Regina v Jessica Rose Anderson

Regina v Hawkins (1989) 35 A Crim R 430 Regina v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286 Regina v Knight [2004] NSWCCA 145 Regina v Murphy [2007] NSWCCA 18 CASES CITED: Regina v Purdon (2006) NSWCCA, unreported, 27 March 1997 Regina v Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 Bick v The Commonwealth [2006] NSWCCA 408 Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 Sanchet v The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] NSWCCA 291

PARTIES: Regina Jessica Rose Anderson

COUNSEL: Ms Dobraszczyk for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions

Jessica Rose Anderson has been charged with a number of offences. She has been charged with making a false or misleading statement in relation to a foreign travel document. That is contrary to s 18(1)(b)(i) of the Foreign Passports (Law Enforcement and Security) Act 2005 of the Commonwealth and carries a maximum of ten years imprisonment. In addition, she has been charged with eleven offences of imposing upon the Commonwealth by an untrue representation contrary to s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 of the Commonwealth, each offence carrying a maximum of two years imprisonment. Thirdly, she has been charged with eight counts of dishonestly causing a loss to the Commonwealth contrary to s 135.1 5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 of the Commonwealth.

Ms Anderson was arrested on 14 December 2006 and has been in custody since then. On her arrest she was interviewed by the Federal Police and made full admissions. Proceedings were commenced against her in the Local Court by way of court attendance notices. She first appeared at the Central Local Court on 15 December 2006. She appeared at two more mention dates in February and April 2007 following orders made for the service of the brief. On 16 May 2007 Ms Anderson indicated that she would plead guilty to each offence and on that day she was committed for sentence to this court.

I should add that she was also originally charged with making a false or misleading statement for the purposes of obtaining a passport other than an Australian passport contrary to s 10(2)a of the Passports Act 1938 of the Commonwealth. Ms Dobraszczyk who appears for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has indicated that her client proposes to direct in writing pursuant to s 107 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 that no further proceedings will be taken against Ms Anderson in respect of that offence. That indication is noted, and a letter will be written by the prosecutor to the Registrar of this court with a copy sent to Ms Duchen who appears for the offender. If that letter has not been received by Ms Duchen within fourteen days of today, Ms Duchen will arrange to have the matter re-listed before me.

I turn now to a consideration of the facts of this case. They are contained in part of exhibit A which was a bundle of documents tendered by consent and unless where otherwise indicated I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the following facts.

I commence with the admissions made by Ms Anderson when she was arrested and interviewed. She was born on 29 June 1957. She obtained a birth certificate from a friend of hers whose surname was Keno in New Zealand in 1982. She used that document to obtain a New Zealand passport because she was not able to obtain a passport legitimately in her own name. That was because she was, at that stage, on probation for various offences. Later she made further applications for a replacement or renewal of her New Zealand passport in the name of Tua Toro Keno. She made these applications whilst she was in Australia. One was made in 2001 and the latest was made in December 2006. She used these New Zealand passports, issued not in her name but issued to her under a false name, to gain numerous further forms of identification in the name of Keno. She used various aliases and false names, both in New Zealand and in Australia.

In addition, and this is why the matter has come before me, she used the identity to obtain Centrelink benefits in Australia knowing that she was committing these offences. She also worked in paid employment at various times whilst receiving Centrelink payments but that is not the subject of any charges.

The matter came to light because of a joint operation by Australian and New Zealand authorities concerning false passports being issued to New Zealand citizens. Her false passport was discovered and it was ascertained that on 31 March 1983 she had, as I indicated earlier, fraudulently obtained her New Zealand passport using the name Keno and that she used this passport to leave New Zealand and enter Australia on 2 April 2003.

As I mentioned, this passport was renewed at least once between then and 2006 and then she made a further application for renewal in December 2006. The Australian Federal Police received notification from the New Zealand police that she had applied on 4 December 2006 in Sydney at the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs for a fresh passport. However, in the meantime search warrants were obtained by the Australian Federal Police and on 14 December 2006 they entered her residence pursuant to those search warrants and arrested her on 14 December 2006.

The facts indicate that Ms Anderson was paid social security benefits by the Department of Social Security until 1 July 1997 and after that by the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency in the name of Tua Toro Keno. In respect of the social security payments paid by the Department these commenced as early as 3 July 1984, about a year after she arrived in Australia, and proceeded until 1997 when the legislation was changed. Payments were made by the Commonwealth Services Delivery Agency up until 7 December 2006. Hence, the overall period of Ms Anderson receiving Commonwealth benefits under a false name and also not being entitled to those benefits, was some twenty-two years, although I regard the overall period as one of about twenty years since there were some gaps within that time frame.

The benefits which she received included the sole parent pension, the family payment, the basic family payment and additional family payment, Newstart allowance, parenting payment single, and family tax benefit.

I also note that between 16 August 1983 and 29 April 2004 Ms Anderson lodged numerous forms with the Department or the Agency providing the Department or the Agency with relevant information to justify the payments which she was falsely seeking. Information, for example, included the names of her children. In addition, Ms Anderson was sent some one hundred and eighty three advice letters by either the Department or the Agency between 15 August 1983 and 15 November 2006 informing her of the social security payments being paid in the name of Tua Toro Keno.

As the agreed facts sheet records Ms Anderson was not entitled to receive those benefits because she was not in fact Tua Toro Keno. As a result of her false claim in that name she was paid social security payments, which were not payable at all, for some twenty years. The overall amount paid was the sum of $304,008.04.

I turn now to consider Ms Anderson's subjective circumstances. These have been set out in exhibit B which is the pre-sentence report issued by the Probation and Parole Service and in exhibit 1, a psychological report.

Exhibit B, the pre-sentence report, authored by David Tibos and dated 27 June 2007, records a good deal of Ms Anderson's most unfortunate personal history. She was made a State ward at the age of seven in New Zealand and removed from her parental home. She returned at the age of sixteen but, at that age, reports that she was gang raped and, as a result, bore a son. She met a man named Peter in 1976 and that relationship lasted on and off for many years. She commenced to live with Peter and in 1983 he went to live in Australia and she followed him. Just before leaving New Zealand he became violent and the violence intensified once they were both living in Australia. Her sons were often the victims of the violence. She separated several times from him and on those occasions he found her and on other occasions she feared for her safety and decided to return. For some period of about three months she stayed at refuges.

The intensity of the violence perpetrated on her by her partner Peter would, she told the probation officer, vary depending upon his drinking and gambling problems. Evidently contact was made with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship which confirms those issues of domestic violence.

Ms Anderson has had several positions of paid employment, including one where she occupied a position as a senior supervisor. But on a number of times she ceased her employment as a result of the violence on the domestic front.

She indicated to the probation and parole officer that many of her decisions have been motivated by fear of being assaulted. Her partner has presently left Australia and is now living in a new relationship in New Zealand. Nevertheless, she feels still fearful for her safety.

She explained that her motivation for her offending was that her family was often left without food as a result of her partner Peter's drinking and gambling. She has expressed to the probation and parole officer her regret for her behaviour. The records of the Probation and Parole Service indicate that Ms Anderson has not abused alcohol since 2005 although alcohol does appear to be an underlying factor in her offending history.

The author of the report expresses the view that unless Ms Keno is able to address what the author calls her 'lifestyle issues' then the risk of her re-offending remains high.

The psychological report has been prepared by a psychologist named Suzanne Freeman and is dated 25 June 2007. Ms Freeman interviewed Ms Anderson at Dillwynia Correctional Centre on 15 June 2007. She obtained a similar history about the family background. However, she obtained some additional information. During the period of separation from her parents as a young girl she was fostered in numerous different foster families. In one foster family she and her sister, who was fostered at the same time with the same family, were required to work at night with their foster parents and experienced constant fatigue a school. In addition, she says that she was sexually abused by the male foster parent who had also sexually abused her sister.

Ms Anderson and her partner Peter had seven children. One of them, a boy named Sidney, was tragically killed in a car accident when he was seven years of age. The others are Roberto aged twenty-six, Jack aged twenty-two, Cara aged nineteen, Marvin aged sixteen, Tennessee aged fifteen and Shardae aged twelve.

The report indicated that Ms Anderson was the only regular bread winner for this large family and was constantly concerned about obtaining enough money to pay the bills. After her partner Peter left, Ms Anderson met a man named Allan. This is now some two and a half years ago and she has commenced a very satisfactory and supportive relationship with him.

The psychologist indicates that objective testing applied by the psychologist pointed to Ms Anderson having wide ranging and complex personality pathology. The psychologist noted that currently Ms Anderson is highly anxious and suffering from major depression and severe symptoms of trauma and noted that she has clearly suffered many serious losses in her life.

She has been selected to attend a course on domestic violence and the psychologist expressed the opinion that she requires psychotherapy to deal with her depression, anxiety and trauma.

Ms Duchen called her client to give evidence under oath before me today. She confirmed the accuracy of the information she had provided to both the probation and parole officer and the psychologist. She indicated that she still had problems with arthritis in her lower back which at this stage is untreated because the prison authorities are waiting for her medical records. She expressed her remorse and sorrow for what she had done.

In cross-examination she acknowledged that Allan had provided financial and emotional support but conceded that she had continued to receive her social security benefits after she had met Allan. Indeed she had also continued to receive her social security benefits for the period of some months that she resided in a refuge. She confirmed once again her regret at what she did and indicated that she had used the money mostly to support herself and her children. There is no suggestion that she was supporting herself in any inappropriate or extravagant manner.

I was provided with some very helpful written submissions by Ms Dobraszczyk and I heard helpful oral submissions from her and from Ms Duchen as well. Briefly, I take into account the following matters in those submissions.

Public deterrence is of great importance in social security fraud cases. There is authority for that proposition in Regina v Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 at 347. In addition, and it is important to understand the reason that the law regards these offences so seriously, I quote this passage from the Court of Criminal Appeal's judgment in Regina v Purdon unreported, 27 March 1997. In that case the court comprising Mr Justice Hunt and Justice McInerney and Acting Justice Donovan said the following:

" The rationale stated for the rule that a custodial sentence is to be imposed for social security fraud except in very special circumstances is that the offence is easy to commit but difficult to detect. It is widespread and the introduction of more checks upon applicants for social security would cause delays in the payment of benefits and therefore hardship to those whose need is urgent.

It has also been said that the rule reflects a concern for the protection of the revenue but I would prefer to express it as a concern for the additional burden upon all taxpayers who shoulder the heavy burden of providing the funds for the social security system to operate and even heavier burden created by the widespread abuse of it by frauds such as these.

The rule is not based upon the fact that many of the frauds are perpetrated from motives of greed rather than need. Both types of fraud are widespread, they are equally difficult to detect. If the fraud is based upon a perceived need a custodial sentence must be expected except in very special circumstances. If the fraud is based on greed the custodial sentence will be longer. The principle of deterrence is of vital importance in these cases ." I accept, as indeed I am bound to, that proposition and I approach this sentencing exercise with those principles in mind. I have also taken into account s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 of the Commonwealth, in particular the matters in subs (2) which are relevant to this particular sentencing exercise.

I accept the submission that this case is objectively very serious. There was a large amount of overpayment, just over $300,000 and the offence continued over a period of about twenty years. In addition Ms Anderson regularly filled in forms whereby she supplied information to support the money which she was fraudulently extracting from the Commonwealth. Not only that but she received notifications from the various departments or agencies confirming that she was receiving these benefits. There can be no doubt that Ms Anderson knew what she was doing for the whole of the period of the twenty years that she chose to continue to extract money from the Commonwealth.

As was said by the court in Regina v Hawkins (1989) 35 A Crim R 430 at 435:

" This was no temporary 'dipping into the till' crime to overcome a problem that may have arisen. It was a consistent and persistent demonstration of fraud over a significant period ." I regard that passage as applying to this case. I have taken into account the amount of the fraud which is not the highest amount which has been the subject of these kinds of offences in the precedents but which is significantly high. As I have already said I regard the period of time as very significant. I note that none of the overpayment moneys has been recovered so that Ms Anderson can receive no benefit for any contrition shown by any action to make reparation for any loss.

Ms Anderson, as I indicated, pleaded guilty. She pleaded guilty on 16 May 2007. The Crown submits that this was a plea at a relatively early stage whereas Ms Duchen submits that it was a plea at the earliest realistic opportunity. I propose to accept Ms Duchen's submission in this regard. It is acknowledged in the Crown's submissions that between her first appearance in December 2006 and her plea in May 2007 two further appearances concerned orders being made for the service of the brief. I accept Ms Duchen's submission that it must be reasonable for a person to be able to be in possession of the full brief which is to be prosecuted against them and to be in a position to obtain legal advice before entering a plea. However, I do note that there was an overwhelmingly strong Crown case against Ms Anderson.

Taking that into account and the extent of her early plea, I propose to allow her a discount which reflects not only her remorse and acceptance of responsibility expressed in evidence before me and to other persons but her willingness to facilitate the course of justice. This will be reflected by a discount of some thirty per cent from the sentence which I propose to impose.

Ms Anderson has a lengthy criminal history. It covers her time in New Zealand as well as in Australia. She has served periods of imprisonment before, once in New Zealand for some two months and on two or three occasions in Australia. The offences which are contained on her record are mostly dishonesty offences. Many of them are for theft and stealing. They include shoplifting but they also include driving offences. Ms Anderson cannot receive the benefit of additional leniency as a result of this criminal record. Indeed to some extent it demonstrates a consistent disregard for the law which requires people to behave in a way that does not infringe on the property rights of others. Ms Anderson's behaviour over the years according to her criminal record has consistently demonstrated a disregard for the property and the possessions of others. These particular offences for which I am sentencing her today are by far the most serious examples of her criminal behaviour.

I have taken into account the submission about the hardship which might be caused to Ms Anderson's family as a result of her imprisonment. This is a factor which is referred to in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act . I adopt what was said by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Regina v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286 where Justice Howie said at [31]:

" It is now clear that the reference in s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act to the 'probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the person's family or dependants' should be read as if it were preceded by the words 'in exceptional circumstances'. It should be emphasised that the question of whether the probable effect of a sentence upon a third party will give rise to an exceptional case cannot be considered in isolation from the facts of the particular matter and the degree of criminality involved in the offences for which sentence is to be imposed. " The consequences of imprisonment upon the family of any prisoner are harsh. The prisoner is deprived of the benefits of having his or her family close by. Perhaps more importantly the family, particularly if they are young, are deprived of the benefits of, in the usual case, their parent. This is perhaps particularly so in the case of a mother with young children. In this case Ms Anderson has three teenage children. However, the consequences of her imprisonment are sadly in a way no greater than the unfortunate consequences that follow when any person has committed a serious crime which warrants a term of imprisonment. Her case is no exception and the authorities constrain me as to the extent that I can take into account the impact that a gaol term has on the family of an offender.

I have also taken into account and I am satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate other than a period of full-time imprisonment. This is, in my opinion, very clear from the authorities and Ms Duchen realistically conceded this. There was no other option in my respectful opinion than to make that concession. I will date the sentences from the date when Ms Anderson went into custody, namely, 14 December 2006. I have also taken into account the submissions made today. I have, so far as the Crown is concerned, given weight to the period of time over which the offences were committed.

So far as the psychological report is concerned, Ms Duchen made it clear that she was seeking no benefit from that report to explain the criminal behaviour and I regard the contents of the psychological report as descriptive of the subjective circumstances of Ms Anderson rather than offering any explanation by way of mitigation for her behaviour. The conditions referred to by the psychologist, which were major depression and severe symptoms of trauma as well as anxiety, are not at all surprising given Ms Anderson's circumstances and I hardly need a psychologist's report to confirm that a person in her position might be suffering from those conditions.

Ms Duchen has pointed to her client's incredibly traumatic life and she has explained her client's offending behaviour in the past as stemming from need. I understand that that may well have been the case although I still regard her criminal record as providing her no assistance so far as leniency and compared with the criminal record of other persons who may have far fewer offences or none at all, it is one that, in my opinion, demonstrates a consistent disregard for the law concerning the property of others. I accept Ms Duchen's submission that these offences did not involve any elaborate planning. Unlike other offences in the authorities where people had half a dozen or more identities or where a person was employed by the agency, Ms Anderson's offending behaviour was not part of some elaborate and complex scheme. Nevertheless, it was a serious fraud upon the Commonwealth.

I acknowledge that her psychological needs will be attended to in prison but I accept Ms Duchen's submission that realistically it is unlikely that her psychological needs will be attended to as well as they might be were she not in prison. I acknowledge the submission that this was one ongoing offence but I do not accept that submission in its entirety. There was a consistency in the behaviour but in this instance Ms Anderson's opportunities were numerous, when she filled in forms or received information from the departments, to cease her criminal behaviour. I regard her need for supervision on release as being significant given her personal history and personal problems so that I propose to allow a parole period in the region of forty per cent.

I will tell you now, Ms Anderson, I am going to sentence you to five years imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. So you have three years to serve from 14 December 2006 and the overall sentence will be five years. HIS HONOUR: I need to divide that up according to the principles in Pearce , and this is where I might need some assistance. Ms Dobraszczyk, just remind me of the section which contains the parole periods and non-parole periods. You haven't got it in front of you, have you?

DOBRASZCZYK: I have a little bit. A head sentence in excess of three years must fix a non-parole period or recog order. That's section 19AB.

DOBRASZCZYK: There is also a section which your Honour may be looking for which deals with cumulative and concurrent sentences.

DOBRASZCZYK: That I don't have in front of me, 19AG.

HIS HONOUR: Can I fix sentences, fixed terms without a non-parole period?

DOBRASZCZYK: Yes. There is a section dealing with that.

HIS HONOUR: I propose to sentence in respect of the passport offence, if I can call it that, to a fixed term of twelve months and I propose to fix concurrent periods of six months for the s 29B offences, which are less serious in amount, so that is counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and probably 8, 9 and 10. And I propose to fix fixed periods of twelve months in respect of those 29B offences, which are 5, 6 and 7, which are significant amounts. They will all be concurrent so that the passport offence of twelve months and the mixture of 29B offences of twelve months and six months will all be - sorry, the twelve months ones will be cumulative on the six month ones under the 29B. So in effect there will be fixed sentences of eighteen months. Does that make sense? Do you understand what I mean?

HIS HONOUR: Then in respect of the Criminal Code offences I propose to do the same, namely, a mixture of six months and twelve months but I need to attach a non-parole period to some of those. The less serious ones are 1, 2, 5, 6 and the more serious ones are 3, 4, 7 and 8.

DOBRASZCZYK: Does your Honour mean therefore those less serious ones for the six months and 3, 4, 7, 8 for 12?

HIS HONOUR: Correct. I should have said before but I'll return to the formal remarks in a moment, the overall sentence I had in mind was seven years and after the discount of about thirty per cent it will be reduced to an overall sentence of five years and the minimum period or non-parole period will be three years. What I need to do is to--

DOBRASZCZYK: As your Honour knows in terms of the dates, in terms of when things start and overlap, that's what needs to be done.

HIS HONOUR: Do you need your Act back to direct my attention to--

DOBRASZCZYK: I might just check some of those sections in order to assist. The section, your Honour, in relation to cumulative, partly cumulative or concurrent sentences is s 19, in particular subs (2).

HIS HONOUR: And I don't have to give reasons like in the State system for a longer than normal parole period because there is no notion of a normal parole period, am I right, there's just the authorities which suggest?--

DOBRASZCZYK: That's correct, your Honour. If your Honour was going to issue at the higher end then there might be a reason for that but that's not this case, with respect. I was just going to check in relation to the fixed sentences. Section 19AB subs (3) and (4) really deal with the fixed sentences issue and subs (4) where the court decides that neither a non-parole period nor recognisance release order is appropriate, the court must state its reasons for so deciding and cause the reasons to be entered in the records of the court.

DOBRASZCZYK: I think they're the main sections your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I'll just resume my remarks on sentence.

As I have indicated I propose to impose a sentence in effect of five years with a non-parole period of three years and that is after taking into account a discount of roughly 30% for the reasons that I have indicated.

I have, in fixing that period, had regard to four cases which have been provided to me by the prosecution. One is Regina v Murphy [2007] NSWCCA 18. The second is Bick v The Commonwealth [2006] NSWCCA 408. The third is Sanchet v The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] NSWCCA 291 and the last is Regina v Knight [2004] NSWCCA 145. I regard the cases of Knight and Sanchet as more serious than this case. In Knight the offender received a sentence of eight years with a non-parole period of five years, but in that case the offender had committed some thirty-three different offences and had extracted some $362,000 from the Commonwealth using twenty-three false identities. I also regard the case of Sanchet as more serious than this case. There were sixty-one separate charges in Sanchet and an amount of $400,000 was obtained over a period of four years using twenty-two false identities. The offender is that case received a maximum of six years with four years non-parole.

Murphy , the most recent case, was a case where the offender was an employee of Centrelink, committed eleven offences. That is about half the number committed by Ms Anderson. The amount was greater, $375,000, but they occurred over a much shorter period, that is eighteen months. The Court of Criminal Appeal regarded the sentence of three years and three months as lenient. Nevertheless, it reduced the non-parole period of two years and three months to two years because it was regarded as relatively too high.

In Bick which I regard as relatively close to the circumstances of this case, there were fourteen offences, fewer than in this case. It had additional complexity though in that five false names were used, but the period of time involved was some twelve years which is much shorter than the period of time over which Ms Anderson committed her offences. The sentence was four and a half years with a non-parole period of three and a half years. I regard this case as more serious, but not significantly so than the case in Bick which is why I fix a head sentence of five years, but because of the subjective circumstances of Ms Anderson, I regard an appropriate non-parole period as three years overall in this case.

Ms Anderson for the offence of making a false or misleading statement in relation to a foreign travel document application, that is the passport, which is an offence against the Foreign Passports Law Enforcement Security Act 2005 , I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of twelve months to commence on 14 December 2006 and to expire on 13 December 2007. I do not fix a non-parole period in respect of that offence because of the other sentences which I am about to impose. In respect of the following offences, again s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 , namely the offences contained in the court attendance notice.

HIS HONOUR: What's the best way of describing these? DUCHEN: Maybe if your Honour looks at the facts and they're numbered there.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, there's lots of numbers. There's a H number.

DOBRASZCZYK: Which is crossed out. That doesn't help because that's only in relation to the one document. But is it still appropriate - well we have two CANS--

DOBRASZCZYK: Perhaps then with that separate one, that is in relation to the period 3 July 84 perhaps making it clear that it's in relation to that separate offence between that period and--

HIS HONOUR: Yes, and then I'll identify the second court attendance notice as the one containing eight counts.

DOBRASZCZYK: Eight counts and then on that piece of paper counts number whatever we're dealing with.

In respect of the offence against s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 which was committed between 3 July 1984 and 7 January 1986, I sentence you to a period of imprisonment of six months to commence on 13 June 2007 and to expire on 12 December 2007. In respect of the following number defences contrary to s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 , contained in the court attendance notice which contains ten numbered offences, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10, I sentence you to concurrent terms of six months imprisonment to commence on 13 June 2007 and to expire on 12 December 2007. In respect of the counts in the same court attendance notice which are numbered 5, 6 and 7, I sentence you to concurrent periods of imprisonment of twelve months to commence on 13 June 2007 and to expire on 12 June 2008. In respect of all of those offences under s 29B of the Crimes Act I do not fix a non-parole period because of the additional sentences which I am about to impose.

In respect of the offences contrary to s 135.1 subs (5) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 which are contained in the court attendance notice, itself containing eight offences, in respect of the offences numbered 1, 2, 5 and 6, I sentence you to six months imprisonment to commence on 12 June 2008 and to expire on 11 December 2008. In respect of the offences contained in that court attendance notice and bearing the numbers 3, 4, 7 and 8, I sentence you to imprisonment for a period of three years to commence on 11 December 2008 and to expire on 10 December 2011. I fix in respect of each of those offences non-parole periods of twelve months to commence on 11 December 2008 and to expire on 10 December 2009.

I make an order for reparation pursuant to s 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 in the amount of $304,008.04 which should be payable to the Commonwealth. In addition I make an order for fingerprints to be taken from you pursuant to s 3ZL of the Crimes Act 1914 .

HIS HONOUR: Ms Dobraszczyk, what if anything-- DOBRASZCZYK: A few technical issues. In relation to--

DOBRASZCZYK: The code offences, the more serious Code offences where your Honour gave three years.

DOBRASZCZYK: Three, four, seven and eight, we're assuming that that means that they're to be served concurrently. So that's three years for each offence?

DOBRASZCZYK: Is that correct, to be served concurrently?

HIS HONOUR: That's correct. Those three year offences under the Code are to be served concurrently and each of them has a non-parole period of twelve months to be served concurrently.

DOBRASZCZYK: That's my second issue. In relation to the non-parole period, your Honour in the Commonwealth legislation there's only one non-parole period that can be given.

DOBRASZCZYK: There is a section in relation to that which of course I've forgotten.

DOBRASZCZYK: Then the non-parole period in relation--

HIS HONOUR: I fix one non-parole period for the whole period?

HIS HONOUR: That makes it a bit easier, perhaps less--

DOBRASZCZYK: Yes, it's in 19A(b). So where a person is convicted of a federal offence or two or more at the same sitting, and where the court imposes a federal sentence that exceeds, or sentences that in the aggregate exceed three years which we have here.

HIS HONOUR: So I should have just fixed the concurrent three years sentences. In respect of the code offences leave it at that and then fix one non-parole period in respect of the lot?

DOBRASZCZYK: Yes, because that section then goes onto say the court must either fix a single non-parole period in respect of those sentences or make a recog release order.

HIS HONOUR: If I could have that back? Ms Duchen just before I - is there anything you want to add?

HIS HONOUR: Do you agree with what Ms Dobraszczyk was saying?

DUCHEN: Yes, I think that's right your Honour and so when your Honour those last four offences are three years concurrent with each other and then when you set the non-parole period you said "and I set a non-parole period of" not concurrent or anything.

DOBRASZCZYK: Which would be your Honour's three year period.

DUCHEN: No, it's twelve months the non-parole period is it not?

HIS HONOUR: No, the overall non-parole period is three years.

HIS HONOUR: It's a three year non-parole period, two years additional. Total sentence is five.

DUCHEN: That's right, I'm sorry, that's quite right.

So in respect of the offences contrary to the Criminal Code Act 1995 which are numbered 3, 4, 7 and 8 I sentence you to a period of three years imprisonment to commence on 11 December 2008 and to expire on 10 December 2011.

In respect of all of the sentences which I have just imposed under all of the pieces of legislation I fix a single non-parole period of three years to commence on 14 December 2006 and to expire on 13 December 2009. Ms Dobraszczyk anything to be corrected or added? DUCHEN: I don't think that's right. HIS HONOUR: I'll come to you Ms Duchen.

HIS HONOUR: We've got a reparation order, fingerprint order, sentence.

DOBRASZCZYK: I think we have dealt with every offence.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I'm pretty sure we have. Ms Duchen?

DUCHEN: I'm just wondering about the non-parole period your Honour and I might be wrong here because it's quite a complicated--

DUCHEN: I have the date your Honour. I'm just concerned you've put that after the three years which basically turns into a fixed term now from December 08 to December 11, right. That's for those last four offences. Then you've gone back to a single non-parole period and you've taken it right back to before those offences occur.

HIS HONOUR: It seems that is what I have to do under the legislation under 19A(b). I have to fix a single non-parole period in respect of federal sentences that I impose.

DUCHEN: I know you have to fix a single one your Honour, I don't cavil with that. What I was concerned about was whether that refers to one non-parole period for one offence or one non-parole period for all offences.

HIS HONOUR: I think it is in for all offences. The section says--

DUCHEN: If it says that then that's right then your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: It says "where the court imposes on the person a federal sentence or federal sentences that in the aggregate exceed three years" I've done that, "then if at the time that they're imposed the person is not already subject to a federal sentence" which Ms Anderson is not "the court must either fix a single non-parole period in respect of that sentence or those sentences".

HIS HONOUR: So I've imposed all the sentences and I--

HIS HONOUR: I fix a single non-parole period in respect

of all those sentences to commence 14 December 2006 of

DUCHEN: Thank you your Honour. I was just concerned about a sentence or all those sentences, that's all.

HIS HONOUR: It seems to be what the legislation says. Anything else that I need to do?

HIS HONOUR: I will return your legislation, thanks Ms Dobraszczyk. I will return exhibits 1 and B. I will return exhibit A comprising tabs 1 through to 4 inclusive.

DUCHEN: I'm wondering if your Honour should maybe keep these on the file?

DUCHEN: I'm wondering if your Honour should perhaps keep these on the file, the report and everything?

HIS HONOUR: You're quite right Ms Duchen. They obviously should stay with the file. So exhibit A 1 to 4 goes with the file as well. Ms Anderson I have to make sure you understand the sentences. I think you do. You have received a sentence of five years from 14 December 06 to 2011. The non-parole period that you must spend in gaol is three years from 14 December 06 to 13 December 09. Do you understand that?

HIS HONOUR: The reasons for that sentence are what I explained over the hour or so when I first came back on. Do you understand that?

HIS HONOUR: Can I thank you both Ms Duchen and Ms Dobraszczyk for your assistance. You've both been very helpful. I apologise to the staff, the court officer and the monitor who have both sat here until well after 5 o'clock without any complaint. This has been an important exercise. It has been in the community's interests and in Ms Anderson's interests to have it finalised this afternoon. It's not been straightforward, so I appreciate the time which they have given. Thank you very much. oOo

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.