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[2000] VSC 264
Supreme Court of Victoria
2000-06-23
McDonald J
Original judgment source is linked above.
"AND the said Alice McGill doth hereby for herself her heirs executors administrators and transferees registered proprietor or proprietors for the time being of the land hereby transferred covenant with the said Edward Vernon Jones his heirs executors administrators and transferees registered proprietor or proprietors for the time being of the balance of the land now comprised in the said Certificate of Title that she the said Alice McGill her heirs executors administrators or transferees will not erect or cause to be erected on either of the said lots hereby transferred more than one dwelling house AND it is hereby requested that this encumbrance be noted on and appear on every future Certificate of Title for the said land or any part thereof as an encumbrance affecting the same."
"(1) The court shall have power from time to time on the application of any person interested in any land affected by any restriction arising under covenant or otherwise as to the user thereof or the building thereon by order wholly or partially to discharge or modify any such restriction (subject or not to the payment by the applicant by compensation to any person suffering loss in consequence of the order) upon being satisfied - (a) by reason of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the court deems material the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete or that the continued existence thereof would impede the reasonable user of the land without securing practical benefits to other persons or (as the case may be) would unless so modified impede such user; or (b) that persons of full age and capacity for the time being or from time to time entitled to the benefit of the restriction whether in respect of estates in fee simple or any lesser estates or interests in the property to which the benefit of the restriction is annexed have agreed either expressly or by implication by their acts or omissions to the same being discharged or modified; or (c) that the proposed discharge or modification will not substantially injure the persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction."
"The enquiry must ... be whether there have been changes in the character of the neighbour and whether those changes lead to the conclusion that it is no longer possible to achieve the purpose of the covenant. ... "
"Looking then at the requirements specified in s.84(1)(a) of the Property Law Act 1958, the applicants must prove that the original purpose in imposing the covenant can no longer be achieved because of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood: see Re Truman, Handbury, Buxton and Co Ltd's Application; Driscoll v Church Commissioners for England [1957] 1 WB 330; [1956] 3 All ER 802; Re Mason and The Conveyancing Act (1960), 78 WN(NSW) 925. Now it is no light task to sustain this burden. In many cases, the real purpose is not easily discovered and, accordingly it is difficult to discover whether the restriction has become obsolete".
" ... I have to be satisfied on the first limb of paragraph (a) that 'by reason of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the Court deems material the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete. It appears to me the critical words in that limb of the section are the words 'shall be deemed to be obsolete'. What does 'obsolete' mean? When is a restrictive covenant properly to be deemed 'obsolete'? This has by authority been stated to arise when the object of the restrictive covenant can, by reason of changes that have occurred, be no longer achieved or fulfilled. In other words through changes that have occurred the restrictive covenant has become futile or useless."
His Honour after citing Re Truman, Handbury and Buxton Co Limited and Driscoll v Church Commissioners for England further said at p.282 -
"It appears from that, that if the restrictive covenant continues to have any value for the persons entitled to the benefit of it then it can very rarely, if at all be deemed obsolete. One really enquires into the purpose of the restrictive covenant."
"It appears to me that as to the issue whether the continued existence of the restrictive covenant would impede the reasonable user of the land, the Full Court has adopted and applied the concepts applicable thereto stated by Lord Evershed, M.R. in Re Ghey and Galton's Application [1957] 2 QB 650, especially at 663; [1957] 3 All ER 164 at p.171 where Lord Evershed, M.R. said: 'But I think it must be shown in order to satisfy this requirement that the continuance of the unmodified covenants, hinders, to a real, sensible degree, the land being reasonably used, having due regard to the situation it occupies, to the surrounding property, and to the purpose of the covenant'."
After considering a further part of the judgment of the Full Court in Re Anton Stani, Menhennitt, J. at p.58 further said -
"In that passage, in my respectful view, the Full Court was adopting the whole of the considerations stated by Lord Evershed as to the meaning of 'impeding the reasonable user of the land' and the passage I have quoted from the Full Court judgment makes it manifest that that is essentially a question of fact."
"The test of practical benefit, it seems clear enough, is not merely whether if the covenant is modified or discharged there would be any depreciation in the sale value of land benefited by it. The notion of practical benefit goes much further than that. ... It [is] clear that if there is some real benefit to the person entitled to the restrictive covenant, then to deprive him of it is to deprive him of some practical benefit. And the right of a person to have preserved amenities for what he reasonably considers to be amenities for his projects is a right, the deprivation of which deprives him of a practical benefit."
"It seems to me that the meaning of the term 'obsolete' may very well vary according to the subject matter to which it is applied. Many things have some value, even though they are out of date in kind or in form - for example, motor cars or bicycles, or things of that kind - but here were are concerned with its application to restrictive covenants as to user and these covenants are imposed when a building estate is laid out, as was the case here of this estate in 1898, for the purpose of preserving the character of the estate as a residential area for the mutual benefit of all those who build houses on the estate or subsequently buy them. It seems to me that, if, as sometimes happens, the character of an estate as a whole or a particular part of it gradually changes a time may come when the purpose to which I have referred can no longer be achieved, for what was intended at first to be a residential area has become, either through express or tacit waiver of the covenants, substantially a commercial area. When that time does come, it may be said that the covenants have become obsolete, because their original purpose can no longer be served and, in my opinion, it is in that sense that the word 'obsolete' is used in s. 84(1)(a)."