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[1990] FCA 163
Federal Court of Australia
1990-05-28
Mr J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Re: THE PAUL DAINTY CORPORATION PTY. LTD. and PAUL DAINTY PRODUCTIONS PTY.
And: THE NATIONAL TENNIS CENTRE TRUST; THE VICTORIAN ARTS CENTRE TRUST and
Trade Practices - exclusive dealing - alleged forcing of third party's services - hire of concert venues to promoter - management of venues contracting with third party (Bass) for ticketing services - management insisting to promoter that venues take responsibility for ticket sales - whether any services provided by Bass to promoter - whether conduct authorised or approved by Victorian legislation.
Crown - immunity from statute - whether National Tennis Centre Trust, Olympic Park Management and Victorian Arts Centre Trust come under shield of the Crown - whether they are 'related corporations'.
National Tennis Centre Act 1985 (Vic) 1985 ss 6, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Williams and Hodgson Transport Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 72; (1986) 162 CLR 395 followed
Mr D Shavin and Mrs K Howard
Solicitor for the Appellants: Mark G Caldwell
Counsel for the 1st and 3rd Mr R C Macaw QC and
Respondents: Mr G C Clarke
Solicitor for the 1st Messrs Freehill,
Respondents: Hollingdale and Page
Solicitor for the 3rd
Respondents: Messrs Stedman, Cameron
Counsel for the 2nd Mr K M Hayne QC and
Respondents: Mr J W K Burnside
Solicitor for the 2nd Messrs Arthur Robinson and
Respondents: Hedderwicks
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
This appeal concerns alleged exclusive dealing, in a form sometimes called 'third line forcing' which might be better described as third party forcing, contrary to s 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ('the Act'), by three Victorian Government instrumentalities - the National Tennis Centre Trust ('NTCT'), Olympic Park Management ('OPM') and the Victorian Arts Centre Trust ('VACT', also referred to as 'Bass'). The allegations of exclusive dealing, which were rejected by the trial judge, arose because NTCT and OPM have entered into agreements with VACT to use its Bass ticketing service exclusively for all activities at the entertainment venues controlled by NTCT and OPM, which for present purposes means the National Tennis Centre and the Melbourne Sports and Entertainment Centre respectively. These two Centres are very popular venues for holding events such as celebrity concerts, having good seating and other facilities for many thousands of spectators.
2. The appellants are two related companies. The first, The Paul Dainty Corporation Pty Ltd ('PDC') has since 1972 organized tours of international concert artists to Australia. The second appellant, Paul Dainty Productions Pty Ltd ('PDP') has since 1978 owned the Comedy Theatre in Melbourne, including its box office, and has sought to expand its ticket-selling activities for other venues, using the trade name 'Ticket Master'.
3. PDC wished to hire the Tennis Centre for two series of international celebrity concerts to be given, some months apart in 1988, by Pink Floyd and Mick Jagger respectively. PDC objected when it was informed, late in 1987, that ticketing arrangements would have to be handled by Bass. It wanted to have the ticketing done by PDP. When NTCT stood firm, the Pink Floyd concerts went ahead, in February 1988, on NTCT's terms; but while the Mick Jagger concerts were being arranged, the appellants began these proceedings on 15 July 1988, alleging that PDC was being forced to use the services of Bass rather than PDP, that this amounted to exclusive dealing within the meaning of the Act, and that it ought to be restrained.
4. The basic response of NTCT was that it was employing Bass's services as part of its scheme to supply all its hirers with a fully ticketed venue. The hirers, including PDC, were not being brought into any contractual relationship with Bass at all, and so were not being required to use Bass's services.
5. It is interesting that both the appellants and the respondents in the course of their submissions relied upon what might be called 'floodgates' arguments.
6. The appellants submitted that, if the respondents' arguments are upheld, then the services of a third party can always be forced on a contracting party by an arrangement which makes the other contracting party nominally responsible for the service, which is then subcontracted to the third party.
7. On the other hand, it was argued for the respondents that, if the appellants are right in what they say, "the world is awash with third line forcing, for it would occur every time a person engages another to fulfil the first person's contractual obligation". Examples given included a solicitor who deposits his client's money in a particular bank's trust account, a builder who engages a sub-contractor, and a vendor who engages a particular estate agent to accept a purchaser's deposit and hold it as a stakeholder.
8. All that can usefully be said in the face of these arguments is that these are the types of problems which naturally arise when, for understandable reasons, the legislature chooses to forbid commercial conduct which is not criminal or immoral, but may be economically undesirable. The courts, while being alert to detect sham or artificially contrived arrangements, must do their best to apply the provisions of the enactment to the particular facts before them. It is difficult in such cases to argue usefully by analogy or by extrapolation.
9. Interlocutory injunctions were sought by the present appellants, but that application was eventually compromised, on 27 July 1988, when the relevant parties entered into a supplementary agreement, which applied only to the Mick Jagger concerts.
10. While basing their case on the terms originally offered by NTCT, and accepted only under protest in the case of Pink Floyd, the appellants also made submissions based on the supplementary Mick Jagger agreement which, they said, underlined the true nature of PDC's relationship with Bass - as a user of its ticketing and financial services.
11. Another aspect of the claim is that OPM attempted to impose the same terms, with regard to ticketing by Bass, on PDC when it sought to arrange concerts at the Melbourne Sports and Entertainment Centre by a group known as 'Europe'. Eventually the proposal fell through for other reasons; but it is not disputed that both Centres propose to engage the services of Bass for all future concerts and other activities by promoters such as PDC, unless restrained by the Court.
12. The appellants also seek damages from NTCT and VACT (which is sued as being involved in the contraventions of the other respondents) for lost profits from the ticketing arrangements for the Pink Floyd and Mick Jagger concerts. The amounts involved would be substantial, but the parties are agreed that questions of liability should be determined first.
13. The trial judge, Sweeney J., found that under the basic agreements and arrangements which VACT and OPM had imposed or sought to impose upon PDC, there was no exclusive dealing, because VACT's only contract or arrangement for the supply of its Bass ticketing service was with NTCT or OPM alone. PDC was not accepting any service from VACT. His Honour went on to find that there were two aspects of the supplementary agreement for the Jagger concerts which did involve services from Bass to PDC, but since these had been insisted on by PDC as part of the settlement of interlocutory proceedings, it could not be said that NTCT was forcing Bass's services on PDC - which is the substance of the relevant exclusive dealing provision.
14. There were three other lines of defence relied on by the respondents which the learned trial judge rejected, but which have been raised again in this Court by way of notices of contention, and will have to be considered in due course. These relate to whether the respondents are immune from action because they come under the shield of the Crown; whether the respondents are related companies, and so excluded from the effects of s 47 of the Act; and whether their conduct has been specifically authorised by an Act of the Victorian Parliament, thus giving them immunity under s 51 of the Act.
Trade Practices Act 1974 - Exclusive Dealing
15. Section 47 of the Act, so far as it is relevant, reads as follows;
"47 (1) Subject to this section, a
corporation shall not, in Trade or commerce,
engage in the practice of exclusive dealing
.......
(8) A corporation also engages in the
practice of exclusive dealing if the
corporation grants ...... a licence in respect
of, land or a building or part of a building
on the condition that another party to the ...
licence ... -
(a) ....
(b) ....
(c) will acquire goods or services
of a particular kind or
description directly or
indirectly from another person
not being a body corporate
related to the corporation.
(9) A corporation also engages in the
practice of exclusive dealing if the
corporation refuses to grant ...... a licence
in respect of, land or a building or part of a
building for the reason that another party to
the ... licence -
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d) ... has not agreed to acquire,
goods or services of a
particular kind or description
directly or indirectly from
another person not being a body
corporate related to the
corporation.
.......
(13) In this section -
(a) a reference to a condition shall
be read as a reference to any
condition, whether direct or
indirect and whether having
legal or equitable force or not,
and includes a reference to a
condition the existence or
nature of which is ascertainable
only by inference from the
conduct of persons or from other
relevant circumstances....."
16. Section 4(1) of the Act contains three definitions which are relevant for present purposes:
"acquire" includes, in relation to services,
"accept";
"services" includes any rights, benefits,
privileges or facilities that are or are to be
provided, granted or conferred in trade or
commerce; and
"supply" when used as a verb in relation to
services, includes "provide, grant or confer".
Section 51 of the Act provides,
"51. (1) In determining whether a
contravention of a provision of this Part has
been committed, regard shall not be had -
(a) ...
(b) in the case of acts or things
done in a State - except as
provided by the regulations, to
any act or thing that is, or is
of a kind, specifically
authorized or approved by, or by
regulations under, an Act passed
by the Parliament of that State;
or
(c) ...."
17. The leading authority in cases of exclusive dealing similar to the present is Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v Williams and Hodgson Transport Pty Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 359. Although it was concerned with sub-s (6) of s 47 - the supply of goods or services on a condition that other goods or services will be acquired from a third person - the principles involved are the same. Sweeney J., in the judgment now appealed from, held, and the respondents maintain, that this decision is directly in point and governs the outcome of the present case. The appellants seek to distinguish the case.
18. In it a Brisbane brewer offered liquor retailers in North Queensland the choice of collecting beer from one of its regional depots in the area, or having it delivered from the brewery. Most retailers chose to have their beer delivered. The brewer insisted that the beer should be carried by its preferred carrier, 'QRX', an unrelated company. This practice was challenged by another carrier which was ready and able to do the work.
19. The High Court held that, although the freight and insurance costs were passed on to the retailer in addition to the price of the beer, the only contract of carriage was between the brewer and the carrier and the carrier provided no services, in any relevant sense, to the retailer. The retailer was invoiced for a total price, though freight was shown as a distinct item. The property in the beer did not pass until delivery, and the insurance of it while in transit was, of course, for the benefit of the brewer only.
"It was submitted on behalf of the
respondent that a retailer who bought beer
which was delivered to the retailer's premises
by Q.R.X. acquired, in the sense of accepted,
the services of Q.R.X. because the retailer
received the benefit of those services even
though there was no contractual arrangement
between the retailer and Q.R.X. It was
further contended that the services of Q.R.X.
were forced on the retailer, since as a matter
of commercial reality the retailer had to
accept the terms offered by the appellant. It
was said that in these circumstances the
appellant supplied the beer on condition that
the retailer acquired the services of Q.R.X.
The questions raised by these submissions
are not without difficulty. It is clear
enough that it was not a condition of the
supply of beer to retailers generally in North
Queensland that it be delivered by Q.R.X.
Retailers might, if they wished, purchase from
the regional depots in North Queensland and
some retailers did. There were commercial
advantages in buying the beer from Brisbane,
but it was not right to say that in reality a
retailer was forced to accept delivery by
Q.R.X. However, when a retailer wished to
have the beer delivered from the brewery, the
appellant required, as a prerequisite to
granting supply, that the appellant itself
should arrange delivery. The appellant
supplied the beer on that condition.
However, the condition was not that the
retailer should accept the services of Q.R.X.
The condition was that the appellant should
arrange the carriage of the beer and should
deliver it to the retailer, not the brewery,
but at the retailer's premises or some other
place in North Queensland. In other words the
condition was that the appellant would deliver
the beer which it sold to its destination in
North Queensland. It was of course clear that
if the appellant had itself carried the beer
there would have been no exclusive dealing
within s 47. The position was not altered
when the appellant arranged for a third person
to carry on its behalf. In those
circumstances the services were acquired by
the appellant and not by the retailer. No
doubt in a loose sense the retailer received a
benefit from the services, but in truth what
the retailer acquired was the beer and not the
services of the carrier. Certainly there was
no condition that it should acquire (even in
the sense of accept) those services.
There can be no doubt that if the
condition is that the services should be
provided to the corporation which is alleged
to be engaged in the practice of exclusive
dealing there in no contravention of s 47(6).
The decision of the Federal Court in Re
Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society (No.
- Ltd. [1978] FCA 50; (1978) 36 FLR 134; 22 ALR 621; is
distinguishable from the present case. In
that case a building society made the practice
of imposing, in respect of loans made to its
members, a requirement that a property
mortgaged to secure repayment of the loan be
insured with a particular nominated insurer.
It was held by a majority that there was a
contravention of s 47(6). There the contract
of insurance conferred rights on the borrower,
and not merely on the building society, and
those rights came within the definition of
"services" in the Act. However Deane J. said,
36 FLR at 168; 22 ALR at 650:
"It was not contended on behalf of
the commission that any contravention of
s 47 would be involved if the condition
as to insurance was restricted to
coverage of the interest of the relevant
applicant, as mortgagee, in the mortgaged
property. It would seem a condition
which was so limited would not be within
s 47(6) for the reason that it would
relate to acquisition of the relevant
services by the applicant itself through
the member as its agent. The issue
between the parties is whether the
consideration or requirement is within s
47(6) to the extent that it requires
insurance in respect of the interest of
the member."
The statement supports the conclusion in the
present case that if the services of Q.R.X.
were acquired by the appellant itself there
was no breach of s 47(6) and in my opinion
that was the position".
See also Brennan J. at 405-6, where his Honour said;
"Here there is no contract or
arrangement, whether direct or indirect,
between a licensee who acquires delivered beer
from the brewer and Q.R.X. pursuant to which
the licensee acquires delivery services from
Q.R.X. From start to finish Q.R.X.'s contract
or arrangement is with the brewer alone. In
so far as the licensee derives a benefit from
the delivery of beer to his premises, he
acquires that benefit from the brewer and not
from Q.R.X. It is submitted that a person may
acquire services simply by accepting them, and
that a licensee accepts delivery services by
Q.R.X. But a licensee does not accept any
services from Q.R.X.; the licensee accepts the
delivered beer supplied to him by the brewer.
If it were legitimate (and it is not) to
distinguish between the beer supplied and the
delivery services, nevertheless the licensee
would accept both the beer and the delivery
services from the brewer under the contract of
sale of the beer. The brewer does not seek to
force licensees to accept the services of a
carrier nominated by the brewer. The brewer
simply asserts its right to choose the carrier
to deliver its beer to the point of sale at
the licensee's premises in discharge of its
obligation to the licensee to deliver the beer
there. The position is no different from what
it would be if the brewer's own employees
delivered the beer."
21. Paraphrasing these statements of the High Court, the respondents assert that there is no contract or arrangement, whether direct or indirect, between PDC and VACT (Bass for present purposes) for PDC to acquire ticketing services or financial services from Bass. From start to finish PDC's contract or arrangement is with the Centres alone. In so far as PDC derives a benefit from having tickets sold for its shows, or having the proceeds of such sales held and invested safely, it acquires that benefit from the Centres. PDC (sometimes called 'the Hirer') accepts the ticketed venue supplied to it by VTCT or OPM (sometimes called 'the Venue' or 'the Venues', 'the Centre' or 'the Centres'). If it be legitimate to distinguish between the hire of the venue and the ticketing (as it would seem to be in the present case - more so than in the case of the beer and its delivery, because the ticketing is not over and done with when PDC takes occupation of the part of the venue covered by its licence), nevertheless PDC accepts both the venue and the ticketing arrangements from the relevant Centre under the contract for hire of the venue. The Centre does not seek to force PDC to accept the services of Bass. It simply asserts its right to supply a ticketed venue to all promoters such as PDC, and to choose the company which will carry out the ticketing. The position is not different from what it would be if the Centre's own employees sold the tickets and accepted responsibility for the proper investment and distribution of the proceeds. So runs the argument for the respondents.
22. The appellants concede that there is no comfort for them in the terms of the agreements which VTCT and OPM were requiring PDC to accept if it wished to hire either of the venues. They argued, however, that this was not the end of the matter. Section 47 can operate on indirect conditions, conditions not necessarily having legal force, and conditions which are ascertainable only by inference from conduct or other circumstances (see sub-s 47(13) above).
23. Here it was alleged by the appellants that ticketing is always carried out by, or for the benefit of, the person presenting the performance - whatever form that performance might take. The ticket constitutes a contract between the promoter and the members of the public who come to watch its show. Therefore, whatever the formal contracts might say, the Centres, in providing ticketing, were acting as agents of the promoter, PDC. The Centre could only be said to be providing the ticketing for its own purposes if it were also the entrepreneur, taking financial responsibility for the performance and merely hiring PDC to stage it - which was clearly not the case in the instances before the Court.
24. If the Centre , as agent for PDC, chose to sub-contract its ticketing responsibilities, then in accordance with well-accepted principles of agency the sub-agent (Bass) became accountable to the principal, PDC, for the proper and faithful conduct of those responsibilities (see, for example, De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286).
25. Given the correctness of the basic premise, that ticketing is always for the benefit of the promoter and brings into existence contracts between it and the spectators, it would be difficult to resist the balance of the appellants' argument that services are being provided to it by Bass. All parties are agreed that this is the crucial question. If Bass is providing services indirectly to PDC, under the standard contracts in question, then those services are indeed being forced on PDC by the Centres. This would be so even if the services were being provided to the Centre and PDC jointly; see Ku-ring-gai, above.
26. However, as counsel for the respondents pointed out, the licence agreements are not cast in terms of agency, or of any authority conferred by PDC on the Centres for them to act for it in entering into contracts with the public. The tickets basically confer a licence to persons to enter the venue at a particular time, and sit in a particular seat, with a view to watching an advertised concert. This is a licence which NTCT and OPM respectively have the right to issue and PDC does not. If for any reason the expected performance does not proceed, the members of the public have recourse to the management of the Centre which sold them their tickets. It controls, through its agent Bass, the funds represented by the sales of those tickets.
27. Similarly, if a member of the public is injured while attending a performance, any action in contract that person might have could be directed only against the Centre, which might have a consequential action against the promoter, depending on the circumstances of the injury and the terms of any contract between Centre and promoter. The injured person might have an action in trespass or negligence against the promoter and his employees, but that is a different question.
28. There seems, on analysis, to be no good reason to assume a tacit contract between the promoter and the members of the public who purchase tickets for that particular show.
29. The standard form of ticket produced by Bass at the relevant times gave on the front all necessary directions to the seat reserved and said, in the case of the Pink Floyd concerts,
"NAT'L TENNIS CNTR
PAUL DAINTY and 3XY
PRESENT
PINK FLOYD"
"CONDITIONS OF SALE
This ticket is sold by Bass Victoria as
agent for and on behalf of the
organisation, venue, management and/or
promoter ('the Seller') responsible for
the service, event or performance for
which it is sold. The name of the Seller
is normally shown on the front of the
ticket and all complaints or claims are
the responsibility of the Seller and not
Bass.
This ticket is sold subject to the
Seller's Conditions of Sale, copy of
which is available for inspection at the
time of purchase of the ticket and also
(to the extent that they are not
inconsistent with the Seller's Conditions
of Sale) subject to the following
1. The ticket cannot be exchanged or
returned after purchase.
2. The right is reserved to add,
withdraw or substitute artists
and/or to vary advertised
programmes, seating arrangements and
audience capacity.
3. The right of admission is reserved
Cameras and tape recorders may not
be permitted.
4. If an outdoor performance/event is
cancelled due to adverse weather or
for any other cause reasonably
beyond the Seller's control there is
no right to refund or exchange and
no obligation is assumed by the
Seller for the arranging of a
substitute service event or
performance."
31. These contents of the ticket do not, in our opinion, advance the issues to be decided. The words on the front are descriptive of the event and, on careful analysis, devoid of contractual significance. "Paul Dainty" does indeed "present" Pink Floyd, and apparently has some sponsorship arrangement with 3XY entitling it to some of the credit.
32. The references to 'the Seller' on the back of the ticket are couched in the widest possible terms to cover all the types of performance and the venues for which Bass might sell tickets. Its only clear determination is to limit its own liability. So far as the ticket purchaser reading the conditions is concerned, 'the Seller' could be 'National Tennis Centre', 'Paul Dainty and 3XY', both of those groupings or some other person not shown on the ticket (though that would apparently not be 'normal'). The true identity of the seller must in fact depend on the terms of Bass's engagement, and of any other relevant contract entered into by the person engaging Bass.
33. The most relevant terms of the basic agreement covering the Mick Jagger concert (which terms had, it is agreed, also governed the Pink Floyd concerts, although never executed for that purpose) were as follows:
"INTRODUCTION
A. The trust is a body corporate constituted under
Section 5 of the Act and is responsible for the
care, improvement, use, promotion and financial
management of the Centre including making the
Centre available for the staging and performance of
events.
B. The Hirer wishes to stage the Events at the Centre
at the performance times.
C. The Trust has agreed to make the Centre available
to the Hirer for the Events at the performance
times on the terms and conditions contained in this
agreement.
IT IS AGREED
Part 1. Definitions
1.1 Unless the subject matter or context requires
otherwise, in this Agreement including the
introduction, schedules and appendices (if any) the
following words and expressions whether commencing
with capital letters or not have the meanings
respectively assigned to them below:
......
(2) "the Additional Facilities" means the staff,
facilities, equipment and services other than
the Centre Facilities which the Trust agrees
to provide to the Hirer, and are described in
Item 8 of the Schedule;
......
(4) "the Booking fee" means the fee specified in
Item 14 of the Schedule to be paid by the
Hirer to the Trust in respect of each sale or
deemed sale of a ticket for the Events;
......
(7) "the Centre Facilities" means that part of the
Centre, and the items, facilities and services
(if any) described in Item 4 of the Schedule;
......
(10) "the Events" means the concert, show, play,
exhibition, conference, meeting, tournament,
trade show, entertainment or event of a
musical, dramatic, sporting, commercial or
other nature to be publicly performed, staged
or presented at various times during the
hiring period which are described in Item 2 of
the Schedule;
(11) "the Gross Receipts" means the total amount of
money received from the sale of tickets to the
Events;
......
(13) "the Hiring Fee" means the amount specified in
Item 5 of the Schedule;
......
(22) "the House Seats" means those seats specified
in Item 12 of the Schedule.
Part 2. Hiring of the Centre
2.1 Subject to the provisions of this Agreement the
Trust grants to the Hirer licence and authority to
use the Centre and the Centre Facilities on the
Performance Dates, at the Performance Times and at
the Other Possession Times exclusively for the
purpose of staging the Events.
......
2.3 In respect of its use of the Centre, the Hirer
acknowledges and agrees that at all times:-
(1) the Trust retains possession of the Centre;
(2) all keys to the Centre and the Centre
Facilities (where applicable) shall be kept by
the Centre Manager;
(3) all entrances and exits to the Centre shall be
in charge of persons appointed by the Centre
Manager;
(4) the Hirer's use of the Centre is
non-exclusive. It may be necessary for the
Hirer to share use of the Centre or the Centre
Facilities, and for the Centre Manager to
allocate times for the use of the Centre and
the Centre Facilities.
Part 3. Fees
3.1 In consideration of the Trust agreeing to grant to
the Hirer licence and authority to use the Centre,
the Hirer agrees to pay to the Trust:-
(1) the Hiring Fee and the Booking Fee; and
(2) the Additional Fees and all other charges
payable by the Hirer to the Trust pursuant to
this Agreement,
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
Agreement.
4.1 If the Hirer is unable to present a performance at
the relevant Performance Time, the Hirer shall:-
(1) immediately notify the Trust in writing of
that fact; and
(2) pay that part of the Hiring Fee attributable
to the performance not presented, unless the
Hirer is notified in writing by the Trust that
the Trust has re-hired the Centre for that
Performance Time;
(3) meet all costs of any nature incurred by the
Trust in providing the use of the Centre for a
cancelled performance, including the cost of
staff, the Additional Facilities, ticketing
services and equipment engaged in providing
that use, together with all costs of any
nature incurred as a result of the failure to
present a performance.
......
Part 7. Hirer's Obligations
7.1 The Hirer convenants and agrees with the Trust that
the Hirer will:-
(1) present the Events on the Performance Dates
and at the Performance Times;
......
(4) ensure proper supervision of its agents,
Employees, invitees, guests and patrons;
......
(7) report to the Centre Manager any damage to the
Centre or the Centre Facilities sustained in
its use by the Hirer, its employees, agents,
invitees, guests and patrons immediately upon
becoming aware of the damage.
......
8.4 The Hirer agrees not to do or permit its employees,
agents, invitees, patrons and guests to do anything
whereby:-
(1) any permit or licence issued or in force in
respect of the management or operation of the
Centre, or presentation of the Events, may be
forfeited, suspended or not renewed;
(2) any member of the police force, emergency
services or any other person engaged by the
Trust is hindered or obstructed in the
exercise and discharge of his duties in the
Centre.
Part 9. Ticket sales
9.1 The Hirer acknowledges that the Trust is
responsible for all ticketing arrangements for all
Events held at the Centre.
9.2 The Hirer agrees that:-
(1) it will not issue any tickets;
(2) the Trust will print supply and sell or
arrange for the printing supply and sale of
all tickets; and
(3) the Trust will determine the terms, conditions
and exclusions (if any) to be printed on the
tickets.
9.3 The Hirer acknowledges and agrees that in respect
of all ticket sales:
(1) the Gross Receipts will be retained by the
Trust until the conclusion of the Events and
then applied by it in satisfaction of all
amounts payable by the Hirer to the Trust
pursuant to this Agreement which have not
previously been paid to the Trust;
(2) within 24 hours after the conclusion of the
last performance the Trust shall furnish to
the Hirer a Box Office Statement detailing the
amount of the Gross Receipts;
(3) unless otherwise agreed, within 10 days after
the conclusion of the last performance, the
Trust shall:
(a) furnish to the Hirer a Final Statement
detailing the manner in which the Gross
Receipts have been applied by the Trust
towards satisfaction of the amounts
payable by the Hirer in accordance with
clause 9.3(1); and
(b) subject to clause 9.3(1) being satisfied
pay to the Hirer the balance of the
Gross Receipts remaining;
......
(6) if the Gross Receipts prove insufficient to
cover all amounts payable to the Trust
pursuant to this Agreement, the Hirer will pay
within 7 days of receipt of the Final
Statement the balance shown therein to be due
to the Trust.
9.4 The Hirer may distribute the specified number of
complimentary tickets in respect of each performance.
9.5 If the Hirer distributes Complimentary Tickets for
a performance in excess of the specified number,
the Hirer shall pay to the Trust within 24 hours of
the staging of the performance in respect of which
the excess Complimentary Tickets were issued, an
amount equal to the amount by which the Hiring Fee
would be increased if the excess Complimentary
Tickets were deemed to represent ticket sales at
the full adult price and the receipts for those
sales were added to the gross receipts.
9.6 The Trust retains the right to use at its own
discretion the House Seats and the Hirer
acknowledges that those seats do not form part of
the Centre or the Centre Facilities which the Hirer
has licence and authority to use.
9.7 The Hirer will deliver to the Trust as soon as
practicable after the signing of this Agreement
full particulars of:
(1) the information which the Hirer requests
should appear on the face of the tickets;
(2) the prices excluding any booking fee for which
the tickets are to be sold and the price
barriers (if any, as approved by the Trust) in
respect of which the same are to be sold; and
(3) the persons or classes of persons who are to
receive complimentary tickets or tickets at
concessional prices,
for approval and use by the Trust.
9.8 The Hirer acknowledges and agrees that:-
(1) no person will be admitted to any performance
without a ticket, a complimentary ticket, or a
valid pass authorised by the Trust and the
Trust has the right to refuse admission to any
person not having a ticket or valid pass;
(2) the Trust shall not be responsible for any
breakdown or failure in the ticketing system
or for any act, omission or default on the
part of any person whatsoever including the
Trust, its members, employees and agents, the
Centre Manager and any person engaged by the
Trust in respect of the printing supply and
sale of the tickets nor for any fraud on the
part of any person engaged by the Trust in
respect of the printing supply and sale of the
tickets; and
......
Part 10. Additional Facilities to the Hirer
10.1 The Trust will provide to the Hirer the Additional
Facilities in order to enable the Hirer to more
effectively stage the Events, for the payment of
the Additional Fees.
10.2 The Hirer will pay to the Trust as well as the
Additional Fees referred to in Clause 10.1 all
amounts paid or payable by the Trust in providing
the Additional Facilities, including without
limitation:-
(1) the salaries or wages for any staff which the
Trust engages to assist with the staging of
the Events including without limitation
ushers, ticket sellers, security staff,
electricians and stage crew;
(2) the costs of cleaning the Centre thereafter
including the disposal of rubbish;
......
(5) the cost of providing air-conditioning and
illumination to the Centre with the permanent
equipment with which the Centre is equipped;
and
(6) the cost of replacement and repair of all
facilities and equipment damaged as a result
of use by the Hirer, its employees, agents,
invitees, guests or patrons.
......
Part 11. Maintenance of the Centre and facilities.
11.1 The Hirer covenants and agrees with the Trust that
the Hirer shall and will ensure that its employees
agents invitees guests and patrons shall:-
(1) use the Centre, facilities and equipment in a
safe, proper and efficient manner so as not to
involve any risk of injury or damage to person
or property;
(2) comply with all reasonable directions of the
Centre Manager in connection with the safe and
proper use of the Centre, its facilities and
equipment;
......
11.2 The Hirer agrees that it will at its own expense
make good any damage to the Centre, its facilities
or equipment resulting from the use of the Centre
by the Hirer, its employees, agents, invitees,
guests and patrons.
Part 12. Presentation of the Events
12.1 The Hirer shall conduct and manage the Events in a
proper and orderly manner and shall not permit or
suffer:-
(1) any riotous, disorderly, drunken or improper
conduct;
(2) any act, matter or thing which may injure or
tend to injure the reputation of the Centre,
the Trust or the Centre Manager
and the Hirer acknowledges that the Trust, its
employees, members, and agents are entitled to
refuse admission to or remove any person from the
Centre.
12.2 Unless otherwise agreed the Hirer will not commence
or conclude any Performance or schedule any
Intervals at any times other than the Performance
Times and Interval Times.
12.3 The Hirer shall:-
(1) supply and pay for all performances required
for the proper presentation of the Events;
(2) at its own expense transport all personnel,
property, facilities and equipment necessary
to present the Events to and from the Centre;
(3) present the Events in the most advantageous
manner and styles practicable; and
(4) pay all Governmental taxes and levies payable
in relation to the staging of the Events.
......
12.5 The Trust shall have the right to withhold from
sale or discount the sale price of tickets to any
seats which in the opinion of the Centre Manager
would have a restricted view of any performance due
to positioning by the Hirer, its employees or
agents of the stage or any equipment brought into
the Centre for use in connection with the
performance. For the purpose of determining which
seats have restricted views the Hirer undertakes to
provide the Trust with a marked up Box Plan and
Stage Layout at the time of providing the Trust
with the ticket information required under clause
9.7 of this Agreement.
Part 13. Possession and vacating the Centre
13.1 The Trust will make the Centre available to the
Hirer on the Performance Dates, at the Performance
Times and at the Other Possession Times.
......
Part 15. Indemnities
15.1 The Hirer hereby indemnifies and agrees to keep
indemnified, and save harmless the Trust against
all claims, demands, actions, damages, costs,
losses and expenses of any nature whatsoever which
may be incurred by the Trust by reason of or in
relation to the use of the Centre by the Hirer or
the Hirer's servants, agents, invitees, guests or
partons pursuant to this Agreement including
without limitation claims arising out of:-
(1) any accident, damage or injury to property in
the Centre;
(2) any loss of property from the Centre;
(3) any accident, damage, or injury suffered by
any person or to the property of any person in
or about the Centre, the entrances, lobbies
and exits;
(4) the sale of tickets:
......
Part 16. Rights of the Trust
16.1 The Trust reserves the right to grant to any other
person, retain for itself, or divide between itself
and any other person on any terms whatsoever the
Trust's right to:-
(1) print, supply and sell tickets of admission to
the Centre for the purpose of enabling members
of the public to attend the Events;
(2) provide catering services at the Centre;
(3) sell programs and items peculiar to or
provided especially in connection with the
staging of particular Events, and to derive in
respect of the programs or items sold, a fee
from any person to whom that right may be
granted in whole or in part;
(4) sell or supply to persons attending the Centre
wines spirits drinks (whether alcholic or
non-alcoholic) refreshments food confectionary
tobacco cigars cigarettes or other items
articles or services whatsoever not the
subject of any agreement or arrangement
regarding catering services or the sale of
programs or items connected with the staging
of a particular event.
16.2 The Trust reserves for itself the right:-
(1) for its members, employees, agents and the
Centre Manager to have access to the Centre
and all of the Centre Facilities at all times
for the purpose of carrying out their normal
duties;
(2) to determine acceptable sound limits in
respect of any performance;
(3) to insist on the removal from the Centre of
any employee, sub-contractor or agent of the
Hirer;
(4) to direct crowd control measures and control
security systems and procedures;
(5) to refuse admission to or remove any person
from the Centre;
(6) to suspend or control any performance if in
the reasonable judgment of the Trust the
performance is not in accordance with the
Agreement;
(7) to take all actions and make all directions
relating to the use of the Centre and the
Centre Facilities by the Hirer as it deems
necessary; and
(8) to refund the full purchase price or part of
the purchase price of any ticket or provide a
replacement ticket in lieu of a refund.
17. Default
......
17.2 If the Trust determines this Agreement pursuant to
sub-clause 17.1, the Trust without prejudice to but
in addition to any other remedy available may
retain all or any part of the monies which have
been paid to it whether by way of Security Deposit,
or Gross Receipts or otherwise for the purpose of
receiving and retaining sufficient monies to make
good any deficiency in payment by the Hirer to the
Trust and shall refund the excess (if any) to the
Hirer.
.........."
34. The Schedule Items to the agreement, so far as they are relevant for present purposes, were as follows:
"ITEM 4: (Description of Centre Facilities)
Centre Court Stadium (excluding Grand Slam Suite level)
Floor
Seating
Stage
Dressing rooms as allocated by Centre Manager
Grid (hanging system)
ITEM 5: (The Hiring Fees)
12.5% of the gross receipts, excluding booking fees, or
$5,000 per day - whichever is the greater.
ITEM 8: (Additional Facilities)
Items, facilities and services to be
provided by the Licensor at expense of
Licensee, including but not limited to:
Front of House Staff
Electricity and Gas Consumed
Cleaning
St. John Ambulance Personnel
Security: Front of house, backstage, building and artists
Production Staff
Utility Staff
Set-up and Get-out Costs
Ticketing Costs
Crush Barriers
Follow Spots
Police Attendance
Fire Brigade Attendance"
35. Although the agreement which OPM sought to impose upon PDC for its 'Europe' concerts (which did not proceed) had a number of variations from the NTCT document, the parties are agreed that these are not sufficiently significant to affect the outcome of the case. Sweeney J. did not elaborate on the differences and we refer only to a few of them. The passages from that document, of November 1988, which are worth noting are as follows:
"INTRODUCTION
A. OPM is an incorporated committee of
management under the Crown Lands
(Reserves) Act 1978 and is responsible
for the care, improvement, use,
promotion, and financial management of
the Centre.
B. OPM is empowered pursuant to Section 17
of the Act to grant licences to enter and
use the Centre subject to such terms and
conditions as OPM thinks fit.
C. The Licensee has requested access to the
Centre for the purposes and upon the
dates set out in item 2 of the First
Schedule.
D. OPM has agreed to grant the Licensee the
limited licence created by the terms and
conditions contained in this Agreement
for the purposes and on the dates set out
in item 2 of the First Schedule.
AND IT IS AGREED THAT:
1. DEFINITIONS
......
(iv) "Patron" means any person granted a
patron's licence;
(vii)"Patron's licence" means a licence
granted or issued to a member of the
public in accordance with Clause 3;
......
2. GRANT OF LICENCE
2.1 Subject to the provisions of this
Agreement OPM HEREBY GRANTS a limited
licence ("the Licence") to the Licensee
to enter upon those parts of the Centre
which are shaded on the plan of the
Centre comprising the Second Schedule for
the purposes and ..... on the dates set
out in item 2 of the First Schedule. ....
2.2 The Licence is limited by the following
conditions:-
(i) The Licence is non-exclusive and OPM
shall remain in possession of the
whole of the Centre throughout the
term of the Licence and nothing in
this Agreement shall restrict or
prevent OPM from granting any
further or other licence to any
person to enter and use any part of
the Centre including any shaded area
on the plan comprising the Second
Schedule.
......
(iii) Subject to this Agreement the
Licence shall extend to invitees of
the Licensee who are necessary for
or incidental to the purposes set
out in Item 2 of the First Schedule
PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT:-
(a) OPM may in its absolute
discretion at any time
determine such extension of the
Licence in relation to any
particular invitee or invitees
or class of invitees of the
Licensee;
(b) The Licence shall not extend to
the general public or any
particular class or member of
the general public or to any
person or class of persons
being part of the audience for
a performance in the Centre and
the general public and the
audience shall be deemed not to
be persons necessary for or
indidental to any purpose set
out in item 2 of the First
Schedule;
......
3. ADMISSION OF THE PUBLIC
3.1 Upon the execution of this Agreement OPM
shall at the request of the Licensee
grant revocable limited licences for the
admission of the public ("patrons'
licenses") to the Centre at such times
within the term of the Licence as the
Licensee may request for the purposes set
out at item 2 of the First Schedule.
3.2 The procedure and manner for granting
patrons' licences shall be as set out
below:
(i) OPM shall grant patrons' licences to
the public for any monetary or other
consideration or without such
cosideration as specified by the
Licensee PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT:-
(a) OPM may in its absolute
discretion decline to grant any
patrons' licences for any
consideration other than money.
(b) OPM or any booking agent
engaged by OPM to collect any
monetary or other consideration
or to issue patrons' licences
may charge the public a booking
fee for the collection of such
consideration or the issue of
such licence in addition to any
monetary or other consideration
specified by the Licensee and
OPM or any booking agent of OPM
may decline to grant or issue
any patron's licence until such
booking fee is paid.
(c) OPM may divide the general
class of patrons' licences into
particular blocks, types or
classes and grant a licence of
a particular, block, type or
class for a different or other
consideration from licences in
any other block, type or class
as specified from time to time
by the Licensee.
.......
(iii) The Licensee may specify a date on which
OPM or any booking agent of OPM shall
commence to grant or issue patrons'
licences. The Licensee may specify
different dates or times for different
blocks, classes or types of tickets and
different dates or times for different
performances or other events set out in
item 2 of the First Schedule.
(iv) At each performance or other event held
at the Centre eighty (80) patrons'
licences, tickets and seats (as the
circumstances determine) shall be reserved
from grant or issue for the use of OPM
and its invitees. OPM may in its
absolute discretion determine the
position and siting of any such reserved
seats.
......
(vii) In the event that any performance or
other event for which patrons' licences
have been granted, issued or sold by OPM
or any booking agent of OPM should be
cancelled or fail or otherwise not take
place then OPM or any booking agent of
OPM shall refund any monies paid for such
patrons' licences to patrons and the
Licensee shall pay to OPM any refund fee
of OPM or any booking agent of OPM and
any further or other administrative cost
of OPM or any booking agent of OPM
relating to such refund."
36. Agreements between VACT, on the one hand, and OPM and NTCT on the other, for the exclusive provision of Bass's services, were entered into on 21 April 1988 and 12 May 1988 respectively. However, they were expressed to have effect from 1 January 1988, the parties having reached agreement in principle late in 1987. They were in very similar terms, so it is only necessary to consider the OPM agreement in detail. Under it, OPM appointed VACT, which was to be referred to in the agreement as 'Bass', "as its exclusive Agent to sell on behalf of OPM tickets to all events held at Olympic Park in accordance with the terms herein contained and the Terms and Conditions annexed hereto...".
37. OPM also granted Bass the sole right and privilege to use the Box Office and any temporary ticket box located at the Entertainment Centre or Olympic Park for its business of ticketing at the times specified in the agreement. It was provided that the agreement "shall commence on the commencement date (1 January 1988) and shall continue for a period of three years".
38. By clause 12 of the agreement it was provided that Bass should "hold the gross takings from ticket sales for each performance on behalf of OPM in a trust account in accordance with the Terms and Conditions annexed hereto". Under clause 3 of those Terms and Conditions Bass was entitled to charge the venue a booking fee for each ticket sold; and under clause 13 of the agreement Bass was to refund to OPM a percentage of those booking fees determined in accordance with the sliding scale (between 13% and 16.5%) of all booking fees received by Bass in connection with events held at any of the venues controlled by OPM and NTCT.
39. Under clause 5 of the Terms and Conditions Bass was entitled to "deduct its charges from the gross takings from ticket sales, on the day following a performance prior to paying the resulting net takings to the Venue".
40. Clause 6 provided for the handling of takings as follows:
"(a) Bass shall pay the net takings to
the Venue by 12 noon on the working
day following each event or on such
other date as is agreed. A
statement setting out the gross
receipts for an event and all
charges deducted by Bass in
calculating net takings, shall
accompany each payment.
(b) In the event of a cancelled
performance Bass will retain 100% of
the takings for the purpose of
effecting refunds. Monies unclaimed
after 12 months will be remitted to
the Venue.
(c) In the event of a postponed
performance, Bass will withhold such
takings as are agreed by the Venue
and Bass as being sufficient to meet
anticipated refunds.
(d) Bass may invest the gross takings
from ticket sales for an event in
Trustee Authorised Investments when
such takings exceed $30,000 on the
Monday of the second week following
the week in which gross takings
exceed $30,000. Bass shall pay the
Venue the interest which accrues
from such investments within 14 days
of final settlement. Bass will
deduct from the accrued interest an
administrative charge of $50 for
each week or part thereof the
takings are invested. The Venue
will pay the interest to the
Promoter of the performance in
respect of which the interest is
earned within seven days of receipt
of the interest from Bass.
(e) Bass may from time to time by notice
in writing to the Venue change the
level of gross takings at which it
will invest or the amount of the
administrative charge. However,
Bass will not invest the gross
takings if the administrative charge
is likely to exceed the interest
which should accrue."
41. There is, in our opinion, nothing in these agreements between the venue and the promoter, or the venue and the ticket-seller, to support the appellants' arguments that tickets for a performance, of their very nature, must be sold on behalf of the promoter or entrepreneur who arranges the performance. There is nothing unlikely or contrived about the arrangements set out. The respective interests of spectators, promoter, venue and ticket-seller are all catered for in a perfectly reasonable way, which does no violence to principles of law or common sense.
42. There is, in our view, no reason to assume that a relationship of principal and agent arises between promoter and venue for purposes of ticket sales. The contract for the hire of the venue is, on its face, a contract between principals for the hire of a ticketed venue - one which provides all its own ticketing facilities. It is a 'package deal' which, in addition to ticketing, covers such matters as catering, program selling and security services.
43. Counsel for the appellants drew attention to a number of clauses in the NTCT agreement (e.g. 7.1(4) and (7), 8.4, 10.2(6) and 11.1) which refer to the hirer's "employees, agents, invitees and (or) patrons". See also clauses 1 and 3 of the OPM document. They argued that the word "patrons" implied the existence of a contract between the people attending the performance and the promoter or hirer. But in our view the expression is not a term of art and has no necessary contractual connotation; it means no more than 'spectators'. The clauses cited merely acknowledge the fact that the public will come to see the performance staged by the hirer, and they provide that the hirer must accept certain responsibilites for the behaviour of those members of the public, just as it must for its servants, agents and invitees or guests. There is no reason why such persons cannot have their sole contractual relationship, as licensees, with the venue, while at the same time being properly described as 'patrons' of the hirer's concert.
44. The other way in which the appellants' case was put was to rely upon the financial arrangements outlined above, under which Bass had control of large sums of money, much of it being destined for PDC eventually. It was said that Bass's obligation to account for it, and invest it in the short term, gave rise to a fiduciary relationship irrespective of contractual obligations, and the carrying out of those fiduciary responsibilities amounted to the performance of services by Bass for PDC.
45. However, the authorities make it clear that equity will not impose fiduciary obligations on parties who have entered into ordinary and arm's length commercial relationships, which fully prescribe the respective powers and duties of the parties. This is particularly so when the parties involved are substantial corporations, having equal bargaining power. There is simply no need for the intervention of equity, to imply fiduciary responsibilities, in such circumstances. As Gibbs C.J. said, in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 70,
"... the fact that the arrangement
between parties was of a purely commercial
kind and that they had dealt at arm's length
and on an equal footing has consistently been
regarded by this Court as important, if not
decisive, in indicating that no fiduciary duty
arose ...".
See also Wilson J. at 119. In the same case Mason J., who dissented on this issue said, at 97,
"That contractual and fiduciary
relationships may co-exist between the same
parties has never been doubted".
"True it is that a promise or a
contractual term may be so precise in its
regulation of what a party can do that there
is no relevant area of discretion remaining
and therefore no scope for the creation of a
fiduciary duty."
In our view that is the position in the present case. The rights and responsibilities of both Bass and the Centres, in dealing with the proceeds of the ticket sales, are set out in detail in the relevant agreements.
"There is, however, the notion underlying
all the cases of fiduciary obligation that
inherent in the nature of the relationship
itself is a position of disadvantage or
vulnerability on the part of one of the
parties which causes him to place reliance
upon the other and requires the protection of
equity acting upon the conscience of that other...."
47. There is no such position of disadvantage or vulnerability, requiring the protection of equity, in the present case. It was not suggested by counsel for the appellants that there was any reason to imply a fiduciary relationship apart from the simple fact that Bass had, under its contracts with the Centres, control of moneys most of which would be payable to the Centres, which would in turn pay all but 12.5%, after deducting certain fees and charges, to PDC - provided only that the concerts went ahead. We do not accept the argument for the appellants that there is no distinction between such commercial obligations to account and the creation of fiduciary relationships.
48. There is a further point to be made. Assuming, contrary to the conclusion we have reached, that the basis for a fiduciary relationship has in all the circumstances been established, that would not, in our opinion, mean that a service was being provided so as to attract the relevant provisions of the Act. Whether or not such a service is being provided by one party to another is a matter to be determined by reference to the arrangements, whether legally enforceable or not, into which the parties have entered and to the overall facts and circumstances of the matter. Whether or not those arrangements or facts and circumstances may involve the parties in a particular case being in a fiduciary relationship with one another is not, however, relevant to the question whether one party is providing the other with a service. A fiduciary relationship is a relationship found by equity in circumstances where equity considers that it is right to protect the interests of a disadvantaged party which are, or seem to be, under threat. We note, in passing, that there was never any suggestion of such a threat to PDC's interests in the present case.
49. As stated early in these reasons, an application for interlocutory injunctions covering the Mick Jagger concerts was compromised by an agreement between the parties. The agreement was in the following terms, written by PDC's solicitors and counter-signed by the respective solicitors for VACT and NTCT:
"I refer to our discussions concerning
the above matter and set out below the terms
of the agreement reached relating to the
selling of tickets for the Jagger Tour in
Melbourne.
I confirm the understanding of the
parties that this agreement is entered into by
my client under protest by reason inter alia
of the matters raised in the application of my
client to the Federal Court. I further
confirm the understanding of my client that
this agreement is entered into having regard
to the commercial reality that an
interlocutory hearing of my client's
application could not be achieved in the
Federal Court prior to the date when tickets
have to go on sale for the Jagger Melbourne
concert and that all parties have co-operated
in having a final hearing of the Section 47
issues on 28th November, 1988. This agreement
is without prejudice and is not to be a waiver
of any right or entitlement of my client to
recover damages including but not limited to
the fees and charges set out in paragraph 2
below.
Set out below is the understanding that
has been reached, such understanding to be
read in conjunction with the Hiring Agreement:
1. Tickets for the Melbourne Jagger concerts
will be sold through Bass as agents for
the National Tennis Centre. No tickets
shall be released for sale for any show
without the prior consent of the Paul
Dainty Corporation. BASS shall comply
with the Paul Dainty Corporation's
directions given to and agreed by the
National Tennis Centre as to the time in
which tickets are released for the
various shows.
2. (a) The booking fee for all tickets sold
by BASS shall be $1.30 per ticket and
BASS shall deduct that fee from the
settlement remittance to the National
Tennis Centre in respect of the ticket.
(b) Where a ticket is sold by BASS and
payment is by use of credit charge
facility, BASS will charge a fee of 2.7%
on the face value of the ticket (ie.
$38.30) and deduct that fee from the
settlement remittance to the National
Tennis Centre in respect of the ticket.
(c) Where a ticket or tickets are sold
by BASS as a result of a telephone
booking, BASS will make a transaction
charge to the customer of $4.00 if the
telephone call is a local call and $5.00
if the telephone call is a toll free
call. The transaction charge fee will be
charged by BASS to the account of the
customer and not to the Paul Dainty
Corporation. The credit charges in
respect of the transaction charge fee are
to the account of BASS and not to the
Paul Dainty Corporation.
3. BASS will sell all tickets to the public
and no tickets will be pulled off the
system for the staff of BASS, friends of
staff or relatives of staff. Further
should any staff of BASS or their friends
or relatives desire to acquire tickets
the Paul Dainty Corporation will set
aside an area at each concert where such
tickets will be available for purchase by
staff relatives and friends.
4. The National Tennis Centre shall set the
sight lines but only after close
consultation with the Paul Dainty
Corporation.
5. All funds received from the sale of
tickets by BASS less the booking fees and
transaction fees due to BASS and referred
to in paragraph 2 shall be held under a
joint Paul Dainty Corporation/BASS/
National Tennis Centre Trust account
style 'Bass Victoria Trust Account No. 6'
and all interest derived thereon shall be
paid to the Paul Dainty Corporation and
such funds will be released in accordance
with the licence agreement. It is
acknowledged that BASS in selling tickets
will not receive funds until up to 15
days from the date of sale and that the
funds may not be invested in that time.
BASS shall use its best endeavours to
ensure all funds received from the sale
of tickets are deposited in the trust
account as soon as possible after receipt
by BASS. Further BASS will not invest
until such time as $30,000.00 in ticket
sales has been received. All funds will
be invested in an authorized trustee
investment. It is further acknowledged
that BASS shall charge $50.00 per week
being a fee to implement the investment
on behalf of the Paul Dainty Corporation.
6. BASS have advised that they are unable to
change the terms and conditions appearing
on the back of the ticket due to the time
constraints arising out of printing lead
times. It is agreed that the terms and
conditions appearing on the reverse of
the ticket shall remain.
7. The National Tennis Centre shall and at
its expense install a BASS computer
terminal and printer at the Comedy
Theatre Melbourne within 7 days of the
finalization of these terms so that the
Paul Dainty Corporation shall be able to
obtain up-to-date information on the sale
of tickets for the Jagger concerts and be
able to obtain a hard copy thereof. The
National Tennis Centre shall at its
expense within 7 days after the final
performance of Jagger's Melbourne
concerts remove the computer terminal and
printer from the Comedy Theatre and make
good any damage thereby caused.
8. No complimentary tickets in addition for
(sic) those which provision is made in
the licensing agreement shall be issued
by the National Tennis Centre unless the
Paul Dainty Corporation first consents
and approves. This clause shall not
abrogate the provisions of clause 4 of
the Schedule of the Hiring Agreement.
9. Ticket sales for the selling of the first
show shall commence on the 1st of August,
1988. All information from the Paul
Dainty Corporation shall be forwarded to
the National Tennis Centre on the 26th of
July, 1988 and the National Tennis Centre
shall pass such information onto BASS so
as to ensure tickets will be available to
be sold on the 1st of August, 1988.
10. The price per ticket is $37.00 net to
Paul Dainty Corporation Pty. Ltd. The
Paul Dainty Corporation and the National
Tennis Centre shall discuss price
reductions for seats with restricted
viewing. Nothing in the paragraph shall
abrogate the rights of BASS under
paragraph 2.
11. The National Tennis Centre and BASS shall
fully inform the Paul Dainty Corporation
of all matters relating to the sale of
tickets and no decision shall be made
conerning the sale of tickets unless the
consent and approval is first had and
obtained from the Paul Dainty Corporation
however the National Tennis Centre shall
have final control of seating
arrangements.
12. The National Tennis Centre shall assume
full liability to the Paul Dainty
Corporation Pty. Ltd. and to the public
in respect of all tickets sold subject to
the Paul Dainty Corporation complying
with the Hiring Agreement and in
particular regarding the requirement as
to public liability insurance.
13. The National Tennis Centre Trust agrees
that despite the provisions of Clause
9.8(2) of the Hiring Agreement, it shall
indemnify the Paul Dainty Corporation in
respect of any loss or damage it shall
suffer arising out of a failure by the
Trust's agent BASS in performing or
completing the performance of the
ticketing arrangements due to a claim or
allegation or finding that BASS is acting
utlra vires in acting as a general
ticketing agency, provided however that
such indemnity shall not apply if such
claim, allegation or finding is a result,
directly or indirectly, of the actions of
Paul Dainty Corporation or its servants
or agents.
14. The National Centre Trust shall account
to and pay the Paul Dainty Corporation in
respect of all cleared funds in the trust
account for each performance within 24
hours after the completion of each
performance or the next business day if
such date falls on a non-business day.
The National Tennis Centre shall be
entitled to retain out of the moneys it
is holding an estimate of its costs and
shall account to the Paul Dainty
Corporation within ten days after the
final performance in relation to all
amounts held.
15. The National Tennis Centre shall decide
which tickets are to be withheld from
sale however it will not withhold any
tickets from sale unless it has first
closely consulted the Paul Dainty
Corporation.
16. The Paul Dainty Corporation shall in
providing information about ticketing to
the National Tennis Centre also forward a
copy by fax to BASS simultaneously marked
to the attention of Anne Stoddart.
Due to the shortness of time this agreement
shall be signed by the parties respective
legal advisers and shall be binding upon their
respective clients in each and every aspect as
contained herein.
This letter has been prepared after earlier
negotiations and discussions between the
parties and in belief that it fairly
accommodates all points raised by your
clients.
If the matters are rejected I propose to use
this letter in any resumed hearing of the
interlocutory proceedings."
50. In dealing with the issues raised by this agreement, the learned trial judge said,
"The applicants submitted that, under the
supplementary terms in respect of the Jagger
concerts, VACT provided services directly to
PDC. In my opinion, clauses 5 and 11 justify
a finding to that effect. However, NTCT did
not grant a licence on the condition that PDC
would acquire services from VACT. On the
contrary, the course of negotiations between
the parties showed that it was NTCT's wish
that VACT should render those services to it
and not to PDC. It was the requirement of the
latter which led to the relationship between
it and VACT.
NTCT did not refuse to grant a licence to
PDC for the reason that PDC had not acquired,
or had not agreed to acquire services from
VACT. Rather, it granted a licence to PDC
which, at the insistence of PDC and against
the original wish of NTCT, included terms
whereby PDC agreed to acquire services from
VACT, as part of what was, in essence, a
settlement of the claim for an interlocutory
injunction.
In these circumstances, it would not be
appropriate to make any of the declarations
sought by PDC in respect of the Jagger concerts."
51. Counsel for the appellants argued that the agreement was designed to solve mechanical problems that needed to be worked out, or to clarify areas of doubt in the basic document produced by NTCT as its hiring agreement, and it did not change the relationships created by the basic document. Clause 5, in particular, merely recorded the consequences of the legal relationships already established and created no new obligations. Clause 11 was also said to arise logically from "the denial of any responsibility under the head agreement to anyone for anything".
52. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the evidence was clear (as the trial judge found) that the supplementary terms were insisted upon by PDC; so, to the extent that those terms changed any agreement or arrangement between the parties, the respondents cannot be held responsible - they imposed no relevant obligation on PDC.
53. It is true that Deane J. in the Ku-Ring-Gai case (above) at 167-8 said,
"The practice of exclusive dealing does
not necessarily involve the imposition of any
condition. It involves supply upon a
condition. The condition may well have been
suggested by the recipient of supply. It may
have been imposed by some third party. It may
arise, by implication, from all the
circumstances in which the goods and services
were supplied."
But his Honour did suggest that a party can be guilty of forcing another party to accept services from a third party in circumstances where it is the second party which has insisted that it receive the particular services. And, in our view, that is the case here.
54. There is no imposition by NTCT of any condition that PDC acquire services from Bass. PDC insisted upon Bass supplying those services directly to it. The provisions of clauses 5 and 11 were not, in our opinion, a mere working out or clarification of existing provisions. They represented a distinct change in legal relationships by imposing obligations on Bass, for the benefit of PDC, which were capable of direct enforcement by PDC against Bass. Under the basic agreement PDC would have had to look to NCTC for any such services.
55. In any event it is difficult to see that the appellants could be entitled to any remedy arising out of the terms of clauses 5 and 11 of the supplementary agreement. There is no suggestion that such an agreement is likely to be repeated, so injunctive relief would not be appropriate. The carrying out of these terms can hardly be thought to have resulted in any damage to the appellants. And, in those circumstances, there would appear to be no purpose served by the making of a declaration.
56. It is significant that, in their arguments, counsel for the appellants did not urge findings in their favour based solely on the supplementary agreement above. They relied upon it as illuminating what they submitted to be the true nature of the basic agreement.
57. It is not disputed that the Trade Practices Act does not apply to a state government body which is, for the relevant purpose, under the shield of the Crown; see Bradken Consolidated Ltd v The Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1979] HCA 15; (1979) 145 CLR 107.
58. In Townsville Hospitals Board v Council of the City of Townsville [1982] HCA 48; (1982) 149 CLR 282 at 288-9, Gibbs C.J. said,
"... many functions formerly regarded as
matters of private concern are now carried out
by instrumentalities of government and the
question whether the functions in question are
traditionally or peculiarly governmental is
likely to be increasingly unhelpful in
deciding whether the body formed to carry out
those functions enjoys the privileges and
immunities of the Crown...... The answer to
the question must in the end depend upon the
intention to be derived from the statute under
which the body in question is constituted".
"It has more than once been said in this
Court that "there is evidence of a strong
tendency to regard a statutory corporation
formed to carry on public functions as
distinct from the Crown unless parliament has
by express provision given it the character of
a servant of the Crown": Launceston
Corporation v Hydro-Electric Commission (1959)
[1959] HCA 12; 100 CLR 654, 622; State Electricity Commission
(Vict) v City of South Melbourne (1968) 118
CLR 504, 510. All persons should prima facie
be regarded as equal before the law, and no
statutory body should be accorded special
privileges and immunities unless it clearly
appears that it was the intention of the
legislature to confer them. It is not
difficult for the legislature to provide the
immunities of the Crown, and where it does not
do so it should not readily be concluded that
it had that intention."
60. See also, on the importance of the statutory ability of the executive to control the instrumentality, whether in practice it does so or not, Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps (South Australia) [1979] HCA 34; (1979) 145 CLR 330, per Stephen J. at 348.
61. In the present case the VACT has perhaps the strongest claim to the shield of the Crown because sub-s 4(2) of the Victorian Arts Centre Act 1979 provides,
"Subject to the general direction and
control of the Minister the Trust shall be
responsible for the management of the Centre".
62. It is true that the phrase 'general direction and control' in this context is somewhat ambiguous. It may mean the unfettered or unrestricted direction and control, or it may mean direction and control on policy questions as distinct from detailed matters. The 'management of the Centre' is another expression which could be interpreted narrowly, in a geographic sense, or broadly, in a functional sense.
63. Other relevant sections of the Victorian Arts Centre Act provide that the functions of the Trust, which is established as a body corporate with the usual powers of such a body, include "the care improvement and maintenance of the Centre", "the control and management" of the Centre other than the National Gallery, and the presentation of the performing arts within the Centre and, with the approval of the Minister, outside the Centre (s 5).
64. The Trust is given all necessary powers, including incidental powers, to carry out its functions and objects (sub-ss 6(1) and 6(2)) and may, with the consent of the Minister, enter into a contract for the provision of services (sub-s 6(3)). These powers would, it seems, entitle the Trust to establish a ticket agency and provide the services of that agency to bodies such as NTCT and OPM. The contract to provide such services would probably require Ministerial consent. The power of the Trust to provide such a ticketing service was made explicit by the Victorian Arts Centre (Amendment) Act 1988, which came into force on 15 December 1988.
65. The nine members of the Trust are all appointed by the Governor in Council, though three of them are nominated by other bodies. The Governor in Council appoints the Chairman of the Trust (sub-ss 8(1) and 10(1)).
66. The Trust requires the approval of the Minister for the employment, from time to time, of a general manager and deputy general manager (sub-s 14(1)).
67. Finally, the Trust makes an annual report to the Minister, which is tabled in the Parliament (s 18).
68. The question is not an easy one to decide but, in our view, having regard to Gibbs C.J.'s reminder as to how easily the shield of the Crown can be provided for if that is the intention of the legislature, the better view is that the VACT, in its provision of a commercial service in the form of the Bass ticketing service, is not operating under that shield.
69. Similar considerations apply to NTCT and OPM. NTCT consists of 13 members appointed by the Governor in Council, of whom 5 are nominated by the Minister without restriction, and 4 more are nominated by the Minister from the membership of other bodies. The Governor in Council may at any time remove a member from office. See the National Tennis Centre Act 1985 s 8.
70. The continuing functions of NTCT are to be responsible for the care, improvement, use and promotion of the National Tennis Centre, to be responsible for its financial management and to accept appointment as a Committee of Management of Crown Lands (see s 6). It is this responsiblity for Crown lands which gives NTCT its strongest claim to the shield of the Crown. In addition, the Treasurer is given some powers of oversight of the financial affairs of NTCT (see ss 17, 18 and 19) and an annual report is required, as in the case of VACT (see s 20).
71. However, there is in our view no sufficient evidence in the Act of that type or degree of control by the executive which would attract the shield of the Crown for the Trust's commercial activities.
72. The same is true of OPM, which is constituted pursuant to the Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978 as amended by the Crown Land (Reserves) (Amendment) Act 1984. OPM is a committee of management declared in 1981 by the Governor in Council to be a corporation pursuant to s 14A(1) of that Act. It is required to manage, improve, maintain and control the Crown lands entrusted to its care.
73. The main arguments relied on by counsel for the respondents as showing that OPM is, for relevant purposes, the Crown, are as follows:
(a) OPM has been brought into existence by the
Governor in Council on the recommendation of a Minister (s 14A(1)).
(c) The members of OPM are appointed and removable
(d) The Minister can limit or expand the powers of
(e) The Treasurer can exercise a degree of control
expenditure has to be provided to the Secretary of Lands (s 15(8)).
Recreation Centre can only be given by OPM because the Governor in Council specifically certified that it could do so (s 17(1) and (2)).
74. None of these enabling or reserve powers of the Governor in Council or the Minister compensate, in our view, for the absence of any expression of legislative intent that a body in the position of OPM, under the relevant legislation, should be subject to the control of the executive in carrying out those of its functions which are relevant for present purposes.
75. In our opinion the respondents arguments for immunity under the shield of the Crown must fail.
76. In our view there in no substance in the respondents' submission that they are all 'related corporations' within the meaning of sub-ss 47 (8) and (9) of the Trade Practices Act. They are said to be so because they are all "subsidiaries of the Crown, which is a body corporate". But s 4A(5) of the Act limits the meaning of 'related corporations' in such a way that the three instrumentalities could only satisfy the description if the Crown were held to be a holding company for the purposes of the Act. This would be a very strange conclusion, which could only be even remotely arguable if the three entities were held to be true emanations of the Crown, which we believe they are not.
77. The respondents, in our view, have a much stronger argument under this heading than they have under the previous headings of 'Shield of the Crown' and 'Related Corporations'. The question to be determined is whether the 'acts or things' done by the respondents and alleged to constitute exclusive dealing, have been "specifically authorised or approved by ..... an Act passed by the Parliament" of Victoria.
78. The relevant Act is the Victorian Arts Centre (Amendment) Act 1988 which, in s 5, provides,
"The Agreements referred to in the
Schedule and any subsequent agreements to the
like effect between Olympic Park Management
and Victorian Arts Centre Trust or between
National Tennis Centre Trust and Victorian
Arts Centre Trust, are specifically authorised
and approved".
"Agreements relating to the sale of tickets
1. Agreement dated 28 April 1988
between Olympic Park Management and Victorian
Arts Centre Trust.
2. Agreement dated 18 May 1988 between
National Tennis Centre Trust and Victorian
Arts Centre Trust."
79. Sweeney J. approached the question of the meaning and effect of this enactment by looking at its parliamentary history. His Honour noted, among other things, that the relevant provision had originally been drafted in the following terms,
"Approval of agreements.
5. (1) Olympic Park Management, an
incorporated committee of management under the
Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978, and the
Victorian Arts Centre Trust shall each be
deemed to have and always to have had all
necessary powers to enable it to enter into
and carry into effect the Agreement referred
to in item 1 of the Schedule and any other
agreement of a like nature.
(2) The National Tennis Centre Trust and
the Victorian Arts Centre Trust shall each be
deemed to have and always to have had all
necessary powers to enable it to enter into
and carry into effect the Agreement referred
to in item 2 of the Schedule and any other
agreement of a like nature.
(3) The Agreements referred to in the
Schedule are, and shall be deemed always to
have been, specifically authorised and
approved."
"The Bill plainly recognized the
distinction between the entry into contracts,
agreements or arrangements and the carrying of
them into effect and sought to authorize and
approve both the entry and the carrying into
effect. That distinction is a logical one.
When Parliament deleted the clauses which
provided that each body "shall be deemed to
have and always to have had all necessary
powers to enable it to enter into and carry
into effect" the agreements referred to in the
Schedule, it substituted the new clause 4AA
which contained no deeming provision referring
either to powers to enable any of the bodies
to carry the agreements into effect, or to any
of them always having had the powers to enter
into agreements and carry them into effect.
Construing the words of the amending Act
in their ordinary meaning, they specifically
authorize and approve the agreements referred
to in the Schedule and operate to do so from
15 December 1988, the date on which it
received assent. They do not, in my opinion,
have any effect before that date and they do
not specifically authorize and approve the
carrying into effect of any of the agreements."
80. While seeing the force of his Honour's reasoning, we have nevertheless arrived at a different conclusion. The fact that a deeming provision has been omitted from the Act does not necessarily mean a change of legislative intent. It may merely mean either that further consideration led to the view that it was unnecessary, or that the legislature was reluctant to enact provisions having an appearance of retrospective effect and preferred to leave such questions to the decision of the Court which was then dealing with them.
81. In our view, the Court should construe the provision as enacted by the Parliament without allowing itself to be influenced by speculation as to the legislative intention based upon the history of amendments to the Bill, which may well have been agreed upon for a variety of reasons, expressed or unexpressed.
82. Each of the agreements "specifically authorised and approved" had appointed Bass as the relevant Centre's exclusive agent to sell, on the Centre's behalf, the tickets to all events at the Centre. To allow PDC, through PDP, to sell tickets to any future event at either centre would, in our view, be a breach of the relevant agreement with Bass to give it the exclusive right to sell tickets. Since the named agreements are specifically authorised and approved, so must the exclusive agency be specifically authorised and approved. In reaching this conclusion we reject the appellants' argument that, properly construed, the agreements gave the Centres a choice in relation to each hiring whether or not to employ BASS's services. In our view that was not the intention or effect of the agreements.
83. The appellants have argued that the exclusive dealing of the respondent Centres consists in requiring PDC to use Bass' services, and that this is not conduct specifically authorised or approved by the Victorian Act. As we have already said, we think this is an inaccurate way of describing the situation, because Bass's services are provided to the Centres, not to PDC. But even if this were not so, we believe the Victorian Act specifically authorised the agreements which gave Bass exclusive rights to all ticketing for the Centres.
84. It is also, in our respectful opinion, wrong to say that the Victorian Act authorised the making of the agreements but not their execution. This would have been a pointless exercise on the part of the Victorian Parliament, which should not be attributed to it.
85. In our view it is clear that the Parliament, by using the language of s 51 of the Trade Practices Act, was intending to invoke the protection of that section for conduct in pursuance of the named agreements.
86. Section 51 relevantly provides,
"In determining whether a contravention of a
provision of this part has been committed, regard shall not
be had .... to any act or thing that is .... specifically
authorised or approved by .... an Act passed by the
Parliament of that State..."
87. The direction is to the court, which is instructed, by way of comity in a Federal system, to respect the expressed wishes of a State Parliament. The direction speaks as at the time when the matter is before the court and, in our view, should be construed generously in favour of the State.
88. The word "approved", by contrast with "authorised", suggests the possibility of ratification of an act or thing after it has occurred. We can see no sufficient reason why an exculpatory provision such as this should not have, in one sense, a retrospective effect, so that a possible contravention of Part IV of the Act, which has since been specifically approved by the State Act, is to be disregarded by the court. If the agreements are "approved", the clear inference is that they are approved as at the time of their making and that their implementation is also "approved".
89. Even if we are wrong in this approach, and the Victorian Act speaks only as at 15 December 1988, leaving unaffected any contravention dependent upon an act or thing which occurred before that date, it would still be a complete answer to any claim for injunctive relief.
90. In the result, for the reasons we have given, we agree with the learned trial judge that the appellants have, on any view, failed to show a contravention by the respondents of s 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. For this reason, and for the additional reason just given relating to authorisation and approval by an Act of the Victorian Parliament, we would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Re Paul Dainty Corporation Pty Ltd and Paul Dainty Productions Pty Ltd
the National Tennis Centre Trust; the Victorian Arts Centre Trust and Olympic Park Management [1990] FCA 163; 22 FCR 495
(1986) 162 CLR 395
(1986) 162 CLR 359
(1978) 36 FLR 134
(1984) 156 CLR 41
(1979) 145 CLR 107
(1982) 149 CLR 282
(1979) 145 CLR 330