Rennoll & Rennoll [2025] FedCFamC1F 801 (6 November 2025)

1. The wife has leave to make an oral application for:

(a) An order discharging the appointment of C Property Advisory as the ch 7 single expert appointed for the purposes of valuing the property at D Street, Suburb E ("the Suburb E property"); and

(b) Orders in terms of Exhibit 1.

1. The oral application of the wife is dismissed.
2. On or before 4.00 pm today, the solicitors for the parties are to do all things as are necessary, to confer as to the terms of and instructions to be sent to each of the ch 7 single expert as to the Suburb E property, and the ch 7 single expert as to the property at F Street, Suburb H to prepare an updated report as to value for trial.
3. The solicitors for the parties are to confirm by way of joint email to my chambers on or before 10.00 am tomorrow morning, 7 November 2025, that the instructions have been provided to each ch 7 single expert by way of implementation of Order 3. The parties are on notice that in the event this email is not received by chambers, the matter will be relisted on short notice, and consideration will be given to, subject to the evidence and submissions at that time, the striking out of a party determined to be at fault.
4. The solicitors for the parties are to do all such things as are necessary to request each expert furnish their updated opinion pursuant to Order 3 on or before 18 November 2025 NOTING that a mediation with the Mr K is scheduled for 19 November 2025.
5. The wife be granted leave to make an oral application to extend time to comply with Order 6 made on 8 September 2025 as to the filing of trial affidavit material and other documents.
6. Over the husband's objection to such indulgence of leave, the time for the wife to comply with Order 6 made on 8 September 2025 be extended until 4.00 pm on 7 November 2025.
7. In the event the wife fails or neglects to comply with Order 7 hereof, her Amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 5 November 2025 is struck out, and the husband shall have leave to proceed to prosecute his Amended Initiating Application filed on 16 October 2025, on an undefended basis as against the wife.
8. The husband be granted leave to make an oral application for the costs of and incidental to the listing today, fixed in the sum of $2,000.
9. Within 28 days of any consent orders concluding the s 79 litigation, or the delivery of reasons for judgment and making of final orders in the s 79 litigation, whichever is the earlier, the wife shall pay the husband's costs of, and incidental to the listing today, fixed in the sum of $2,000.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hildred & Hildred has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are proceedings as to property settlement commenced in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) and transferred to this Court on 3 July 2025. On 8 September 2025, the matter was listed for trial as a reserve matter over three days commencing on 17 December 2025. Extensive trial directions were made on that day.
2. The wife is the registered owner of a property at D Street, Suburb E ("the Suburb E property"). C Property Advisory was appointed as the ch 7 single expert for the purposes of opining as to the value of that property in the s 79 proceedings. The ch 7 single expert produced a report as to the value of the Suburb E property dated 31 October 2024 recording an opinion as to value at $1.1 million.
3. The parties agree that it is necessary to obtain an updated opinion as to the value of the Suburb E property for the purposes of a mediation scheduled to occur on 19 November 2025 with the Mr K and for the purposes of the trial.
4. It is the wife's contention that the ch 7 single expert to opine as to the current value of the Suburb E property ought to be the same expert who opines as to the value of the other real property interests of the parties at F Street , Suburb H and G Street, Suburb H ("the Suburb H properties"). That other ch 7 single expert for the purposes of the valuation of the Suburb H properties is J Property Advisory.
5. The wife does not assert for the purposes of the oral application any deficiency in the qualifications and expertise of the appointed ch 7 single expert to value the Suburb E property, or that her proposed expert to value that property has knowledge of any substantial body of opinion different to that available to the current ch 7 single expert, or knows of matters that would be necessary for determining the issue of valuation not known to the current expert. There is no suggestion in the wife's case that the current expert will not discharge their duties and obligations as contained in ch 7 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules").
6. I am mindful as to the purpose and objects of ch 7 of the Rules.
7. The wife has not identified any probative reason to discharge the current ch 7 single expert for the purposes of opining as to the updated value of the Suburb E property. Her failure to progress, in the ordinary course, the updating of the opinion by that single expert is inconsistent with her obligations as a litigant as codified in s 95 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
8. For all of the above reasons, the oral application of the wife made today is dismissed.
9. The legal representatives of the parties have encountered challenges in complying with their obligations pursuant to s 96 of the Act as to facilitating the parties obtaining updated opinions as to the valuation of the Suburb E and the property at F Street, Suburb H ("the F Street property").
10. Although it ought to be unnecessary, having regard to the conduct in this matter to date, a direction will be made requiring the solicitors for the parties to do all things as are necessary to confer as to the terms of, and instructions to be sent to, both the ch 7 single expert as to the Suburb E property, and the ch 7 single expert as to the F Street, on or before 4.00 pm today.

1. The husband makes an oral application that the wife pay the costs of and incidental to the relisting today that have been thrown away, fixed in the sum of $2,000. The wife opposes any order for costs. In the alternative, the wife contends that costs ought to be reserved.
2. The relevant principles as to costs are well settled. While the starting point is established by s 114UB(1) of the Act, that each party pays their own costs, s 114UB(2) of the Act allows the court to make such orders as to costs as it considers just if there are circumstances which justify it doing so.
3. In considering what order for costs, if any, should be made, the court is required to have regard to the matters set out in s 114UB(3) of the Act and give weight as it considers appropriate to any relevant factor. It is well settled that no single factor in s 114UB(3) has priority, nor must more than one factor be satisfied. Rather, any one factor may be sufficient.
4. These parties are engaged in financial proceedings. The balance sheet filed in the proceedings to date records that their property interests are valued between $7.5 million and $9 million.
5. The wife contends that while she has property, she has few liquid funds and is encountering challenges in maintaining herself and the children.
6. Income impecuniosity is not a bar to costs. As identified earlier in these reasons, the listing of the matter today ought not to have been necessary. It cannot be said that the wife has been wholly unsuccessful today for the purposes of s 114UB(3)(e) of the Act. That section is relevant to success in the proceeding, rather than an interlocutory or procedural aspect of the proceeding.
7. By reference to s 114UB(3)(g) of the Act, it is relevant that:

(a) The relisting of the matter today occurred in circumstances where the wife took a misconceived approach as to the updating of the ch 7 single expert evidence for the purposes of trial; and

(b) The wife was unsuccessful in her application to discharge the current ch 7 single expert to opine as to the value of the Suburb E property; and

(c) A necessity existed for the wife to make a second oral application today to extend the time to comply with the trial directions for the filing of trial material. Order 7 made on 8 September 2025 recorded that in the event the wife failed to file her trial material, she may not be permitted to file further material, nor rely on that material without leave of the Court. No relevant explanation was advanced as to the wife's failure to comply with the trial directions as to the filing of affidavits. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the wife seeking an indulgence from the husband's solicitors to extend that time.

1. Putting it simply, the listing today ought not to have been necessary if the parties and their legal representatives had complied with the provisions of the Act as identified earlier in these reasons.
2. The husband's costs today have been unnecessarily incurred.
3. These matters justify an order for costs payable by the wife to the husband.
4. I do not accept the wife's submissions that counsel ought not to have been briefed for the purposes of the listing today. The costs claimed by the husband of, and incidental to, the listing today, including the briefing of counsel, have symmetry with those payable by reference to the relevant scale. It is imperative that these parties not be engaged in further satellite issues such as disputes as to the assessment of costs to be paid. In the circumstances, it is just to fix the costs payable by the wife to the husband in the sum sought at $2,000.
5. So as to not burden the wife in the preparation of the matter for mediation and trial, the costs as ordered will be paid by the wife within 28 days of any final orders compromising the s 79 dispute, or the delivery of reasons for judgment concluding that dispute.

I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Campton.