pay. I do accept that Mr Reilly himself may feel that for moral reasons he should continue as he is at present on a very low income of $150 a week. I've really got to balance his feelings in this regard as against his own stated ability wherein he has a capacity to earn over $1,000 a week at his own trade. Were he to do that, of course, he'd be in a much better position to meet his other obligations which include the obligation which still stands in respect of monies that are owing to the Commissioner of Taxation, and in respect of the penalties that this court must impose. Nevertheless, in trying to balance those factors I think I've got to accept that the reality for the moment is that Mr Reilly is only earning $150 a week. What he states in relation to his capacity to earn may well be correct, but it is still at this stage speculative and there are many things that could affect his future earning capacity. ... For all of those reasons I fix a total penalty of $20,000, and I intend to make an order for witnesses costs as sought by the prosecution in the sum of $4,646 and make an order for legal costs in the sum of $1,500." 9. Her Worship also said that she had taken into account the general sentencing rule enunciated by Napier J. (as he then was) in Webb v O'Sullivan (1952) SASR 65 at p 67:- "The courts should endeavour to make the punishment fit the crime, and the circumstances of the offender, as nearly as may be. Our first concern is the protection of the public, but, subject to that, the court should lean towards mercy. We ought not to award the maximum which the offence will warrant, but rather the minimum which is consistent with a due regard for the public interest." 10. Her Worship also accepted that the appellant was a man of good character who had "unfortunately ... been brought to ... financial ruin". The submissions on the appeals 11. Mr Rogerson submitted that an order for costs is part of a sentence. He relied on Stebbings v Pryce (unreported decision, Rice J., 10 May 1989). I accept that submission since default in the payment of the costs awarded carries imprisonment under the Justices Act, and this "attracts the operation of the principle of totality in the sentencing process" as Rice J. put it. 12. Mr Rogerson submitted in effect that her Worship was correct in approaching the calculation of the penalty in the manner laid down in McMillan v Bierwirth (supra). In that case the general approach taken by von Doussa J. in Bierwirth v McMillan 87 ATC 4184 was approved, provided that an element for general deterrence was also provided for in the penalty. That approach has also been accepted in the Territory; see Ambrose v Sandford Pty Ltd 89 ATC 4707. 13. In an appeal such as this, it is necessary for the appellant to show that the magistrate's exercise of the sentencing discretion miscarried; see Mason v Pryce [1988] NTSC 28; (1988) 53 NTR 1 at pp 5-7. As to the amount of the fine, Mr Rogerson submitted that Her Worship had failed to give proper weight to the appellant's low income, and had therefore erred in law in imposing a fine which was beyond his ability to pay, a fine which amounted to a sentence of imprisonment and which was in all the circumstances manifestly excessive. The appellant relied on similar grounds in his appeal against the award of costs and against the quantum of those costs. In a further ground of appeal, applicable to both the fine and costs, the appellant contended that his situation had now changed, in that he was in the course of entering into a scheme of arrangement under Part X of the Bankruptcy Act (Cth). 14. Mr Tiffin of counsel for the respondent made the following submissions. Her Worship's approach to sentencing was correct. The starting point for the calculation of the fine was admittedly correct, and all other factors relevant to sentence had been considered. It was permissible to impose one penalty in respect of all the offences, under s.221W(4) of the Assessment Act. The fact that a defendant has liquidity problems does not normally justify a reduction of the fine below the level of the administrative penalty, nor does the absence of actual dishonesty; see FCT v Manos Breeder Farms Pty Ltd and Ors 88 ATC 4946 at p 4956-7. As to the last point I note that in Manos Breeder Farms Pty Ltd (supra), von Doussa J., speaking of the defendant's difficult financial position, said at p 4956:- "The defendants must so order the affairs of the business that priority is given to the payment of deductions. Although the deductions are not impressed with a trust, they are moneys deducted from payments that would otherwise be made each month to employees and sub-contractors. The Act makes it clear that Parliament regards the failure to pay the deductions to the Commissioner as a serious matter. The defendants had received warnings from taxation officers, and I do not think the defendants' liquidity difficulties justify reduction in the fine below the statutory penalties." At p 4957 his Honour observed that "had there been actual dishonesty, that would have provided a reason for significantly increasing the amount of the fines". Mr Tiffin noted that the aggregate fine imposed amounted to some two-thirds of the statutory administrative penalty. 15. Mr Tiffin also referred to the recent decision in Budget Nursery Pty Ltd v FCT 89 ATC 4801. That involved a case stated to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, and dealt with the factors to be taken into account when determining the amount of penalties for failing to remit PAYE deductions under s.221F(5) of the Assessment Act. The Court expressed the following views. The appellant's financial circumstances at the time the offences were committed provided no excuse for its failure to remit the PAYE deductions to the Commissioner. On the other hand, its financial circumstances at the time the penalties were imposed, were clearly relevant, since the means of a defendant are always relevant to the extent of punishment to be imposed. The Court considered that granting time to pay "would give to the Judge a much wider range of penalties which could be imposed". The penalties ought to have some relativity to the amount of tax outstanding and the period of time over which that tax remained unpaid. In that case the PAYE deductions amounted to $8,691. The Magistrate had imposed penalties totalling $82,000 together with costs. The District Court Judge, on appeal, had proposed to reduce these penalties to a single penalty of $41,000. The Court of Criminal Appeal considered that the penalty to be imposed was a matter for the Judge in the exercise of his own discretion. The late payment penalties imposed by s.221F(12) provided the starting point for assessing the penalty under s.221F(14). General deterrence is an important factor in fixing penalties. I agree generally with these observations. 16. Mr Tiffin submitted that the appellant by his own account was remaining in his present low-paid employment by choice, in the hope and expectation that he would eventually obtain a 50% interest in the business. Further, his income was supplemented by bonuses which in the preceding 12 months had amounted to some $7,000. Mr Tiffin submitted that if the appellant could not meet the instalment payments, he could apply to the Clerk of Court for further time to pay. Conclusions 17. I consider that Mr Tiffin's submissions must be upheld. Her Worship's approach to the calculation of the penalty was correct. All relevant sentencing factors were taken into consideration. The penalty comprising the fine plus costs is not manifestly excessive and does not involve any erroneous application of the proper principles of assessment. I do not consider that the fact that the appellant has since entered into Part X arrangements affects the matter. 18. Accordingly, I dismiss both appeals and affirm the fine imposed and the award of costs which was made.