking the child outside of the jurisdiction in circumstances where the child has been removed from the jurisdiction with the consent of the parties in the past and his passport has been surrendered.
12. I propose to make orders in the terms set out above.

1. Central to the Pt VIII proceedings is the wife's contention that the husband and his third wife, Ms Hettie ("the second respondent") entered into a series of transactions which had the effect of divesting the husband of significant matrimonial assets. The transactions involved the transfer of shares in companies previously owned by the husband, the resignation of himself as director of those companies, and the appointment of the second respondent as shareholder and director and the payment of large sums of money to her. It is also suggested that she has then divested herself of some of those assets. Each of the transactions undertaken are challenged by the wife as a sham or liable to be set aside.
2. In her affidavit filed 2 July 2025 she asserts the following:
   1. During our marriage, the husband and I transferred more than AUD $20 million from China into Australia. These transfers took place over a span of several years and were facilitated through a complex network of remitters and intermediaries, as direct international fund transfers were subject to restrictions under Chinese foreign exchange laws. I was actively involved in the transfer process and have direct knowledge of how these transactions were carried out. Specifically, I was the one who contacted the remitters in China, communicated with them via WeChat, and provided them with the necessary instructions on how much to remit, to which Australian account, and under whose name. I also followed up regularly to confirm whether each remittance had been processed and provided the relevant banking details and references for each transaction. From round 6 August 2022, under the husband's instructions, [Ms Hettie] began communicating directly with the currency exchange agents. However, I also followed up from time to time.
   2. In many instances, the remitters would divide large sums into multiple smaller transactions to avoid detection or regulatory scrutiny. I would coordinate the timing of these transactions, keep track of the amounts, and ensure that the funds arrived in Australia in accordance with the husband's directions. I have retained WeChat records of these communications, which include conversations with remitters, confirmations of transfers, and screenshots of payment receipts. As such, I have first-hand knowledge of the remittance process and the individuals involved in facilitating these transfers on behalf of the husband.
   3. I am also aware that the source of most of those fund are the net sale proceeds of ...properties registered under the husband's name in China...
   4. The husband transferred the sale proceeds of the properties...to various individuals, including but not limited to his third wife, [Ms Hettie], Mr [MM], and Ms [NN]. These individuals acted as informal conduits or remittance agents, receiving funds originating from the husband and subsequently transferring them to Australia. This arrangement appears to have been structured to break down large sums into smaller, less traceable transactions.

...

1. I have financial records reveals that between April 2021 and February 2025, at least 215 separate transactions were made into Australian bank accounts controlled by the husband and myself. These included accounts held with the Commonwealth Bank, Westpac, ANZ, and accounts of [C] Pty Ltd:

2. Based on the loan agreements provided by the husband, it appears that on 30 August 2023 and 20 February 2024, sums of AUD $2 million were transferred on each occasion through Ms [Hettie], totalling AUD $4 million. I was not involved in the transfer of these funds. Many of these payments coming into Australian accounts listed in No. 36 above were disguised as business payments or personal remittances and often referenced multiple unrelated names. Some payments were made using money exchange services that allowed the conversion of Currency OO into Australian Dollars without formal banking channels.

3. The aggregate total of these banked Australian Dollar funds exceeded AUD $20,832,402, with approximately AUD $18,554,803.00 identified as having been deposited into personal accounts held directly under the husband's name (including under his English name, [Mr Travere]), based on the bank statements and transaction descriptions.

4. The remaining balance was deposited into my account or [C Pty Ltd] company account, then used to purchase real estate in Australia in cash, without any borrowings at the time of purchase. These acquisitions were subsequently leveraged by the husband, through mortgages or other encumbrances, for his personal financial benefit or to effect asset transfers.

...

1. To the best of my knowledge, all the properties were originally purchased unencumbered using a total of $20,832,402.00, which the husband transferred from China to Australia through various senders. Subsequently, the husband mortgaged these properties to third-party financiers in order to draw down on the equity. I do not know where the proceeds from these equity withdrawals have been retained or how they have been applied.

...

1. [Ms Hettie] is the husband's third wife. According to the husband, they divorced in or around early 2016. At the time of their divorce, the husband transferred a property to her and agreed to pay her [Currency OO] 1 million, allegedly at a rate of [Currency OO]100,000 per year-although only approximately [Currency OO]500,000 was paid. The remaining [Currency OO] 500,000 was given to [Ms Hettie] as a discount on the purchase of a property developed by the husband. Despite their divorce, she has remained financially dependent on the husband. He continued to pay her a monthly salary of ¥10,000 through a company under his control, even though she performed only domestic duties such as child transportation and housework.
2. During our marriage, the husband repeatedly informed me that Ms [Hettie] was merely a figurehead or nominee used for the purpose of holding and managing his assets and financial affairs. He made it clear to me on numerous occasions that although certain properties, funds, or business interests appeared to be in Ms [Hettie's] name, she had no real ownership or control over them. According to the husband, Ms [Hettie] was acting at his direction and solely for his benefit. He stated that this arrangement was necessary to minimise exposure to legal or financial risk, both in China and in Australia, and to facilitate the transfer of funds internationally. I was led to believe that Ms [Hettie] was not involved in decision-making regarding these assets and that she was not entitled to any beneficial interest in them.

1. The contentions advanced by the wife are denied by the husband and the second respondent. They each contend that the transactions entered into between them were as a consequence of the repayment of various sums of monies owed by the husband to the second respondent or in accordance with the provisions of a Divorce agreement made in 2016.
2. The Court is not able, in the absence of cross-examination, to resolve the competing assertions which are all matters for determination at the final hearing.
3. The case as presented by the parties is irreconcilable and the consequence may be that in the event the matter proceeds to a final hearing and the wife's case is accepted then the conclusion may arise that the husband, wife, second respondent, and others have been involved in an enterprise that has breached laws of the People's Republic of China. One consequence of so finding may involve the referral of the court file to the Australian Federal Police, AUSTRAC, and to the Embassy for the People's Republic of China. In the event the wife's case is accepted, then one further possible consequence may be that each of the husband and the second respondent have sworn affidavits that are not true, knowing that to be so. That consequence could see them referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration of charges of perjury.

1. The wife sought a broad-ranging series of injunctive orders including financial orders for the husband to make various payments to her as well as seeking a range of injunctive orders against the other respondents to the proceedings.
2. Many of the financial orders were the subject of agreement which were to be reduced to writing with the parties submitting a joint agreed Minute of Orders to be made by consent. There remained some matters that required resolution as set out in the orders sought by the wife in Exhibit 1.
3. The wife sought the husband pay the mortgage and outgoings on the Suburb R property, an anti-suit injunction against the husband commencing proceedings in the People's Republic of China and a payment of the sum of $509,410 by way of either interim property or interim costs pursuant to s 114UB of the Act.
4. As against the second to fifth respondents, she sought the use of a motor vehicle registered in the name of C Pty Ltd. As against the eighth respondent she sought an injunction and an order for interim costs. The eighth and ninth respondents objected to the wife's proposed Orders 8.10(e), 8.10(i), and 13.

1. The wife sought the husband make various payments for her benefit. The husband through his senior counsel submitted that the husband did not have the financial capacity to make the payments and that the Court should not make an order that would have the effect of exposing the husband to an application for contravention.
2. The wife contends that the husband exercises control over assets in the second respondent's name and that consequentially he has failed to disclose his true wealth.
3. In relation to his current financial position, his Financial Statement identifies the second respondent meets his ordinary living expenses of $1,935 per week. His Financial Statement fails to disclose how he meets his stated outgoings of $7,607 per week.
4. He states he has borrowed from the second respondent monies referred to at Item 50 of the Financial Statement but elects not to disclose how much. The note to item 50 is equally opaque asserting the following:

The loans referred to in this Item also include the monies I have borrowed from [Ms Hettie] for the repayment of the mortgages over the properties located at [Suburb G] and [Suburb R]. I continue to repay these mortgages using monies lent to me by [Ms Hettie].

1. He fails to identify how much it is that he has actually borrowed from her. He also identifies a personal liability to the second respondent being a personal loan for the payment of his legal costs in the proceedings said to total $250,000. The husband has also filed two affidavits but does not provide any explanation as to the quantum of monies that he has borrowed from the second respondent, despite now three opportunities to do so.
2. The Costs Notice filed by the husband dated 3 November 2025 discloses his solicitors hold $184,372 in trust. The Costs Notice fails to comply with the Rules in that it fails to disclose how he will meet his estimated future costs of $543,000. An earlier Costs Notice disclosed he held $237,913 in trust. Both memorandums fail to explain where the reduction in funds has gone. The husband also holds approximately $40,00 in his bank accounts. The husband thus has funds at his disposal exceeding $224,000.
3. I am satisfied that the second respondent represents a financial resource of the husband. She has not suggested at any time that she will not continue to fund the husband. What actually is the true nature of their financial relationship is a matter for a final hearing.
4. I am satisfied that the husband has failed to comply with his obligations of disclosure. I am satisfied he has the capacity to meet the order sought by the wife in proposed order 7 and that the making of such an order is proper pursuant to s 114 of the Act for the purposes of preserving the equity in the home.
5. The wife seeks a payment totalling $509,410 by way of either partial property settlement or interim costs. The sum sought by the wife accords with the affidavit of her solicitor and is for the wife's costs for the purposes of the proceedings. There was no challenge to the evidence of the estimate.
6. The wife sought an order pursuant to s 114UB of the Act. An application for costs is governed by the provisions of s 114UB of the Act, which provides a general rule that each party to proceedings should bear their own costs.
7. Section 114UB of the Act reposes in the Court a discretion to make a costs order in circumstances where the Court determines that there are circumstances that justify its making and, if there are such circumstances, the Court may make such order as it considers just, having regard to the matters set out in s 114UB(3) of the Act.
8. It is well settled law that no one factor under s 114UB(3) of the Act is determinative and the Court may give such weight as it considers relevant to any factor. In Fitzgerald & Fish [2005] FamCA 158; (2005) 33 Fam LR 123, the Full Court observed in respect of the previous section:
   1. ... Nowhere in subs (2A) or elsewhere in s 117, is there any prescription that more than one factor must be present before an order for costs is made nor of comparative weight of the factors set out in subs (2A). As a consequence, there is nothing to prevent any factor being the sole foundation for an order for costs
9. Justice Watts in Salvage & Fosse [2020] FamCAFC 144; (2020) FLC 93-966 observed as follows:
   1. When considering whether it is just to make an interim order for the provision of litigation expenses pursuant to s 117(2), the court shall have regard to the matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act. In Zschokke (at 83,217) the Full Court said:

If the order is to be made under s 117(2) then, in our view, the matters contained in s 117(2A) must be addressed, and this would seem to have been recognised, if not expressly at least by implication, by the Full Court in Poletti. In saying this we acknowledge that a number of the paragraphs in the sub-section (notably paragraphs (d) failure by one party to comply with court orders; (e) total lack of success by one party in the proceedings; and (f) existence and terms of an offer for settlement) may not have relevance in an application for an order of the type in question. We also acknowledge that it may well be necessary in such an application for the Court to have regard to a range of relevant matters other than those specified in the sub-section, as is permitted by paragraph (g)...

1. In relation to s 117(2A)(a), apart from the general financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings, the Full Court in Zschokke identified the following particular considerations:

a) a position of relative financial strength on the part of the respondent;

b) a capacity on the part of the respondent to meet his or her own litigation costs; and

c) an ability on the part of the applicant to meet his or her litigation costs.

1. As to such other relevant matters, under s 117(2A)(g), the plurality in Strahan at [96] and [141] specifically adopted the following considerations referred to in Paris King Investments at [30]:

   a) the applicant should have "at least an arguable case for substantive relief which deserves to be heard";

   b) there should be evidence of the applicant's "likely costs of litigation" (see also Wilson and Wilson [1989] FamCA 34; (1989) FLC 92-033 at 77,453); and

   c) it is not "an essential pre-condition" that the applicant's legal representatives will not continue to act unless the costs are paid or secured on an ongoing basis.

1. There is evidence before the Court of the wife's future legal costs. I have referred to the financial circumstances of the parties. On the limited material before me, I am satisfied that the wife has an arguable claim for relief. I am satisfied that the husband has the capacity to meet his own legal fees, but I am not satisfied the wife has the capacity to meet all of hers without a litigation funding order.
2. Dealing with such of the matters under s 114UB(3) of the Act as are relevant, the financial position of the parties is not yet resolved. Neither party is in receipt of legal aid. Each party makes allegations against the other however within the confines of the hearing, I am not able to resolve all the competing claims. The proceedings have not been necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with previous orders of the Court.
3. The parties are involved in complicated litigation. They both seek to retain lawyers to assist them in the presentation of their cases. English is not the first language of either party. I am satisfied that it is just that the wife be provided with funds to enable her to retain lawyers just as the husband does.
4. The proceedings are at a very early stage. I am not satisfied that at this stage it is just that the wife needs funds to cover her entire costs of the proceedings in circumstances where the parties have not yet taken part in either a Conciliation Conference or a mediation.
5. I am satisfied that the husband has the capacity to meet a payment to the wife but am not satisfied at this stage that it is just to order a sum in the magnitude sought by the wife.
6. I am satisfied that a just sum to meet the wife's costs at this stage is represented by a payment of $160,000. I am satisfied for the reasons given above that the husband has the capacity to meet such a sum. Such an order does not prevent the wife from seeking a further order by way of lump sum or on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
7. Otherwise the wife sought an order in the following terms:
   1. That, until further order, the husband be restrained from commencing or taking any steps to commence proceedings against the [...] wife in the People's Republic of China in relation to the marriage or the property of the marriage.
8. The wife's counsel conceded there was no evidence that the husband had said he would commence any such proceedings. The highest the wife assertion reached was as set out in her Case Outline as follows:
   1. Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that the [husband] seeks to agitate parenting and property proceedings in China, he following matters would give the Court cause for concern:
      1. the [husband] asserts that he has property rights in China arising from a purported agreement dated 7 November 2018. He asserts it is valid and enforceable in China.
      2. The [husband]'s financial dealing which have occupied the [wife]'s submissions in respect of inter alia injunctive relief against the non-matrimonial parties, putative parties and the parties the [wife] seeks to join.
9. There is no foundation for the relief the wife seeks. Through the husband's senior counsel, the husband proffered an undertaking to give the wife 60 days prior written notice of the commencement of such proceedings.
10. I do not propose to make the wife's proposed Order 17.

Orders sought against the eighth and ninth respondents

1. EE Pty Ltd is the eighth respondent and Mr GG is the ninth respondent. Mr GG is the father of the second respondent.
2. As conceded by senior counsel for the eighth respondent, the issue between the wife and the eighth respondent is one of notice. That is, the injunction was conceded on a without admissions basis but sought to include the words "without the giving of 14 days written notice to each of the other parties in these proceedings".
3. The wife did not consent to the notice provision.
4. I am satisfied based on the submissions made by the wife that she has an arguable case and that if the injunction is not made the wife's case for final relief may be imperilled. In circumstances where the eighth respondent advanced no submissions as to prejudice, I am satisfied given the wife has given an undertaking as to damages that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction in the terms of wife's proposed Order 8.8.
5. I am not satisfied that the notice provision sought is necessary or proper. A period of 14 days in the context of applications of this type is insufficient period of time in which to enable the [wife] to move the court to hear the application. An interlocutory injunction is always capable of variation in circumstances where there is a change of circumstances. If the company wants to vary the injunction it can do so upon the filing of an application.
6. I propose to make an order in the terms of wife's proposed Order 8.8.
7. The wife's proposed Order 8.10 sought to restrain FF Pty Ltd from dealing with funds held by it on behalf of the various persons and entities identified, while the wife's proposed Order 13 sought restraints against HH Pty Ltd and JJ Pty Ltd from dealing with funds held by it on behalf of the various persons and entities identified.
8. Each of FF Pty Ltd, HH Pty Ltd, and JJ Pty Ltd consent to the injunction.
9. The eighth and ninth respondent opposed the making of wife's proposed Order 8.10(e) and Order 8.10(i) and wife's proposed Order 13 in so far as the orders sought to injunct each of the eighth and ninth respondents' property.
10. In respect of the orders impacting upon the eighth respondent, Mr GG in his affidavit says the following:
    1. I do not ordinarily reside in Australia. [EE Pty Ltd] therefore needs to recruit and retain a director with investment-management experience who does ordinarily reside in Australia, and to pay him or her a market salary. [EE Pty Ltd] will also need to pay insurance, accountants, taxes, and may need to lease an office as part of ordinary corporate operations.
    2. [EE Pty Ltd] presently holds approximately AUD IO million in long term corporate bonds issued by ANZ, Commonwealth Bank and Westpac. Income from these bonds accrues semi-annually. As further income accrues, and unless or until funds are required to satisfy the Chinese company's debts, I also wish for [EE Pty Ltd] to invest the accrued income in other high-performing bonds rather than leaving it in low-interest savings accounts.
    3. [EE Pty Ltd] would be unable to carry out its business of investment under present orders. I propose to provide an undertaking in the form set out in my Amended response to Application in a proceeding namely that [EE Pty Ltd] be permitted to apply its funds toward ordinary business expenses and to make further investments in the ordinary course of business.
    4. Once I have obtained evidence of the Chinese company's debts and the written agreement from China, I intend to seek a further variation of the injunction to allow [EE Pty Ltd] funds to be applied to those debts as and when they become due and payable.
11. The affidavit raises more questions than it answers. Mr GG provides no evidence of the business that is conducted by EE Pty Ltd nor provides any basis for a conclusion that it will need to retain a director with the experience contended or pay insurance, accounts or taxes or lease an office as part of its ordinary business corporate operations. Indeed, there is no evidence of what actually are the "business corporate operations" of EE Pty Ltd.
12. In so far as the ninth respondent was concerned, he has placed no evidence before the court that he needs access to the monies injuncted to meet his legal fees.
13. I am satisfied based on the submissions made by the wife that she has an arguable case and that if the injunction is not made the wife's case for final relief may be imperilled. I am also satisfied given the wife has given an undertaking as to damages that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction in the terms of wife's proposed Order 8.10 and Order 13.
14. It is unnecessary to address Order 19 in circumstances where I have made the order against the husband.

Orders sought against the second and third respondents

1. The wife sought orders in relation to a motor vehicle as follows:
   1. That the wife shall have the exclusive use and possession of the motor vehicle bearing registration number ... (the Vehicle).
   2. That the wife shall be responsible for the costs of registration, insurance, maintenance, and running expenses of the Vehicle for so long as the Vehicle remains in her possession.
   3. For the avoidance of doubt, the Vehicle is registered in the name of [C] Pty Ltd, and this order is made on the basis that the parties' consent to the wife's exclusive use notwithstanding such registration.
2. Whilst it is not immediately clear against whom the order was sought, it was not in issue that C Pty Ltd is the registered owner of the motor vehicle. There is no evidence as to who the legal owner is and that matter was not addressed in the evidence. C Pty Ltd was previously controlled by the husband but is now controlled by the second respondent as a consequence of the various transactions entered into by the husband. The undisputed evidence was that the wife has been in possession of the motor vehicle and had its use since 2023.
3. As a consequence of the change in ownership of the company, the second respondent has decided that the vehicle should no longer be provided to the wife. The wife invites the court to conclude that this is but part of a strategy on the part of the husband and the second respondent to frustrate and defeat her ultimate claims for property settlement. It seems strange that the second respondent provides the husband, with whom it appears she lives, a car, but needs the return of the car the wife has driven for some years.
4. Whilst correspondence attached to the second respondent's affidavit seeks the car be returned, she has filed no application seeking its return. The wife has not identified the head of power to make the order she seeks.
5. I am not prepared to make any orders in relation to the motor vehicle other than to give the wife liberty to apply on three days' notice if the motor vehicle is removed from the wife's possession. In that event the wife can frame the actual relief she seeks referenced to a head of power, it may be in that eventuality that the court would order the husband to provide funds to the wife to enable her to purchase a car or cause him to deliver to the wife the car he drives.

1. Orders will be made as referred to in these reasons and, with the exception of reserving the costs of all parties to the final hearing, all interlocutory applications will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (87) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.