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[2001] QSC 35
procedural. The plaintiffs were ordered to recover interest on the judgment sum of $40,890.65 at 6% per annum from 22 March 1996. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to...
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The court had to resolve a limited issue about the interest rate to apply to a judgment sum. The plaintiffs asked for 10% interest, while the defendant argued for 6%, relying on an earlier Queensland Supreme Court decision. Mackenzie J followed that earlier determination and ordered 6% interest from the date the parties had agreed, 22 March 1996. The defendant also had to pay the plaintiffs' costs on the Supreme Court scale, on a standard basis, which was not disputed.
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1,871 words · generated 29/09/2026
This is a short ruling by Mackenzie J of the Supreme Court of Queensland about costs and interest after the underlying dispute had proceeded through an appeal. The judgment identifies the proceeding as Appeal No 3699 of 2000 and SC No 1589 of 1996, and records that the matter was heard on 6 June 2000 and decided on 21 February 2001.
When judgment had previously been delivered, the parties were given liberty to make written submissions about costs. Mackenzie J explains that there was a delay in dealing with those submissions and that, because the primary question had gone on appeal, the costs issue was not pursued before him at that stage ([1]). By the time this ruling was made, the appeal had been dismissed and the written submissions had been received ([2]).
The outstanding disagreement was narrow. The judgment sum was $40,890.65. The plaintiffs sought interest at 10% per annum, while the defendant argued for 6%, relying on White J's decision in Interchase Corporation Limited v ACN 019 087 573 Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 13 ([2]). The parties agreed that interest should run from 22 March 1996. They also agreed, and the defendant did not dispute, that the defendant should pay the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to the proceedings on the Supreme Court scale, on a standard basis ([5]).
Mackenzie J ordered interest at 6% per annum on the $40,890.65 judgment sum from 22 March 1996. The defendant was also ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs on the agreed basis ([6]). The ruling does not revisit the merits of the underlying claim or explain how the $40,890.65 judgment sum was calculated. Its focus is the rate and start date for interest, together with the costs order.
The judge's central step was to follow Interchase. Mackenzie J records that White J had concluded in that case, on the basis of evidence about commercial interest rates, that 6% was appropriate from the date selected there, 30 June 1993 ([4]). Mackenzie J then states: “I propose to follow that determination in the present case” ([4]). The present ruling does not set out separate evidence about commercial rates or make a new comparative analysis of the plaintiffs' proposed 10% rate.
The judgment places Interchase within the context of two other authorities. Mackenzie J says that White J referred to Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English (1989) 1 QdR 678 and Ausminco Mining Equipment Suppliers Pty Ltd v Liwood Pty Ltd (Appeal 2120 of 1997, 19 December 1997, unreported) ([3]). As summarised in this ruling, those authorities discussed the view that interest should be assessed at ordinary commercial rates and that a practice may develop over time about the appropriate rate. The judgment adds that, once a rate has become customary, good reason would need to be shown to depart from it ([3]).
Mackenzie J's account also describes a caution against routinely calling evidence about interest rates, especially for trivial reasons ([3]). That passage matters because it situates the 6% rate as a rate already accepted in the cited decision on evidence, rather than suggesting that the parties must produce fresh evidence in every case. However, the judgment does not formulate a comprehensive test for when further evidence is necessary or specify how a court should measure whether a reason for departure is sufficient.
The parties' agreement narrowed the remaining work. The commencement date of 22 March 1996 was not contested, and the costs basis and scale were also agreed ([5]). The judge therefore resolved the only disputed point by adopting the 6% rate from Interchase, while giving effect to the agreed start date and costs position.
The ruling describes, rather than comprehensively restates, the earlier principles. Its account of Serisier and Ausminco is that interest should be assessed by reference to ordinary commercial rates, that a practice about the appropriate rate may develop, and that good reason is needed to depart from a rate that has become customary ([3]). It also reports that evidence should not be called routinely or for trivial reasons ([3]). These are the propositions as Mackenzie J summarises them; the full reasoning in the cited judgments is not reproduced in this ruling.
Interchase supplied the specific rate that Mackenzie J adopted. According to the judgment, White J relied on evidence about commercial rates and selected 6% from 30 June 1993 in that case ([4]). Mackenzie J then followed that determination here, applying 6% from the agreed date of 22 March 1996 ([4], [6]).
The practical development shown by this ruling is therefore limited. It demonstrates the application of the 6% rate selected in Interchase to another matter, with a different agreed commencement date. It does not declare that 6% must apply in every case, nor does it abolish the stated possibility of departing from a customary rate for good reason. The judgment does not explain what evidence or circumstances would establish such a reason.
The ruling also leaves separate the interest question and the costs question. Interest was disputed and resolved by reference to Interchase. The costs scale and basis were agreed and recorded in the order ([5], [6]). No broader costs doctrine is developed in the reasons.
At [2], Mackenzie J says: “The only issue in dispute is the applicable rate of interest.” In plain English, the judge is making clear that this decision is not a fresh determination of the substantive dispute. The court is dealing with the interest rate, while the start date and costs arrangements are later recorded as agreed.
At [3], the judgment says that “a practice may develop from time to time as to the appropriate rate until it is shown by evidence to be no longer appropriate.” In plain English, a rate used by courts may become an accepted practice, but that practice can be revisited if evidence shows that it no longer fits. The judgment also says that good reason would need to be shown to depart once a rate had become customary. These statements are presented as principles discussed in the earlier authorities, not as an independent, detailed test devised in this ruling.
At [3], Mackenzie J also notes that neither earlier case encouraged “calling evidence on the subject routinely or for trivial reasons.” This indicates that the authorities, as summarised here, did not treat fresh evidence as an automatic requirement for every interest calculation. The passage does not say that evidence can never be relevant or that a party can never seek to establish a different rate.
At [4], Mackenzie J states: “I propose to follow that determination in the present case.” This is the decisive reasoning. White J had selected 6% in Interchase based on evidence about commercial rates. Mackenzie J adopts that determination for this case rather than setting a different rate.
Finally, the operative order at [6] specifies that interest is 6% per annum on $40,890.65, calculated from 22 March 1996. In plain English, this identifies the principal sum, the annual rate and the date from which interest runs. The same paragraph orders the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' costs on the Supreme Court scale, on a standard basis.
The ruling is most directly relevant to a costs-stage question about interest on a judgment sum where the parties dispute the applicable rate and Interchase is relied on as a relevant prior determination. The factual markers here are a specified judgment sum, competing proposed rates, and an agreed date from which interest should run ([2], [5]).
The reasoning may also be relevant where a party argues that the rate used in an earlier decision should be applied because it was based on evidence about commercial rates. The judgment shows Mackenzie J following White J's 6% determination in Interchase ([4]). It also records the proposition that a customary rate may be departed from for good reason, and the associated caution against evidence being called routinely or for trivial reasons ([3]).
The ruling does not establish that any interest dispute involving a judgment sum will produce a 6% rate. Its reasoning expressly relies on the earlier determination in Interchase, and the source does not set out facts about the parties' financial circumstances, the nature of the underlying claim, or evidence offered in this proceeding to support 10%. Nor does it identify circumstances in which a departure from 6% would be justified. The scope of the decision should therefore be understood through its stated facts and its direct reliance on Interchase, rather than as a universal rate-setting rule.
The judgment itself identifies no later cases that considered or applied this ruling. It is dated 21 February 2001, and its reasons contain no account of subsequent judicial treatment. On the materials available here, it is not possible to say whether later courts followed, distinguished, criticised or otherwise treated GPS Power Pty Ltd & Ors v Gardiner Willis Associates Pty Ltd.
The identifiable precedent relationships run in the other direction. Mackenzie J followed Interchase ([4]). The ruling also refers to Serisier and Ausminco in describing the principles that White J had discussed in Interchase ([3]). The judgment does not state that Mackenzie J independently applied every proposition associated with those cases, beyond using the Interchase determination to resolve the rate issue.
Accordingly, any account of later treatment would require sources beyond this judgment. No later-case history is inferred here.
Several matters are left open by the short reasons. First, the judgment does not explain why the plaintiffs sought 10% or identify their supporting material, if any. Nor does it describe any evidence from the defendant in the present proceeding. Its only express statement about rate evidence is that White J relied on commercial-rate evidence in Interchase ([4]).
Second, although the judgment records that good reason would be needed to depart from a customary rate, it does not define what qualifies as good reason or explain how a court would assess such a contention ([3]). It also does not identify the period or market data that informed the 6% figure in Interchase beyond describing the determination as based on evidence relating to commercial rates ([4]).
Third, Mackenzie J applies the rate selected in Interchase from a different date. The ruling does not explain whether the commercial conditions between 30 June 1993 and 22 March 1996 were examined, or whether the parties argued that those differences affected the appropriate rate. The stated basis for the outcome is that the judge proposed to follow the prior determination ([4]).
Finally, the reasons do not develop the basis for calculating interest beyond the rate, judgment sum and start date recorded in the order. They also do not discuss costs assessment beyond the parties' agreement to the Supreme Court scale on a standard basis ([5], [6]). These are limits of the decision's stated reasoning, not conclusions about how those matters would be resolved in another case.
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[1] MACKENZIE J: This is an order for costs in a matter heard some time ago. At the delivery of judgment, the parties were given liberty to put in written submissions as to costs. There was a delay in this regard and, since the primary question had gone on appeal to the Court of Appeal, the issue was not pursued by me.
[2] The appeal has now been dismissed and all submissions received. The only issue in dispute is the applicable rate of interest. The successful plaintiffs claimed interest on the judgment sum of $40,890.65 at 10% per annum. The defendants claim that the rate should be 6%, in reliance on Interchase Corporation Limited v ACN 019 087 573 Pty Ltd [2000] QSC 13.
[3] In Interchase, White J referred to Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English (1989) 1 QdR 678, 680, and Ausminco Mining Equipment Suppliers Pty Ltd v Liwood Pty Ltd (Appeal 2120 of 1997, 19 December, 1997, unreported). In the former, the principles that interest should be assessed at ordinary commercial rates and that a practice may develop from time to time as to the appropriate rate until it is shown by evidence to be no longer appropriate were discussed. In the letter it was observed that, once a rate had become customary, good reason would need to be shown to depart from it. In neither case was encouragement given to calling evidence on the subject routinely or for trivial reasons.
[4] In Interchase, White J concluded, on the basis of evidence relating to commercial rates of interest, that a rate of 6% was appropriate from the date selected in that case, 30 June 1993. I propose to follow that determination in the present case.
[5] In the present case, the plaintiffs submit, and the defendant does not take issue, that the defendant should pay the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to the proceedings to be assessed on the Supreme Court scale on a standard basis. It is agreed that interest should be calculated from 22 March 1996.
1. That the plaintiffs recover interest on the judgment sum of $40,890.65 at the rate of 6% per annum calculated from 22 March 1996.
2. That the defendant pay the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to the proceedings on the Supreme Court scale, on a standard basis.
Re: GPS Power Pty Ltd & Ors
Gardiner Willis Associates Pty Ltd
(1989) 1 QdR 678
The plaintiffs were ordered to recover interest on the judgment sum of $40,890.65 at 6% per annum from 22 March 1996. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to the proceedings on the Supreme Court scale, on a standard basis.