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[1979] FCA 12
Federal Court of Australia
1979-12-19
Sweeney J, Mr J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.122 - payees having failed to negative the inferences set out in sub-sec, (4) (c) held not payees in good faith; held, payment void as against the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt.
RE: ALEX NEVILLE BIRD (as Trustee of the Estate of YIANGOS ARCADIOU, a bankrupt)
RE: ALEX NEVILLE BIRD (as Trustee of the Estate of YIANGOS ARCADIOU, a bankrupt)
EX PARTE: SALVATORE POZZUTO, GIOVANNI NIGRO, PASQUALE NIGRO and ANGELO POZZUTO
ORDER JUDGE MAKING ORDER; SWEENEY J. WHERE MADE: MELBOURNE DATE OF ORDER: 19 DECEMBER 1979
The payment of $10,000.00 made by the bankrupt to the respondents on 29 September 1976 1s void as against the applicant as trustee of the property of the bankrupt and orders that the respondents pay to the applicant the sum of $10,000.00 together with his taxed costs of and incidental to the application, including reserved costs, such costs to be taxed, if not agreed. Liberty to apply is reserved to either
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA GENERAL DIVISION No. 68 of 1977
applicant seeks the following declarations and orders:
to the Respondent on the 29th September, 1976 for $10,000.00 1s void as against the applicant as Trustee of the property of the bankrupt as being payment having the effect of giving the respondent a
preference priority or advantage over creditors of the bankrupt or alternatively by virtue of the Bankruptcy of the Bankrupt having been deemed to have relation back to date the 20th day of September, 1976 on which date the bankrupt gave notice to some of his creditors namely Gubbatta Nominees Pty. Ltd. trading as Highett Timber Co. Tasmanian Board Mills Ltd., Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd. and Alliance Acceptance Corporation Limited, that he has suspended or 1s about to suspend payment of his debts.
An order that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $10,000.00."
application, as amended by leave, the respondents relied
payees in good faith and for valuable consideration and in the ordinary course
of business, within the meaning of s.122(2) (a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
that the Respondents or any of them knew, or had reason to suspect -
(a) that YIANGOS ARCADIOU was unable to pay his debts as they became due from his own money; and
{b) that the effect of the payment would be to give the Respondents or any of them a preference, priority or advantage over other creditors -
so that the Respondents and all of them retain the rights of payees in good faith, and are not excluded from that status by the operation of s.122(4)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
(a) the transaction took place before the date on which YIANGOS ARCADIOU became a bankrupt;
(b) the Respondents and any of them had no notice, at the time of the transaction of the presentation of a petition against YIANGOS ARCADIOU : and
(c) the transaction was 1n good faith and in the ordinary course of business -
so that the Respondents are entitled to rely on the validity of the transaction, which was a payment to any or all of them as creditors because of the provisions contained in s.123(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966."
Mr J.S. Stevenson, counsel for the respondents, said that their sole answer to the case based upon s.122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 was that, within the meaning
of that section they were payces in good faith and for valuable consideration and in the ordinary course of business. Mr Irlacht, who appeared for the applicant, conceded that they were payees for valuable consideration.
The sole answer made by the respondents to the case based upon s.123 of the Act was that:
Mr Irlicht conceded the first two propositions but not the third.
Under s.122(3) the burden of proving that they were payees in good faith and in the ordinary course of
Section 122(4)(c) provides that for the purposes of s.122:
"a creditor shall be deemed not to be a purchaser, payee or encumbrancer in good faith 1f the conveyance, transfer, charge, payment or obligation was executed, made
or incurred under such circumstances as to lead to the inference that the creditor knew, or had reason to suspect-
(1) that the debtor was unable to pay his debts as they became due from his own money; and
(11) that the effect of the conveyance, transfer, charge, payment or obligation would be to give hima preference, priority or advantage over other creditors."
Under s.123(2) the burden of proving that the transaction was in good faith and in the ordinary course
reason only that, at the time of the transaction, the person, other than the
had notice of the commission of an act of bankruptcy by the bankrupt.
Mr Stevenson conceded that the bankrupt had on 20 September 1976 committed the act of bankruptcy alleged an the application and that, pursuant to the provisions of s.115, the bankruptcy of the bankrupt shall be deemed to have relation back to, and to have commenced at that time, so that, pursuant to the provisions of s.116, the sum of $10,000.00 paid on 29 September 1976 was property divisible among his creditors, unless his clients succeeded in relation
to the grounds of opposition set out in their notice.
The evidence showed that from September 1973 the respondents, as concreters, carried out contracts for the bankrupt throughout the balance of 1973 and 1974 with increasing frequency, until they were devoting about 40% of their working time to his jobs. Until the end of 1974 the
bankrupt was described as prompt in making payments.
dealings with the bankrupt then continued as follows:
for payment when I saw him on work sites, rather more frequently than before, because of his increasing slowness in payment. On some occasions the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU stated that he could not pay the full amount immediately, and on other occasions the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU stated that he could not pay at all for a few days, because of delays in settling sales of his properties. It was apparent to me, however, that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU had a great deal of valuable real estate which was selling well.
payment became more frequent. On sone occasions, I would go to his home at
4 Glengala Road, Sunshine to present anvoices for payment. Occasionally, there were other people who worked for him there, also requesting payment. Sometimes, he would tell us about slow settlement of sales of his properties, and that we would have to be satisfied by partial payment for a few days, or until the next week.
On occasions when he didn't pay, he always reassured me, and others who might be with me, that his business was sound. Indeed, 1t was obvious to me, and I presume to anybody who might be present, that his residence was of a superior nature, and that it was full of all kinds of valuable goods. New building supplies were stored on the premises, in profusion. The said YIANGOS ARCADIOU also had a new car, I believe that it was a Ford "Fairlane".
materials in a part of the "Collie Paving Company's" business premises which we were not using. This apparent ability to purchase building materials he was not going to use immediately reinforced my opinion that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was a wealthy man, who was well able to pay all his debts when he wanted to.
a large tract of land in Werribee for $500,000.00. This reinforced my own opinion that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's failure to make prompt payment to me and other creditors was due to wilful behaviour on his vart,
end of November and the beginning of December 1975, I, together with the other Respondents herein, worked on
some of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's Werribee construction sités, and many
other persons were working there; nobody was complaining about not being paid.
me that there would be no trouble about that. However, no money was received.
In spite of this, I and the other Respondents herein attended a Christmas party given by the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU for the people who worked for him at the Sunshine Heights Hotel, Sunshine. Many people were present at this lavish function, and nobody except the other Respondents herein and myself, appeared to me to be unahppy about the non-payment of accounts owing to them, or anything else.
other Respondents took immediately after Christmas 1975, we decided not to work for the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU in the future,
until he paid us all the money that he owed us. I proposed this action because I thought it would put an end to what I considered to be some financial tricks I did not understand.
the said "Collie Paving Company" would do a small job on a property at Craigieburn, he would pay off a large part of the amount owing to the said "Collie Paving Company". We did that job at a fair and reasonable price of $147.00, and the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU sent us a cheque in the amount of $5,000.00 almost immediately.
THAT in March of 1976 I went to see the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU and told him that we needed money to pay our taxes. The said YIANGOS ARCADIOU said that I should not worry, that he could easily pay the amount due to us on the settlement of the sale of a property due on 9th April, 1976, and that he would pay any interest charge incurred. I told the said COLIN ROBB BROWN of this conversation, and on 31st March 1976 he wrote a letter to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU which I signed and
"We refer to the balance outstanding in your account with us, amounting to $17686.85 at the time of writing.
We acknowledge your latest promise of a remittance on or before 9th April, but,
as we have had to raise finance to cover pressing commitments we now formally advise you that we must now impose an interest charge at the rate of 10% p.a. on the amount outstanding on 9th. April next, until finally liquidated.
This interest will be calculated on a daily basis, and on the present balance outstanding would amount to approximately $7. per day."
"16. THAT shortly after I sent the said letter dated 3lst March 1976, I met the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU and he confirmed that he would pay the interest. After that I did not approach the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU so frequently for payment, because I considered that we had an interest-bearing investment. However, I and the other Respondents were Still determined not to work for the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU again, until we had received payment in full of the amount owing to us.
the firm of Tribe and Associates as instructed by the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
and there I met the said Yiangos Arcadiou's son PHILIP ARCADIOU. The said PHILIP ARCADIOU then gave me a cheque in the amount of $10,000.00 which had been written out by him, but signed by the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU; 1t was quite usual that the cheques I received from the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU
were prepared for his signature by the said PHILIP ARCADIOU. I asked the said PHILIP ARCADIOU where the balance of the money owing to us was, and he replied that we would get it the next week. I then said that we would not start work until all the money due to "Collie Paving Company" had been paid, and the said PHILIP ARCADIOU replied that there was plenty of money, and that everybody was being paid.
THAT the balance due to "Collie Paving Company" was never paid, and the "Collie Paving Company" never did work for the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU again.
YIANGOS ARCADIOU from time to time, accusing him of unfairness in that he had not paid
the said "Collie Paving Company" in full when he had paid off his other creditors. The
various excuses for non~payment. Novertheless, I was astonished when a "Notice of Meeting"
of the creditors of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was sent to the "Collie Paving Company" late an February 1977, just one week after the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU removed property which he had stored free Of charge at our business premises. The removal of that property is certainly an action I would not have permitted, 1f I had known that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was in such grave financial difficulties.
Puzzuto conceded that he must have known of the bankrupt's failure to make prompt payment to other creditors when he referred in paragraph 11 to his "failure to make prompt payment to me and other creditors". Occasionally when he called at
the bankrupt's home to present invoices for payment there were
other people who worked for him also requesting payment. The
bankrupt made frequent promises to pay him but broke his
promises. He had never requested any other debtor to pay
interest on unpaid accounts and the respondents had never
had another debtor whose account was overdue for anything
out the accountancy services which he rendered to the
the amount of $2,000.00 he had received from the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, to process. This disturbed me, because it upset the system whereby I could see what invoices had been paid. The said SALVATORE POZZUTO explained to me that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU had told him that he had a temporary shortage of cash, due to a delay in settling a sale of real estate; during the next month, payment was made in an amount sufficient to bring the account back to ats usual current status.
premises of the "Collie Paving Company" and observed that there were several thousand feet of architraves stored there. On enquiry, I was informed that they belonged to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. Over the next few months, this accumulation of architraves built up to about 100,000 feet. I knew from my experience in and exposure to the building trade at that time that such architraves were worth about .18¢ per foot, so that 100,000 feet would be worth about $18,000.00, and readily saleable.
At about the end of 1976 or the beginning of 1977 I further observed that about 10 new washing machines had been stored on the business premises of the "Collie Paving Company", and again I was informed that they belonged to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. This storing of valuable goods on the premises of the "Collie Paving Company"was a factor which helped to confirm my belief that the said
THAT until August of 1975 payment from the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was slower than it had been in 1974, but the maximum delay in payment was well under 60 days purchase of the average of business being done, and in view of the size of the account and the time it had been running, and my high opinion of the worth of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, I was not at all concerned that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU might not be able to pay his debts.
round figure" amountsrather than exact invoice amounts resumed, but the said SALVATORE POZZUTO explained to me that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU had told him of slight liquidity problems due to delays in settling sales of properties, and I was satisfied with that explanation.
THAT on several occasions during 1974 and 1975 I went to construction sites to see the said SALVATORE PO2ZZUTO when some
matter had arisen which I wished to discuss with him. On some of those occasions I saw the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. Though 1 never exchanged more than formal greetings with the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU I was much
impressed by his obvious energy and Grive, and this added to my confidence in him which lasted into 1977.
THAT I thought 1t appropriate to confirm the favourable impression I had formed of such a large customer of "Collie Paving Company" as the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU, and asked acquaintances of mine who are prominent in the building trade, and who I consider to be most reputable, what was their opinion of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU. On the occasions when I made such enquiries 1n 1975 and 1976, I was reassured by the replies I received.
THAT no delinquency in payment which I considered serious occurred until the end of 1975, when the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU's failure to make as substantial a payment as had been promised in December caused me some alarm. However, I was once again reassured not only by my own enquiries, but also by the Respondents herein, who appeared to be convinced that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was not in serious financial difficulties.
THAT early in 1976 the Respondents herein told me of their determination not to work for the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU until he had paid off the amount due to them; it was thought by me that the payment he could well afford could be forced out of him in this way.
THAT in March of 1976 1t became apparent that the Respondents herein would be unable to pay all of their provisional income tax due on 3lst March 1976 unless the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU paid off the amount that he owed to the "Collie Paving Company". After the said SALVATORE POZZUTO had had a meeting with the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU I composed and typed a letter to the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU inposing an interest charge on the amount outstanding 1f he did not pay as he had promised."
"It was my idea that the interest charged would offset the interest that the Respondents herein would have to pay on overdue taxes and finance charges; because of all I had seen on construction sites, and been told by various persons, I still held the opinion that the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU was a wealthy man who was seeking to augment his working capital by delaying payment to the "Collie Paving Company", though he was well able to pay promptly had he wished to do so.
I felt happier about the situation, in that I felt I had ensured that the "Collie Paving Company" and the Respondents herein would not lose money through the said "YIANGOS ARCADIOU's capricious failure to pay.
the years 1975 and 1976 were profitable and buoyant for the building trade in the Western suburbs of Melbourne, and I knew of no reason why the building operations of the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU should prove to be any exception to the rule.
THAT my confidence was reinforced when payment of $10,000.00 was received from the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU on 29th September 1976. I certainly knew of no meetings which the said YIANGOS ARCADIOU may have attended at
produced, which Mr Brown verified, in the following form:
"SCHEDULE OF AGE OF BALANCES OWING BY YIANGOS ARCADIOU TO COLLIE PAVING COMPANY AT END OF QUARTER, 31.12.73 TO 31.12.75
Date Balance = 30-60 days 60-90 days 90-120 days oo 30 days s
31.12.75 22539.85 10343.20 4235.30 4797.35 3164.00"
As will be seen from the reasons delivered in the case brought by the trustee of this estate against Casabene and others, which have also been published today,
I am of opinion that it is for the respondents to prove that they were payees in good faith within the meaning of s.122 and to negative the inferences set out in sub-sec.(4)(c). In
As at 31 December 1975 the respondents were owed $22,539.85 by the bankrupt, including the amounts set out in the schedule above which ranged from the ages of less than 30 days to 90-120 days. Repeated pleas for payment in 1975 had been met with promises which had been broken. During the Christmas holidays, the respondents decided not to work for the bankrupt in future, until he paid the whole of his account. In February 1976 the bankrupt promised that if the respondents did a small job for him he would pay off a large part of the amount due. They agreed to do so and received a payment of a mere $5,000.00. In March 1976 they told him of their need for money to pay their taxes and received what was described as his "latest promise of a remittance before 9 April", which was not honoured. They imposed an interest charge which he agreed to
In April 1976 they ayain agreed to do some work for the bankrupt on the promise that "a large payment of past due accounts would be forthcoming". It 15 interesting to note that the bankrupt did not offer a promise to pay the whole of
the amount outstanding, and in the event he made no payment.
In September 1976 the bankrupt asked the respondents to work for him and the reply was given that they were unwilling to do so unless they were paid the full amount of the money owing to them. He promised to do so but they received only $10,000.00 and said that they would not work until they were paid in full.
The payment of $10,000.00 was made under such circumstances as to lead to the inference that any reasonable business man in the position of the respondents must, at the least, have had reason to suspect the two matters specified in s.122(4)(c) (a) and (ii). In my opinion, the evidence establishes that the respondents in fact had reason so to suspect. They hoped that by promising to do more work for the bankrupt that they would receive payment for their past
A man who was able to pay his debts as they became due from his own money would hardly have needed to plead with the respondents to work for him in return for a promise to pay accounts which were long overdue and had been the subject of earlier broken promises. The September promise to pay in full was itself broken. The fact that the bankrupt chose to store building supplies free of charge on the premises of the respondents does not disturb the conclusions to which the history of their dealings with the bankrupt so strongly points.
It 1S unnecessary to consider the applicant's claim based upon s.123.
The Court declares that the payment of $10,000.00 made by the bankrupt to the respondents on 29 September 1976 is void as against the applicant as trustee of the property of the bankrupt and orders that the respondents pay to the applicant the sum of $10,000.00 together with his taxed costs of and incidental to the application, including reserved costs, such costs to be taxed, if not agreed. Liberty to apply is reserved to either party.