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After probate was sought and obtained by Deborah and Vicki, Brenton repeatedly criticised their conduct and sought various remedies, including removal of the executors, appointment of the Public Trustee, orders compelling criminal charges and broad discovery. A sequence of proceedings in multiple forums stretching back to 2009 was summarised by the Court (see [6]-[18]). In October 2019 the parties reached an agreement whereby the executors distributed most of the estate ($240,000) equally and certain disputes were discontinued (see [28]-[29]). Despite that, on 6 April 2020 Brenton filed a fresh application in BS 5626/19 seeking removal of the executors, appointment of himself as executor, criminal charging, and discovery (see [30]-[31]). Deborah filed an application in BS 10296/19 seeking leave to apply for a vexatious proceedings order against Brenton (see [3], [4]).

On 28 May 2020 Bowskill J dismissed Brenton's application, ordered the executors to distribute the remaining estate funds equally ($11,050.15 each) within seven days, declared those orders final for the probate proceeding, and restrained Brenton from making further applications in that proceeding or commencing new proceedings in the Trial Division, the District Court of Queensland or QCAT against Deborah and/or Vicki in relation to their father's financial affairs without first obtaining leave from a Trial Division Judge. The application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act was not granted, though the Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to impose the leave requirement (see [44]-[58]).

Why the court decided this way

The judgment rests on three interrelated reasons.

1. Lack of evidence to remove executors

   • The Court found no material before it that called into question the executors' actions in administering the estate since probate was granted. The administration post-death was limited in time (from April 2019 until the hearing) and scope, and the estate was modest and almost finalised, with only $33,150.50 remaining to be distributed (see [40]-[43], [32]-[33]). The Court emphasised that removal of an executor requires a proper evidential basis. In those circumstances appointing a new administrator (or ordering the Public Trustee back in) would be unjustified and disruptive (see [41]-[42]).

2. Finality and proportionality

   • The Court repeatedly emphasised the need to bring the administration to a prompt conclusion and to avoid further expenditure of time and resources on repeated litigation over a modest estate (see [40], [46]). Given that the executors had distributed the bulk of funds and only a small sum remained, the sensible course was to direct final equal distribution to the beneficiaries in accordance with the will (see [46]-[48]).

3. Process control and prevention of abuse

   • Although the statutory test for a vexatious proceedings order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) was not satisfied on the material before the Court (because proceedings had not been exclusively instituted by Brenton and much of the litigation stemmed from lack of legal representation rather than a deliberate wrongful purpose) the Court nevertheless considered the Court's inherent jurisdiction to control its processes. In the exercise of that inherent jurisdiction the Court concluded it was proportionate to require Brenton to obtain leave from a Trial Division Judge before bringing further proceedings in respect of the deceased's financial affairs against his sisters (see [52]-[56]).

The Court also rejected requests that were beyond its jurisdiction (for example ordering criminal charges) or misconceived forms of relief (for example a 'stay of enforcement' of an affidavit) (see [43]).

Before and after state of the law

Before this decision:

• The law recognised both the statutory pathway to restrain litigants through the Vexatious Proceedings Act and the Court's inherent jurisdiction to control abuse of process. Pre-existing authorities such as von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Limited and Budulica v Budulica were available and were referenced by the Court (see [25], [22]).

What this decision adds or confirms:

• The judgment confirms that where the statutory test for a vexatious proceedings order is not met, the Court's inherent jurisdiction remains available to craft proportionate remedies to prevent re-litigation and abuse of process. The Court showed how a leave requirement may be tailored to the subject-matter (administration of the deceased's financial affairs) and to specific courts (Trial Division, District Court, QCAT) relevant to the dispute (see [55]-[56]).
• It affirms the practical principle that finality is a significant consideration when an estate is nearly administered; the Court will be reluctant to replace executors absent clear evidence of misconduct, particularly where the replacement would cause delay and unnecessary cost (see [40]-[43], [46]-[48]).

The decision thus fits within existing authority on case management, abuse of process and probate practice, reaffirming proportionality and finality as central considerations.

Key passages with plain-English translation

1. "I am not persuaded on the material before the court that there is any basis on which to remove the executors; let alone make an order for the appointment of Mr Hill in their place." ([41])

   • Plain English: There is no good evidence the executors did anything wrong after probate, so the Court will not remove them or appoint Brenton instead.

2. "The administration of the estate should be finalised without any further delay, time or resources (whether financial or personal) being expended." ([40])

   • Plain English: The Court wants this matter finished; it is not appropriate to keep fighting over a small estate.

3. "It is in the interests of justice that the litigation relating to this modest estate be brought to an end." ([46])

   • Plain English: For fairness and practicality the Court will order the remaining money to be distributed now.

4. "I am of the view that in the exercise of the court's inherent power to control its own processes, it is appropriate to make an order preventing Mr Hill from making any further applications... without first obtaining leave from a Judge of the Trial Division of this Court." ([55])

   • Plain English: Although the Court will not make a statutory vexatious order, it will require Brenton to get a judge's permission before he can sue his sisters again about their father's finances.

5. "As to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application, it is not within the power of this court to order that the defendants be charged for fraud or conspiracy." ([43(b)])

   • Plain English: The Court cannot order criminal charges as part of this civil proceeding; that is not a remedy it can give.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

This decision is most relevant where:

• A probate matter involves a modest estate, where most assets have already been distributed and only a small balance remains.
• An applicant seeks removal of executors but presents no clear, contemporaneous evidence of misconduct in the post-probate administration.
• There exists a long history of cross-jurisdictional and repetitive litigation between family members, some commenced by each side, often involving self-represented litigants.
• A litigant repeatedly re-litigates the same or closely related issues despite prior determinations or settlements, prompting concerns about abuse of process.
• The statutory test for a vexatious proceedings order is not met on the available material, but the Court needs to prevent further piecemeal, repetitive litigation.

In those circumstances a court may:

• Decline to remove executors for lack of evidence and on grounds of finality, and
• Exercise inherent jurisdiction to impose a leave requirement targeted at preventing further proceedings without prior judicial scrutiny.

How later courts have treated it

As this is a 2020 Queensland Supreme Court decision, subsequent courts will treat it as persuasive authority from the Trial Division on:

• The application of inherent jurisdiction to restrain repetitive litigation about family disputes and probate.
• The relevance of finality and proportionality in decisions about removal of executors.
• The relationship between the statutory mechanism in the Vexatious Proceedings Act and the Court's inherent jurisdiction.

Practically, later courts in Queensland will likely cite this reasoning when: (a) resisting the replacement of executors where the estate administration is near completion and no clear evidence of misconduct exists; (b) crafting leave requirements against litigants who persistently re-litigate family disputes; and (c) distinguishing between relief properly sought under civil jurisdiction and matters for criminal prosecution. Any definitive assessment of how appellate courts have treated this specific decision would require checking later reported decisions and citation history after 1 June 2020.

Still-open questions

1. Scope and limits of leave orders

   • The judgment orders Brenton must obtain leave before initiating proceedings in particular courts and about the deceased's financial affairs. Questions remain about the precise scope of such leave requirements: how narrowly should the subject-matter be described; whether the leave requirement could or should extend to other forums; and exactly what threshold a judge will apply when assessing leave in future (the judgment does not articulate a single leave test beyond noting proportionality and the history of proceedings) (see [55]-[56]).

2. Interaction with statutory vexatious proceedings mechanism

   • The Court declined to invoke the Vexatious Proceedings Act on the facts, yet imposed a similar practical restriction via inherent jurisdiction. That raises the question of when it is preferable to use the statutory mechanism versus an inherent jurisdiction order. The judgment explains the statutory threshold but does not prescribe a deterministic approach to choosing between the two remedies (see [52]-[55]).

3. Evidence sufficiency for removal of executors in cases with pre-death allegations

   • The Court noted allegations concerning conduct prior to the Public Trustee's appointment; it inferred that the Public Trustee would have pursued recovery if appropriate. However, where pre-death misconduct is plausibly alleged but the Public Trustee did not act, courts may face evidential disputes about whether a private beneficiary can now pursue executive removal or recovery. The judgment gives guidance that lack of Public Trustee action is an important factor, but not a closed rule (see [50]-[51]).

4. Cross-jurisdictional history and probative weight

   • The parties had litigation across QCAT, SACAT, South Australian Magistrates Court and Supreme Court files. How future courts will treat multiplicity of proceedings across jurisdictions for purposes of assessing 'frequently instituted' or 'vexatious' conduct may require further appellate clarification (see [6]-[18], [52]-[54]).

Practical takeaway for practitioners

• If seeking removal of an executor, ensure contemporaneous, admissible evidence specifically addressing conduct in the administration period, and be mindful of the court's interest in finality and efficiency where estates are near finalised.
• Where parties are self-represented and litigation is recurrent, courts may use their inherent powers to impose leave requirements even if the statutory test for a vexatious order is not met; counsel should prepare for applications to vary or discharge any such leave restriction on a timely, evidence-based basis.
• Civil courts will not entertain requests that amount to ordering criminal prosecutions; any such allegations should be directed to prosecutorial authorities through appropriate channels.

[4] In her application in proceeding 10296/19, Ms Nanschild contends that the many and varied legal proceedings Mr Hill has instigated over the past 11 years have "cost me a great deal of time, distress, resources and money". She brings the application in order to have the current application by Mr Hill (in proceeding 5626/19) dismissed, and prevent Mr Hill from bringing any further proceedings, without leave of the Court. Her sister, Ms Vicki Hill, is not a party to this proceeding but has filed an affidavit supporting the application by Ms Nanschild. This proceeding was originally commenced in September 2019. On 21 October 2019, it was adjourned to a date to be fixed (with a similar order being made on the same date in relation to an earlier application by Mr Hill in proceeding 5626/19). A fresh application was filed by Ms Nanschild on 13 May 2020, in response to Mr Hill filing his application in proceeding 5626/19 on 6 April 2020.

[5] In order to deal with these applications, it is necessary to set out some of the history, in so far as it is ascertainable from the material before the Court. I will endeavour to do that chronologically.

[6] History of the disputes: Annexed to Ms Nanschild's affidavit filed on 23 September 2019 (in proceeding 10296/19) is a schedule of the proceedings said to have been instigated by Mr Hill. These are said to include proceedings in the Supreme Court, the District Court, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) and the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) and the South Australian Magistrates Court. However, the material before the Court does not include documents which clearly demonstrate the nature of all of these various proceedings, or what happened in relation to them.

[7] To the extent I am able to discern from the objective material the nature of the various disputes, in various forums, that have been the subject of litigation between or involving the parties, it is as follows. I have focussed upon what I regard as objective, independent documents (as opposed to assertions by the various parties); and where earlier proceedings in this court have been referred to, I have reviewed the files in those proceedings.

[8] There appears to have been a proceeding in the South Australian Magistrates Court between Mr Hill (as plaintiff) and Ms Nanschild (as defendant) in 2009. An order was made on 16 March 2009, recording that the matter had settled, on the basis of an agreement by Ms Nanschild to pay Mr Hill $2,875 in settlement of his claim, and that "on behalf of the estate of Stanley Gordon Hill the executors undertake to make no claims on any property that may have been received by the plaintiff from Stanley Gordon Hill".[3] The claim by Mr Hill appears to have related to money held in a bank account by Ms Nanschild on his (that is, Mr Brenton Hill's) behalf. The property received by Mr Hill seems to have included an Edison record player, "wind-up 78 player", Roland keyboard and Hohner mouth organs.[4] I note that the parties, variously (including in these documents, but also others) at times refer to Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill as "the executors", and to the estate of Mr Stanley Hill, even prior to his death.

[9] In 2009, there were also proceedings in QCAT, under the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), involving applications for the appointment of an administrator and for the appointment of a guardian for Mr Stanley Hill. It is not clear from the material who made these applications; although there were multiple applications. It appears to be the case that there were cross-applications by both Ms Nanschild and Mr Hill,[5] but also the involvement of the Public Trustee. Ultimately, an order was made on 19 January 2010, appointing the Public Trustee as the administrator for Mr Stanley Hill for all financial matters; and declaring the enduring power of attorney made by Mr Stanley Hill (appointing Ms Nanschild as his attorney) invalid.[6]

[10] In relation to the enduring power of attorney, it seems an investigation was carried out by the Adult Guardian in relation to that matter, in 2009.[7] Whilst Ms Nanschild's affidavit does not include a copy of the investigation report, there is a copy attached to a document headed "Notice in support of caveat" filed by Mr Hill in proceeding BS 5626/19 on 5 June 2019. The investigation report of the Adult Guardian is dated 22 October 2009. It is recorded in the report that Mr Stanley Hill had suffered an acquired brain injury following a stroke in July 2008, resulting in a severe cognitive impairment. Findings were made that Ms Nanschild had breached various obligations under the Powers of Attorney Act 1998, including in relation to record keeping, gifting Mr Stanley Hill's property and making loans from his funds to herself and Ms Hill. A concern was raised in relation to Mr Stanley Hill's capacity to grant the enduring power of attorney, as it was signed on 31 July 2008, following his stroke on 28 July 2008.

[11] In an affidavit filed by Ms Nanschild, she contends these matters were "disproved" in 2009 by QCAT.[8] I have been unable to find, in any of the many affidavits filed by the parties in the various proceedings to which I have referred, a QCAT document addressing this issue. There is evidence that Ms Nanschild objected strenuously to the process and outcome of the Adult Guardian's investigation, as did Ms Vicki Hill.[9] Consequently, an internal review of that process and outcome was undertaken.[10] The material before the court does not appear to include any evidence of what the outcome of that internal review was. That may have been overtaken by the appointment of the Public Trustee in January 2010. What can be said, though, is that there were orders made by both QCAT and SACAT subsequently (as discussed below), which again appointed Ms Nanschild (with Ms Hill) as the guardian for Mr Stanley Hill's personal affairs.

[12] Moving forward, there were further QCAT proceedings in 2015, resulting in an order made on 18 December 2015, appointing Ms Nanschild and Ms Vicki Hill as guardians for Mr Stanley Hill for all personal matters.[11]

[13] There were proceedings in SACAT in 2016, in respect of which Ms Vicki Hill and Mr Brenton Hill were applicants (seeking administration and guardianship orders). On 3 March 2016, an order was made appointing the Public Advocate as the full guardian of Mr Stanley Hill (and Ms Hill's and Mr Hill's applications were dismissed).[12]

[14] In 2016 Mr Hill attempted to commence proceedings in this Court against the Public Trustee, seeking revocation of the Public Trustee's appointment as administrator (proceeding BS 2018/16). A review of the court's file in that proceeding reveals the claim was discontinued four days after it was filed.[13]

[15] Also in 2016, QCAT conducted a review of the appointment of the Public Trustee as administrator for Mr Stanley Hill for financial matters, and on 9 June 2016 continued that appointment.[14] The material includes a "Tribunal Briefing Report" from the Public Trustee to QCAT, dated 4 February 2016.[15] In the section "matters of interest/concern", the report records:

• (i) that if the caveator (Mr Hill) wishes to pursue his allegation that there is a later will made by Mr Stanley Hill, than the will made in August 2003, he must file and serve on the defendants a proceeding to prove the later will in solemn form on or before 12 August 2019;
• (ii) adjourning the application for removal of the caveat and the grant of probate of the will made in August 2003 to a date to be fixed after any withdrawal of the caveat or 12 August 2019, whichever is earlier; and
• (iii) adjourning Mr Hill's application filed 26 June 2019 to a date to be fixed.

[22] No application was filed by Mr Hill, in accordance with order 1 made by Mullins J. Mr Hill did, however, withdraw the caveat (with the notice of withdrawal of caveat being filed on 11 September 2019).

[23] Consequently, probate of the (2003) will was granted to Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill on 12 September 2019.

[24] Also, in August 2019, Mr Hill commenced a family provision application in the District Court.

[25] On 17 September 2019 Mr Hill filed another application (in proceeding 5626/19) seeking orders that the Public Trustee be appointed administrator of the estate, in the place of Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill. Submissions filed in support of that application, bearing the name of Mr Hill's then lawyer, inauspiciously begin with the sentence: "It is common ground that the executors hate Mr Hill and Mr Hill hates the executors". It seems communications between the parties did not improve with the involvement of a lawyer for one of them.

[26] Mr Hill's application was listed before Dalton J on 19 September 2019. Included in the material before Dalton J was a statement of assets and liabilities of Mr Stanley Hill, prepared by the Public Trustee, which recorded an item "Loans to Brenton Hill" of $5,500 (exhibit AF to the affidavit which is court document 27). Dalton J made an order requiring Mr Hill to make an affidavit swearing to any knowledge he has of a loan to him of $5,500; and otherwise adjourned Mr Hill's application filed 17 September 2019 (for removal of the executors) to 21 October 2019. It does not appear that an affidavit was filed. However, I note that, as part of the material filed by Ms Nanschild in proceeding 10296/19, there is correspondence from her to Mr Hill's then solicitor, suggesting that this entry was a "clerical error", with the actual amount being $1,500.[18]

[27] The application next came on before Boddice J on 21 October 2019. By this time, Ms Nanschild had filed her application for leave to make an application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 for a vexatious proceedings order directed at Mr Hill (10296/19).

[28] Justice Boddice ordered that both Ms Nanschild's application in proceeding 10296/19 and Mr Hill's application (for removal of the executors) in proceeding 5626/19 be adjourned to a date to be fixed. That occurred in circumstances where there was an agreement reached, on that day, that the executors would distribute most of the estate ($240,000) equally to the three beneficiaries (Mr Hill, Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill); and Mr Hill would withdraw his application for removal of the executors and discontinue the family provision application.[19]

[29] Consistently with that agreement, the family provision application in the District Court was discontinued on 22 October 2019.[20]

[30] However, inconsistently at least with the spirit of that agreement, on 6 April 2020, Mr Hill - now representing himself again - filed a further application in proceeding 5626/19 (which is the application presently before me for hearing), seeking the following orders:

[35] I also directed that Ms Nanschild provide a further affidavit, attaching any statements which had been provided by the Public Trustee in relation to its management of Mr Stanley Hill's financial affairs, and any other documents which she may have in her possession in relation to the prior QCAT proceedings. A further affidavit of Ms Nanschild was filed on 25 May 2020, annexing, among other things, the statements provided by the Public Trustee.

[36] At the time of making those orders, Mr Hill indicated he would like his application to be adjourned to July 2020, to give his "investigators" time to do their work. I refused that as I could see no basis on which "investigators" should have any involvement in, or affect the timely disposition of, these legal proceedings; and on the basis of the overriding obligation imposed on the court and the parties by rule 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to proceed in an expeditious way.

[37] Mr Hill filed a further application in proceeding 5626/19, on 25 May 2020, seeking orders for the adjournment of this matter to 14 July 2020 "on the grounds of Covid-19 restrictions to gather further evidence" and "to engage independent discovery of records of the public trustee", referring to this aspect of his application filed on 6 April 2020.

[38] Mr Hill also attempted, on 27 May 2020, to file a further application, seeking that "an expert be brought in", to be appointed by the court. On that day, I directed the registry not to accept that document for filing.

[39] At the resumed hearing on 28 May 2020, I refused Mr Hill's application to adjourn the further hearing of his application. No proper basis for delaying the determination of the application was put forward by Mr Hill. Mr Hill has had ample opportunity to put whatever material he seeks to rely upon before the court, over the length of time that the various applications have been agitated both prior to and since the grant of probate in September 2019.

[40] Determining Mr Hill's application: Proceeding 5626/19 is concerned with the administration of the estate of the late Mr Stanley Hill. The administration of the estate should be finalised without any further delay, time or resources (whether financial or personal) being expended.

[41] I am not persuaded on the material before the court that there is any basis on which to remove the executors; let alone make an order for the appointment of Mr Hill in their place. There is no evidence calling into question the actions of the executors in the administration of the estate, keeping in mind that the administration of the estate has only (and can only have) been undertaken since the death of Mr Stanley Hill in April 2019.

[42] As I have already said, the estate is almost finalised, with only $33,150.50 left to distribute. There is simply no justification for introducing a new administrator at this stage.[22] Accordingly, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Mr Hill's application are refused.

[43] The other orders sought by Mr Hill in his application filed 6 April 2020 are misconceived.

• (a) As to paragraph 1 of the application, it is not possible to grant a "stay of enforcement" of an affidavit.
• (b) As to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application, it is not within the power of this court to order that the defendants be charged for fraud or conspiracy. Nor, I would add, is there any evidence of such things before me. As already noted, Mr Hill's earlier attempt to obtain leave to commence a private prosecution was dismissed.
• (c) As to paragraph 7, there is no basis on which to make orders for the Public Trustee, which is not a party to the proceeding, to provide disclosure; nor are such orders appropriate as against Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill, in the circumstances. Probate has been granted; no basis for their removal as executors has been shown; and in the interests of justice, both as a matter of fairness and efficiency, the estate should be finalised.

[44] The application filed by Mr Hill on 6 April 2020 is dismissed.

[45] For completeness, I note that in further submissions filed on 25 May 2020, Ms Nanschild (on behalf of the executors) contends the further application filed by Mr Hill on 6 April 2020 is "in breach of contract" (referring to the settlement agreement reached in October 2019). It is unnecessary to address this argument, as I have found, as a matter of substantive determination, that the application is without merit and should be dismissed.

[46] It is in the interests of justice that the litigation relating to this modest estate be brought to an end. That can be done by making an order that the remaining funds be distributed equally between the three beneficiaries, consistently with the terms of the will. Whilst I note the disputed issue about whether or not Mr Hill has already had the benefit of some of their father's property and therefore should receive less than one-third, I cannot determine where the merits of that dispute lie on the material before me (and there is a question about whether that was affected by the settlement recorded in the order of the South Australian Magistrates Court). In the interests of finality, and to enable the administration of the estate to be brought to an end, I propose to order that the executors distribute the remaining funds equally to each of the beneficiaries - that is, a payment of $11,050.15 to each of the three beneficiaries, Ms Nanschild, Ms Hill and Mr Hill.

[47] I raised this with Ms Nanschild at the further hearing of this matter on 28 May 2020, as a practical means of finally resolving the proceedings, and she did not object. Ms Hill did not appear on 28 May 2020, but Ms Nanschild assured me that I could proceed on the basis Ms Hill, her co-executor, would not object either. This reflects a more favourable outcome for Mr Hill, than Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill contend he is entitled to; but it is a practical and sensible way of bringing the administration of the estate to an end.[23]

[48] Following the hearing, Mr Hill provided his bank account details to the court, for inclusion in the order.[24]

[49] Determining Ms Nanschild's application: As far as the application by Ms Nanschild in proceeding 10296/19 is concerned, in my view that too is misconceived. Clearly there has been ongoing conflict and acrimony between Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill, on the one hand, and Mr Hill, on the other. That conflict has manifested in the parties invoking the assistance of various courts and tribunals over a number of years. The circumstances have not been assisted by the lack of legal representation on all sides. With the orders I propose to make today in relation to proceeding 5626/19, that will bring to an end litigation in relation to the estate of their father, Mr Stanley Hill.

[50] In so far as Mr Hill has made assertions about the management of Mr Stanley Hill's affairs prior to his death, as is apparent, the Public Trustee administered those affairs from early 2010, a period of about nine years prior to Mr Stanley Hill's death, and then transferred Mr Stanley Hill's assets to the executors to be administered in accordance with his will. I find no basis for a finding of any misconduct by Ms Nanschild and/or Ms Hill, as executors of the deceased's estate (which is only after the deceased's death, in April 2019). In addition, no basis has been shown for finding any misconduct could have taken place in the period whilst the Public Trustee was the administrator (January 2010 to April 2019).

[51] In so far as Mr Hill relies upon the 2009 Adult Guardian's report as a basis for making assertions of misconduct against Ms Nanschild prior to the appointment of the Public Trustee, it is reasonable to infer that, if there was any prior misconduct, which could have given rise a legitimate claim for recovery by Mr Stanley Hill, it would have been pursued by the Public Trustee on Mr Stanley Hill's behalf. There is no evidence of that; and yet there is evidence that Ms Nanschild, together with Ms Hill, were subsequently appointed as the guardians for Mr Stanley Hill, for his personal affairs.

[52] I am not persuaded that in the circumstances of this unfortunate acrimonious family dispute, resort to the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 is appropriate. A court may only make a vexatious proceeding order if it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is sought is "a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia": s 6(1)(a). The term "vexatious proceedings" is defined in the schedule to the Act as including a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; a proceeding instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; a proceeding instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; and a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve any wrongful purpose.

[53] As far as I am able to discern, from the materials before the court, although there have been multiple proceedings of various kinds, in various courts and tribunals in Queensland and South Australia, involving the present parties, they have not only been instituted by Mr Hill; although it is reasonable to infer the proceedings instituted by Ms Nanschild and Ms Hill were in order to deal with or address issues raised or allegations made by Mr Hill. In some respects, applications or assertions by both sides have at times been misguided. For the most part, that would seem to be due to the absence of legal advice and representation, rather than a deliberate intent to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose.

[54] Having said that, I am persuaded, having regard to the history of proceedings as set out above, that there is justification to Ms Nanschild's and Ms Hill's expressions of frustration and concern about ongoing re-agitation by Mr Hill of the issues which have been ventilated over the past many years; and of the need for orders to be made to address that. It is now getting to the point where, if Mr Hill continues to persist in his various attempts to litigate disputes with Ms Nanschild and/or Ms Hill in relation to the administration of the late Mr Stanley Hill's affairs, either prior to or since his death, that could well amount to an abuse of the process of the court.

[55] The unfortunate circumstances of the present, ongoing, dispute between these parties does not, in my view, provide a basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005. However, I am of the view that in the exercise of the court's inherent power to control its own processes,[25] it is appropriate to make an order preventing Mr Hill from making any further applications in proceeding 5626/19, or commencing any new proceedings in the Trial Division of this Court or in the District Court of Queensland or in QCAT against Ms Deborah Nanschild and/or Ms Vicki Hill, either personally or in their capacity as the executors of the will of their late father, Mr Stanley Hill, in relation to the administration of the financial affairs of the late Mr Stanley Hill, without first obtaining leave from a Judge of the Trial Division of this Court. I regard an order in these terms as appropriate, because:

• (a) in so far as the litigation concerning the late Mr Stanley Hill's estate is concerned, the effect of the orders I make today in proceeding 5626/19 is to finally determine those proceedings. That should be sufficient to prevent any further applications or proceedings being commenced in relation to the administration of the estate,[26] but the history of proceedings outlined above supports the inference that may not be the case, and accordingly an order in these terms is warranted;
• (b) in so far as any other asserted claims or allegations by Mr Hill against either of his sisters, related to the management of the affairs of their late father prior to his death, are concerned, again, in all the circumstances, it is in the interests of justice that no further proceedings be permitted to be commenced (and thus require any involvement or deployment of resources by Ms Nanschild and/or Ms Hill), without Mr Hill first obtaining leave from a Judge of this Court to do so.

[56] Orders: I propose to make an order in those terms in each of proceedings 5626/19 and 10296/19.[27]

[57] Although both Mr Hill and Ms Nanschild in their respective applications have sought orders for costs, as they are not legally represented there is no basis for any orders for professional costs. In so far as either of them have incurred filing fees, they should each bear their own costs.

[58] The orders of the Court therefore are:

• (a) In proceeding BS 5626/19, the Court orders that:
  • (i) The application filed by Mr Brenton Hill on 6 April 2020 is dismissed.
  • (ii) The executors, Ms Deborah Nanschild and Ms Vicki Hill, finally distribute the remaining funds in the estate as follows:
    • (A) By paying, or causing to be paid, equal amounts of $11,050.15 to each of Ms Deborah Lea Nanschild, Ms Vicki Joy Hill and Mr Brenton Shane Hill, within seven days of the date of this order.
    • (B) The amount of $11,050.15 payable to Mr Brenton Hill is to be paid by direct deposit into the following bank account: [the account details provided by Mr Hill, in exhibit 1, will be set out in the order made today, but for privacy reasons are not set out in this published judgment].
    • (C) The executors have liberty to apply to the Court, in the event of any inability to transfer the funds to Mr Hill.
  • (iii) These orders are the final orders in relation to proceeding BS 5626/19.
  • (iv) Mr Brenton Shane Hill is restrained from making any further applications in proceeding BS 5626/19, or commencing any new proceedings in the Trial Division of this Court or in the District Court of Queensland or in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal against Ms Deborah Lea Nanschild and/or Ms Vicki Joy Hill, either personally or in their capacity as the executors of the will of their late father, Mr Stanley Gordon Hill, in relation to the administration of the financial affairs of the late Mr Stanley Gordon Hill, without first obtaining leave from a Judge of the Trial Division of this Court.
  • (v) No order as to costs.
• (b) In proceeding BS 10296/19, the Court orders that:
  • (i) Mr Brenton Shane Hill is restrained from making any further applications in proceeding BS 5626/19, or commencing any new proceedings in the Trial Division of this Court or in the District Court of Queensland or in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal against Ms Deborah Lea Nanschild and/or Ms Vicki Joy Hill, either personally or in their capacity as the executors of the will of their late father, Mr Stanley Gordon Hill, in relation to the administration of the financial affairs of the late Mr Stanley Gordon Hill, without first obtaining leave from a Judge of the Trial Division of this Court.
  • (ii) The proceeding is otherwise dismissed.
  • (iii) No order as to costs.