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[2003] NSWCCA 320
respondent. Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed. The two-year sentence and eighteen-month non-parole period remained undisturbed. [27], [36], [39]
The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld Sandison's sentence. It accepted that the dangerous driving was brief, but held that its short duration did not prevent the sentencing judge from finding substantial moral culpability. The judge's assessment was open because the driving was unsafe and emotionally affected, Mawer was seriously injured, and several people were put at risk. The appeal court found no sentencing error.
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2,076 words · generated 29/09/2026
The appeal concerned the sentence imposed on Stephen John Sandison after a jury found him guilty of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm under s 52A(3)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The maximum penalty identified in the judgment was seven years' imprisonment. The jury acquitted him of malicious wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and of the statutory alternative associated with that count. Sandison had pleaded guilty to the dangerous-driving count, but the Crown did not accept the plea, and a trial followed. The jury ultimately convicted him of that count. [2]-[5]
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The offence occurred on 17 April 2001, against the background of a custody dispute. Mawer was involved in proceedings concerning Tymara, his ten-year-old daughter with Sandison's girlfriend, Ms Gaffney. On the morning of the offence, the Family Court made a consent order that Tymara's custody be vested in Mawer's mother, with whom Mawer lived. The order was to take effect at 1 pm the next day. Sandison knew about the order. The judgment records that the prospect of losing custody was a serious disappointment to Gaffney and that Sandison shared her emotional upset. Mason P said this circumstance was relevant to moral culpability, but could point in two directions. [6]-[8]
Later that day, Gaffney asked Sandison to collect children from Mortdale station. Mawer was there speaking with the children, unexpectedly from Sandison's perspective. Sandison recognised him. The District Court judge found that Sandison's knowledge of the Family Court outcome, together with recognising Mawer, contributed to his decision to drive in an unlawfully dangerous manner. [9]-[11]
The collision occurred near a T-intersection, a telegraph pole and a raised pedestrian ramp intended to slow vehicles. There were people in the area, including Mawer and the children. The sentencing judge found beyond reasonable doubt that Sandison approached and crossed the ramp at a speed unsafe in the circumstances. Rather than safely turning to park and collect the children, he continued through the intersection, collided with the pole and struck Mawer. The sentencing judge did not need to resolve the precise sequence of contact between the car, Mawer and the pole. [12]-[13]
The sentencing judge imposed two years' imprisonment, backdated to 20 August 2002, and set a non-parole period of eighteen months. He allowed a 20 per cent reduction for the guilty plea, while observing it would have been an acceptance of the inevitable. He considered Sandison's character, family circumstances and psychological state, including depression, and declined to suspend the sentence. [25]-[27]
Sandison's sole appeal ground challenged the description of his driving as an “abandonment of responsibility”. He argued the driving lasted only seconds, and that the phrase had a more demanding meaning under the guideline judgments. He did not challenge the primary findings about speed, recognition of Mawer or Sandison's emotional state. [15], [28]-[29]
Mason P treated the appeal as one about the proper characterisation of facts already found, rather than a challenge to those findings. The appeal court was not being asked to determine the collision facts afresh. The key question was whether the sentencing judge's view of the conduct and moral culpability was reasonably open. [14]-[15], [28]-[30]
The Court considered the guideline judgments in R v Jurisic and Queen v White. It noted the White guideline that custodial sentences will usually be appropriate in a typical case unless moral culpability is low, as with momentary inattention or misjudgment. The judgment also records a guideline that, where moral culpability is high, a full-time custodial head sentence below two years for dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm would not generally be appropriate. [16]-[19]
Mason P rejected what he described as close parsing of the guideline language. The Court's reading was that the guidelines themselves recognised that whether there had been an abandonment of responsibility involves an element of judgment on which sentencing judges can reasonably differ. Sentencing remained the product of an appropriately informed discretion, sometimes called an intuitive synthesis. [18], [30]
The facts supporting the sentencing judge's evaluation included Sandison's unsafe speed over the raised ramp, his recognition of Mawer, the emotionally charged context, the serious injury, and the risk to other people in the area. The sentencing judge had also considered the victim's continuing pain and disability, including an effect on his capacity to work. [21]-[24]
The Court did not treat the short duration as decisive. Mason P said that a few seconds of dangerous driving did not prevent the finding of substantial moral culpability, because the case involved more than momentary inattention. In this way, the judgment distinguishes the duration of conduct from its character and context: brevity is relevant, but does not itself settle the culpability assessment. [31]-[32]
Mason P also found that the sentencing judge had given close attention to moral culpability and had not applied the guideline mechanically. That was important because the appeal challenged the sentencing evaluation, not merely the length of the sentence in isolation. No error was shown, and the appeal was dismissed. [33]-[36]
Hidden J agreed, describing the case as unusual and the sentencing exercise as difficult. He nevertheless considered the assessment of moral culpability open to the sentencing judge and the sentence clearly within the discretion available. Shaw J likewise stressed that an appeal does not turn on whether another judge might have imposed a different sentence. [37]-[38]
The judgment does not set out a comprehensive history of dangerous-driving sentencing law. Its legal framework is the guideline judgments it discusses: R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 and Queen v White (2002) 55 NSWLR 252. Mason P said it was unnecessary to reproduce their full reasoning because the appeal concerned the sentencing judge's characterisation of the facts. [14]
As described in Sandison, White addressed when custody would usually be appropriate and how moral culpability affects the sentence. The judgment quotes a guideline associating low moral culpability with momentary inattention or misjudgment. It also refers to factors including the nature and extent of injury, the number of people put at risk, speed and erratic driving. [16]-[19]
Sandison's contribution is an application of that framework to a short but emotionally charged episode of driving. It confirms that short duration does not necessarily equate to low moral culpability and does not rule out an abandonment-of-responsibility finding. The assessment remains dependent on the circumstances, and the sentencing judge's evaluative judgment is not displaced merely because another view is possible. [30]-[34]
The decision should not be read as establishing that emotional upset, a custody dispute or recognition of a particular victim automatically increases culpability. Mason P said the custody-related emotional context could point in two directions. The conclusion depended on the sentencing judge's assessment of the whole set of circumstances, including the manner of driving and the risk and injury involved. [8], [31]-[34]
Nor does the judgment establish a new numerical sentencing tariff. It records the existing guideline discussion and upholds the sentence on the facts. Mason P noted that statistics did not show individual levels of moral culpability, though they were consistent with the sentence being within the range to the extent that the statistics could indicate one. [35]
At [18], the judgment records that whether there was an abandonment of responsibility involves “an element of judgment on which sentencing judges could reasonably differ”. In plain English, the phrase is not a mechanical test whose application can be decided by parsing words in isolation. It calls for an evaluative assessment of the conduct and circumstances.
At [30], Mason P says that sentencing is an “appropriately informed discretion”, sometimes called an “intuitive synthesis”. This means the judge considers relevant features together rather than treating each fact as a separate, fixed-point calculation. The Court used this reasoning to reject the claim that the guideline phrase had to carry a narrowly defined meaning that prevented its use here.
At [32], Mason P states that a few seconds of dangerous driving did not preclude the characterisation and that the case involved “more than momentary inattention”. In plain English, short duration alone could not decide the moral-culpability question. The context and nature of the driving also mattered.
At [34], Mason P concludes that the sentencing judge had paid close attention to moral culpability, had not acted mechanistically and had made no error. This passage captures the appeal court's central conclusion: the relevant question was whether the sentencing decision involved error, not whether the appeal judges would have made the same assessment themselves.
At [38], Shaw J says, “I might not have given a sentence in this case, but that is not the relevant question”. The point is that a difference in sentencing preference does not itself demonstrate appealable error. The appeal concerned the proper exercise of discretion, not the appeal judges' independent choice of sentence.
Sandison is relevant where a sentencing appeal challenges an evaluative finding that dangerous driving involved an abandonment of responsibility or substantial moral culpability. The judgment is particularly pertinent where the driving episode was brief and the appellant argues that brevity necessarily means the conduct was only momentary inattention or misjudgment. [29]-[32]
Its factual setting included an emotionally charged dispute, recognition of the injured person, unsafe speed over a traffic-calming feature, loss of control, serious injury and risks to several people. Those details explain why the Court considered the sentencing judge's assessment open. The case does not say that any one of these features automatically determines the outcome. [8]-[13], [21]-[24], [31]
The decision may also be relevant where an appeal asks the court to re-evaluate the weight or description given to findings that are not themselves challenged. Here, Sandison did not dispute the primary findings about speed, recognition and emotion. The Court considered whether the sentencing judge's characterisation was reasonably available on those findings. [28]-[30]
The decision does not provide a general rule that emotionally affected driving is always high in culpability, nor that risk to multiple people or serious injury alone requires a particular sentence. It supports a contextual approach to the sentencing judge's evaluative task and appellate review. [30]-[34]
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later cases, and the material provided does not establish how subsequent courts have treated Sandison. It would therefore be unsafe to describe it as followed, distinguished, limited or otherwise treated by later authority on the basis of this text alone.
What can be identified from the judgment itself is its treatment of earlier authorities. Mason P discussed Jurisic and White as the relevant guideline judgments, but did not set out their full reasoning because the appeal point concerned the sentencing judge's characterisation of the facts. The Court applied the White guideline framework to assess the moral-culpability argument and concluded that no error had been shown. [14]-[20], [31]-[34]
The judgment supplies no later citation history, subsequent statutory changes or account of how later decisions have interpreted its discussion of “abandonment of responsibility”. Those matters would require sources beyond this judgment.
The judgment leaves open how the “abandonment of responsibility” characterisation should apply to other fact patterns. Mason P expressly treated it as an evaluative issue on which sentencing judges could reasonably differ. The decision therefore provides an example of an available assessment, rather than a checklist that conclusively determines every case. [18], [30]-[32]
It also does not quantify the weight to be given to emotional context, the victim's relationship to the offender, speed, injury or the number of people exposed to risk. The Court noted the relevance of the victim not being a stranger and the offender's qualified remorse, but did not turn those matters into independent rules. [34]
The judgment does not explain whether the same assessment would have been open on materially different findings, such as different speed, no recognised victim, no nearby pedestrians, less serious injury, or a different account of the driving episode. Its reasoning is tied to the sentencing judge's findings in this case. [11]-[13], [21]-[24], [28]-[34]
Finally, the supplied text does not show later appellate treatment or developments in legislation or guideline judgments after the decision. A current assessment of those matters would require checking later legal sources, which are not included here.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
CITATION : REGINA v Stephen John SANDISON [2003] NSWCCA 320 HEARING DATE(S) : 29 August 2003 JUDGMENT DATE : 29 August 2003
JUDGMENT OF : Mason P at 1; Hidden J at 37; Shaw J at 38 DECISION : Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS : Criminal appeal - sentencing - Crimes Act 1900, s52A(3)(c) - custody dispute contributed to dangerous driving hitting pedestrian - victim known to driver - White guideline - "abandonment of responsibility". ND PARTIES : REGINA v Stephen John SANDISON FILE NUMBER(S) : CCA 60243/03 COUNSEL : Appellant: R J Button Respondent: D C Frearson SOLICITORS : Appellant: Legal Aid - Mr Healy Respondent: S E O'Connor - Crown Prosecutor
LOWER COURT District Court JURISDICTION : LOWER COURT DC 02/11/0335 FILE NUMBER(S) : LOWER COURT Davidson ADCJ JUDICIAL OFFICER :
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL CCA 60243/03
MASON P HIDDEN J SHAW J
REGINA v Stephen John SANDISON Judgment 1 MASON P: Mr Button has put the applicant's case well and at its highest. I am, however, unpersuaded that the sentencing judge fell into any appellable error in this matter. 2 The applicant was arraigned on an indictment containing two counts: 1. malicious wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 33 of the Crimes Act 1900 ; 2. in the alternative, driving a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to another person or persons where by the vehicle was involved in an impact causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s 52A(3)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 . 3 The offences charged occurred on 17 April 2001 and the victim was Mr Peter Mawer. To this indictment the applicant pleaded not guilty to the first count, but guilty to the second count in the presence of the jury. The plea was not accepted by the Crown. A trial ensued spanning several days. 4 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the first count, not guilty on the statutory alternative to the first count of malicious wounding, and guilty on the second count, which had been the one to which the applicant had originally pleaded guilty. 5 The maximum penalty for the offence on which the applicant was found guilty is seven years imprisonment. 6 The victim, Mr Peter Mawer, had been in an ongoing custody dispute with the applicant's girlfriend, Ms Gaffney, in relation to a ten year old daughter of the couple, Tymara. Ms Gaffney had two other children, one of them an infant child by the applicant. The three children were living with Ms Gaffney. 7 Ms Gaffney had planned to move with the three children to live in Port Macquarie. Mr Mawer obtained an interim injunction preventing the move so far as Tymara was concerned. The custody dispute came on for final determination in the Family Court on the morning of 17 April, that is, the date of the offence. An order was made by consent that Tymara's custody be vested in Mr Mawer's mother, with whom Mr Mawer resided. This order was to take effect from 1 pm the following day. 8 During the afternoon of 17 April, Tymara had gone to the pictures with her older half-sister. The arrangement was that when the girls got back to Mortdale station, they would ring home to Ms Gaffney to arrange to be picked up by car. This happened and Ms Gaffney asked the applicant, who was at her home at the time, to pick up the children. The applicant knew of the consent orders made in the Family Court that day. The prospect of losing custody of Tymara was a serious disappointment to Ms Gaffney and her emotional upset was shared by the applicant. This factor, it seems to me, is relevant to the issue of moral culpability, but it tends to point in two directions. 9 As it turned out, unbeknown to the applicant in advance, Mr Mawer was also at the station speaking to Tymara at the roadside. He was recognised by the applicant. The applicant struck him with the car and severely injured him. The precise details of the accident and the inferences to be drawn as to the applicant's intention were key issues in the trial. 10 The sentencing judge had to act consistent with the jury's verdicts and its view of the facts adverse to the applicant, if established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned sentencing judge held that the verdicts had acquitted the applicant of intention to cause grievous bodily harm to Mr Mawer, and had also excluded a deliberate or reckless act of wounding. 11 Davidson ADCJ was, however, satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant recognised the man speaking to the two children as Mr Mawer. He further concluded that it was this which, added to his knowledge of what had transpired in the Family Court earlier that day, caused him to drive in the unlawfully dangerous manner that the jury found he did. 12 Mr Mawer was speaking to the two girls near a telegraph pole, which was just on the kerb at a point where Morts Road formed a T-intersection with streets running to its left and right. There is a relatively small area of road where cars can park near the kerb in order to pick up and let down passengers. Just before the turning area there is a raised pedestrian ramp, obviously designed to slow down traffic to enable a left or right hand turn to be made. 13 If such turn is not made with safety, there is a clear potential danger to pedestrians on the footpath opposite the intersection and near the telegraph pole. At the time in question there were a number of people in that area, as well as Mr Mawer and the two daughters of Miss Gaffney. Davidson ADCJ made the following findings about the accident: "There were eyewitnesses who attested to the speed at which the prisoner approached and traversed the pedestrian cross speed bump. Although there was a good deal of discrepancies in this part of the evidence, as is frequently the case in a charge of this sort, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was a speed which exceeded that which was safe in all the circumstances.
If the prisoner was intending to make a right hand turn in order to park close to and parallel with the kerb so he could take aboard the children, then he failed to do so. Instead, he continued on over the intersection and collided with the pole and also with Mr Mawer's leg, causing painful injury to Mr Mawer.
Although there was some factual dispute traversed at the trial, whether he hit the pole and then Mr Mawer, I, in my view, find it unnecessary to determine this, although the objective circumstances of Mr Mawer's injuries seem to me to clearly point to the car coming into contact with Mr Mawer's leg and his leg coming into contact then with the pole.
The prisoner's behaviour after the incident in which Mr Mawer, in obvious and extreme pain, hobbled in a bleeding state to a nearby tobacconist, was indicative, in my view, of no remorse for what had occurred as a result of his handling of this motor vehicle.
Indeed, the evidence of witnesses as to his behaviour towards Mr Mawer indicated that he regarded Mr Mawer as having got his just desserts for daring to speak to Tymara Lee, when in the prisoner's mind he had no right to do so until the following day at about 1 pm." 14 His Honour approached the sentencing discretion with the guideline judgments of R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 and Queen v White (2002) 55 NSWLR 252 in view. He recognised the judgments were not prescriptive like a statute. It is unnecessary to set out the details of the reasoning in the two cases, because the matter at issue in this application for leave to appeal relates to his Honour's characterisation of the facts which he found. I do not understand the applicant to contend for appealable error if that characterisation was properly made. 15 The sole ground of appeal is that the sentencing judge erroneously characterised the driving of the applicant immediately prior to the impact as an "abandonment of responsibility". That ground was, of course, developed in ways which I shall address. 16 In R V White the leading judgment was given by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice's discussion of the factors calling for custodial sentence is at pages 284-6. He concluded at page 286: ".... The guideline this Court should give pursuant to section 37A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 with respect to the typical case identified above is: A custodial sentence will usually be appropriate unless the offender has a low level of moral culpability, as in the case of momentary inattention or misjudgment ... ". 17 The Chief Justice then offered the numerical guidelines. He referred at page 286 to the second limb of the guideline in R v Jurisic (at 231E) as follows: "... With a plea of guilty, however, wherever there is present to a material degree any aggravating factor involving the conduct of the offender, a custodial sentence (minimum plus additional or fixed term) of less than three years (in the case of dangerous driving causing death) and less than two years (in the case of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm) should be exceptional...." 18 A list of aggravating factors are then mentioned, including: "(i) Extent and nature of the injuries inflicted. (ii) Number of people put at risk. (iii) Degree of speed. (iv) .... (v) Erratic driving ...."
and eight other factors. The Chief Justice pointed out that references to passages in Jurisic that the question whether or not there was an abandoning of responsibility involved an element of judgment on which sentencing judges could reasonably differ. 19 After discussing various cases the Chief Justice said at 287 [229] - [230]: "...The guideline for offences against s 52A(1) and s 52A(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 for the typical case identified above should be:
"Where the offender's moral culpability is high, a full time custodial head sentence of less than three years (in the case of death) and two years (in the case of grievous bodily harm) would not generally be appropriate.'
In the case of a low level of moral culpability, a lower sentence will, of course, be appropriate." 20 I return to the reasons of Davidson ADCJ. His Honour held that from the time the applicant recognised Mr Mawer, who was standing at the roadside: "... his driving from there on, I find may properly be described within the meaning of the guideline judgment in White's case, was erratic, in that his emotive impasse was to allow him to take over the role of his motor vehicle to an extent. I do not use the words 'road rage' to describe the circumstances as I find them, but there was, in my view, a strong emotive content to his handling of the vehicle from that point on." 21 After referring to the particular circumstances of the accident and its immediate aftermath, the learned sentencing judge said: "... In those circumstances, I am unable to approach this matter as one in which there was low moral culpability, as indicated by circumstances of momentary inattention or misjudgment, a view of the facts which Mr Crawford-Fish presses upon me.
There was, although for a short period whilst the prisoner was driving along Morts Road, and certainly from the time he negotiated the speed bump, an abandonment of his responsibility.
In my view the prisoner not only put at potential risk Mr Mawer, but perhaps the children and perhaps other persons who were on the footpath in the vicinity of the telegraph pole by his manner of driving.... " 22 Later the offence was characterised as follows:
"...The offence was a serious one involving, as I have said, not an insignificant level of moral culpability. It involved for a short period in any event, after he traversed the speed bump in Morts Road until the impact an abandonment of responsibility occasioned by his permitting emotive factors to overcome his control, proper control of the vehicle... " 23 Consistently with the White guideline his Honour also addressed the extent and nature of the injuries suffered by Mr Mawer. Considerable attention had been paid to this in the sentencing proceedings. There had been a victim impact statement and extensive cross-examination. His Honour found that Mr Mawer had suffered serious injuries in the sense that they resulted in pain and an element of continuing disability. That disability had affected Mr Mawer's capacity to continue in employment, at least to a degree. 24 His Honour also adverted to the fact that the applicant's driving had put at risk not only Mr Mawer but the two children standing nearby, and perhaps also others. This is indicated as an aggravating factor within the White (supra) guideline. 25 Davidson ADCJ allowed a 20 per cent reduction having regard to the guilty plea, adding that it would have been an acceptance of the inevitable. He then addressed matters personal to the applicant and dealt with them in a manner attracting no criticism in this Court. Good character was taken into account as well as the material concerning the applicant's current family and psychological state. The applicant is aged forty-two, and is suffering from a level of depression. 26 His Honour determined that the custodial sentence was appropriate and he declined to suspend it. He considered the available Judicial Commission statistics, observing that 47 per cent of persons convicted received a sentence of other than full time custody. His Honour said that he considered a suspended sentence did not meet the objective circumstances of the offence. 27 The sentence was backdated to take account of the period of pre-trial custody. Davidson ADCJ imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment to date from 20 August 2002 and set a non-parole period of eighteen months. He declined to displace the statutory term of licence disqualification. 28 The applicant does not dispute the primary findings of fact with regard to speed, recognition of the victim by the applicant and emotion on the part of the applicant. It is accepted that the applicant was going too fast when he went over the speed bump, losing control in the process. Counsel did, however, refer us to evidence at trial to the effect that the speed at the time of impact was between 5 and 15 kilometres an hour. He did not, however, suggest that the finding that that speed was too dangerous in the circumstances was erroneous. 29 The applicant submitted, however, that it was an error on the sentencing judge's part to have described the unexpected entering into an emotional state for a matter of seconds as an abandonment of responsibility. He submitted that this phrase must have a "more potent meaning" in the Jurisic/White context. Counsel submitted his Honour's conclusions were not reasonably open in light of the primary facts. He submitted that this was not a case of high moral culpability, or an abandonment of responsibility. 30 It seems to me that this submission involves the type of close parsing of the guideline judgments that is incompatible with their fair reading and inconsistent with the emphasis they make upon the concept of "abandonment of responsibility" involving an element of judgment on which sentencing judges could reasonably differ. Sentencing remains a product of a particular appropriately informed discretion, sometimes referred to as an intuitive synthesis. 31 I am not persuaded that the sentencing judge erred in his characterisation of the particular offence, or his decision to apply the White guideline. There were aggravating features, including substantial injury to Mr Mawer, erratic behaviour, excessive speed and the putting at risk of several people. 32 The conclusion of substantial moral culpability was well open in light of the primary facts. Merely because the dangerous driving was of only a few seconds duration, does not preclude such characterisation. This case involved more than momentary inattention. 33 In White at 284 [205], the Chief Justice said: "... in determining the appropriateness of full time custody and the length thereof, the sentencing judge must give close attention to the degree of moral culpability involved. This is a critical component of the objective circumstances of the offence." 34 In this case the sentencing judge gave close attention to the degree of moral culpability involved. He did not approach the matter in a mechanistic way. No error has been shown. The Crown is correct to assert the relevance of the fact that this victim was not a stranger and the very qualified remorse of the offender. 35 Although not a substantial ground of appeal, counsel took us to the sentencing statistics. Those statistics do not really bolster the primary attack, nor cast any doubt on the exercise of the sentencing discretion. For one thing, they are not an indicator of individual levels of moral culpability in this range of offences. For another, they show that the custodial sentence that was imposed is at least within the range to the extent that one can speak of a range from those statistics. 36 For those reasons I would grant leave, but dismiss the appeal. 37 HIDDEN J: This was a most unusual case, posing a very difficult sentencing exercise for the trial judge. I must say that this application has troubled me. However, for the reasons identified by the President, it does seem to me that his Honour's assessment of the applicant's moral culpability was one which was open to him, and that the sentence imposed was clearly within the range of his Honour's discretion. I agree with the orders proposed. 38 SHAW J: In my view judicial discretion in sentencing is a vital element of the criminal justice process, and that is so whether other minds might think a sentence was too lenient or too severe. I might not have given a sentence in this case, but that is not the relevant question, and in all the circumstances I agree with the reasons and orders proposed by Mason P. 39 MASON P: The orders of the Court will be as I have indicated.
Last Modified: 09/05/2007 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
REGINA
Stephen John SANDISON
(1998) 45 NSWLR 209
(2002) 55 NSWLR 252
Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed. The two-year sentence and eighteen-month non-parole period remained undisturbed. [27], [36], [39]