Regna & Eline (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 161 (14 March 2025)

Fitzwater & Fitzwater (2019) 60 Fam LR 212; [2019] FamCAFC 251

Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378

Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092; [2022] FedCFamC1A 97

M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68

Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501; [1996] HCA 46

Regna & Eline [2024] FedCFamC1F 161

Regna & Eline (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 566

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

1. All previous orders are discharged.
2. The mother has sole decision-making responsibility for all major long-term issues in relation to X born 2011, Y born 2013 and Z born 2014 ("the children").
3. The children live with the mother.
4. The children spend no time with the father, and he is not to communicate with them, or allow, permit or encourage others doing so on his behalf.
5. Within seven (7) days of this order, the father will inform the mother's solicitor of his email address for the purpose of Order 6, and the father shall thereafter keep the mother informed, in writing, of any changes to his email address.
6. The mother shall email the father each January and July with the following information in relation to each of the children, until each child respectively turns 18 years of age:

(a) A recent photograph;

(b) An update as to their educational progress, including their report cards for the most recent semester; and

(c) An update on any significant medical issues.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer is discharged.

1. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in "Parenting Orders - obligations, consequences and who can help" and these particulars are included in these orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Regna & Eline has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. The children in this parenting dispute are X born in 2011 , Y born in 2013 , and Z born in 2014 ("the children").
2. The applicant father, Mr Regna, was born in 1979 ("the father").
3. The respondent mother is Ms Eline, born in 1989 ("the mother"). The mother has re-married Mr E, born in 1990, and is referred to in some documents as Mrs E.
4. The mother has other children from earlier relationships, including, relevantly, Ms J, who was born in 2007. Ms J is strongly aligned with her former stepfather, the applicant father in this matter and, as set out in these reasons, has been co-opted by him in his hostility towards the mother and efforts to inveigle the children in same. She sought to intervene in these proceedings as a minor, in support of her former stepfather and "to save" the children from the mother. Ms J came to court with the applicant on at least the first two days of hearing in September 2024. She lives with the applicant father and has not seen her mother or biological father for several years. She and the father recently holidayed. Ms J was the subject of final parenting orders made on 28 September 2023 by another Justice of this Court.
5. It is common ground that between February/March 2021 and February 2024, the children lived with the father and spent no time with the mother, save for three s 65L meetings at court in mid-2023 (Regna & Eline [2024] FedCFamC1F 161 at [4]). That was despite orders being made on 19 April 2022 for the children to spend supervised time with her.
6. In February 2024 the parties ought have had a trial, but on the Independent Children's Lawyer's ("ICL") application, the trial was adjourned and interim orders were made for the children to live week-about and an updated Family Report be produced (Regna & Eline [2024] FedCFamC1F 161).
7. In August 2024 the parties again ought have had a trial, but on the afternoon of the first day, the father's legal representatives sought and were granted leave to withdraw. On the father's and ICL's application, the trial was again adjourned. Further interim orders were made for the children to live with the mother and spend no time with the father (Regna & Eline (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 566) ("Regna & Eline (No 2)").
8. The trial then commenced on 2 September 2024 for an agreed three days. However, only the father was cross-examined for those three days. The trial then went part-heard to 13 January 2025 for five days, but concluded in three.

1. In the father's trial Outline of Case filed 2 August 2024 ("August Outline"), he sought sole decision making for major long-term decisions for the children and the children spend time with the mother informed by their wishes. In the same August Outline, the father proposed alternative orders where the parents would jointly share major long-term decision making for the children and spend alternate weeks with each parent, with changeovers occurring each Friday. His Outline also included various specific orders. There was no hint of orders for supervised time between the children and mother in his August Outline, much less no time.
2. I made many references to the father's alternate proposal for week-about orders at the interim hearing on 8 August 2024 and in my Ex Tempore Reasons given in the father's presence on that day (Regna & Eline (No 2)). As said numerous times, his week-about alternative was notwithstanding his case that the mother was a rapist and paedophile with respect to Ms J and Z. The inconsistency between those two positions could not have been lost on him at the interim hearing or in hearing the Reasons given on 8 August 2024.
3. Nevertheless, when the trial began on 2 September 2024, the father still relied upon his August Outline. The mother's Counsel cross-examined the father consistent with the orders sought by the father in his August Outline.
4. By the afternoon of day two of trial on 3 September 2024, Counsel for the ICL relentlessly pursued the father in cross-examination to change his case to either no time for the children with the mother, or that their time with her be supervised, both positions premised on the mother being an unacceptable risk to the children. It was said the cross-examination was to highlight the lack of reality in the orders sought by the father - that was a submission amply open to the mother or ICL. But instead of making a submission to that effect, the ICL's Counsel pressed the father to fundamentally change the orders he sought.
5. Given all I had said about the August Outline at the August 2024 interim hearing and in Reasons given in the presence of the father, I do not accept the father's evidence on day two of the trial in September 2024 that "his [former] lawyers did the orders" in the August Outline and he had "no idea" what was in it. Rather, this is but one example of what became the father's complete inability to accept any personal responsibility for anything, and to blame anyone and everyone else for any suggestion of short comings on his part.
6. In any event, by the time the ICL pursued the father to change his orders, the mother's Counsel had completed his cross-examination of the father and had not (understandably) canvassed anything about unacceptable risk because of the orders sought in the father's August Outline. Similarly, Counsel for the father frankly and appropriately conceded his preparation for cross-examination of the mother (about to occur) did not canvass unacceptable risk, again because of the orders in his client's August Outline. He added the first he knew of the father's changed position from the orders in his August Outline was when the ICL cross-examined the father to change the orders he sought.
7. Following the ICL's cross-examination of the father on day three of trial, being 4 September 2024, and his subsequent material change of position, I gave the father's Counsel the opportunity to clarify the orders sought by his client. He subsequently advised the father sought sole decision making for major long-term issues and the children have "indefinite" supervised time with the mother (Transcript 4 September 2024, p.87 lines 15-30).
8. This considerable change to the orders sought by the father denied each the mother and father, via their Counsel, procedural fairness; the mother's Counsel, who had understandably cross-examined on the basis of the orders sought by the father in the August Outline, and the father's own Counsel who had similarly prepared. Accordingly, the trial was adjourned part-heard so the mother's Counsel could consider whether he needed to re-cross-examine the father based on his new orders, and so the father's Counsel could re-prepare his cross-examination of the mother based on his client's new orders.
9. I ordered the parties to file an Updated Case Outline including a Minute of Orders sought by 6 January 2025. The mother's Minute maintained her position that the children spend no time with the father.
10. The father, contrary to orders made for his benefit, did not file anything. Thus, I declined to resume the trial on 13 January 2025, until the father provided a signed Minute of Orders. He then proposed the children spend no time and have no communication with the mother (Exhibit 33).
11. During the January 2025 part of the trial, the ICL handed up an order that the children spend no time with the father, but the mother provide the father a written update about the children twice a year. The mother adopted the ICL's Minute (Exhibit 64).

1. The parties met in mid-2010 and commenced cohabitation in late 2010. They married in early 2012.
2. The subject children were born in 2011, 2013 and 2014.
3. The parties moved to City O in 2014 where the mother commenced studies in 2015.
4. The parties separated on a final basis on 15 August 2015. The mother subsequently began living with her mother, the maternal grandmother. After separation, the parties shared equal time with the children under an informal arrangement.
5. Each parent has had Domestic Violence Orders ("DVO") in their favour against the other, and each has been found to have contravened such orders, many as aggravated offences. Arising out of his contraventions, the father served time in jail on remand and has been sentenced to time served; the vast majority of his contraventions are listed as convictions recorded (Exhibit 1). The mother received modest fines for her contraventions with no convictions recorded (Exhibit 49).
6. On 20 June 2016, Final Orders were made in prior proceedings for equal shared parental responsibility (as it was then) and week-about time. Specific issues and communication orders were also made.
7. The Initiating Application relevant to this proceeding was filed by the father on 19 September 2021. The mother filed her Response on 28 January 2022.
8. The first Family Report, prepared by Ms H, was filed on 29 September 2022. It recommended in part that the children live with the mother but spend no time with her husband Mr E. Ms H also recommended a moratorium of time between the children and father with family therapy to occur prior to any time recommencing.
9. A psychiatric assessment of the parties was prepared by Dr P and filed on 31 August 2023. Dr P opined the mother's mental health symptoms would meet the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Edition) ("DSM-5") diagnostic criteria for a mental health disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.
10. She opined that whilst the father did not present with mental health symptoms that would meet any DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for any diagnosis, "he demonstrated pathological personality traits which impact on his interpersonal relationships and ability to parent".
11. A s 102NA(2) order was made by the Court on 28 September 2023 restricting the personal cross-examination of the parties except by legal representation.
12. Subsequently, Ms H produced an updated Family Report filed on 15 July 2024. Her primary assessment was that the children ought live with the mother.

1. The material upon which the parties relied was a veritable moving feast of affidavits due to the three attempts at a trial, and then a part-heard trial, with each iteration necessitating updating material. I required each party to file a list of material upon which they relied.
2. The father's list of documents handed up in January 2025 listed the following material upon which he relied (Exhibit 33):
   • Initiating Application filed 16 September 2021;
   • Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed 16 September 2021;
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna filed 20 December 2023;
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna filed 19 January 2024;
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna filed 19 February 2024;
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna filed 30 July 2024;
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna filed 5 August 2024;
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna file on 30 August 2024; and
   • Affidavit of Mr Regna filed on 13 December 2024.
3. The respondent mother relied upon the following documents set out in Exhibit 35:
   • Outline of Case filed 6 January 2025;
   • Amended Response filed 8 April 2022;
   • Notice of Risk filed 28 January 2022;
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 20 December 2023;
   • Affidavit of Mr E filed 20 December 2023;
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 19 January 2024;
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 26 February 2024;
   • Affidavit of Mr E filed 26 February 2024;
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 30 July 2024;
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 5 August 2024;
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 30 August 2024; and
   • Affidavit of Ms Eline filed 6 January 2025.
4. The Independent Children's Lawyer relied upon the following (Exhibit 65):
   • Family Report by Ms H filed 1 November 2022;
   • Updated Family Report of Ms H filed 15 July 2024; and
   • Psychiatric Report by Dr P filed 31 August 2023.
5. As required by r 8.15(3) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules"), various annexures to the parties' and experts' affidavits became Exhibits.
6. Both the mother, her husband, the father, and the two experts were required for cross-examination. The mother urged I make credit findings against the father, but I decline to do so, mindful of what was said in Adamson v Adamson [2014] FamCAFC 232; (2014) 51 Fam LR 626 at [168]:

... These parties are, and will remain, the parents of D and K and adverse credit findings in this decision carry the inherent risk that, rather than bringing an end to long-standing conflictual issues, they may be embraced as vindication for the pursuit of further conflict in the future.

1. True, the parties' proposals will not see any form of co-parenting going forward, but I nevertheless do not consider general findings about credit (or a lack thereof) to be necessary or helpful in this case.
2. That said, the father did not help his case by the hostile, argumentative and non-responsive way he answered questions. Any challenge or criticism of him was someone else's fault, including his former lawyers for the orders in his August Outline. Another was when he said it was "on the children, not me" if the children overhead him saying "bad things". The father made multiple personal attacks on both the Counsel for the mother and ICL in his extensive non-responsive answers to questions. In another (non-responsive) answer he called one of the experts a "biased", "man hating woman" and called the 35-year-old mother of the children a "violent little girl". To no avail, he was asked time and time again to listen to the question and answer that question.
3. The mother was largely responsive to questions and made appropriate concessions. She spoke candidly of the violence between her and former and current partners, and with remorse that the children were exposed. She also spoke with insight about her husband, Mr E's rehabilitation from an alcohol fuelled perpetrator of violence and abuse, to someone who had taken proactive steps to become of sober habit with far more pro-social problem solving techniques. The mother called her husband Mr E, "blunt" in his style of communication. I agree; he was a man of few words, but owned much of his violence, said alcohol was no excuse, and spoke of his new skills and supports to make better choices.
4. The parties tendered 65 Exhibits between them.

1. The standard of proof in this case is the balance of probabilities. Section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Evidence Act") provides:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. The section is particularly apt in this matter given the serious allegations of sexual abuse the father makes against the mother and with respect to the allegations each parent makes against the other in relation to acts of family violence.
2. It is well settled that it is not necessary for a trial judge, in reaching a decision, to refer to every piece of evidence or argument presented during the trial. In Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62], Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ said this:

...A judge's reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge's failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party's case.

1. In Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 385-386, Mahoney JA said this:

It is not the duty of the judge to decide every matter which is raised in argument.

...

Nor is it necessary for a judge who is exercising a discretionary judgment to detail each factor which he has found to be relevant or irrelevant, or to itemize, for example, in the assessment of damages for tort, each of the factual matters to which he has had regard ... Nor is a judge required to make an explicit finding on each disputed piece of evidence. It will be sufficient, if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear...

1. Section 65D(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") provides that this Court may make such parenting orders as it thinks proper (subject to s 65DAB of the Act, which is irrelevant in this matter).
2. Section 60B of the Act sets out the objects of Part VII of the Act, and that is:

The objects of this Part are:

(a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and

(b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.

1. Section 60CA of the Act provides that the child's best interests are a paramount consideration in making a parenting order. Section 60CC of the Act addresses those best interests and provides:

(1) Subject to subsection (4), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must:

(a) consider the matters set out in subsection (2); and

(b) if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child - also consider the matters set out in subsection (3).

1. The children are not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander children.

1. I now turn to the s 60CC(2) considerations.

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect or other harm) of: (i) the child; and (ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child).

1. Section s 60CC(2)(a) is informed by subsection (2A) which provides:

(2A) In considering the matters set out in paragraph (2)(a), the court must include consideration of

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

1. In this matter, both parents say the other poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the children.
2. Section 140 of the Evidence Act guides my findings of past facts. Then, a separate, future looking and predictive consideration - not governed by findings on the balance of probabilities - is whether the mother and/or father pose an unacceptable risk of harm to the children. Or as neatly said in Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97; (2022) FLC 94-092 ("Isles") at [47]:

47. ...The civil standard of proof is reserved for the proof of facts, the positive or negative findings in relation to which could well feed into any alternate finding about the existence of an unacceptable risk of harm.

1. At [51] the Isles Full Court adopted what Austin J said in Fitzwater & Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251; (2019) 60 Fam LR 212 ("Fitzwater") at [139] including this useful elucidation of the concept of unacceptable risk:
   1. Speaking of the risk of some future occurrence is just another way of expressing the chance of it happening. The concept of chance lies along a continuum, encompassing all outcomes which lie in the range between highly probable and remotely possible, assuming the polar extremes of certainty are ignored. In the current context, the higher the chance of the children's sexual abuse, the greater the risk of their physical or psychological harm. At some point on the continuum the risk of such harm becomes so potent it cannot be tolerated: it is unacceptable.
2. Before I consider what each party says about unacceptable risk, it is helpful to set the backdrop for the discussion from the agreed update put to the Family Report Writer:

This summary I'm giving you with the joint consent of the parties, so what I'm about to say, you can take as uncontested. The first of this is that the mother and father at this juncture are each seeking orders that they have sole decision-making for the children, that the children live with them, and that the children spend no time with the parent. Is that your understanding of the current situation?‑‑‑Yes.

Okay. The father's position is that the children are at unacceptable risk of physical and/or emotional harm in the mother's care due to: (1) the mother sexually abusing [Z], and failing to protect [Ms J] from sexual abuse, and; (2) the mother exposing the children to violence through her past relationships and current relationship. The mother's position is that the children are at unacceptable risk of emotional harm in the father's care due to: (1) the father exposing the children to his firmly held belief that the mother has sexually abused [Z], and/or exposed [Z] and [Ms J] to sexual abuse, and the children are thereby at risk of sexual abuse in the mother's care, and (2) the second limb is that the father is not able or willing to facilitate a relationship between the children and the mother, if they were in his care.

(Transcript 15 January 2025, p.4 lines 28-45)

(emphasis added)

1. Before I embark upon a consideration of each contention set out in the extract above, it is worthwhile to recall that a positive finding of abuse or family violence should not be made unless the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities (see s 140 Evidence Act), including but not limited to the matters set out in s 140(2) which the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied.

Father's case: the mother sexually abusing Z, and failing to protect Ms J from sexual abuse

1. The father's sworn/affirmed evidence in support of these most serious allegations in his many affidavits is limited to this:

[Ms J] has disclosed to me that [Ms Eline] and a previous partner of hers physically abused and raped her.

(Father's affidavit filed 20 December 2023, paragraph 49)

[In mid] 2024, I received a phone call from the police Child Protection and Investigation Unit at [Suburb S]. They told me, and I verily believe, that they were investigating an allegation of sexual abuse against [Z] [sic] by [Ms Eline] made in her household.

(Father's affidavit filed 5 August 2024, paragraph 1)

1. To say the sworn/affirmed evidence from the father about a critical issue in his case is scant, is quite the understatement. Indeed, proof to the satisfaction of the court "should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences" (M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 at 77) ("M & M"), which is precisely what the father proffers.
2. Notwithstanding the father's inexact and indefinite evidence, I have gleaned the following from the first Family Report of Ms H, filed 1 November 2022 (Exhibit 47):

(a) Ms J said the mother and her boyfriend had touched her inappropriately. "She said that this occurred before [...] [the father] rescued us from the toxic relationship in 2019". "[Ms J] stated that it occurred at [Ms Eline's] house at [Suburb AA]. [Ms J] stated that this had occurred multiple times after school and before the other children got home from school" (Exhibit 47, paragraph 6.20);

(b) The father said Ms J told him that she had been raped and molested by the mother and her then partner (Exhibit 47, paragraphs 7.13 and 7.17);

(c) Ms J asked her biological father why he "did nothing to help her when she was raped by her mother's boyfriend" (Exhibit 47, paragraph 11.2);

(d) Subpoenaed documents inspected by the Family Report Writer, said Ms J attended a police station with her former stepfather, the applicant father, in mid-2022 to report allegations of sexual abuse by Ms Eline's then boyfriend between March and November 2019 involving inappropriate touching of her chest and crotch on the top of her clothes. Ms J told police that she did not wish to make a complaint, but wanted the information noted. She made a s 93A interview and then signed a police notebook stating she did not wish to make a formal complaint. Then a short time later in mid-2022, Ms J and her former stepfather called the Police saying Ms J now wanted to proceed with a complaint. Both Ms J and the father spoke to the Police over the phone. (Exhibit 47, paragraph 12.18); and

(e) "The police document refers to [Ms J] stating that the offences occurred every night for between two and three months and she would be in the lounge room with the suspect, her mother [Ms Eline] and her sister as well as the suspect's daughter. She stated that when [Ms Eline] would leave the room, the suspect would touch her chest and "no no" zone. She said the touching always occurred on top of her clothes and this made her scared and feel uncomfortable". When Ms J returned to the mother's address in 2020 nothing further happened (Exhibit 47, paragraph 12.19).

1. There are considerable differences in what comes from the extracts above - rape or inappropriate touching on top of clothes; the mother's then boyfriend abusing Ms J alone or in concert with the mother; and, the abuse occurring after school or every night.
2. This is recorded about Z in the same report:

[Z] said the abuse from her mother was "rude stuff" however, she could not provide any context to this.

(Exhibit 47, paragraph 12.38).

1. To the psychiatric assessor, the father alleged the mother, "had harmed her children in a variety of ways, including sexual assault toward her daughter, [Ms J] ..." (Exhibit 45, p.10).
2. In the second Family Report (Exhibit 48) filed 15 July 2024, this is said:

(a) "[Ms Eline] said that in the second week she had the children, police from the Child Protection Investigation Unit rang her and said that [Mr Regna] reported that she had sexually assaulted [Z] in the shower. [Ms Eline] said that she spoke to the police about this being untrue. She confirmed that she had assisted [Z] wash the hair dye out of her hair and had then left the bathroom. [Ms Eline] said that [Z] is independent in her use of the bathroom. She said that since this learning of this allegation, she gets [Z] to do everything" (Exhibit 48, paragraph 3.2 and see paragraph 3.15);

(b) "[Mr Regna] has over the years made a number of unsubstantiated allegations against [Ms Eline], and I noted that this has continued as recently as [early] 2024 when [Mr Regna] alleged to police that [Z] had disclosed that [Ms Eline] had sexually abused her in the shower" (Exhibit 48, paragraph 8.2); and

(c) The father "continues to state that a child has disclosed sexual abuse by" the mother (Exhibit 48, paragraph 8.9).

1. The above is a representative sample of what is contained in the material. Various exhibits also deal with allegations of sexual abuse but do not assist in providing an evidential foundation for the father's serious allegations. For example, Exhibit 31 says, in part, with respect to a notification on 17 May 2024:

Notifier advised that they believe that the mother is 'touching her ([Z's]) private parts and putting her fingers in when in the shower'.

When notifier was asked why they believed this, they responded 'she did the same to me when I was 12'.

1. It is common ground that Ms J made this notification. This appears to be a new allegation of abuse made by Ms J and does not sit with what has been previously alleged. Moreso, the Exhibit goes on:

NB: it was noted that the notifier was taking prompts and instructions from an unknown adult male in the background on what to say and had to be prompted to answer questions by CSO, the response would then be delayed until the adult in background told notifier what to say.

1. Whilst the father denied he was the "unknown adult male in the background", I find he was because it is consistent with other conduct of the father in him:

(a) Requiring Z to tell the Report Writer things she thought untrue (Exhibit 48, paragraph 5.6);

(b) Telling Ms J how to reply to some text message (Annex 8 to Father's affidavit of 20 December 2023, second statement paragraphs 8-9, Exhibit 57);

(c) Telling Z the mother pushed her off a bed and also caused a scar on her back (Exhibit 47, paragraph 6.5);

(d) Interrupting and taking over Ms J's phone conversation with her school (Exhibit 14);

(e) Telling Y his mother stabbed the father when he was young (Exhibit 47, paragraph 6.8); and

(f) Letting X believe the mother is only after the father's money (Exhibit 47, paragraph 13.9).

1. I further find the father's answers about where he was when Ms J made the call were contradictory and unconvincing: he went to the shops for some unrecalled period of time; yet he said no one else was home when Ms J called (Transcript 4 September 2024, p.65 lines 5-10); but the "unknown adult male" in the background could have been her housemate talking to her partner" (Transcript 4 September 2024, p.66 lines 30-33); but because Ms J is gay, she would not be talking to a man (Transcript 4 September 2024, p.66 line 37).
2. Exhibit 32 refers to Z being interviewed by the Child Protection Investigation Unit ("CPIU") in mid-2024, where no disclosures were made. The children were due to go to the mother's the following day, but the father withheld them.
3. Conscious of s 140 of the Evidence Act, the father has failed to persuade me of the first particular of unacceptable risk (in summary, the sexual abuse of Ms J and Z) as alleged by him for the following reasons.
4. First, there is no reliable or probative evidence that would allow me to make positive findings that the mother sexually abused Z and/or failed to protect Ms J from sexual abuse. As set out above, the father gives very little evidence about this in sworn/affirmed form, and what I have gleaned from other sources all come together to constitute "inexact proofs" or "indefinite testimony" (M v M).
5. Second, with respect to Ms J's allegations, it is clear that the father allows or otherwise does not dissuade her from actively working as her former stepfather's mouthpiece in a joint attack of vitriol towards her mother and in collecting "evidence" against her. For example, she had sought to intervene in the proceedings. Another example is she came to court with her former stepfather in the first tranche of the trial, and when the trial resumed in January 2025 the father said he wanted his former step-child, then under 18, to give evidence. Further, Ms J took Z to a GP in July 2024 and got a certificate that the child "should avoid going to see her mother". Additionally, she wrote a statutory declaration supposedly for a school guidance officer (according to the father in cross-examination yet not mentioned in his affidavit which attached it) but used by the father in these proceedings (Annex 5 to Father's affidavit of 20 December 2023, Exhibit 57) and whilst she makes many complaints about the mother, says nothing about sexual abuse. Moreover, the father has told her how to reply to text messages about the children (Annex 8 to Father's affidavit of 20 December 2023, second statement paragraphs 8-9, Exhibit 57).
6. Third, with respect to the father's allegations, he was an unreliable witness determined to pour scorn and opprobrium on anyone who did not accept his views; I say more about his attitude to others later, suffice to say at this point, his views of the mother are palpable and have been made clear to the children. For example:

[Y] said that [Mr Regna] also says bad things about [Ms Eline] and [Y] spoke of how this makes him angry. He said that he doesn't like hearing [Mr Regna] say bad things about [Ms Eline].

(Exhibit 48, paragraph 5.9)

1. Fourth, and perhaps most tellingly, this was attributed to Z in the second Family Report:

I asked [Z] if there was anything she was worried about and she appeared slightly nervous, fidgeting with her fingers and squirming in her seat. She confirmed that [Mr Regna had said that she needed to say things however she didn't think that was fair. She also confirmed that she didn't like saying things that are not true.

(Exhibit 48 paragraph 5.6)

1. Fifth and finally, despite the father taking the children to Child Safety and the Police on many occasions (including taking X to the Police in mid-2024 - which "slipped" his mind to include in affidavits filed in July and August 2024), nothing has ever come of these, adverse to the mother. Similarly, there is no evidence before me from the Police or Child Safety that they told the father to withhold the children from the mother "for their safety" as he alleged. Instead, in their most recent assessment, Child Safey concluded the father was causing the children emotional harm by coaching them to make "significant disclosures about the mother sexually abusing [Z]" (Annexure 1 to Mother's affidavit of 19 January 2025, Exhibit 52). For the many examples of the father's conduct I have given in this s 60CC(2)(a) discussion, I agree.
2. For those reasons, the evidence, such as it is, fails to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that which is alleged by the father, and does not permit any positive findings of sexual abuse by the mother and/or her former partner against either child. Again, for those reasons, I reject the father's allegations as groundless, meaning, looking to the future, I do not assess and evaluate the magnitude of any risk to the children from the mother to be so potent as to be unacceptable.

Father's case: the mother exposing the children to violence through her past relationships and current relationship

1. I accept the mother has survived relationships marred by violence and abuse, starting with at least the father, then two other partners and then her current husband. At least from the children's perspective, when they were not spending independent time with their mother (as opposed to say the three s 65L meetings at court in early 2023) from February/March 2021 to another judge's interim hearing in February 2024 (Regna & Eline [2024] FedCFamC1F 161 at [4]), they were spared any such exposure. The mother readily accepted, and with remorse, that prior to the cessation of time by the father in February/March 2021 her various partners' violence and abuse (including from the father) was something to which the children were exposed.
2. I am satisfied the father committed acts of family violence against the mother because he has been found to have contravened a DVO protecting the mother, on numerous occasions between 2015 to 2019. In other words, other judicial officers concluded the contraventions of the DVO were made out. The father was fined but no convictions recorded for two contraventions, and, then a raft of convictions recorded for contravening Domestic Violence Orders (aggravated offences) with suspended sentences or sentenced to time already served (Exhibit 1). The agreed facts upon which the pleas were entered are not in evidence before me. All I have is the fact of the convictions for the offences in the father's criminal history in Exhibit 1.
3. Suffice to say I do not accept the father's denials in cross-examination or in his 20 December 2023 affidavit at paragraph 51 that, "I have never committed acts of domestic violence against [Ms Eline]." The convictions recorded and breaches with no conviction recorded tell differently. The father's Counsel quite appropriately accepted it is not for this Court to go behind the convictions; I agree. Relevantly, s 91, in Part 3.5, of the Evidence Act does not apply to these child related proceedings; s 69ZT(1)(c) of the Act. In turn, s 69ZX(3)(b) of the Act allows this Court to adopt decisions or judgments of any court, and I do so. As said, different judicial officers have been satisfied the elements of the contraventions of the DVO were made out on the requisite standard.
4. Exhibit 1 was his criminal history, to which the father said, "half of them are fake" (Transcript 2 September 2024, p.61 line 15). That therefore must mean the father concedes the other half are not fake. I also do not accept the father's view that "I pleaded guilty for stuff I shouldn't have because I was told to. So yes, half of them are fake". I do not accept his claims about his pleas because his record is his record and ultimately, whatever advice he received, it was the father, not some other person, who entered the pleas of guilt. To that end, on each plea of guilt a Magistrate must have been satisfied his pleas were genuine and unequivocal (Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 at [511]).
5. I am also satisfied the mother's next two relationships (in 2019 see Exhibit 36 and in 2020 see Exhibit 37) were violent because the mother accepted that to be so and accepted the children were exposed to those partners' violence and abuse at times. To his credit, the father helped the mother and children escape the 2019 relationship, but things between them soured. The father took issue with whether the 2020 partner was actually the mother's partner at the time, preferring the unnecessary term "fuck buddy" instead. There is no suggestion either of those people are in the mother's environment anymore.
6. Finally, I accept the mother's relationship with her now husband, Mr E, was also one of violence because both the mother and her husband accepted that to be so. Mr E also accepted he had been incarcerated for matters of violence and convicted of DVO contraventions, the last of which occurred in late 2020.
7. In relation to the mother's contraventions, I repeat and rely on what I said earlier about adopting decisions or judgments of another court here; s 69ZX(3)(b). She too has a history of contravention of DVOs, being two contraventions in 2016 and two in early 2021. She was fined for each contravention and no convictions were recorded. Again, I do not have the agreed facts upon which her pleas were entered. All I have is her criminal record setting out the offences and dates. Again, I will not go behind the fact of the convictions.
8. I am satisfied Mr E has inflicted family violence and abuse against the mother in early 2022, when Mr E, intoxicated, spat on the mother, pushed her and snatched the keys off her before calling her a "dog". Both the mother and Mr E accepted this to be so. He also attacked another person.
9. That was his nadir.
10. I accept Mr E' evidence that as a consequence, he has taken active steps to rehabilitate himself, including engaging with a psychologist on a regular basis, undertaking a 12 month Men's Behaviour Change Program, and, accessing what is on offer for men and their mental health through a government department. He appropriately acknowledged, and voluntarily so, intoxication was no excuse for his violence but has also changed his drinking habits to one of sobriety. He has been employed since 2022 in a job where he is consistently tested for drug and alcohol use.
11. A family violence order was made and is in force. There is no evidence before me that it has been contravened by Mr E.
12. I am satisfied he now has a new, pro-social skill set to draw upon, because he was able to describe techniques to avoid escalation and not choose violence. He also impressed me with his awareness of the resources he has since discovered that he can access through the government.
13. Accordingly, I find the mother's partners committed acts of violence upon her and exposed the children to family violence prior to their cessation of time with her in early 2021. Further, I find that her current husband has also been violent and abusive to her. However, looking to the future, Mr E's awareness of alternatives to violence and abuse and his supports through a government department mean I assess the risk of the mother's and/or children's further exposure to family violence as limited and the magnitude as not unacceptable.

The mother's case: the father exposing the children to his firmly held belief that the mother has sexually abused Z, and/or exposed Z and Ms J to sexual abuse, and the children are thereby at risk of sexual abuse in the mother's care

1. I have dealt with the father's beliefs and lack of evidence about sexual abuse above.
2. Despite a lack of particulars in his sworn/affirmed material, the father is plainly of this view and has clearly told the children. For example, Z told the Report Writer for the first Report that "Dad was to keep us safe from her and dad doesn't want us to see her" (Exhibit 47, paragraph 13.7). Similarly, Ms J's pursuit and negative opinion of the mother has been enabled by the father. Notwithstanding, Ms J's pursuit of the mother is not just limited to Ms J and the mother, but the father has allowed Ms J to extend her grasp to Z, taking her to a GP to get a medical certificate stating Z is not safe with the mother. It is also plain Z knows the father's belief by telling the Family Report Writer her father told her to say things, but she did not like saying things that were untrue. Y also expressed his anger about his father saying bad things about the mother.
3. The father is firmly of the view that the mother is a rapist and a paedophile. He agreed to that in cross-examination and personally told the mother that at an August 2024 hearing. It is clear he has freely shared his beliefs with the children and is echoed by Ms J in that regard - "everybody knows about it", and "the children are aware that [Ms J] views the mother as a rapist? - yes".
4. I have no confidence whatsoever that the father would be able to quarantine the children from his views. He has not done so in the past and there was no suggestion that he would constrain himself going forward. He also blamed the children for hearing things he might be saying; "On occasions, I say bad things but not to the children. If the children are at my door listening in to conversations, that's on them, not me" (Transcript 3 September 2024, p.6 line 26). I find this is hardly child focused and is a good demonstration of the father's inability to accept responsibility for his actions and propensity to blame anyone else (including the children) for any failings levelled at him.
5. Given my findings about the sexual abuse allegations, it follows that giving the children a false narrative about sexual abuse is something that is emotionally damaging to them. It also follows that asking the children to report untrue things about their mother is damaging to them, as is saying negative things about her to them, or preventing them from overhearing such.
6. I conclude the father's beliefs and lack of constraint in sharing them with the children pose unacceptable risks of harm to the children via the psychological harm it will cause them. Looking forward, living with the father would see the children continuing to be exposed to his views and likely taken to authorities for further reporting. In other words, there is a high chance of the father continuing his pursuit of the mother and involvement of the children. The higher that chance (which I assess as high) the greater the risk of the psychological harm to the children. I find the risk of such harm is "so potent it cannot be tolerated: it is unacceptable".

The mother's case: that the father is not able or willing to facilitate a relationship between the children and the mother, if they were in his care.

1. The father's vitriol and hostility toward the mother is palpable. As set out in the Family Reports, it is clear to the children too. Y is angered by his father's bad words about the mother. Z does not like to tell her father's lies. Z wanted to meet her mother in the first Family Report but thought that would make her father angry. In or about July 2023, Y overheard the father saying something about the children being removed from him "in two weeks", but did not raise that with his father or anyone because "I'll probably get in trouble with dad" (Exhibit 7).
2. The father allowed time with the mother to cease in early 2021 and took no steps to find or even propose an alternate supervision service. Apart from some s 65L court-ordered time between the mother and the children, time did not resume until March 2024 when the court ordered week-about. Even then, the father withheld the children on the eve of the August 2024 attempt at a trial.
3. Despite the children saying they were content to meet the mother with the Report Writer for the first Family Report, the father left the rooms saying, in front of the children, they did not want to. He placed the children in an invidious bind of either staying and meeting the mother or following him as he walked to the car (Transcript 2 September 2024, p.57 line 4 to p.58 line 2). They followed him; he really gave them no choice.
4. In the first Family Report he said the pregnancies of the three children were planned (Exhibit 47, paragraph 7.6). However, in cross-examination he claimed, "She stopped taking it [the birth control pill] without my knowledge to trap me into giving her a child". The father's hostility towards the mother now extends to their first child's conception.
5. At a s 65L meeting in March 2023, the father put the chocolates the mother gave the children in the bin, which the children saw. He claimed the children agreed to that (Transcript 2 September 2024, p.12 line 16). He agreed he was "outraged" they got chocolates from her. I do not accept his feeble excuse that it was about sugar content - he was just outraged the children had something nice from their mother, which they might enjoy.
6. The father again withheld the children in August 2024. He had taken Z for an interview with CPIU in mid-2024, the day before they were to go to the mother's home for a week. No disclosures were forthcoming. Despite this, he kept the children in contravention of orders. He did not deliver the younger two to the mother until a later date in mid-2024 when the second attempt at a trial of the matter should have begun:

[During mid] [2024], the children were required to transition to the mother's care, but that did not occur. It is common ground that the father is still not complying with orders because it should be the mother's week this week with the three children, who are the subject of my orders.

[Y] and [Z] were delivered by the mother to court counselling this morning and [X] delivered by the father.

It would seem on the face of it, although without making a finding, every party agrees that [X] is with the father, which would seem contrary to the orders. That seems to present a difficulty for the father's position here, where he implored me through the duty lawyer that he will abide by the orders. It would seem he is not, at least insofar as [X] is concerned.

(Regna & Eline (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 566 at [74-76])

1. Having heard the evidence, I now safely conclude the father did not comply with the 2024 orders for week-about in mid-2024.
2. And, as a final example of the father's view of the mother, in cross-examination, he referred to the mother as "a violent little girl". His use of the phrase "little girl" is a telling insight into his view of the adult mother. He only corrected himself to "woman" when asked about his use of the word "girl" for the adult mother of the children.
3. In short, for all of these examples, I find the father is unable and unwilling to facilitate a positive/beneficial relationship between the children and the mother. He offers nothing but negativity, condemnation and derision about her, which he has shared with the children - they say as much themselves. Thus, I accept the opinions of the psychiatric expert and Family Report Writer in this matter that his attitude to the mother is harmful to the children and his failure to support a positive relationship between the children and the mother has had and will have a significant negative impact on them.
4. I accept the expert opinions because the father's negative talk about the mother and failure to facilitate time will have caused the children an internal sense of confusion culminating in cumulative levels of harm over several years.
5. Further, given all the father has said and done (or not done with respect to compliance with orders), I am satisfied the children's on-going emotional needs will not be met by the father in any way that is positive or beneficial to them in the short and long term.
6. Looking to the future, the children need to be protected from the father's beliefs and inability to prioritise the children and their needs over his hatred of the mother and efforts to inculcate them with his views. This constitutes a great risk of psychological harm to the children and risks the children's ability to grow into the best people they can be - it is a risk to them that cannot be tolerated - it is a risk that is unacceptable.
7. For the many reasons already given, and reasons that follow with respect to the children's views and the mother's capacity to parent, I am satisfied she will promote the safety of the children. In particular, I refer to the second part of the agreed statement put to the Family Report Writer under the next s 60CC(2) factor about the children settling in well since they have solely lived with the mother.

1. I have already described the father sabotaging the children seeing the mother, as they had agreed to do, for the first Family Report.
2. In the second Family Report (Exhibit 48) produced in June 2024 (when week-about was in place), Z said she really loves staying with her mother. Y said he wanted to spend more time with his mother and live with her. X said week-about was a bit "annoying" and did not like having less access to technology when with his mother - a not uncommon complaint from a child his age.
3. In the second tranche of the trial in January 2025, the mother said having the children at home was as if nothing had happened and they have all settled in.
4. In terms of the children's views, perhaps most telling is this part of the agreed statement put to the Report Writer in January 2025:

I can indicate to you that on 8 August 2024, the court made an interim order for each of the children to live with the mother, and spend no time with the father. Were you aware of that?‑‑‑Yes.

This is the arrangement that has been in place since that time. Now, [X] did abscond from school on or around [...] of August 2024, a few days after that change of residence, by going to a [community group] after school, and then came home with the mother once she found him. There is also evidence that in mid-August, [X] received a package at school with items including a phone, a go card, $20, and instructions written by [Ms J] encouraging him to run away from mum. It is uncontested between the parties that aside from the incident [in] August 2024, none of the children have tried to run away at any other time, and that was the incident where [X] absconded from the school. There is no evidence of the children seeking out to communicate with the father since they have been in the mother's sole care. The children have seemingly settled in well, and neither parent has proposed or provided any evidence of any third party to supervise their time with the other parents - sorry - to supervise either their time, or the other parent's time in the alternative.

1. Over time, and as explained by the Family Report Writer, the children have grown older and developed a sense of right and wrong, a sense of justice and what is fair and unfair; Z said as much in the second report. That the children have settled at their mother's and not sought to find their way back to their father, indicates they are demonstrating or living their views by staying put. It also folds into the next two s 60CC factors about the mother's capacity to parent after the sudden change in parenting arrangements in August 2024.

**_(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs_**

1. These matters go hand-in-hand.
2. The children need and deserve to grow into the best people they can be. They have a need to attend school regularly and learn. They need to be emotionally freed from the father's negative talk and consequent internal confusion that must have caused them. They need age-appropriate boundaries. They do not need to be shouldered with the burden of the father's beliefs and ferment about the mother.
3. I have already made findings under s 60CC(2)(a) which readily led to the conclusion that the father does not have the capacity to provide for the children's many needs in any way that would allow them to become their best selves.
4. I am also not convinced that the father knew nothing about the contents of Ms J's package sent to X at school (extracted just above as part of the agreed statement to the expert); he organised the package to go from Ms J to his then partner, who subsequently provided it to her child who attended at the same school as X for delivery to him. Thus, on balance, he either knew and participated, or, turned a blind eye to Ms J's activities and enabled/empowered her through silence - it does not matter whether act or omission, as neither option tells well for the father's capacity to parent in any positive way of benefit to the children's needs.
5. I am also not satisfied the father's capacity to parent extends to positive role modelling for the children. Indeed, I consider the father's unabated, negative attitude to women to be one that is harmful to the children and will colour X's and Y's views of women and will colour Z's best view of herself. For example, of people whose opinions he did not share or care for, the father unabashedly said in cross-examination that:
   • The female psychiatric expert was "part of the Domestic Violence Action Group for Women, as is everybody else", her opinions are "a pack of lies" "more lies" and "a load of lies", she is "trying to get something out of it [her report]", is part of a pact or group of people that are "anti-men";
   • The female Report Writer "is biased", her opinions are "false" and "a lie", she is "part of a Council for Domestic Violence Against women", "works for a Domestic Violence Action Group Australia", "was against me from the start" and her Report was "a biased report by a man-hating woman";
   • Neither expert "believed in domestic violence against men";
   • When Z said something critical of the father, he said "she's lying"; and
   • The mother was a violent "little girl".
6. The father can have whatever opinions he wants about women who challenge him or otherwise do not accept his story. But I conclude that his attitudes are not healthy and not well-rounded ones for the children to be exposed.
7. Exhibits 9, 10, 15 and 20 also reveal the children having many "unexplained" and "family reason" absences from school when in the father's care. I do not accept his explanation that they were "because of Covid" because the records do not support that. That then calls into question the father's ability, or lack thereof, to attend to the children's educational needs and I conclude from those records that the father has failed to adequately meet the children's need to attend school.
8. A question also looms as to whether the father is medically well enough to provide for the children and his medical conditions remain clouded in mystery - despite the February 2024 trial being adjourned, in part so there could be "clarity as to his medical and/or health condition and any treatment he has received" (Regna & Eline [2024] FedCFamC1F 161 at [9(a)]). And at [16]:

I am comfortably able to say that the father, in my view, even in his most recent affidavit, has not fulsomely disclosed the full extent of his medical situation and that is more likely to be clarified by the additional subpoena that had been issued recently by and on behalf of the Independent Children's Lawyer.

1. The Court again raised this with the father in August 2024 and the ICL had been very clear from at least February 2024 through to the eventual trial that the father ought put on medical evidence about his health. The best the father did was a two page letter from a medical professional to his GP saying not very much at all and concluding with the following plan:

1. Can continue [medication] long term if needed.

2. No restrictions on driving [...].

3. Discharged from clinic

(Annexure 4, Father's affidavit filed 30 July 2024, Exhibit 60)

1. This is against a backdrop of the material indicating the father has/had:
   • Attempted self-harm overdose in 2014/2015;
   • A sickness and "nearly died" in 2014;
   • Severe depression in 2015/2016;
   • A diagnosis of a mental health condition but later withdrawn;
   • A diagnosis of anxiety disorder in 2017;
   • Suicidal ideations in 2017;
   • Surgery for a medical condition in 2020;
   • An overdose in mid-2023 requiring hospitalisation;
   • Migraines;
   • Migraines requiring hospitalisation in 2023;
   • Suspected "white spots" in his brain;
   • A mental breakdown in 2023 with severe depression wherein the hospital was "calling him every day to make sure I am still alive" (Exhibit 3);
   • Post-traumatic stress disorder; and
   • A suspected medical episode in 2023 (Exhibit 18).
2. The medical professional's letter does not deal with this rich list of problems - many of which would be outside his area of expertise. Instead, I find the father has not made material disclosure about his medical issues and has minimised the effect of his medical conditions on his household in his evidence to this Court. Conversely, Exhibit 3 reveals the father telling the school that the children would be taken from him if the Department knew about his 2023 overdose and consequent hospitalisation. He has not been so forthcoming with the court.
3. Further, the children have been exposed to the father's illnesses in inappropriate ways, with the child Ms J "babysitting" his medication (Exhibit 3) after he overdosed in 2023. The Exhibits from the school make it plain the children were alert to his difficulties, with Exhibit 8 recording the father saying the three subject children found him unconscious and Ms J called an ambulance. In cross-examination, the father said it was only Ms J who found him, but I prefer what is recorded by the school. It is contemporaneous to the overdose and the father had motive in cross-examination to limit the subject children's exposure to the sequelae of his overdose. I find this must have been frightening for the children.
4. Similarly, the father allowed Z to attend a doctor with him where she formed the view he was "slowly dying and that he cannot drive" (Exhibit 19). The father did not accept any responsibility for Z being so exposed, instead sheeting home blame for this to the doctor. Again, I find he lacked child focus and blamed others.
5. Conversely, I am satisfied the mother does have capacity to parent and meet the children's needs. Whilst the children have been exposed to her past experiences of family violence, I am satisfied that risk going forward is not unacceptable. There is also evidence before me of the children saying the mother does not speak negatively of the father. She has appropriate boundaries with technology-time and chores for the children. On the agreed statement extracted under s 60CC(2)(b) they have seemingly settled in well with her.
6. The father does complain about: the children's attendance, or not, at a community group; says X's NDIS funding has not been used; and, that the children are collected early from school (Father's affidavit filed 15 December 2024). No one made any particular issue of this at trial and to the contrary, the agreed update given to the Report Writer notes the children have settled in well.
7. In the meantime, to facilitate the children's attendance at school from her residence, the mother has been travelling about 1,200 km per week. She is commended for that effort.
8. I am not troubled if the mother has withdrawn the children from the Community Group they attended with the father - distance is one issue, and the other is a Community Group Leader who involved himself in the matter by apparently notifying the department, according to the father. The father says the Community Group Leader is now a friend. The children do not need that kind of noise, or potential noise, around them.

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

1. In an ideal world, the children would benefit from a relationship with both parents and others of significance, if it were safe to do so. In this matter, the ideal and reality are a hemisphere apart.
2. For the findings I have made, I have concluded the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the children, lacks parental capacity to meet the children's many needs, and consequently will not enable the children to become their best selves. In short, I do not consider it safe or beneficial for the children to have a relationship with the father.
3. I cannot tell from the father's evidence whether he is still in a relationship with Ms R or not. Doing the best I can, they seem to have had break ups and/or stayed together but resided apart. In the September 2024 part of the trial, she was going to be a witness in the father's case, but by January 2025, she was not. Suffice to say, I cannot make any findings about what she might bring to the children.
4. For the findings I have made about the mother (and Mr E) with respect to promoting the children's safety, their views and the mother's capacity to parent, I do consider it is safe and beneficial for the children to have a relationship with the mother and others in her orbit who are significant to the children.

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

1. I have determined the father poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the children for the many reasons already articulated.
2. Can that risk be mitigated? The answer is no.
3. For a start, the father's belief system about sexual abuse by the mother and/or former partner is ingrained and hardwired within him. I can see nothing which would change his beliefs. The children are also well-alert to his views; "everyone knows" as he said in cross-examination. Over the several years in court, the father has not seen fit to quarantine the children from his views about the mother being a rapist and paedophile as far as he is concerned.
4. In the time the children were in his primary care, he was a manipulative parent causing the children emotional harm and failed to support the children's relationship with their mother due to his belief (albeit putting little into evidence himself) that Z and Ms J have been sexually abused.
5. He also has no insight into the impact of his beliefs, words and deeds on the children; for example, if the children overhear him saying "bad things" about the mother, "that's on them, not me". He lacks capacity to parent and to meet the children's various needs in a way that would allow them to live their best lives free from the burdens of the internal confusion he has imposed upon them.
6. I can see no way of mitigating the various risks that the father presents to these children - supervision is not the answer. No one proposed that at the end of the day, but I have turned my mind to that option and reject it on the strength of the Family Report Writer's analysis, which I accept as a well-reasoned opinion based on expertise:

My worry about supervised time for children is that supervised time is generally a fluid process where it is utilised for a short period, until unsupervised time can occur.

...

I worry about the cumulative level of emotional harm that these children have been exposed to in the father's care, and my worry is that any time between the children and their father would continue, I suppose, to undermine a primary placement with the mother. So if the court consider that these children are at unacceptable risk from [Mr Regna], then my recommendations would be that no time be ordered, and the reason I say that is because the children have been exposed to an internal sense of confusion throughout the proceedings, and throughout the time that they spent with [Mr Regna]. ... if the court deemed that there is unacceptable harm to the children, or risk of harm to the children from [Mr Regna], I'm very concerned about how any supervised time would ever move to unsupervised, and then what that would do to the children over the long-term, having to have long-term supervised time. Unfortunately for [Mr Regna], even whilst under the court monitoring throughout this process, he has maintained some behaviours which are not helpful, and are certainly not appropriate for the children.

(Transcript 15 January 2025, p.6 lines 4-27)

1. Under the eye of the Court the father has pursued fruitless sexual abuse allegations; I have no confidence whatsoever that he would desist from doing so even with supervised time.
2. The idea of indefinite supervision is something "long recognised" as "undesirable, though sometimes warranted" (see Betros v Betros [2017] FamCAFC 90 at [13] and cases cited therein). The court continued:

Consideration should usually be given to whether orders can be created to avoid the permanence of the supervision or, if that is not practicable in the circumstances of the case, whether the orders for permanent supervision are instead best made unconditionally, leaving the supervised party to decide if and when he or she might bring fresh proceedings to vary the orders upon proof of changed circumstances, in the manner envisaged by Rice and Asplund [1978] FamCAFC 128; (1979) FLC 90-725, as s 65D(2) of the Act ordinarily allows (see Gorman & Huffman and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 174).

1. In this matter no one proposed supervision. In any event, to what end would supervision occur? On the strength of the findings made, it is impossible to see how supervised time could lead to unsupervised time. It is also part of my predicative assessment looking forward that even with supervised time, the father would try to exert influence over the children, manipulate them and thereby cause them further emotional harm which would undermine them living with the mother.
2. Upon my findings, and without any means to mitigate the unacceptable risks posed by the father to the children, their best interests are served by orders that the children spend no time with the father. In contrast, by reference to my earlier findings under each of the s 60CC factors with respect to the mother, I consider the orders proposed by the ICL and adopted by the mother to be in the children's best interests.
3. However, the ICL's proposed orders said nothing about communications between the children and father. The father's Minute proposed that the children not communicate with the mother (and spend no time). Thus, orders about no communication were in his contemplation.
4. Hence, in addition to the no time order, for all the same reasons, the father is also not to communicate with the children. In short, the father cannot be trusted to use this medium in a child focused way, and would more likely than not use communications as a continued opportunity to undermine the mother to the children, and impose his views upon them. He will also be restrained from allowing, permitting or encouraging other people to contact the children on his behalf. I have no confidence the father would not think twice to use Ms J as his messenger (or passively permit her to do so), and to that end, I refer to my findings about the father being the voice in the background when Ms J phoned Child Safety and the package that was sent by Ms J, via the father, to X.
5. I am satisfied it is in the children's best interests that the mother send six-monthly reports to the father about each child, as proposed by the ICL and adopted by the mother. Such reporting about each individual child will cease as each child turns 18 years. The provision of information will allow the father to have some knowledge of the children as they mature to majority. Then should any of the children reach out to their father as adults, he will have some knowledge of their childhood years, which may assist in any engagement/topics of discussion.
6. I accept that final orders whereby the children live with the mother will likely see them change schools again, after several earlier changes when in the father's care. Y is embracing of a specific new school closer to the mother's home. I consider another new school for the children to be a far lesser evil than (a) remaining living with the father and all the burden that imposes on the children, and (b) enduring part of the 1,200 km a week travel they have been undertaking with the mother to maintain their schools on an interim basis.
7. I also accept the orders may mean the children will attend different Community Groups. However, I am not troubled by that as the Community Group/s they attended when with the father, included a Community Group Leader, who has become a friend of the father's and (on the father's case) bought into the sexual abuse narrative. It will be good for the children to be removed from that.
8. Finally, I turn to the allocation of parental responsibility for major long-term decisions with respect to the children. The parties' positions were, essentially, that the parent with whom the children lived would have sole parental responsibility. For the reasons given, the children will live with the mother. Accordingly, I consider it in the children's best interest that she have sole parental responsibility for all major long-term decisions for the children because that is a practical approach. Further, the deep enmity the father has to the mother means the idea of joint parental responsibility (not that anyone proposed that at the end of the day) would be a disaster for the children. I also do not consider it would be safe for the mother to consult the father given his attitude to her, exemplified by him calling her a rapist and a paedophile at court in August 2024 and a "little girl" in cross-examination; s 61CA of the Act.
9. For all the reasons throughout this judgment, I make the orders set out at the start of these Reasons, which I consider to be in the children's best interests. Finally, I will discharge the ICL.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty-one (151) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Brasch.