Re SS (Bail Application) [2025] VSC 411 (11 July 2025)

1. The applicant, SS,[1] who was on a supervision order under the Serious Offenders Act 2018, was arrested on 27 January 2025 and charged with offences that are alleged to have taken place on 26 January 2025 and 27 January 2025. Having been refused bail by the Magistrates' Court, he has now applied for bail to this Court.

B. The events of 29 February 2024 - alleged threats to kill

1. It is a condition of the applicant's supervision order that he submit to urinalysis when required to do so (subject to there being reasonable grounds for that request). On 23 February 2024, the applicant was required to submit to urinalysis testing. The applicant attended, but, it is alleged, refused to provide a sample when he was told that the sample would be tested also for GHB.[2] On 29 February 2024, the applicant, who it was believed had engaged in an incident of 'road rage' on 28 February 2024, was required to provide urine for testing at Mulgrave between 11am and 2pm. He arrived at 1:58pm. It is alleged that Ms Rita Prossimo, who worked at the clinic, indicated that she was prepared to do the testing notwithstanding the time, and that the applicant then became aggressive and angry, invaded her space, and swore at and abused her. Ms Prossimo felt threatened and believed the applicant was going to hurt her. In the course of this exchange, the applicant, it is alleged, told Ms Prossimo that he knew where she lived and threatened to kill Ms Prossimo and her husband and family, and also threatened to follow her (and another woman present) home. There was a co-worker present who, it is alleged, also heard the threats. The applicant has a different version: he contends that Ms Prossimo and the co-worker refused to test him because they wanted to go home early.
2. The applicant has been charged by direct indictment, with, on 29 February 2024:

(a) Making a threat to kill Ms Rita Prossimo intending that she would fear that the threat would be carried out or being reckless as to whether or not she would fear that the threat would be carried out; and

(b) Making a threat to kill Mr Ross Prossimo intending that Ms Rita Prossimo would fear that the threat would be carried out or being reckless as to whether or not she would fear that the threat would be carried out.

1. The applicant is currently on bail for those charges.
2. He has also been charged, in what was described as an alternative charge, with 'using intimidation towards a person knowing or believing that the person may become involved in a criminal investigation or proceeding'. I assume the criminal investigation or proceeding would be the proposed charges of breaching a condition of the supervision order. The applicant seeks bail for this charge.

C. The events of 26 and 27 January 2025 - attempted aggravated carjacking and assault

(a) The applicant, the co-accused, who was then 15 years old and is the daughter of a person with whom the applicant is in a relationship, and four of the co-accused's friends, were standing on the street outside their vehicle at a residence in Croydon causing a minor traffic obstruction as Mr Darrell Leng and his wife Ms Lynda Timmins (who were driving in separate vehicles) approached. Mr Leng briefly stopped and yelled at the applicant and co-accused to get off the road and then drove into his driveway close by;

(b) As Mr Leng drove into his garage, the applicant and the co-accused followed Mr Leng's vehicle towards his garage. On the way, he banged on Ms Timmins' vehicle, which had parked on the street. The applicant and the co-accused walked down the driveway and into Mr Leng's garage, where he was sitting in his car. The applicant forced open the passenger-side door and entered the vehicle, holding a clenched fist up to Mr Leng's face. The applicant was wielding some kind of implement in his hand. The co-accused was armed with a machete. She opened the driver's-side door, held the machete up to Mr Leng's neck and said: 'Do you want me to stab you?'. The applicant demanded Mr Leng hand over the keys to the car and exit the vehicle. The applicant and the co-accused unsuccessfully started searching the vehicle for its keys; and

(c) Mr Leng began dialling 000. The applicant demanded Mr Leng hand over his mobile phone, and when Mr Leng refused to do so, the applicant punched Mr Leng in the face three times, causing minor wounds to his upper lip and scratches to his glasses. Mr Leng then got out of his vehicle, and as the garage door started to close, the applicant and the co-accused ran out. Mr Leng and Ms Timmins, who was still in her vehicle on the street, both called 000.

1. Dashcams installed on Ms Timmins' vehicle and CCTV recorded some of what transpired including footage of the machete. Mr Leng and Ms Timmins both identified the applicant as the alleged offender. Monitoring records for the applicant's electronic ankle bracelet show that he was in the vicinity of Mr Leng and Ms Timmins' residence at the time of the alleged offences.
2. That evening, between 10:57pm and 11:15pm, the applicant was captured on CCTV purchasing petrol at a petrol station in Ringwood. The applicant did not return to his residence until 11:48pm. He is currently subjected to a curfew as part of the supervision order, which requires him to be present at his residence in Mount Waverly between 11pm and 6am.
3. These events have given rise to the following charges, in respect of which the applicant now seeks bail:

(a) Attempted aggravated carjacking;

(b) Attempted theft of a motor vehicle;

(c) Aggravated burglary (did enter as a trespasser with an intent to steal and at the time a person was present and knew a person was present);

(d) Theft (namely car keys and garage remote);

(e) Common law assault;

(f) Unlawful assault;

(g) Home invasion with intent to assault;

(h) Home invasion with intent to steal;

(i) Aggravated burglary (did enter as a trespasser with intent to assault);

(j) Aggravated burglary (did enter as a trespasser with intent to assault and at the time had an offensive weapon, namely a machete);

(k) Aggravated burglary (did enter as a trespasser with intent to steal and at the time had an offensive weapon, namely a machete);

(l) Committing an indictable offence (namely attempted aggravated carjacking) while on bail; and

(m) Nine charges of breaching a condition of his supervision order: seven contraventions of condition 6.3 that the applicant must not commit an offence referred to in Schedule 3 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018, one contravention of condition 7.10 that the applicant must not contravene, inter alia, the Control of Weapons Act 1990, and one contravention of condition 7.2 that the applicant must not fail to comply with his curfew.

1. DSC Virtue is the Informant in the charges referred to in paras (a) to (l) and LSC Stonehouse is the Informant in the charges referred to in para (m).
2. On 27 January 2025, at around 8:08pm, after confirming through the electronic monitoring records that the applicant was at his partner's residence in Croydon, police officers attended to cordon off the residence. At 10:30pm, the applicant drove out of the driveway. Police officers attempted to perform a traffic stop, activating their lights and sirens and using an unmarked police vehicle to block the street. It is alleged that the applicant attempted to manoeuvre his vehicle to evade the police officers, including by reversing up onto the nature strip, and eventually hit the police vehicle with his vehicle, which caused minor scratches to both vehicles. The applicant exited the vehicle and, it is alleged, attempted to walk or run into nearby grassland. He was arrested a few moments later. According to the Informant's report, the applicant was 'extremely angry and verbally insulting'. After the applicant was arrested, police officers conducted a search of his vehicle. They located a hatchet wedged between the driver's seat and centre console, and clothing that is said to match the clothes worn by the alleged offender captured on Mr Leng and Ms Timmins' vehicle dashcams.
3. These events have given rise to the following charges, in respect of which the applicant also seeks bail:

(a) Possession of a dangerous article (a hatchet); and

(b) Failing to stop a motor vehicle as directed by a police officer.

1. DSC Virtue is the Informant for both those charges.

D. Other charge in respect of which bail is sought

1. The applicant is also charged with failing to appear on 20 May 2024 at the Moorabbin Magistrates' Court in accordance with his undertaking of bail entered into on 18 April 2024 (SC Hill is the Informant). He seeks bail for this charge also.

1. The applicant has convictions between 1992 and 1996, in the Children's Court, too many separately to list, for offences including thefts, burglaries, unlawful assaults, wilful damage, discharge of a firearm, intentionally or recklessly causing injury, criminal damage, cultivating a narcotic plant, intentionally causing serious injury, stating a false name, and going equipped to steal. He received youth supervision orders and numerous sentences to a youth training centre. In 1997, he was convicted of attempted armed robbery and intentionally or recklessly causing injury, driving offences, unlawful assault, entering a building with the intent to steal, theft, possessing stolen property, going equipped to steal and carrying a dangerous article, possessing a drug of dependence, using a drug of dependence, escaping from lawful custody and resisting police or persons assisting police, and thefts of motor vehicles. He received a community based order and periods of imprisonment. In 1998, he was convicted of armed robbery, intentionally or recklessly causing injury, breaching a condition of a community based order, and possessing a regulated weapon. He received further sentences of imprisonment. In 1999, he was convicted of breaching a community based order, attempted armed robbery, intentionally or recklessly causing injury, and recklessly causing injury. He received further sentences of imprisonment.
2. Then, on 4 July 2000, the applicant was found guilty of murder, recklessly causing serious injury, aggravated burglary, reckless conduct endangering life, burglary, theft including theft of a motor vehicle and escaping from lawful custody. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years. He was released (I understand) on 25 August 2019.
3. On 23 August 2019, a supervision order was made by Tinney J in relation to the applicant pursuant to s 14(1) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018, following a finding that the applicant posed 'an unacceptable risk of committing ... a serious violence offence' if the applicant were released into the community without being subjected to a supervision order. On 31 January 2020, the applicant was convicted of contravening a condition of that supervision order and received a fine. On 8 January 2021, he was convicted of contravening a condition of the supervision order and of committing an indictable offence while on bail. He received a sentence of five months imprisonment and a fine. On 27 April 2021, he was convicted of shoplifting and was fined. On 23 December 2021, he was convicted of unlawful assault and of contravening a condition of the supervision order and was sentenced to 210 days of imprisonment.
4. On 28 April 2023, the supervision order was confirmed by Croucher J.
5. On 20 October 2023, the applicant was convicted, again, of contravening a condition of the supervision order and of committing an indictable offence while on bail. He was sentenced to 21 days imprisonment. Finally, on 12 January 2024, the applicant was convicted of behaving in an offensive manner in a public place and received a fine.

F. The charges in respect of which the applicant has been granted bail

1. The applicant faces a number of charges that have not yet been heard and in respect of which he is already on bail. He is charged with:[3]

(a) On 9 May 2023, contravening his supervision order by failing to comply with his curfew (SC Haylock is the Informant);

(b) On 20 and 24 October 2023 (LSC Stonehouse is the Informant, with charges initially having been laid by SC Crossland):

1. Contravening his supervision order by using methylamphetamine;
2. Using methylamphetamine; and
3. Committing an indictable offence (contravening his supervision order) while on bail;

(c) On 26 October 2023, resisting emergency workers whilst on duty (LSC Stonehouse is the Informant, with charges initially having been laid by SC Crossland);

(d) On 23 February 2024 (LSC Stonehouse is the Informant, with charges initially having been laid by SC Adonis):

1. Contravening his supervision order by failing to submit to urinalysis;
2. Committing an indictable offence (contravening his supervision order) while on bail; and
3. Breaching a provision of the Bail Act 1977 by failing to comply with his supervision order;

(e) On 29 February 2024 (LSC Stonehouse is the Informant, with charges initially having been laid by SC Adonis):

1. Contravening his supervision order by failing to submit to urinalysis;
2. Committing an indictable offence (contravening his supervision order) while on bail;
3. Committing an indictable offence (intimidation relating to the involvement in a criminal investigation while on bail);
4. Breaching a provision of the Bail Act 1977 by failing to comply with his supervision order; and
5. Using threatening words in a public place;

(f) On 21 May 2024, contravening his supervision order by breaching curfew (LSC Stonehouse is the Informant); and

(g) On 23 May 2024 (LSC Stonehouse is the Informant):

1. contravening his supervision order by failing to submit to urinalysis; and
2. contravening his supervision order by breaching curfew.

1. I note, also, that the applicant has been summonsed to appear on the following charges, which are also outstanding:

(a) On 8 August 2024, driving while suspended, and driving an unregistered vehicle;

(b) On 26 February 2024, dangerous driving, failing to give his name and address after a motor vehicle accident, and failing to render assistance after a motor vehicle accident; and

(c) On 19 May 2024, careless driving, failing to give his name and address after a motor vehicle accident, and unlawfully assaulting two people.

1. Because the applicant is accused of Schedule 2 offences while on bail for a Schedule 2 offence, I am required to refuse bail unless the applicant can satisfy me that 'exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail'.[4] In considering whether exceptional circumstances exist, I must take into account the 'surrounding circumstances'.[5] The relevant surrounding circumstances include whether the applicant would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and, if so, whether the time the applicant would spend remanded in custody if bail is refused would likely exceed that term of imprisonment, the nature and seriousness of the alleged offending, the strength of the prosecution case, the applicant's criminal history, the extent to which the applicant has complied with the conditions of any earlier grant of bail and the applicant's 'personal circumstances, associations, home environment and background'.[6]
2. If I am satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the grant of bail, I must then grant bail unless the respondent establishes that there is an 'unacceptable risk' that the applicant would, if released on bail, commit a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence, otherwise endanger the safety or welfare of any other person, interfere with a witness or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, or fail to surrender into custody in accordance with the conditions of bail.[7]

1. The applicant relied on an affidavit sworn by his solicitor that exhibited various documents and adduced written and oral evidence from Associate Professor Rajan Darjee, who is a forensic psychiatrist who has examined the applicant.
2. The respondent relied on an affidavit sworn by its solicitor that exhibited various documents and adduced oral evidence from Mr Karl Johannson and written and oral evidence from Dr Bea Raymond and LSC Stonehouse. Mr Johannson is with the Specialist Response Unit in the Post Sentence Branch of Corrections Victoria and is involved, among other things, with the administration of supervision orders. Dr Raymond is a forensic psychologist who has examined the applicant on three occasions. LSC Stonehouse is the Informant for the charges of breaching the supervision order arising out of the 26 January 2025 incident and otherwise gave evidence also on behalf of the other Informants.
3. I will not summarise all the evidence that was given, but note the following matters.
4. Dr Raymond said that:

(a) The applicant has an antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits that manifests in hostility and aggression to others. He 'holds attitudes of [using] violence to get his needs met'. He has a 'pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of others with a history of deceit, manipulation, violence and intimidation' and 'appears to lack guilt, insight and empathy'; and

(b) The applicant, if in the community and even if subject to a supervision order, is at 'high risk' of committing an offence of the kinds listed in Schedules 2 and 3 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (for example, aggravated carjacking, common assault, robberies and burglaries).

(a) Although the applicant does not 'intrinsically' want to commit serious violence, in the sense that he does not fantasise about doing so or find it thrilling and is not 'predatory', the applicant 'clearly has a propensity to impulsive and aggressive behaviour' and posed a 'high risk of aggression';

(b) It was 'highly likely that there will be further acts of aggression' and a 'real possibility there might be ... offences that might be considered Schedule 3 offences' (which includes offences such as common assault and aggravated carjacking), but it was 'unlikely' that there would be a 'serious violence offence' in the sense of a Schedule 2 offence (which includes offences such as murder, manslaughter, intentionally or recklessly cause serious injury). These were references to the schedules to the Serious Offenders Act 2018, not the Bail Act 1977. This amounted to a high risk of what Associate Professor Darjee described as 'non-injurious physical violence' - that is, of aggressive and violent acts that do not result in serious physical injury to others;

1. These opinions were formed in a context where he had initially been asked to ignore the alleged events of the present charges. When asked to consider those allegations, Associate Professor Darjee then said that the applicant is 'going to continue doing the things that he's been doing since 2019', and if the applicant did perform the acts with which he is charged and is not on remand but is in the community then he would pose a moderate risk of 'serious violence', a high risk of 'medium level violence' and a high risk of 'relatively minor violence'.
2. Mr Johannson said that:

(a) The applicant was twice given parole, but had the parole cancelled due to breaches by him of parole conditions;

(b) On release from prison, in August 2019, as part of an 'intensive treatment and supervision condition', the applicant resided at Rivergum. Rivergum is a secure residential facility that is designed to provide a structured and secure environment in which a person may undergo 'offence-specific treatment'. The applicant did not progress past the first phase of the three-phase model, which was the 'treatment readiness phase', and was hostile and aggressive to staff;

(c) The applicant's compliance with the requirement of his supervision order that he attend meetings with his Specialist Case Manager has been 'minimal' and his engagement has been 'low level'. Further, between August and December 2024, the applicant was directed on 10 occasions to present for urinalysis testing as a result of suspected drug use, but he did not attend on any of those occasions. At the moment, investigations are underway with a view to determining whether to lay further charges against the applicant for further alleged breaches of the conditions of the supervision order;

(d) The applicant was enrolled in a Forensicare 'problem behaviour program', but was 'exited' from that program due to missed appointments and aggression towards staff;

(e) The applicant was provided with drug and alcohol treatment from the Australian Community Support Organisation that involved him doing 'prosocial' outings. The applicant was 'exited' from that program due to his failing to engage and aggression towards staff;

(f) The applicant was offered to participate in a 'lived experience' through 'mentoring' program by 'Hard Cuddles', but he did not want to engage with that program;

(g) 'Forensic Intervention Services', which is a branch of Corrections Victoria that provides clinical services aimed at offence-specific treatment, has not accepted the applicant for one-on-one treatment due to what they described as his 'destabilised lifestyle' and his reluctance to engage with them;

(h) There has been a level of 'staff burn out and fatigue' at Corrections Victoria among those dealing with the applicant due to his 'aggressive', 'threatening' and 'abusive' behaviour;

(i) In July 2024, Corrections Victoria obtained a report from Code Black Psychology about how its staff might deal with the applicant to limit their exposure to 'occupational violence' and to enable them better to engage with him. He believed that the report's recommendations had been implemented.

(j) Since the applicant has been on remand, there have been 23 incident reports about him raised through the prisoner information management system relating for the most part to verbal abuse but including some thrown objects;

(k) The applicant claims, in prison, to have suffered a number of seizures and to be unable to stand on his legs and to need a wheelchair, but no seizures have been observed and no medical reason for his inability to stand has been identified;

(l) The applicant has been treated by Ms Melissa Pardi, psychologist, from the psychological services organisation Caraniche. The supervision order requires that he attend on her. He has only attended 14 out of 43 pre-arranged appointments,[8] which Mr Johannson described as 'somewhat minimal' engagement. Ms Pardi has reviewed the applicant once by audio-visual link since he has been on remand. Some attempts to see him while on remand failed due to problems with the connection (that cannot be attributed to the applicant), but on another occasion the applicant refused to attend, and on two other occasions he said he had a migraine and was not well enough to attend; and

(m) The applicant refused to attend an appointment with Dr Raymond.

(a) The applicant had been found guilty of breaching his supervision order many times including by failing to follow directions, by using methylamphetamine, by committing an unlawful assault, and, once, by removing his electronic ankle bracelet;

(b) In respect to the 26 January 2025 allegations, Ms Timmins' dashcam 'clearly shows' the applicant, the applicant was also identified by photo board, the data from the applicant's electronic ankle bracelet shows he was at that location at that time, and the clothing shown on the dashcam was later found in the applicant's car. According to Mr Leng's statement, the applicant punched him in the face and demanded his keys after the co-accused had held the machete to his throat. The only injury Mr Leng suffered was 'a minor cut to his lip'. Also, Mr Leng had conveyed to him that he 'strongly opposed' bail because he was scared of the applicant;

(c) In respect of the 29 February 2024 allegations, another pathology worker present says she heard the death threats being made, and Ms Prossimo had previously conveyed, through her husband, that she was too afraid to speak to the police;

(d) He has spoken to the alleged victims of two 'car collision incidents' that took place in February 2024 and March 2024, the first of which included an alleged assault and the second an alleged punch to the driver's window, which are the subjects of pending charges, and they were scared and opposed bail;

(e) Allegations were made against the applicant's current partner by a former partner of hers that she had engaged in 'controlling behaviour around drug use' by taking his money to buy drugs or saying that if he didn't give her money for that purpose she would kill herself. (Given the remote nature of this evidence, I place little weight on it);

(f) In 2023 or 2024, police found in the applicant's car syringes and on 12 January 2025, 'bottles of yellow liquid' that looked like urine that, he believed, had been prepared by the applicant as 'clean' urine that he could supply if asked to provide a sample for testing; and

(g) While the applicant has been in custody this year, there have been 'multiple incidents' of verbal and physical violence such as biting, kicking, spitting and throwing things.

1. The respondent also tendered, through LSC Stonehouse, an incident report relating to events that took place on 2 July 2025 after court. The applicant refused to return from the Court to prison unless it was by ambulance, and when the opinion by ambulance staff was that he did not need an ambulance, the applicant refused to get into the prison transport vehicle and became physical and attempted to assault staff by biting. Ultimately, in the early hours of the morning, MK9 OC Gel (a form of pepper spray) was required to subdue him and to return him to prison.
2. LSC Stonehouse also said, over objection, that when he saw the applicant not long after his arrest, the applicant appeared gaunt compared to how he had previously appeared, and that this caused LSC Stonehouse to believe, based on his experience as a police officer, that the applicant had returned to taking drugs that suppressed appetite such as methylamphetamine. I put this evidence to one side - I consider it would be unfair for me to assume drug use on the part of the applicant by reference to an observed change in his weight.

1. Most of the applicant's submissions were focused on the question of whether he posed an unacceptable risk, and that issue was addressed first in his oral submissions. But before that question arises, I am required to decide whether there are exceptional circumstances that justify the grant of bail. To be 'exceptional', the circumstances must be 'genuinely unusual or out of the ordinary'[9] such that 'the continued incarceration before trial would be productive of injustice'.[10]
2. The applicant's counsel identified that the applicant relies, primarily, upon his diagnoses including his personality disorder and, he says, his acquired brain injury and his status as a 'vulnerable adult' under s 3AAAA of the Bail Act 1977 as being 'exceptional circumstances'. Other factors raised that go to the question of exceptional circumstances include the likely delay in the hearing and determination of these matters and whether being held on remand would amount to preventative detention, the strength of the prosecution case, the applicant's purported willingness to engage in psychological treatment and the difficulties with doing so in prison, the prospect that he would lose his accommodation if bail is not granted, and the effect on his relationship with his mother.
3. A 'vulnerable adult' is relevantly defined as a person who is 18 years of age or more and 'has a cognitive, physical or mental impairment that causes the person to have difficulty in ... making a decision ... or communicating a decision.' That defined term does not, however, appear in either the definition of 'surrounding circumstances' in s 3AAA of the Bail Act 1977 or in the 'exceptional circumstances test' in s 4A of the Bail Act 1977 or in the 'unacceptable risk' test in s 4E of the Bail Act 1977, although it does appear elsewhere in the Bail Act 1977.[11] I accept the respondent's submission that the defined term is therefore not directly relevant to the exercise with which I am engaged. That said, the 'surrounding circumstances' include 'any special vulnerability of the accused, including ... experiencing any ill health, including mental illness' or 'having a disability, including ... intellectual disability and cognitive impairment'. In this way, the same matters that might make someone a 'vulnerable adult' would in ordinary circumstances, and do here, form part of the surrounding circumstances.
4. The applicant has a mental make-up that has contributed to his past behaviour and, if the allegations are proved, has no doubt contributed to that conduct also. But that of itself is not exceptional. Also, for reasons set out more fully in the consideration of 'unacceptable risk' in Part G.3 below, I do not accept that the applicant has the range of organic medical conditions that he claims or that his being held on remand would deny to him treatment that he would otherwise engage in. The medical notes indicate various complaints of symptoms, but do not amount to evidence that the applicant has genuine organic conditions or conditions that could be (and would be) treated if he were on bail but may not be treated if he is on remand. No evidence was led of any treatment he was receiving prior to his arrest other than from Ms Pardi.
5. Again for the reasons set out in more detail in Part G.3 below, I do not consider that the prosecution case is weak. The evidence from the alleged victims if accepted would, it seems, prove the offences and there is no obvious or particular reason to doubt their evidence.
6. On the other hand, I do accept for reasons set out in more detail in Part G.3 below that the applicant's present accommodation is placed at risk in the event that he is not granted bail and that his being on remand would prevent him from visiting his mother in her nursing home.
7. The applicant contended that, but for the charges brought by DSC Virtue, the alleged offences are 'relatively low level'. The word 'relatively' there plays an important role. The charges brought by DSC Virtue are serious and, if proved, and particularly having regard to the applicant's criminal history, are likely to result in a significant period of imprisonment. The maximum sentences for attempted aggravated carjacking, attempted aggravated burglary and home invasion with intent to steal and with intent to assault are 25 years imprisonment. Importantly, even if the charges are not tried until early 2027, this is not a case where it can be said that the period of time likely to be spent on remand would be longer or substantially longer than any period of imprisonment in the event that the charges are proved.
8. Having regard to these matters, individually and in combination, including the more detailed discussion below, I am not satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist in this case.

1. As noted above, even if exceptional circumstances were established, I am required to refuse bail if I am satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that the applicant would, if released on bail, commit a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence (under the Bail Act 1977) or otherwise endanger the safety or welfare of other persons or interfere with a witness or fail to surrender into custody. In forming this assessment, I am required, again, to have regard to the 'surrounding circumstances'.
2. I am satisfied that there is not an unacceptable risk that the applicant would interfere with a witness or would fail to appear.
3. The applicant's counsel submitted that the risk of the applicant committing a further relevant offence or endangering the safety or welfare of other persons was an acceptable risk in the circumstances. He submitted that an assessment of the level of the risk and its reasonableness should be informed by factors including the following:

(a) As a matter of underlying principle, it is inappropriate to hold people in custody because they are 'socially inconvenient';[12]

(b) The applicant suffered from various medical issues that were not able properly to be investigated or treated while in custody, and, related to this, he was a 'vulnerable adult'[13] due to his cognitive problems;

(c) His accommodation will be at risk if he were to be remanded in custody for perhaps another 18 months before his matters came to trial;

(d) The applicant would be denied ongoing contact with his mother;

(e) The past history of non-compliance with the supervision order is not predictive of future behaviour, because Corrections Victoria had only recently, or perhaps even not yet, implemented the recommendations of a report prepared by Code Black Psychology that made recommendations for how it might better engage with the applicant;

(f) The applicant was engaged with treatment by Ms Pardi, and this was positive;

(g) The applicant has a relationship that was a protective factor; and

(h) The risk could be ameliorated by imposing as bail conditions that the applicant attend drug testing when required (without there being an additional requirement that the request be on reasonable grounds) and not go to certain areas where the alleged victims reside.

(a) I accept that it is inappropriate to hold people in custody merely because it is 'convenient' to do so, and that this must be borne in mind. But I am, ultimately, applying a statutory test;

(b) I am not satisfied that there are significant medical issues that the applicant may not get adequately addressed in custody or if there are that this materially changes the assessment of the reasonableness of the risk he poses. The extent to which the applicant suffers from organic injury is unclear. There are, for example, references to his complaints being 'functional'. His various conditions seem to have been long-lasting and there was little evidence as to any attempts the applicant was making to seek medical treatment that were frustrated by his being arrested and remanded;

(c) I accept that the applicant's public housing is at risk if he is not granted bail, and that this is a factor to take into account. Although the respondent argued that the accommodation was not at risk because an agreement had been reached to reduce his rent to $15 a week or month, this would be subject to review and it is difficult to see how public housing would be kept empty for an extended period while someone is in custody for offences which, if proved, would result in a further period of imprisonment. On the other hand, I accept the evidence led that for so long as the applicant is subject to a supervision order, accommodation will be provided;

(d) I accept that the applicant's ability to maintain a relationship with his mother would be hampered, and that this a factor to take into account. His mother is now in a home, and, I assume, will not be able easily to visit the applicant;

(e) I do not accept that the applicant's ability to comply with the terms of his supervision order or to act without aggression is likely materially to change as a result of the Code Black Psychology report. That report was obtained in June 2024 and, according to Mr Johansson and based on his discussions with the applicant's Specialist Case Manager, was implemented promptly. According to the history given to Dr Raymond, training was implemented for 'all staff' through September 2024. That is some months prior to the most significant of the current alleged offences;

(f) I do not accept that the applicant has 'engaged' with Ms Pardi in any real sense, although his relationship with her has not broken down. A letter from Ms Pardi dated 27 March 2025 states: 'Unfortunately, [SS]'s sporadic attendance pattern has impacted meaningful treatment gains and therefore there are outstanding treatment targets related to relapse prevention planning and emotional regulation'. As noted, as at the date of that letter he had attended only 15 of 44 scheduled appointments. This was in an environment where he was subject to a supervision order that required his attendance at ongoing treatment. I accept that there have since been some occasions when he was unable to attend while in custody that were beyond his control. But I am not persuaded that his being in custody will prevent him from engaging in a treatment program that he would otherwise engage with if he were on bail, regardless of what conditions might be imposed;

(g) I do not accept that the applicant's relationship is a significant protective feature. The applicant did not mention this as a relationship of consequence to Dr Raymond when he saw her in June 2024. The applicant's partner has a significant criminal history for dishonesty offences and I am satisfied, from the imposition of a condition on her on 15 March 2024 as part of a community corrections order that she undergo assessment and treatment for drug abuse or dependency as directed, that her offences have been associated with substance abuse. More fundamentally, of course, the existence of this relationship has not prevented the events alleged to have taken place that gave rise to the most recent charges; and

(h) The alleged conduct took place at a time when the applicant was already on bail and was further subject to a supervision order that required, among other things, him to wear an electronic ankle bracelet and not commit any further offences or engage in behaviour that threatens the safety of any person. The presence of a supervision order has not had the effect of preventing problems from arising due to what I am prepared to accept, for the purpose of this application, is the applicant's defiant and aggressive attitudes towards those who seek to control his behaviour. If the presence of the existing supervision order and bail conditions were not sufficient to prevent the alleged offending, I cannot see that the grant of further bail or the imposition of further conditions would ameliorate the risk. I have no confidence that the applicant would comply with any conditions that are imposed on him.

1. On balance, I am satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that the applicant would, if released on bail, commit a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence (under the Bail Act 1977) or otherwise endanger the safety or welfare of other persons. In my view, and in addition to the observations above, this follows principally from the following matters:

(a) The expert evidence from both Dr Raymond and Associate Professor Darjee set out above is to the effect that there is a high risk that the applicant if released on bail will to continue engage in aggressive behaviour and behaviour of the type that he has engaged in to date;

(b) It is concerning that the charges include entering onto someone else's property accompanied by a co-accused with a machete, directly threatening a member of the public, striking them, and attempting to steal their property. This is so even given the uncertainty about what (if anything) the applicant had in his hand. The event would have been frightening and, if the allegations are true, represents a brazen and flagrant breach by the applicant of the various conditions and other measures taken in an endeavour to prevent him from offending while in the community and indicates a willingness to ignore conditions binding on him the breach of which may be met with significant punishment;

(c) Further, the prosecution case cannot be described as weak. The co-accused has, I was told, pleaded guilty. The evidence seems likely to establish that the applicant entered Mr Leng's garage with the co-accused. The applicant's counsel indicated that the prosecution could not exclude the possibility that the applicant had done so with a view to trying to prevent the co-accused (a 15 year old girl) from engaging in inappropriate actions. That scenario is inconsistent with Mr Leng's evidence that the accused punched him after the co-accused had held the machete to his throat;

(d) The allegations of making threats to kill are also concerning and, again, the prosecution case cannot be described as weak. Although at first blush it might seem surprising that the applicant would threaten violence towards someone who had offered to provide the test (rather than to refuse the test), this is less surprising if the possibility is allowed that the applicant did not want to be tested but did not want to refuse to be tested, and that is why he turned up two minutes before closing time. But in any event, there are, it seems, two people who say they heard the alleged threats and there is no obvious motive for their fabricating evidence; and

(e) This is not a case where the period of remand would exceed any term of imprisonment imposed if the allegations are proved.

1. The tendered photograph indicates that Mr Leng did not suffer serious physical injuries. That, however, is not dispositive. On the allegations, the events would have been frightening and probably traumatic. The same observations apply to the alleged threats to kill. Threatening behaviour is violent behaviour and can cause significant trauma or psychiatric harm, even if it is not accompanied by significant or lasting physical damage. This must not be overlooked.
2. In light of the applicant's past history of aggressive conduct and of ignoring conditions directed at modifying his behaviour to protect the public, it is difficult to see how the addition of any further conditions could ameliorate the risk to an acceptable level if he were now granted further bail.
3. Finally:

(a) The presence of a hatchet in the applicant's car remains unexplained and so also remains a concern. However, in circumstances where the applicant was, it seems, driving others around, it may be that the hatchet was not his. Certainly, it is not alleged that he took it with him when he went into Mr Leng's garage. For these reasons, I have placed little weight on its presence in his car;

(b) The presence of bottles of liquid in his car that might have been 'clean urine' and presented to disguise drug use, and the applicant's refusal on several occasions to attend for urinalysis, certainly raises a prospect that he continues to take drugs. However, in my view the risk should he be granted bail remains unreasonable even if he were not abusing unlawful substances. Accordingly I have not relied on these matters, either.

1. The applicant has not established that there are exceptional circumstances that exist that justify the grant of bail, and further, the applicant poses an unacceptable risk, if granted bail, of committing a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 offence, or otherwise endangering the safety or welfare of other persons. Accordingly, the application for bail must be refused.

[1] In accordance with an earlier order of this Court, a pseudonym is used in these reasons.

[2] Gamma-hydroxybutyrate, an illicit 'party drug'.

[3] This summary does not indicate where there are multiple charges for the same offence

[4] Bail Act 1977 (Vic); s 4AA(2)(c)(i).

[5] Ibid s 4A(3).

[6] Ibid s 3AAA(h).

[7] Ibid s 4E(1).

[8] I note that a letter from Ms Pardi dated 27 March 2025 states that the applicant had attended 15 of 44 prescheduled appointments.

[9] Rajic v The Queen [2016] VSC 27, [27].

[10] Roberts v The Queen [2021] VSCA 28, [10] (Maxwell P, Niall and Emerton JJA)

[11] See, eg, of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) ss 10AA, 10A, 13, 13A.

[12] Citing Re Clarke (1975) 61 Cr App R 320.

[13] Within the meaning of s 3AAAA(1) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic).