RE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1971 (WA); EX PARTE PRICE [2025] WASC 199 (22 May 2025)

1. Mr Price has filed an ex parte originating motion seeking leave to file and issue the proposed writ.
2. I am mindful that Mr Price is a self-represented litigant with obviously no legal training and that accordingly, it is necessary to approach the proposed writ with some flexibility to assess whether it discloses a viable cause of action which, with appropriate amendment, could be put into a proper form. Having made that allowance, I am satisfied that should the proposed writ (and originating summons) be filed, it would be an abuse of the process of the court and further, would be a vexatious and frivolous proceeding. Therefore, for the following reasons, I refuse the application seeking to file and issue the proposed writ.

Writ of Summons and Originating Summons sought to be filed

1. I will outline the salient parts of each of the two documents headed 'writ' and 'originating summons'.
2. The originating summons is headed 'originating summons to enforce foreign award (Cwlth Act s.8(2))(r.7.1)' with the relevant legislation being stated as the International Arbitration Act 1974. The applicant is stated as Ian Lionel of the Family Price. I do not propose to repeat the prolix pleading in full but the following amplifies the incoherence of the document.

This application is brought before the Honourable Court pursuant to the applicant's inherent and constitutional right to access justice and seek redress for a series of grave breaches of law, civil procedure, and fundamental human rights.

The applicant, Ian Lionel of The Family Price, a living man and subject of the Commonwealth, seeks urgent remedy and declaratory relief in respect of the following matters:

The unlawful execution of a redacted search warrant issued by an officer over 400km away from the location of the property and carried out without due process or proper authority;

The violent and unjustified trespass upon the applicant's residence, including forced entry, the use of armed officers from the Gang Crime and Firearms Unit, and the removal of the applicant at gunpoint;

...

The deprivation of liberty, property, and security, including the theft of personal belongings, overnight detention without charge, denial of access to legal representation, and procedural manipulation during bail proceedings;

The refusal of courts, law enforcement, and associated agents to respond to formal affidavits, notices, and filings submitted in good faith, over an extended period of time;

The total lack of remedy provided to date by any agency or authority, despite repeated attempts to resolve the matter lawfully and peacefully.

The applicant respectfully requests the Court to consider this matter on its merits, in accordance with the laws of equity, common law, the Constitution, and the foundational principles of justice.

...

To seek immediate and lawful remedy for multiple serious and ongoing violations of the applicant's rights under common law, constitutional law, and international human rights principles.

To obtain declaratory relief confirming that the actions taken by police, state agents, and associated departments were unlawful, including:

Execution of a redacted and unsigned warrant issued outside of jurisdiction;

...

To challenge the jurisdictional overreach and procedural misconduct of police, the court system, and public officers who failed to act within the bounds of lawful authority.

...

To assert the applicant's right to fair process, following repeated attempts to lodge affidavits, notices, and formal complaints that have gone unanswered or been improperly rejected.

1. The writ is similarly prolix and lacking coherence. Rather than endeavouring to summarise the document, I outline below part of the document.
   1. A declaration that the redacted warrants, which concealed the name and signature of the justice of the peace or judge who allegedly issued them, were invalid and void ab initio.

1. A declaration that the Magistrates Court, as a non-Chapter III court, lacked jurisdiction to make a "not guilty" ex-parte decision on behalf of the Plaintiff who was present and withheld consent, and that referring the case to the District Court was ultra vires.
2. A declaration that proceedings against the Plaintiff in the District Court are invalid because:
   1. They arise from actions undertaken by or on behalf of a body not recognized by law;
   2. They are tainted by procedural defects and unlawful initiation.
3. A declaration that "Western Australian Police" is a trading name or operational label, not a legal personality with standing to prosecute or initiate proceedings. Unless a duly sworn officer acts in the name of the State of Western Australia, all actions are nullities, as affirmed in Queensland Rail [2015] HCA 11, Tey v Plotz [2010] WASC 163 at [15], and acknowledged in correspondence from the State Solicitor's Office dated 11 March 2025 (Ref: 492-25).

1. A declaration that the Plaintiff has filed Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition addressing the unlawful actions of the Magistrates Court and the improper referral to the District Court, to be heard on 2 May 2025, both of which are the subject of the declaratory relief herein sought.
2. A declaration that the initiation and continuation of criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff in the absence of legal standing, jurisdiction, and lawful foundation constitutes an abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
3. A declaration that the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions continued prosecution against the Plaintiff with knowledge of the invalid foundation of the case, in defiance of the Case Management Order made by Magistrate Ridley on 19 March 2024 requiring full disclosure by 2 April 2024, and subsequent requests for compliance, demonstrating a deliberate abuse of judicial process.
4. During the hearing of this application, Mr Price submitted that he has been charged with criminal offences which have been committed to the District Court. Mr Price outlined a number of issues concerning the prosecution, including the lawfulness of his arrest and the search warrant. Further, Mr Price submitted that he was not heard appropriately in the Magistrates Court, and in particular at the time of committal. Mr Price expressed concern regarding the failure of the State prosecutor to disclose evidentiary material and the admissibility of evidence.

(1) If any writ, process, motion, application or commission, which is presented for filing, issue or sealing appears to the registrar to be an abuse of the process of the Court or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding, the registrar shall refuse to file or issue such writ, process, motion, application or commission without the leave of a judge or a master first had and obtained by the party seeking to file or issue it.

(2) In the case of a motion or an application ordinarily returnable before a master in chambers, an application for leave to file or issue such motion or application shall be made to a master in chambers.

(3) In all other cases, an application or commission shall be made to a judge in chambers.

(4) Applications for leave under subrules (2) and (3) shall be made ex parte and shall be supported by affidavit.

1. There are two main reasons for the requirement for leave to file an originating process which appears to a registrar to be an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding. First, it reinforces the inherent power of the court to protect itself from the unwarranted waste of its time and resources. Second, to avoid the loss that would otherwise be suffered by those required to defend actions which lack any substance.[1]
2. Order 67 r 5(1) of the Rules does not set out the criteria I am to apply in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to file or issue the proposed originating motion. However, from the express words used in the Rules, it is clear that I should only refuse leave to file or issue the originating motion if I am satisfied that the originating motion would be an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding.[2] In considering this issue, I adopt the same approach as that used in the exercise of the power of summary dismissal elsewhere in the Rules.[3]
3. The applicable principles were outlined by Vaughan J in Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Gates[4] which I respectfully rely upon in determining this application:
   1. The requirement for leave of a master or judge to file or issue a writ which appears to a registrar to be an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding reinforces the inherent power of the court to protect itself from unwarranted wastage of time and resources and to avoid the loss caused to those who have to face actions which lack any substance.
   2. Order 67 r 5(1) does not state the criteria that is to be applied in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to file or issue a proposed writ. However, it is accepted that a judge or master should refuse leave to file or issue only if satisfied that the writ would be an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding. Moreover, the caution attendant upon the exercise of the power of summary dismissal elsewhere in the Rules of the Supreme Court applies with no less force in the context of O 67 r 5.
   3. Accordingly, the question for determination is whether [the applicant's] proposed writ would be an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding.

1. There is considerable overlap between the concepts of 'abuse of process' and whether a proceeding is 'frivolous' or 'vexatious'. The expressions are often used in conjunction or interchangeably.
2. What amounts to an abuse of the court's process is insusceptible of a formulation comprising closed categories. It extends to all categories of case in which the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness. Abuse of process occurs in any circumstance in which the use of the court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. However, the onus of satisfying the court that there is an abuse of process is a heavy one. The power to dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process should be exercised with caution and only in the most exceptional or extreme case.

1. Proceedings will constitute an abuse of process if they are clearly doomed to fail or are plainly unsustainable.
2. In the context of an application to strike out a claim or pleading the terms 'frivolous' and 'vexatious' have often been used interchangeably. For example, an action is frivolous if it is obviously (or plainly) unsustainable and an abuse of the process of the court. It may for the same reason be categorised as vexatious.
3. An action is frivolous when it is not worthy of serious consideration, is insupportable in law, discloses no cause of action or is groundless. So too a matter that is without substance or is fanciful is frivolous. The term is apt to describe proceedings in which the plaintiff's claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed or in which there is no serious question to be tried. An action is vexatious if it has no reasonable prospects of success. The term has also been said to be apt to describe an action which is a sham and which cannot possibly succeed.

1. A proceeding will also be vexatious if it is productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment.

1. In determining the application, I must be mindful that Mr Price is self-represented and therefore, he is entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules. The court is required to approach the documents in which he articulates his case with some flexibility.[5] I must ensure that in a poorly expressed or unstructured document in which he sets out his case, there is no viable case which, with appropriate amendment or permissible assistance from the court, could be put into proper form.[6]
2. I am satisfied that the writ (and the originating summons) amounts to an abuse of process to the court and further may be considered to be a frivolous or vexatious proceeding. There are numerous difficulties with the writ that Mr Price proposes to file.
3. The proposed writ fails to comply with the base requirements of O 6 r 1 of the Rules. The baseless argumentative contentions do not constitute a 'concise statement of the nature of the claim made.'
4. The non-compliance with the rules is compounded by the scandalous nature of a number of the allegations within the writ.
5. The writ and originating summons appear to be an ambit claim of complaints arising from Mr Prices' contended difficulties with law enforcement. The writ seeks a myriad of declarations concerning the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court and District Court and the legal status of the WA Police. In his affidavit, Mr Price states that he seeks to address the 'unlawful acts' committed on him by restraining the Magistrates Court and District Court from 'taking further steps'. In addition, Mr Price deposes that he seeks 'an injunction to prevent any further harassment, detention, or legal proceedings based on the original unlawful referral or the invalid warrants.'
6. The complaints that appear to underlie the documents concern the contended lawfulness of the prosecution, the lawfulness of the search warrant, admissibility of evidence and the failure to disclose evidentiary material. These are matters that should be raised by him in the District Court. During discourse at the hearing, I made it abundantly clear that he should instruct a legal practitioner in respect to any criminal proceedings.
7. The proposed writ and originating summons are not in a form which makes any real attempt to comply with the Rules. The documents comprises discursive and argumentative assertions. Rather than disclosing any causes of action that are relied upon, the documents significantly obscures any possible claim of a cause of action. I am satisfied that the documents, with appropriate amendment, could not be put in a proper form.
8. The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Jones v Skyring [1992] HCA 39; (1992) 109 ALR 303, 312.

[2] Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Allen [2012] WASC 258(S) [23].

[3] Ex parte Gates [20]; Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Allen [23].

[4] Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Ex parte Gates [2018] WASC 213.

[5] Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 536 - 537.

[6] Sethi v Bhavsar [2020] WASCA 52 [27].