[1990] FCA 388
General information, not legal advice.
Federal Court of Australia
1990-10-10
Davies J, Gaudron JJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Solicitors for the applicant: James Pappas and Associates
Solicitor for the respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
This is an appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ("the AAT Act"). Pursuant to s.44 of the A.A.T. Act, the appeal is limited to questions of law. As to what constitutes a question of law, it is sufficient for me to refer to the judgment of Mason C.J. in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v. Bond, [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 64 ALJR 462, a judgment with which in this respect Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. concurred.
2. The applicant, Mr R.J.J. Carr, had had longstanding medical problems. He had suffered partial blindness, a psychiatric disorder, epilepsy and at the time of his employment also suffered fractures of his legs. A benefit classification certificate was issued in 1978 during the time of his employment specifying as conditions: "Epilepsy", "Visual Defect" and "Anxiety Depression".
3. The issue which came before the Tribunal was the extent of the superannuation benefit which was payable to the applicant under the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) ("the Act") on his retirement. This question turned upon the applicant's circumstances and paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s. 66(2) of the Act which read:-
"(a) a person ceases to be an eligible employee by reason
of retirement on the ground of invalidity before attaining his
maximum retiring age;
(b) there was in force in respect of the person,
immediately before the person's retirement, a benefit
classification certificate; and
(c) the Commissioner is of the opinion that the
incapacity which was the ground for his retirement was caused,
or was substantially contributed to, by a physical or mental
condition or conditions specified in the certificate or by a
physical or mental condition or conditions connected with such
a condition or such conditions,"
4. It was put to the Tribunal that the applicant continued to be fit for work and ought not to have been retired on the ground of invalidity as had occurred. The Tribunal rejected the submission in that it rejected the contention that it could review the decision to retire the applicant on the ground of invalidity. The Tribunal was correct in this view. The Tribunal was bound to proceed on the footing that a person had been retired on the ground of invalidity if in fact that was the case. See s.7(1) of the Act. Accordingly, paragraphs (a) and (b) were satisfied.
5. The applicant had been employed at Concord Hospital and had managed adequately despite his conditions of epilepsy, visual defect and anxiety depression. The Tribunal set out the facts which then occurred and which involved fractures to his legs:-
"In spite of these problems and in
spite of alleged badinage and teasing
by fellow employees, the applicant
continued to work in the hospital
laundry. There were a number of days
lost in sick leave as set out in Exhibit 3.
He stated his epilepsy was
controlled by medication and his partial
blindness did not affect his job.
In 1979 he fell over at home and fractured
the tibia in his left leg. After
hospitalization at Gosford he returned to
work. On 17th April 1980 the
applicant suffered a more serious injury.
Crossing Concord Road, Concord,
he was struck by a motor vehicle and
sustained compound fractures of both
his legs. As a result of that accident
the applicant was away from his
work until about February or March 1982.
When he returned to work he was
placed back on duty in the laundry but
became afraid of further damage to
his legs as the result of collision
with laundry trolleys. After two weeks
back in the laundry, at his own request,
he was redeployed to work sweeping
gutters and roads in the hospital grounds.
He did this work for one or two
months until a laundry truck nearly ran
him down. He told his
Superintendent of the problem and was
then redeployed to work cleaning
windows. He found this work worrying
because of the risk of epileptic fits
while working on ladders and because his
partial blindness restricted him
from seeing cobwebs clearly so as to do
his work properly. Following the
redeployments mentioned the applicant
faced further medical examinations
leading to the decision to retire him."
6. The Tribunal, faced with the remaining question posed in s. 66(2), referred to a report given by a Dr Quinn, a medical officer, who listed the conditions which Dr Quinn considered had brought about the retirement and who estimated percentages against each as follows: partial blindness 50 per cent; epilepsy 20 per cent; depression 10 per cent; bilateral tibia and fibula fractures 10 per cent. The Tribunal went on to say:-
"We agree with Dr Quinn that all four factors contributed
substantially to causing the applicant's retirement. While
percentages are not, in our opinion, a proper method for
expressing a qualitative analysis of what is a question of
mixed fact and law, we take the view that the major
contributions arose from the applicant's blindness and the
fractures. However we agree that the other conditions also
made a not insignificant contribution to a cumulative situation
in which the applicant was rendered incapable of carrying out
his duties. As three of the four factors were stated on the
applicant's BCC and substantially contributed to his
incapacity, notwithstanding the earnest and careful submissions
made on behalf of the applicant, we have come to the conclusion
that the decision under review was correct and the decision is
therefore affirmed."
7. Mr G. Scragg, counsel for the applicant, submitted that that decision was unreasonable and that the cause of the retirement was solely or overwhelmingly the orthopaedic condition. However, there was considerable evidence which supported the Tribunal's conclusion. Its decision was not unreasonable. Indeed, I believe I would myself have come to the same conclusion and would have thought it probable that the applicant's blindness and psychiatric problems played a part, together with the orthopaedic problems, in bringing about the applicant's incapacity to work. It appears to have been the interaction of the conditions which brought about the retirement and not any one condition on its own. No one condition overwhelmed the significance of the part played by others. It may well be that it was the orthopaedic fractures which tipped the balance and, when added to the applicant's other medical conditions, brought about the incapacity for work; but that is not to say that it was the orthopaedic condition alone or overwhelmingly which caused the incapacity or that the other conditions did not contribute substantially to that incapacity and thereby led to the retirement.
8. Mr Scragg further relied upon the point that the benefit classification certificate used the term "Anxiety Depression" while the two psychiatrists who gave evidence before the Tribunal preferred the term "personality disorder". Dr D.S. Bell, a psychiatrist called for the respondent, had said in a report:-
"A lifelong personality disorder would be the significant cause
of the psychiatric disorder Mr Carr had before he was appointed
as a permanent officer and it is the same disorder which has
been responsible for his psychiatric disorder since then."
"It was reasonable to describe the history of psychiatric
disorder in the case of Mr Carr as being `Anxiety/Depression'.
These words refer to the main symptoms he displayed, which of
course is an acceptable method of classifying psychiatric
disorder.
...
Clearly Mr Carr has a life long personality disorder of
considerable severity. The use of separate axes demonstrates
the interaction of the two. Specifically, the anxiety and
depression are the manifestations of overt disorder when the
individual with personality disorder has reached the limits of
his adaptation, or to be more accurate, maladaptation."
"... the description of a condition in the BCC as `anxiety
depression' should not be regarded as a precise technical
description in accordance with the terminology of the American
categorisation system known as D.S.M. In our view it
sufficiently describes a condition with which the personality
disorder existing at the time of the applicant's retirement was
connected."
This finding was consistent with the evidence before the Tribunal.
9. A medical condition "anxiety depression" had been specified in the benefit classification certificate. It was the task of the Tribunal as the tribunal of fact to decide what that term meant and to determine whether a medical condition which substantially contributed to the applicant's incapacity was or was connected with the medical condition specified in the benefit classification certificate. I see no error of law in the Tribunal's approach to this matter. Accordingly, paragraph (c) was satisfied.
10. Mr Scragg also submitted that the Tribunal made an inconsistent finding of fact when it stated that it preferred the view expressed by Dr Bernard Bloch, "Physically, he has recovered well from his accident and there is no desirability or merit in orthopaedic assessment." which had received confirmation from a report by Dr Higgs and evidence given by Dr Alexander yet went on to say: -
"That is not to say that the injuries did not play a
substantial part in the incapacitating of the applicant from
work. We believe they did."
11. In my opinion, there was no inconsistency in the Tribunal's findings. Dr Bloch was speaking of the applicant's orthopaedic condition. The Tribunal, however, was speaking in the context of the orthopaedic fractures and their interaction with the applicant's other medical conditions and of the effect that that interaction had in bringing about the incapacity which led to the applicant's retirement. I see no inconsistency between the Tribunal's acceptance of Dr Bloch's evidence and its view that the fractures nevertheless significantly contributed to the applicant's incapacity.
12. I find the reasons of the Tribunal to be a careful and compassionate consideration of the applicant's circumstances. No error appears in its reasons for decision. For these reasons, the application must be dismissed with costs.
Re Richard John Joseph Carr
Commissioner of Superannuation [1990] FCA 388
(1990) 64 ALJR 462