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[2020] QCAT 312
respondent. The decision of the Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General on 2 December 2019 to issue REB a negative notice was confirmed. The reasons were to be published in de-identified...
The Tribunal reviewed the decision to refuse REB a Blue Card. It accepted that he had work experience, family support and had taken some steps after the events. But it was concerned that the domestic-violence behaviour appeared not to be isolated, and that he continued to deny or minimise his responsibility without showing adequate insight into the effect on others. The evidence did not show sufficiently how he had addressed the triggers for his behaviour or developed strategies to manage risk. Because the Tribunal considered children's welfare paramount and the risk factors stronger than the protective factors, it confirmed the negative notice.
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1,912 words · generated 28/09/2026
In REB v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2020] QCAT 312, Member Hughes reviewed the Director-General's decision to issue REB a negative notice under Queensland's working-with-children screening scheme. A negative notice prevents the person from obtaining a Blue Card for relevant employment or volunteer work ([2]). The review was heard in Brisbane on 24 July 2020, and the decision was delivered on 5 August 2020.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
REB was a former Juvenile Aid Bureau police detective. He said that after his relationship with his former partner ended in 2015, he had tried to move on, re-partnered, and worked as an Operations Manager in the not-for-profit social housing sector. The Tribunal accepted that he was a capable employee with family support and that he had taken steps to move forward after the events ([8]-[11]).
The central history was a 2013 conviction for contravening a Protection Order made for his former partner and her three children. The conviction followed the Order by about two months. REB was sentenced to nine months' probation, with no conviction recorded ([12]). Police material described serious physical violence. REB disputed the allegations and said he had pleaded guilty on his lawyer's advice, rather than because the allegations were true ([12]-[13]).
The Tribunal also considered material describing earlier child concern reports and other incidents, including allegations relating to 2011 and a further reported incident in 2014 while the Protection Order remained in force ([16]-[19]). These materials were part of the Tribunal's assessment of whether the 2013 incident was isolated and whether the risks had been addressed. The Tribunal confirmed the negative notice, finding that the applicant's risk factors outweighed the protective factors ([37]-[38]).
The Tribunal framed the statutory question as whether issuing a positive notice would not be in the best interests of children. Although REB was not convicted of a “serious offence”, the Tribunal said he could receive a positive notice unless his case was “exceptional” ([3]-[4]). The Tribunal treated child welfare as paramount because a Blue Card authorises work with children in different environments ([6]-[7]).
Its method was to balance protective factors against risk factors, referring to Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492 for that assessment ([4]). Protective factors included REB's age, employment history, family support, stated commitment to helping vulnerable people, and attendance at information sessions addressing alcohol and aggression concerns during probation and parole ([8]-[11]). The Tribunal did not dismiss those matters. It accepted that he had taken steps to move forward.
The difficulty was that the evidence about those steps did not explain sufficiently what had led to the behaviour, what coping strategies REB had developed, or how any risks had been addressed. The Tribunal said that the information about the sessions lacked enough detail to reveal his ability to identify triggers and appropriate strategies ([10]). It later noted an absence of evidence of ongoing professional treatment, counselling, alcohol or anger-management programs, psychometric testing, or a formal assessment of his current suitability to work with children ([20], [26]).
The Tribunal also relied on the applicant's response to the evidence. It considered that denying and minimising his involvement, and transferring responsibility to his former partner, showed an absence of acceptance of responsibility and limited insight ([14]-[15], [21], [24], [27]-[29]). It was particularly concerned that he could not identify how the incidents might have affected the children ([21]). The focus was therefore not simply whether past offending had occurred, but whether REB demonstrated sufficient awareness of its seriousness and impact, and whether he could exercise restraint in situations involving children ([22]-[23]).
Time since offending was relevant but not decisive. The Tribunal's stated reasoning was that a period without evidence of further offending does not, by itself, establish that a person no longer presents a risk where there is insufficient evidence about the triggers and how they have been addressed ([20]). It ultimately could not be satisfied that REB had addressed the specific risk factors or triggers for the offending behaviour ([36]).
The decision describes and applies the statutory scheme; it does not purport to amend it or announce a new statutory test. As set out in the reasons, a person not convicted of a serious offence may receive a positive notice unless the case is exceptional. The issue for the Tribunal was whether issuing the notice would not be in the best interests of children ([3]-[4]). The reasons cite ss 6, 221, 226 and 360 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), among other provisions.
The judgment's contribution in this particular review is its application of that framework to evidence about domestic violence, insight and risk management. It explains that the Tribunal weighed protective and risk factors, and treated the welfare and best interests of children as paramount ([4], [6], [33]). It also illustrates why the fact that an offence is not classified as “serious”, and did not involve children directly, did not end the assessment. The Tribunal noted those matters but still considered other evidence relevant to risk ([16]).
On the human-rights point, the Tribunal said its approach was consistent with the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), ss 13 and 26 ([33] and footnote 25). The supplied judgment does not analyse those provisions in detail, so it would be unsafe to attribute a more specific human-rights test to this decision than the statement it makes.
The reasons also cite previous decisions for propositions about convictions, responsibility, insight and the best interests of children. They do not state that REB changed or overruled any prior law. Rather, they apply the cited framework to the evidence before Member Hughes.
At [4], the Tribunal said it had to “identify and balance protective factors with risk factors.” In plain English, the assessment was not a mechanical result based only on the conviction. The Tribunal considered circumstances pointing towards suitability as well as information suggesting ongoing concerns.
At [10], it accepted that REB attended information sessions, but found the information insufficiently detailed to show whether he could identify triggers and suitable coping strategies. That distinction matters: attendance was a protective factor, but the Tribunal wanted evidence of what had been learned or changed.
At [14], the Tribunal said it could not go beyond the conviction and had to accept it as it was. In context, REB's account disputing the allegations did not allow the Tribunal to disregard the conviction. The Tribunal also considered other material, including police records and child concern reports, in assessing the broader pattern and risk ([15]-[19]).
At [20], the Tribunal explained that a period without evidence of further offending did not, on its own, show that REB was no longer a risk. Its concern was the lack of information about what had triggered the behaviour and how those factors had since been addressed. This is a fact-specific explanation of why elapsed time was not enough on the evidence presented.
At [31], the Tribunal concluded that limited insight, failure to take sufficient steps to address contributing factors, and failure to show how he could control his emotions were risk factors outweighing the protective ones. At [37], it summarised the result: the community could not be confident of the applicant's awareness of the impact of his behaviour or his capacity for restraint and self-control in situations relevant to work with children.
This decision is most directly relevant to a Blue Card review involving domestic-violence history where the Tribunal is assessing whether the applicant has addressed the risks associated with past behaviour. It is particularly pertinent where the record contains a protection-order contravention, evidence suggesting more than one incident, or behaviour in which alcohol may have played a part ([12], [16]-[20], [25]).
It also provides an example of the significance the Tribunal placed on evidence of insight. In REB's case, the Tribunal found that his denial and minimisation, lack of remorse, inability to identify triggers, and failure to describe non-violent coping strategies were relevant to his present suitability ([21]-[29]). Conversely, the decision records that employment, family support, time passing and attendance at some information sessions were considered protective matters ([8]-[11]). They did not, on the evidence in this case, outweigh the identified risks.
The decision should not be treated as establishing that any domestic-violence conviction automatically requires a negative notice. The Tribunal expressly considered the statutory context, the particular history, the applicant's evidence, and the information available about whether the risks had been addressed. Nor does the judgment say that a particular type or duration of counselling is invariably required. Its reasoning concerns the deficiencies it identified in the evidence before it.
The supplied judgment contains no information about subsequent judicial or tribunal treatment of REB. It cannot establish from this text whether later courts or tribunals have followed, distinguished, applied or criticised the decision.
Within the judgment itself, Member Hughes referred to a number of earlier authorities. Maher is cited in connection with balancing protective and risk factors ([4]). Pritchard, Drinkwater and Stitt are cited in the discussion of how the Tribunal treats a conviction ([14]). HIC and CW are cited in relation to the relevance of behaviour to child-related employment and the effect on children ([23]). Re TAA and Peri are cited in the discussion of insight, domestic violence, and the interests of children ([28], [32]-[33]). These are relationships within the reasons in REB, not evidence of how later courts treated REB itself.
REB also referred to Quinn and Launiuvao, decisions in which applicants convicted of serious offences had succeeded in review applications. Member Hughes said they had no application because their circumstances differed from REB's ([5]). The judgment does not provide the facts or reasoning of those cases in enough detail to make a broader comparison.
The judgment does not set out a general evidential threshold for proving that a person has addressed triggers or reduced risk. It records what was missing in this case, including detailed evidence about coping strategies, ongoing treatment, programs or formal assessment ([10], [20], [26]). It does not specify that any one form of evidence would necessarily have been sufficient.
Nor does the decision quantify how much weight each protective or risk factor received. The reasons identify the factors and state the overall balance, but do not assign numerical or fixed weights ([31], [37]). The assessment therefore remains dependent on the particular evidence and statutory context.
The reasons also refer to allegations and reports from several periods, while distinguishing the established conviction from disputed allegations. They do not explain in detail the evidentiary standard applied to every item of non-conviction material. A lawyer examining the decision's application in another matter would need to consider the exact record, the statutory provisions in force for that matter, and how the evidence was received and assessed.
Finally, the judgment notes that the legislation did not deem the 2013 offence “serious” and that it did not involve children ([16]). It nevertheless found the overall case exceptional. The reasons show that those features were relevant but not determinative; they do not establish a universal rule for how such factors must be weighed in other cases.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL - review of decision by respondent to issue a negative notice
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - OTHER MATTERS - whether exceptional case - whether not in best interests of children to issue positive notice
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - OTHER MATTERS - where protective factors - where no incidents of domestic violence since 2014 - where applicant has re-partnered - where applicant attended information sessions to address alcohol and aggression concerns - where applicant is a capable employee with family support
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - OTHER MATTERS - where risk factors - where conviction for contravention of Protection Order - where no acceptance of responsibility for own actions and their seriousness - where incident of domestic violence not isolated - where period without evidence of further offending not of itself sufficient to show applicant does not present as a risk, without evidence of triggers for the behaviour at the time and how they have been addressed since - where evidence of past and current professional treatment, coping strategies and support networks to address anger is deficient - where applicant focused on minimising his involvement by seeking to transfer responsibility to former partner - where no evidence of ongoing participation in alcohol and anger management programs or other counselling, psychometric testing or formal assessment of his current suitability to work with children - where applicant expressed no remorse and limited insight into
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - OTHER MATTERS - exceptional case - where interests of children must take priority over applicant's interests - where it was applicant's responsibility to provide safe environment for his former partner's children - where those who work with children must act responsibly and protect them - where community must be confident applicant can exercise restraint and self-control - where risk factors outweigh protective factors
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 13, s 26
Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) s 6, s 156, s 167, s 221, s 226, s 360, Schedule 1
Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492
CW v Chief Executive, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 219
Drinkwater v Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian [2010] QCAT 293
Grealy v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2018] QCAT 2
HIC v Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian [2013] QCAT 403
Launiuvao v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2018] QCAT 322
Peri v Chief Executive Officer, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 56
Pritchard v Chief Executive Officer, Public Service Business Agency [2015] QCAT 25
Quinn v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2019] QCAT 275
Re TAA [2006] QCST 11
Stitt v Chief Executive Officer Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 257
Is it not in the best interests of children to issue a positive notice to REB?
What protective factors favour issuing a positive notice to REB?
What key risk factors prevent issuing a positive notice to REB?
Since 2010 there has been four child concern reports recorded in relation to the children's father exposing the children to domestic violence. Other concerns of neglect when the children were in their father's care following the separation of their parents.
REB has one previous Child Concern Report recorded in 2006. This relates to a domestic violence incident with a previous partner where he has physically assaulted her. The children of the partner were not present.
In [omitted] 2011 there was a child concern report recorded for REB and for exposing the children to domestic violence. It was reported that REB had been physically violent... at the time. REB had been drinking that day.[15]
It can be harmful for children to become aware people they respect don't obey the law because it can create confusion for them as they try to develop a sense of right and wrong.[18]
A person aware of the consequences of his actions on others is less likely to re-offend than a person who has no insight into the effect of his actions on others. This is particularly important with children because they are entirely dependent on the adults around them having insight into their actions and the likely effect on children.[21]
Is this an 'exceptional case' to not issue a positive notice to REB?
[1] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 156, Schedule 1.
[2] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 226.
[3] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 221.
[4] Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v Maher & Anor [2004] QCA 492.
[5] Quinn v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2019] QCAT 275; Launiuvao v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2018] QCAT 322.
[6] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 6(a), s 360.
[7] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 6(b).
[9] National Police Check Results Report dated [omitted].
[10] QPS Court Brief printout dated [omitted].
[12] Pritchard v Chief Executive Officer, Public Service Business Agency [2015] QCAT 25, [36], citing with approval Drinkwater v Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian [2010] QCAT 293, [19]; Stitt v Chief Executive Officer Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 257, [37].
[13] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 167, s 226(2)(a)(ii), Schedule 2.
[14] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 226(2)(iv).
[15] Child Concern Report dated [omitted].
[16] Queensland Corrective Services Notified Concerns dated [omitted].
[17] HIC v Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian [2013] QCAT 403, [65].
[18] CW v Chief Executive, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 219, [61], [67].
[19] QPS Court Brief printout dated [omitted].
[21] Re TAA [2006] QCST 11.
[22] Peri v Chief Executive Officer, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 56, [49], citing with approval Re TAA [2006] QCST 11.
[23] Pritchard v Chief Executive Officer, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 25, [47], [48]; Grealy v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2018] QCAT 2, [29].
[24] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) s 6(a), s 360.
[25] Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 13, s 26.
[26] Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 6(a), s 360.
[27] Peri v Chief Executive Officer, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 56, [49], citing with approval Re TAA [2006] QCST 11.
[28] Direction 3 dated 1 June 2020; Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 66.
REB
Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2020] QCAT 312
The decision of the Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General on 2 December 2019 to issue REB a negative notice was confirmed. The reasons were to be published in de-identified format only.