Regina v Stambolis

Subjective matters 31 The respondent was born on 5 June 1970 and was aged 34 at the time of these offences. 32 The applicant had an extensive criminal record. His first stealing offence occurred on 22 August 1989. This was followed by a further fifteen counts of break enter and steal or break and enter with intent to steal, one count of receiving stolen property and four counts of possess housebreaking implements. Over the years the respondent has been subject to periods of fulltime imprisonment, the longest being a sentence of 3 years with a non-parole period of 12 months. 33 The motivation for these offences has been the respondent's drug addiction. He began smoking cannabis when he was 17 and progressed to heroin and cocaine by the age of 25. Attempts to rehabilitate himself in the past have proved unsuccessful. 34 A pre-sentence report of 5 August 2005 indicated periods of stability on the part of the respondent while under supervision of the Probation and Parole Service followed by lapses into drug use and further offences. The longest period of stability appears to have been 18 months. The respondent was reported as using illicit drugs as a coping mechanism when faced with difficult situations. The respondent had previously been on the methadone program while on parole, but his attendance was erratic. 35 The respondent apparently experienced a dysfunctional upbringing, as a result of his father's alcohol abuse and violence towards the family. His parents separated in 2000. The respondent's relationship with his mother was good but was strained insofar as his father was concerned. The respondent's mother remained supportive of him and believed that he was emotionally vulnerable and had a tendency to place others' needs above his own. 36 The respondent left school at the age of 15 without having obtained his school certificate. He undertook a commercial cookery course from 1987 to 1991 and has been employed in the hospitality industry since 1996. His drug addiction has impacted on his ability to retain permanent employment in this industry. The respondent has worked in some well-known restaurants.

Remarks on sentence 37 His Honour noted that the respondent pleaded guilty to the four charges on 25 May 2005. The delay in entering a guilty plea was explained to his Honour by the fact that the prosecutor was asked for an assessment of the offence of escaping lawful custody. On 20 May 2005 the respondent was advised that this offence could be dealt with by way of a Form 1. It was after receiving this information that the respondent entered his pleas of guilty. It was against that background (ROS 12.8) that his Honour concluded that the guilty pleas had been entered at the earliest opportunity, and that in the circumstances a deduction of 25% was appropriate. 38 The respondent gave evidence in the sentence proceedings. The effect of that evidence and a letter placed before the Court was that the respondent was now seriously and absolutely committed to rehabilitation. There was evidence before the Court that the respondent had been assessed as suitable for admission to the Bridge Rehabilitation Program, a fulltime residential course conducted by the Salvation Army. His Honour had regard to those matters but remarked: "It is so easy for offenders to come to court and proclaim their serious resolve to do something about their addiction." 39 His Honour referred to a report of Dr Lennings, psychiatrist, of 28 July 2005. This report recorded a previous occasion when the respondent had attended the Bridge Program. On that occasion he had completed 9 months of the 10 month program, but had left to resume a relationship. Dr Lennings thought that the respondent had a relatively good insight into the triggers of his drug use, but what was lacking was an ability to abstain from drug use behaviour at times when he was feeling particularly low. Dr Lennings thought the respondent would be helped by a return to the Bridge Rehabilitation Program. 40 His Honour had regard to remorse expressed by the respondent for the effects of his offences. His Honour also noted that the respondent appeared to be thriving in gaol and that he was working as a site foreman in various commercial activities which were being conducted by Corrective Services. 41 His Honour concluded: "There is no doubt that he is an educated and poised young man who should not be offending in the way he is; but he is a drug addict and petty criminal who is able to present himself as he did in court, in a very persuasive manner. He has at least that ability. But whether he can be trusted, is a matter he needs to prove to the community." 42 At the conclusion of his review of the above matters, his Honour said (ROS 10.9): "I propose to provide him first of all with an indication of the seriousness of the offences he has committed, but also with an opportunity of proving that he can rehabilitate himself." 43 His Honour took into account some matters of aggravation under s21A in relation to the respondent's offences. These were the fact that the offences were committed whilst he was at conditional liberty and that to a limited extent there was some element of planning in the offences. His Honour also took into account his previous criminal record which in his Honour's opinion disentitled him to any leniency. That is a matter referred to in the judgment of Howie J. 44 In relation to mitigating factors, his Honour said: "As to the mitigating factors, I do not take into account the fact that I consider Stambolis is unlikely to re-offend since I do not know one way or the other at this stage whether he is likely to re-offend. Nor do I take into account either that he has "good prospects" of rehabilitation. That is a matter for him to prove, though he has taken some steps since October last year to participate in rehabilitation programs."

His Honour had regard to the respondent's expressions of remorse. 45 It was as a result of the above process of reasoning that his Honour awarded the sentences previously referred to and suspended those sentences in accordance with s12 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. His Honour's concluding remarks were: "I do not think that there are "special circumstances" but it does seem to me that the offender is at the cross-roads and that he should be given an opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to change."

Crown Appeal 46 The Crown has appealed against the sentences on the basis that they are manifestly inadequate. 47 There were as Howie J has indicated a number of errors in his Honour's remarks on sentence. These were not relied upon by the Crown in its appeal. Accordingly, in arriving at its decision the Court did not take those matters into account but restricted its consideration to the matters specifically raised in the appeal. 48 The thrust of the Crown's complaint is that his Honour failed to properly consider the totality of the criminality involved in the offences. As an indication of this the Crown specifically referred to the concurrency of the sentences, the particular circumstances of each offence including a significant element of planning and the serious aggravating factor that the offences were committed whilst the respondent was subject to a good behaviour bond and in the case of the second offence, also on bail. 49 I am of the opinion that the challenge by the Crown has been made out. The sentences imposed by his Honour were manifestly inadequate. 50 This Court in R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17 provided guidance as to the reasoning process which ought be followed by sentencing judges. The start point in that process is the consideration identified in R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354: "As Jordan CJ pointed out in Geddes at 556, making due allowance for all relevant considerations, there ought to be a reasonable proportionality between a sentence and the circumstances of the crime, and we consider that it is always important in seeking to determine the sentence appropriate to a particular crime to have regard to the gravity of the offence viewed objectively, for without this assessment the other factors requiring consideration in order to arrive at the proper sentence to be imposed cannot properly be given their place. Each crime, as Veen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472 stresses, has its own objective gravity meriting at the most a sentence proportionate to that gravity, the maximum penalty fixed by the legislature defining the limits of sentence for cases in the most grave category. The relative importance of the objective facts and subjective features of the case will vary: See for example the passage from the judgment of Street CJ in Dodd (1982) 2 NSWLR 517 quoted in Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 64. Even so, there is sometimes a risk that attention to persuasive subjective considerations may cause inadequate weight to be given to the objective circumstances of the case: Rushby (1977) 1 NSWLR 594." 51 As Zamagias made clear, before referring to the subjective circumstances of an offender, it is important in the light of the passage quoted for a sentencing judge to have due regard to the seriousness of the offence or offences before the court. This, in my opinion, his Honour failed to do. 52 What seems to have been the start point for his Honour's reasoning process in relation to formulating the sentences are the passages at [41] and [42]. One is inevitably left with the impression that his Honour commenced his process of reasoning from the start point that the sentences imposed on the respondent were to be suspended. 53 A proper analysis of the objective criminality of the offences would have revealed that in the case of the aggravated break enter and steal, it carried a high maximum penalty indicative of the seriousness with which the legislature regards that type of offence. It was associated with a significant level of preparation and planning in that walkie-talkies were used, the respondent was equipped with a cordless drill and was clearly familiar with the layout of the premises and the fact and location of the safe. Finally, the commission of both offences whilst on a bond and the September offence whilst on bail, were seriously aggravating factors which demonstrated a level of contempt by the respondent for the criminal justice system. 54 The appropriate reasoning process was set out in Zamagias as follows: "(22) Taking the last matter first, it seems beneficial to set out my understanding of how a court should approach the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. 23) It is clear that, when sentencing an offender to a term of imprisonment under that Act, a court is required to undertake a number of steps before finally determining the appropriate sentence. Each step requires the court to consider the objective gravity of the offence balanced against the subjective circumstances of the offender, but it is the first of those considerations that will principally determine which of the available sentencing alternatives the court should adopt. This is because at the end of the day the sentence must be commensurate with the seriousness of the crime: R v Geddes (1936) 36 SR(NSW) 554; R v Rushby [1977] 1 NSWLR 594.

(24) There is a preliminary question to be addressed and, depending upon the answer to that question, two further steps may have to be undertaken before the ultimate sentence is imposed.

(25) The preliminary question to be asked and answered is whether there are any alternatives to the imposition of a term of imprisonment. Section 5 of the Act prohibits a court from imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless the court is satisfied, having considered all possible alternatives, that no other penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. It should be noted that at this stage in the process the only consideration is whether a sentence of imprisonment should be imposed and not whether that sentence should be suspended. Notwithstanding that s12, which provides the power to suspend a sentence, is contained in Division 3 of Part 2 of the Act under the general heading "Non-custodial Alternatives", a suspended sentence is not an alternative to which s5 relates: That is because a sentence cannot be suspended until it has been imposed: (JCE (2000) 120 A Crim R 18 at [15]). It is the execution of the sentence that is suspended not its imposition.

(26) Having determined that there is no other penalty appropriate other than a sentence of imprisonment, the court is next to determine what the term of that sentence should be; R v Foster [2001] NSWCCA 215 at [30]. This has been regarded as the first step of a two-step approach in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, see R v Blackman and Walters [2001] NSWCCA 121 at [50] to [52]; JCE at [17]. The determination of the term is to be made without regard to whether the sentence will be immediately served or the manner in which it is to be served. This is because any of the alternatives available in respect of a sentence of imprisonment can only be considered once the sentence has been imposed, see s6 (periodic detention order), s7 (home detention order) and s12. It follows that the term of the sentence cannot be influenced by what order might be made after the sentence has been imposed. For example it cannot be increased because it is to be served by way of periodic detention: R v Wegener [1999] NSWCCA 405, or by home detention: R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209 at 249. Nor can the term be reduced because an otherwise appropriate alternative is unavailable: R v T (NSWCCA, 19 June 1995).

(27) The fact that a term of a sentence is to be determined without regard to the fact that it is to be suspended is consistent with the approach adopted in other jurisdictions where that sentencing alternative has been available for many years, see R v Percy [1975] Tas SR 62 at 73; Stevens v Giersh (1976) 14 SASR 81 at 82; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321 at 346 per Kirby J. (28) Once the term of the sentence has been determined the court is then to consider whether any alternative to full-time imprisonment is available in respect of that term and whether any available alternative should be utilised. The availability of an alternative to full-time custody will generally be governed by the length of the term that has been determined subject to the restrictions or pre-conditions imposed by the legislature on a particular sentencing alternative, see for example s77 of the Act with respect to home detention. But the appropriateness of an alternative to full time custody will depend on a number of factors, one of importance being whether such an alternative would result in a sentence that reflects the objective seriousness of the offence and fulfils the manifold purposes of punishment. The court in choosing an alternative to full time custody cannot lose sight of the fact that the more lenient the alternative the less likely it is to fulfil all the purposes of punishment: R v Jurisic at 250B." 55 Regrettably that simple and logical process was not followed by his Honour. Not only was there a failure to adequately assess the objective seriousness of the offences but the subjective matters to which his Honour had regard were not of a kind as would significantly impact on that consideration. Apart from the respondent's protestations that he was now ready to change his way of life, there was no material upon which his Honour could be confident that such rehabilitation hopes were likely to be realised. His Honour said as much (see [44]). Had his Honour taken into account the appropriate sentence to be awarded in respect of each offence before considering questions of how the sentences might be served, it would have become clear to him that each of the sentences would need to be significant (Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610) and that there was no basis for concurrency at least as between the offences of break enter and steal. They were quite discrete offences with the second offence in point of time involving a significant escalation in criminality.

Conclusion 56 What then should be the result of the appeal? This is a case where double jeopardy is a significant consideration. The fact that the offences in respect of which the Crown has appealed, were committed whilst the respondent was subject to a bond, is a significant aggravating feature and cannot be ignored. The respondent has, however, already been sentenced by Shadbolt DCJ for that breach of trust. This Court has to be careful to avoid double punishment of the respondent. 57 As a result of the suspension of his sentences, the respondent was at liberty between 5 August 2005 and 17 February 2006. Since the beginning of September 2005 he has been successfully participating in the Bridge Rehabilitation Program. The reports from that program before the Court speak glowingly of the respondent's progress. Accordingly if re-sentencing the respondent, this Court needs to take into account the time spent by him in that residential rehabilitation program. (R v Cartwright (1989) 17 NSWLR 243 at 258-9, R v Eastway (NSWCCA, unreported, 19 May 1992)). 58 I am also mindful of the judicial restraint which must be exercised when considering a Crown appeal, such as was outlined by Wood CJ at CL in R v Wall [2002] NSWCCA 42. In particular I am mindful that a sentence which is imposed as a consequence of a successful Crown appeal will generally be less than that which should have been imposed by the sentencing court. In that regard I should observe that had the respondent been properly sentenced in the first place, a substantial non-parole period should have been imposed in respect of each offence without any concurrency. That non-parole period ought to have been significantly longer than the sentences awarded by his Honour and then suspended. 59 In my view sentences of imprisonment must now be passed upon the respondent albeit of a lesser duration than those which should have been imposed by the sentencing judge. Although his Honour erroneously failed to take this into account when re-sentencing, I have to have regard to the standard non-parole period in respect of the aggravated break enter and steal offence of 5 September 2004. That standard non-parole period is 5 years. For the reasons set out in [53] hereof, I am of the opinion that this offence was in the mid-range of seriousness for such offences. Although there was a plea of guilty to that offence, the standard non-parole period remains relevant as an important guidepost for sentencing purposes (R v Way [2004] 60 NSWLR at [53], [122].) 60 Apart from the fact that this is a Crown appeal there are, in my opinion, special circumstances which make the imposition of the standard non-parole period inappropriate. I have already referred to the issues of double jeopardy, the respondent's participation in the Bridge Rehabilitation Program and the fact that he was at liberty between 5 August 2005 and 17 February 2006. It should also be noted that when Shadbolt DCJ sentenced the respondent he did not take into account the respondent's period in custody between 7 September 2004 and 5 August 2005, nor did he take account of the residential component of the Bridge Rehabilitation Program. Accordingly, regard needs to be had to the principle of totality when formulating the sentences now to be served by the respondent. 61 I propose to reconcile those considerations with the need to pass sentences of imprisonment by making the sentences totally concurrent with that passed by Shadbolt DCJ and by fixing as the start point for the sentences 7 September 2004 when the respondent first went into custody. The sentences which I propose are imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year and a balance of term of 1 year in respect of the first break enter and steal offence and imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years with a balance of term of 2 ½ years in respect of the aggravated break enter and steal offence. 62 The orders which I propose are:

(3) The sentences imposed in respect of counts 1 and 2 of indictment 1 are quashed.

(4) In lieu thereof on count 1, the offence of break enter and steal on 25 August 2004, the respondent is sentenced to a term of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months and a balance of term of 12 months. The non-parole period is to commence on 7 September 2004 and is to expire on 6 September 2005. The balance of term is to expire on 6 September 2006.

(5) On count 2, possessing housebreaking implements on 25 August 2004, the respondent is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment for 9 months to commence on 7 September 2004 and to expire on 6 June 2005.

(6) The sentences imposed in respect of counts 1 and 2 of indictment 2 are quashed.

(7) In lieu thereof, on count 1, the offence of break enter and steal in circumstances of aggravation on 5 September 2004, the respondent is sentenced to a term of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and a balance of term of 2 years and 6 months. The non-parole period is to commence on 7 September 2005 and is to expire on 6 September 2007. The balance of term is to expire on 6 March 2010.

(8) On count 2, possessing housebreaking implements on 5 September 2004, the respondent is sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment of 9 months to commence on 7 September 2005 and to expire on 6 June 2006.

16/03/2006 - Typographical error - word "not" omitted in last sentence. - Paragraph(s) [11]

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