Revive Kitchens & Bathrooms Pty Ltd v Crome

[Ground 1] Issuance of incorrect Tribunal order

The Tribunal issued a formal order stating $0.00 payable, which has let us confused regarding the enforceability of this decision. We strongly object to the in accuracies in this binding legal document as it creates legal uncertainty about what is oved.

[Ground 2] Confusion from erroneous information

The order also contains significant errors, including incorrect dates and statements that do not accurately reflect the evidence submitted or the hearing transcript. This misrepresentation has contributed to confusion and undermine the fairness of the proceedings.

[Ground 3] Rejection of supporting documents

Essential documents, including invoices and breakdown of services. were unfairly rejected during the hearing, despite our efforts to present them in good faith.

[Ground 4] Insufficient time and limited access during holiday

The timeline for submitting documents overlapped with the holiday period, during which staff, third party suppliers and internal resources were unavailable. Our administrative tear m was also on leave, further limiting our ability to meet the Tribunals requirements.

[Ground 5] Failure to consider key evidence

Documents such as CAD drawings and detailed cost breakdowns were either not considered and rejected. These documents were critical to substantiating the work completed and the basis of our claim for costs

[Ground 6] No breach established - Mutual agreement to cancel

The Tribunal incorrectly found a breach despite clear evidence and acknowledgment by the hearing member that the contract cancellation was mutually agreed. Revive was only seeking recovery of costs for services rendered not enforcement of the original contract.

[Ground 7] Undervalued paid deliverables

The CAD drawing is a deliverable valued at $1,700. The client was only billed partially covering time spent, not ownership. Expecting its release without full payment is unfair and uncommercial. However, happy to provide this to Tribunal for evidence.

[Ground 8] Mischaracterisation of costs - Not double dipping

The design and administrative services were separate. The designer is a third party contractor paid via an external invoice. Administrative support was provided by in-house staff paid internally. Each service was billed fairly and independently.

1. At the conclusion of the grounds of appeal, the Builder submits that the issues set out in the grounds of appeal:

had a direct and material impact on the outcome of the case. A more accurate and just result could have been reached had the evidence being properly assessed. The hearing member acknowledged key points in her own notes, further validating that a different conclusion could have reasonably been made.

1. In addition to those stated grounds, the Builder says it seeks leave to appeal as the Primary Decision was not fair and equitable, was against the weight of the evidence, and that there is now significant new evidence is now available that was not reasonably available at the time of the hearing.
2. As to the Primary Decision not being fair and equitable, the Builder submits:

I wish to formally apply for an appeal regarding the recent decision made in my case. The order indicates that certain evidence was deemed missing, which significantly influenced the outcome of the hearing.

I would like to highlight that I was able to obtain this evidence after the deadline for submitting documents; however, it was rejected on the day by the applicant. I believe that this rejection adversely impacted my case and constitutes a substantial miscarriage of justice.

According to the NCAT Guideline, appeals are permitted in instances where a party feels that their case was not fairly considered due to missing or improperly excluded evidence. I believe this situation falls under that category, and I respectfully request that my appeal be considered on these grounds.

1. As to the Primary Decision being against the weight of the evidence, the Builder submits that:

The Tribunal should have given more weight to the cost breakdown and invoices we attempted to submit. These documents clearly outlined the basis for the deductions made and demonstrated that they were fair and reasonable. The delay in submission was due to the holiday period and our business closure, which was beyond our control. Ignoring this evidence overlooked the transparency and justification we were prepared to provide

1. As to there being significant new evidence now available that was not reasonably available at the time of the hearing, the Builder submits that:

New Evidence: We have obtained new evidence that was not available during the original hearing. This evidence has the potential to substantially affect the outcome of the case and should be considered for a fair review.

Procedural Fairness: The original decision may not have adhered to proper procedural fairness, which impacted our ability to present our case adequately. It is essential that all parties are given a fair opportunity to be heard.

Public Interest: As a company with over 50 active clients, the issues raised in this appeal have significant implications for the public interest. Denying us the opportunity to review this case fairly, especially given the new documents that could assist in our hearing, may adversely affect our ability to secure our contractor license.

This, in turn, affects not only our business but also the clients and communities we serve.

Substantial Impact: The decision has had a significant adverse effect on our rights and interests as a business.

The ability to operate effectively is crucial not only for our continued success but also for the economic wellbeing of our clients and stakeholders.

Business Stability: The outcome of this appeal could directly impact our business operations, employee livelihoods, and our capacity to serve our clients effectively. A fair review is essential to ensure the ongoing viability of our services in the community

....

We now seek to present a detailed breakdown of costs and associated invoices that justify the deductions made from the deposit. These documents were not reasonably available at the time of the hearing due to the holiday period, during which our business was closed and our accounting staff were on leave. Despite our efforts, we were unable to access the necessary records within the Tribunal's submission timeframe. This new evidence is significant, as it directly addresses the key point of dispute in the case-whether the fees deducted from the deposit were legitimate and properly documented. Had this evidence been available at the hearing, it would have provided clear justification for our actions and supported our position. These documents demonstrate transparency and adherence to standard practices and could have materially influenced the Tribunal's decision. Copies of the cost breakdown and supporting invoices are attached to this application.

The evidence was available but could not be submitted within the required timeframe due to the holiday period, during which our business and relevant services were closed. As a result, we were unable to meet the submission deadline set by the Tribunal. However, I did bring the documents to the hearing, as they were requested by the other party during prior correspondence. Despite this, the other party objected to their inclusion, and the Tribunal did not accept them formally due to procedural limitations. Notably, the Tribunal member acknowledged that these documents could have assisted in the outcome, underscoring their relevance and significance to the matter.

(emphasis added)

1. Attached to the Notice of Appeal are copies of a few pages of the evidence said to be before the Tribunal, and the new evidence the Builder wished to rely on.

1. The Builder says that the Appeal Panel should make the following orders

[1] Reassessment of the Tribunals Order: The panel should review the order to correct the inaccuracies regarding the amount payable, ensuring it reflects the actual financial obligations.

[2] Consideration of Rejected Evidence: The panel should allow the introduction and consideration of al previously rejected supporting documents and evidence to provide a complete picture of the case.

[3] Clarification on Breach Findings: The panel should clarify the findings regarding the alleged breach of contract. taking into account the mutual agreement to cancel the contract.

[4] Revaluation of Costs and Deliverables: The panel should reevaluate the valuation of deliverables and ensure that all costs are characterized accurately, without misinterpretation or unfair treatment.

1. The Builder concludes by submitting that following the reassessment sought, the Appeal Panel should issue a revised order that "reflects the accurate facts and considerations of the case, thereby ensuring fairness and justice in the proceedings".

1. The Homeowners filed their Reply to Appeal on 12 May 2025.
2. This is a lengthy document, as attached to the Reply are 28 pages of submissions and 4 pages of emails.
3. By way of summary, on p 2 of the Reply, the Homeowners submit:

... we believe that the [Builder's] grounds for appeal are not valid, nor sufficiently strong, to justify the matter proceeding to appeal.

We also reiterate our concerns that this is the second appeal the [Builder] has made against a Tribunal decision on this matter. We believe this appeal is an attempt to further draw out a dispute resolution process that has been in progress for a year now. These delays allow the [Buiilder] to continue holding (and earning interest) on money rightfully owed to us.

If the [Builder] was committed to "fairness" as expressed throughout their application, we believe they would have complied with various previous Tribunal orders to produce documents in a timely manner. They would have also complied with their obligations under the Home Building Act and also provided evidence of costs when requested multiples times over the previous year.

We believe granting a leave to appeal would be unjust for us as consumers who have complied with all requests of the Tribunal, submitted extensive documentation, responded to appeals and borne the financial cost of initiating this process.

Although not considered in the decision, we ask the Tribunal to consider the significant time and money in pursuing this matter, including costs to lodge this matter with the Tribunal, debt recovery costs prior to the last appeal, time away from work to attend hearings, prepare documents and serve documents related to this matter and lost interest on money held by the [Builder] for a year.

1. Where necessary, we will refer to the Homeowners' submissions later in these reasons.

1. The Homeowners also filed a 420 page bundle of materials, being the evidence before the Tribunal and other "additional evidence not before the Tribunal" (see pp 12-38 of the bundle).

1. Section 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) sets out the basis upon which appeals from decisions of the Tribunal may be brought. That section states that an appeal may be made as of right on any question of law or with leave of the Appeal Panel on any other grounds (s 80(2)(b)).

1. In Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [13], the Appeal Panel set out a non-exhaustive list of possible questions of law giving rise to an appeal as of right:

(1) whether there has been a failure to provide proper reasons;

(2) whether the Tribunal identified the wrong issue or asked the wrong question;

(3) whether a wrong principle of law had been applied;

(4) whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness;

(5) whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant (that is, mandatory) considerations;

(6) whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration;

(7) whether there was no evidence to support a finding of fact;

(8) whether the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would make it.

1. These matters were clarified and expanded by the Appeal Panel in Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 (Cusumano), where the Appeal Panel stated (references omitted):

32 To the above list [referring to the list in Prendergast extracted above] might be added the following (some of which are nuanced aspects of the categories in Prendergast):

(1) Whether the Tribunal drew inferences that were not available from the facts as found (an extension of item 7 [of Prendergast]) ...

(2) Whether the construction of a statute or contract arrived at by the Tribunal at first instance was wrong in some identified way: ...

(3) Whether the Tribunal's decision was vitiated by bias, or a reasonable apprehension of bias, relates to and intersects with the fair hearing rule, and may encompass or be related to the procedural fairness question: ...

(4) Whether the Tribunal failed to respond to substantial, clearly articulated arguments based on established facts which may constitute a failure to accord natural justice, that is, procedural unfairness. Alternatively, it may also constitute a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: ...

(5) Whether the facts as found necessarily satisfied the statute or necessarily did not: ...

...

1. The Appeal Panel then observed at [33] that, "plainly", the categories (that is, the categories of questions of law) are not closed.
2. We also note that in Prendergast, the Appeal Panel stated at [12]:

In circumstances where the appellants are not legally represented, it is apposite for the Tribunal to approach the issue by looking at the grounds of appeal generally. It is necessary for the Appeal Panel to determine whether a question of law has in fact been raised, subject to any procedural fairness considerations that might arise to the respondent.

1. Clause 12 of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act provides that, in an appeal from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal, an Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal only if satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because:

(1) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(2) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(3) significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. The principles to be applied by an Appeal Panel in determining whether or not leave to appeal should be granted are well settled. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17, the Appeal Panel conducted a review of the relevant cases at [65]-[79] and concluded at [84](2) that:

Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand;

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed...

1. Even if an appellant establishes that they may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice in the sense explained above, the Appeal Panel retains a discretion whether to grant leave under s 80(2) of the Act. An appellant must demonstrate something more than that the Tribunal was arguably wrong: Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78 at [31]- [32].

1. In addition to these principles, we note that where an appeal is brought in respect of an interlocutory decision, leave to appeal is required: NCAT Act, s 80.
2. As the Appeal Panel stated in YQM v Le [2025] NSWCATAP 205 at [90]:

The principles for the grant of leave to appeal an interlocutory decision were considered by an Appeal Panel in Champion Homes v Guirgis [2018] NSWCATAP 54. At [35] the Appeal Panel relevantly stated:

9 ...

(2) However, the requirement for leave is a filter restricting access to the appeal process: Coulter v R (1988) 164 CLR 350; [1988] HCA 3 at 359 per Deane and Gaudron JJ;

(3) Leave should only be granted where there are substantial reasons to allow an appellate review: Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; [2000] 104 FCR 564;

...

(7) In connection with a matter of practice and procedure, restraint should be applied in reviewing such decisions, especially if an application for leave is made during the course of a hearing: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [21], referring to Adam P Brown and in In re Will of FB Gilbert (dec);

(8) Leave should not be granted unless a substantial injustice would result and the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the appeal body. What is sufficient is dependent on the particular case: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9;

(9) Lastly, subject to the above, the matters set out in Collins at [84 (1)-(2)] are also relevant to the exercise of a discretion to grant leave.

(emphasis added)

Not an opportunity to have a second go at a hearing

1. Finally, we note the following additional principle.
2. The Appeal Panel stated in Noori v JMG Auto Parts Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCATAP 250:

74. ... an appeal to the Appeal Panel does not provide a losing party in the Tribunal below with the opportunity to run their case again: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10]. And, as the Appeal Panel stated in [Temple v AMR Motors Pty Limited [2017] NSWCATAP 221], in passages relied on by the respondent:

38. Any decision to grant leave to appeal must be undertaken in a legally principled manner and not simply because, if we were hearing the matter anew on the evidence led before the Member, we might reach a different conclusion when considering that evidence (although in the present case that would not be so).

39. It is fundamental that an appeal on a question of fact does not provide and is not intended to provide an opportunity for an applicant dissatisfied by the result of a hearing at first instance to re-run the same case before an Appeal Panel. Yet, that is, in effect, what the present Appellants seek to do by identifying what they contend are contestable findings of fact by the Member.

75 To put the matter another way, as indicated in the Tribunal's Guideline 1, Internal Appeals (which can be found on the Tribunal's website):

... an appeal is not an opportunity to have a second go at a hearing.

1. At the outset of the appeal, the Builder sought an adjournment of the appeal. This was in the context of Builder not having received either the Reply to Appeal, or the 420 page bundle of materials filed by the Homeowner. We heard oral submissions from each of Mr Hadid and Mr Crome, and adjourned to consider the adjournment application.
2. We also indicated that we would consider the Builder's reliance on documents Mr Hadid asserted that the Tribunal erroneously did not allow him to tender at the Tribunal hearing, and new or fresh evidence that the Builder wished to rely on in the appeal.
3. We adjourned to consider these issues. When the hearing resumed, we indicated that the application:

(1) for an adjournment was refused;

(2) to rely on any rejected evidence was refused; and

(3) to rely on new or fresh evidence was also refused.

1. We indicated that we would provide written reasons for these decisions in these Reasons for Decision. Our reasons are as follows.

1. The Builder rejected to the appeal hearing proceeding principally on the basis that it had not received the Reply to Appeal or the 420 page bundle of material filed by the Homeowner.
2. There was a rather unedifying dispute about whether the Homeowner's documents had been provided to the Builder at all, the accuracy of email addresses, firewalls and negotiations to arrange for service of physical documents.
3. In FHP v Arys Health Pty Ltd (No 3) [2025] NSWCATAP 223, the Appeal Panel stated:

25 Section 51 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) confers power on the Tribunal to adjourn proceedings. Pursuant to s 36(2)(a) of the NCAT Act the Tribunal when exercising this power is to seek to give effect to the guiding principle in s 36(1) to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

26 In Donna O'Neill v T and I Engines Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 77 (O'Neill) at [20]-[22], the Appeal Panel relevantly explained the principles to be applied in exercising the power to adjourn proceedings:

"[20] In Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Limited [2013] HCA 46, a unanimous High Court said:

"In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University, it was pointed out that case management is an accepted aspect of the system of civil justice administered by the courts in Australia. It had been recognised some time ago by courts in the common law world that a different approach was required to tackle the problems of delay and cost in the litigation process. Speed and efficiency, in the sense of minimum delay and expense, are essential to a just resolution of proceedings. The achievement of a just but timely and cost-effective resolution of a dispute has effects not only upon the parties to the dispute but upon the court and other litigants. The decision in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University was concerned with the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) as they applied to amendments to pleadings. However, the decision confirmed as correct an approach to interlocutory proceedings which has regard to the wider objects of the administration of justice."

[21] That approach is applicable in this Tribunal. Section 36(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ('the Act') is in relevantly identical terms to s 56(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the provision considered in the Expense Reduction decision.

[22] It follows that a number of principles apply to applications for an adjournment:

1. matters should almost always proceed on the date fixed for hearing, for the reasons enunciated above,

2. an application for an adjournment should be seen as the exceptional rather than the ordinary course;

3. where the adjournment is caused, at least in part, by the delay of the party seeking the adjournment, or non compliance by that party with an extant order of the Tribunal, adequate explanation is called for, and its absence weighs heavily, and sometimes decisively against the grant of an adjournment."

1. The principles in O'Neill at [20]-[22] have been followed many times by subsequent Appeal Panels: see for instance Alta Vale Residential Pty Ltd v The Owners - Strata Plan No. 95693 [2024] NSWCATAP 212 at [95] and the decisions referred to: O'Neill at [23].
2. Applying these principles, we did not consider that the Builder had demonstrated a sufficient reason for the appeal hearing to be adjourned. While the Reply did contain detailed submissions, ultimately the Homeowners were simply opposing the appeal and relying on the Primary Decision which they said was correct. As to the 420 page bundle, this was the parties' evidence before the Tribunal (save for additional evidence that the Homeowners filed in response to the new evidence that the Builder wished to rely on).
3. Ultimately, we considered that a decision to adjourn the appeal hearing was not consistent with the guiding principle set out in s 36 of the NCAT Act, namely:

36 Guiding principle to be applied to practice and procedure

(1) The guiding principle for this Act and the procedural rules, in their application to proceedings in the Tribunal, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

(2) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the guiding principle when it -

(a) exercises any power given to it by this Act or the procedural rules, or

(b) interprets any provision of this Act or the procedural rules.

(3) Each of the following persons is under a duty to co-operate with the Tribunal to give effect to the guiding principle and, for that purpose, to participate in the processes of the Tribunal and to comply with directions and orders of the Tribunal -

(a) a party to proceedings in the Tribunal,

(b) an Australian legal practitioner or other person who is representing a party in proceedings in the Tribunal.

(4) In addition, the practice and procedure of the Tribunal should be implemented so as to facilitate the resolution of the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties and the Tribunal is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter of the proceedings.

1. The decision of the Tribunal to reject some evidence is an interlocutory decision in respect of which leave is required.
2. The Builder told us that the Tribunal had rejected the tender of documents 4, 5, 8, 9,11, 12 and 13 attached to the Notice of Appeal.

Application to rely on new or fresh evidence was also refused.

1. The fresh evidence sought to be relied on were documents 6, 7 and 10 attached to the Notice of Appeal.

1. It is not necessary to linger over this ground of appeal. True it is that the Tribunal issued a formal order which stated that the Builder was to pay the Homeowners "$0.00 18 April 2025". But the reasons for decision stated at [26] that the amount to be paid was $7,103.00.
2. We accept that the Builder may have been confused, but this is not an error amenable to appeal. That is because it was a "slip" or inadvertent error, which was corrected pursuant to s 63 of the NCAT Act on 16 April 2025.
3. Section s 63 of the NCAT Act provides:

63 Power to correct errors in decisions of Tribunal

(1) If, after the making of a decision by the Tribunal, the President or the member who presided at the proceedings is satisfied that there is an obvious error in the text of a notice of the decision or a written statement of reasons for the decision, he or she may direct a registrar to alter the text of the notice or statement in accordance with the directions of the President or the member.

(2) If the text of a notice or statement is so altered, the altered text is taken to be the notice of the Tribunal's decision or the statement of its reasons, as the case may be, and notice of the alteration is to be given to the parties in the proceedings in such manner as the President or member may direct.

(3) Examples of obvious errors in the text of a notice of a decision or a statement of reasons for a decision are where -

(a) there is an obvious clerical or typographical error in the text of the notice or statement, or

(b) there is an error arising from an accidental slip or omission, or

(c) there is a defect of form, or

1. The principles regarding s 63 were considered at length in _Br_uce v Knight (No 3) [2021] NSWCATAP 343 at [31]- [36].
2. It is sufficient to note [35] where the Appeal Panel stated that in Lawrence v Ciantar (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 186 the Court of Appeal said at [10]:

... the slip rule contained in ... expressly applies only to the correction of errors that arise from "a clerical mistake" or "an accidental slip or omission". The slip rule has no application to alleged mistakes that are a consequence of a deliberate decision: Expo Aluminium (NSW) Pty Ltd v Pateman Pty Ltd (No 2) [1991] NSWCA 92. ...

1. This is not a proper ground of appeal, because the Tribunal's slip was corrected.
2. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises a question of law, the appeal is dismissed. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises some other error, leave to appeal is refused.

1. The Builder's brief submissions are set out above.
2. At the appeal hearing, Mr Hadid told us that this ground of appeal also related to Ground 8.
3. This ground of appeal is a generalised, "rolled up" submission of incorrect dates and statements in the Primary Decision. These are not identified in the Builder's documents, nor were they articulated by Mr Hadid at the appeal hearing.
4. There is no substance to this ground of appeal.
5. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises a question of law, the appeal is dismissed. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises some other error, leave to appeal is refused.

1. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
2. The "essential documents" alleged to have been "unfairly rejected" during the Tribunal hearing, were not identified with any precision by the Builder, nor were they articulated by Mr Hadid at the appeal hearing.
3. Nor did the Builder provide us with the sound recording of the Tribunal hearing or a transcript of relevant parts of the hearing sought to be relied on to establish this ground of appeal.
4. Accordingly, it is impossible for us to discern what "essential documents" were rejected by the Tribunal. The decision to do so is a decision involving a matter of practice and procedure, and leave to appeal is required.
5. Applying the principles set out above, we would not grant leave to appeal in respect of this ground of appeal.

Ground 4: Insufficient time and limited access during holiday

1. This ground of appeal relates to the Builder's submission that there was significant new evidence now available that was not reasonably available at the time of the hearing.
2. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
3. Whether evidence was "not reasonably available" at the time of the hearing is not considered by reference to any subjective explanation from the party seeking leave to rely on it, but by applying an objective test and considering whether the evidence in question was unavailable because no person could have reasonably obtained it: Al-Daouk v Mr Pine Pty Ltd t/as Furnco Bankstown [2015] NSWCATAP 111 (Al-Daouk) at [23]; recently applied by the Appeal Panel in Ashwood v Medlock [2025] NSWCATAP 209 at [36].
4. In any event, as the Builder states in the Notice of Appeal, the evidence was in fact available; the Builder failed to submit that evidence in time.
5. This ground of appeal has no substance.
6. This ground of appeal does not raise a question of law. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises some other error, leave to appeal is refused.

1. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
2. In essence, the Builder submits that the Tribunal failed to consider documents "such as CAD drawings and detailed cost breakdowns" in its calculation of what were the costs associated with the project to which the Builder was entitled.
3. In GTK v NSW Treasury [2025] NSWCATAP 174, the Appeal Panel stated at [37]:

... A failure to provide adequate reasons may represent a failure to consider key evidence and submissions and therefore constitute a denial of procedural fairness or it may reveal a constructive failure to exercise the jurisdiction: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 277; Waterways Authority v Fitzgibbon (2005) 79 ALJR 1816; [2005] HCA 57 at [129]; and, by implication, Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26 at [24]- [32] ("Dranichnikov"). Both of those questions raise a question or law: FLK v Transport for NSW [2023] NSWCATAP 140, at [22]-[27] (and the authorities there cited).

(emphasis added)

1. We will give the Builder the benefit of the doubt on this ground of appeal, and assume that it is submitting that there was a constructive failure by the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction, and therefore that this ground of appeal raises a question of law.
2. This was a claim by the Homeowners for the return of their deposit. As the Tribunal found, the Homeowners "made it clear" that they required designs and other work necessary to put before the owners corporation of their strata scheme to enable works to be done. The Tribunal further found that the agreement between the parties was that if for any reason the project was cancelled, then, "as stated by the [Builder,] we will return [the] deposit minus the costs associated with the project to date".
3. At [6] of the Primary Decision, the Tribunal found that the Builder had not provided any CAD drawings to the Homeowners and therefore found at [22] no amount should be allowed for those drawings.
4. At [14] of the Primary Decision the Tribunal found that on 5 May 2024, the Builder delivered to the Homeowners concept drawings, a scope of works and drainage diagram of existing and proposed works, a floor plan of the proposed alterations, details of the qualified trades people who would carry out the work, approximate time frame, details of the licensed contractors, license and public liability certificates, proposed renovation schedule, neighbourhood notice and selection schedule.
5. Neither in its written submissions or at the appeal hearing did the Builder identify the "detailed cost breakdowns" the Builder submits that the Tribunal overlooked.
6. In those circumstances, we see no error on the question of law raised.

Ground 6: No breach established - mutual agreement to cancel

1. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
2. It is not clear what breach or breaches the Builder is referring to. we note that at [8] and [9] of the Primary Decision the Tribunal found that:

8. I find that the contract was not void, but breached the Home Building Act in various ways. Section 10 of the Home Building Act provides that if a contract offends s7 of the Home Building Act, a party is not entitled to damages or to enforce any other remedy in respect of a breach of the contract committed by any other party to the contract. That is not in issue here, however.

9. In any event, the contract was quite general and not sufficiently specific about the works that would be done for the applicants to be able to fully understand what would be done under the contract. That is required pursuant to 7(2)(c) of the Home Building Act, 1989.

1. This ground of appeal does not raise a question of law. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises some other error, leave to appeal is refused.

1. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
2. The submissions are misconceived, as the Tribunal found that the CAD drawings were never delivered to the Homeowners.
3. This ground of appeal does not raise a question of law. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises some other error, leave to appeal is refused.

Ground 8: Mischaracterisation of costs - not double dipping

1. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
2. They appear to be a reference to the Tribunal's finding at [24] that:

... there is no reference to the "+25% builders fee 1679.27" in the contract and it is not allowed. Even if the terms of the contract are not taken into account, given the amounts charged for the items listed above, it would amount to "double dipping" to claim a separate fee for those items.

1. On the basis of the Builder's presentation of this ground of appal, we discern no error by the Tribunal.
2. This ground of appeal does not raise a question of law. To the extent that this ground of appeal raises some other error, leave to appeal is refused.

1. For completeness, it is necessary to consider the Builder's claims that the Primary Decision was not fair and equitable and against the weight of the evidence.
2. The Builder's brief comments are set out above at [15] and [16].
3. We see nothing of substance in those submissions, which overlap to some extent with the other articulated (and rejected) grounds of appeal.
4. Leave is only usually granted where these matters involve an issue of principle, a question of public importance, an injustice which is reasonably clear or that the Tribunal has gone about its factfinding process in such an unorthodox manner that it is likely to have produced an unfair result. We are not satisfied that any of these factors are established.

1. The final matter is a formality. Mr Oliver Crome, along with Mrs Erica Crome, was an applicant in the Tribunal proceedings, and the order of the Tribunal was that the Builder pay both Mr and Mrs Crome the sum of $7,103.00. Therefore, by reason of r 29(b) of the NCAT Rules, Mr Crome is a party in the appeal proceedings. However, for some reason he was not named as a respondent by the Builder in the appeal. It follows therefore that, on our own motion, pursuant to s 7 of the NCAT Act, we join Mr Crome as a respondent in the proceedings.

(1) Mr Oliver Crome is joined as a respondent in the appeal proceedings.

(2) To the extent that the appeal raises questions of law, the appeal is dismissed.

(3) To the extent that the appeal raises other errors, leave to appeal is refused.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.