RE BAJAJ; EX PARTE BAJAJ [2025] WASC 313 (6 August 2025)

1. For the reasons set out below, I will dismiss Mr Bajaj's application for a review order and a stay.

1. The facts relevant to this application for a review order are set out in the affidavit of Mr Bajaj, sworn 16 July 2025. I have also had regard to the orders and transcript from the Magistrates Court on 17 July 2025.
2. It is only necessary to summarise the following key aspects of the evidence for the purposes of considering the application.

1. Mr Bajaj is the owner of a property in Derby Road, Shenton Park (Property).
2. Mr Bajaj has had a number of different managing agents for that property. Two previous managing agents terminated their agreements and in August 2024, Mr Bajaj entered into an agreement with Mack Hall Real Estate in association with Knight Frank, to manage the Property.
3. In January 2025, the managing agents arranged a new tenant for the Property. A fixed term residential tenancy agreement for one year was executed in January 2025 and commenced on 7 February 2025. A copy is attached to Mr Bajaj's affidavit.
4. Shortly after the tenant moved into the Property, Mr Bajaj wished to undertake some maintenance and repairs to the property, and instructed the managing agents to issue a number of relevant forms under the RT Act to permit such entry. These are known as section 19 Forms - Notice of Proposed Entry to Premises.
5. Whilst it seems that entry and some maintenance and repairs occurred, not all the works that Mr Bajaj wanted to undertake occurred. It then appears from the material before the court that a dispute arose between Mr Bajaj and the tenant, where the tenant indicated she did not want Mr Bajaj attending to undertake these repairs. Mr Bajaj wanted to, as he considered they were necessary, and the tenant did not and considered they were interfering with her quiet enjoyment of the Property.
6. On 21 March 2025, the managing agents, on Mr Bajaj's instructions issued a Notice of Breach of Agreement pursuant to s 62 of the RT Act. The breach identified was the failure to allow access to Mr Bajaj and another person on 28 March 2025 at 11.00 am to carry out necessary maintenance at the Property, as had been previously agreed. The notice stated that the tenant was required to remedy the breach within 14 days of the giving of the notice.
7. On 27 March 2025, the tenant issued a Form 23 - Notice to Lessor of Breach of Agreement, and sent it by email to the managing agents. The breach identified is:

The landlord's obligation to provide the tenant with quiet enjoyment, constant harassment, and abusive and threatening behaviour on the 22/2/2025 resulting in a misconduct restraining order.

1. On 2 April 2025, the managing agents sent a letter to Mr Bajaj by email giving Mr Bajaj notice that at the end of April 2025 they would be terminating their agreement with Mr Bajaj to manage the Property and they would assist with the handover to any new managing agent.
2. On 7 April 2025, the managing agent, on Mr Bajaj's instructions, sent a Form 1C Notice of Termination to the tenant requiring vacant possession of the Property be given by 15 April 2025. The stated ground for termination was that the tenant had breached the residential tenancy agreement by failing 'to allow access to the owner to carry out maintenance at the property within the 14 breach notice period'.
3. The tenant did not provide vacant possession of the Property by 15 April 2024.

1. On 17 April 2025, the managing agents, on Mr Bajaj's instructions filed a Form 12 - Application for Court order in the Magistrates Court seeking termination of the residential tenancy agreement and possession of the Property to be delivered up to Mr Bajaj. The reasons for application were stated to be:

Failure to allow access to the owner to perform maintenance at the property.

1. Mr Bajaj accepts that his application was made seeking orders under s 71 of the RT Act.

1. In the period between 2 April 2025 and 30 April 2025, the managing agents continued to manage the Property on behalf of Mr Bajaj.
2. A meeting was held on or around 9 April 2025 between the managing agents and Mr Bajaj to discuss the proposed termination of their agreement. After that meeting, the managing agents sent an email to Mr Bajaj confirming that their agreement to manage the Property would be terminated as of 1 May 2025.
3. By email dated 30 April 2025, the managing agents confirmed that their agreement with Mr Bajaj had concluded and that a handover pack containing all relevant information and keys would be available for collection from 1 May 2025. The email also stated that the managing agents had received rent payments up until 15 May 2025 and they had informed the tenant that they were unable to accept any further rent after 30 April 2025.

1. Mr Bajaj's application was listed in the Magistrates Court on 15 May 2025 and was listed before Registrar Raine. Both Mr Bajaj and the tenant appeared. Mr Bajaj was not represented by the managing agents, as they had, by this point, terminated their agreement with Mr Bajaj. The tenant also appeared on her own behalf.
2. The registrar confirmed that this was Mr Bajaj's application for termination and then indicated that he was going to ascertain if anything could be agreed between the parties, otherwise he would list the matter for trial.
3. The tenant indicated that she did not consider there was any maintenance that was required at the Property and she only agreed for a plumber to attend the property and not for Mr Bajaj to undertake any other maintenance. The tenant also raised issues regarding Mr Bajaj's conduct towards her when he attended. Mr Bajaj indicated that this was not correct, and he had arranged, through the managing agent, for his attendance for other repairs and maintenance.
4. The registrar asked the tenant if she wished to retain possession of the Property or leave, and the tenant indicated she wished to remain in possession because it was within walking distance of Shenton College, where her son was completing year 12 in the 2025 academic year. The tenant also indicated she had filed an application for a misconduct restraining order.
5. The registrar then indicated that he did not consider there was going to be any agreement between the parties and so he was going to adjourn the matter to a trial before a magistrate to make a determination.
6. Mr Bajaj opposed adjourning the matter to trial and wanted the matter to be dealt with on 15 May 2025. Mr Bajaj referred to the rent being paid up until 15 May 2025 and that the managing agent was no longer representing him.
7. The registrar indicated that he did not have jurisdiction to determine the matter; that it was not possible to list the matter for determination by a magistrate that day; that Mr Bajaj had not indicated any prejudice in the matter being adjourned to a trial; and that it would be unfairly prejudicial to hear the matter on 15 May 2025 as the tenant was not aware this would occur and Mr Bajaj no longer has representation from the managing agent. The registrar noted that even if the matter was listed before a magistrate, the matter would still be programmed to trial.
8. The registrar then made the following orders:
   1. The application is adjourned to 17 July 2025 at 10.30am before a Magistrate for trial at 501 Hay Street Perth WA 6000.
   2. By 7 July 2025 both parties are to lodge with the Court and serve on the other party(s) a Form 32A Statement of Intended Evidence of a Witness for each and every witness (including the parties themselves) that they intend to call at the trial hearing. The parties are to attach to the Witness Statements any document they intend to rely upon.

1. The matter returned to the Magistrates Court on 17 July 2025 and was listed before Magistrate Owen-Conway.
2. Mr Bajaj and the tenant each appeared and represented themselves.
3. The magistrate indicated that she had received an email from Mr Bajaj seeking a stay of his application, and also that he was seeking a review of the orders of the registrar in the Supreme Court.
4. Mr Bajaj confirmed that his position was that his application under s 71 of the RT Act should have been determined on 15 May 2025; that there was no need for a trial; and that he was seeking a review of the registrar's orders in the Supreme Court.
5. After some exchanges between the magistrate and Mr Bajaj, the magistrate confirmed with the tenant that she did not want to give up the tenancy. The magistrate asked whether the tenant was suggesting that the s 71 application was retaliatory action, and when the tenant confirmed this, the magistrate indicated that the tenant would need to make her own application to the Magistrates Court to have that issue determined.
6. The magistrate then made the following orders:
   1. Subject to further Order, the Applicant Lessor's Form 12 - Application is adjourned to a Status Conference hearing listed on 28 August 2025 at 9.30am at the Magistrates Court of Western Australia Central Law Courts, 501 Hay Street Perth.
   2. The parties agree that the Applicant Lessor's property managers have purported to terminate the management agreement with the Applicant Lessor and have declined receipt of any rent payments form the Respondent Tenant.
   3. The parties agree that the Respondent Tenant shall make payment of rent due owing and payable to the Applicant Lessor by payment to the following account [redacted].
   4. The Applicant Lessor shall inform the Court as soon as practicable by lodgement of written submissions, of the outcome of the application commenced by him in the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning the Registrar's Order made on 15 May 2025.

1. It appears that the tenant also made an application for a misconduct restraining order against Mr Bajaj. At the hearing, I did not have before me a copy of the application, but Mr Bajaj indicated from the bar table that it was heard on 23 July 2025 and was dismissed due to the non-attendance by the tenant.
2. After the hearing, Mr Bajaj provided a bundle of court documents. The relevant order made on 23 July 2025 was as follows:
   1. There being no appearance by the Applicant at the hearing the application for a Misconduct Restraining Order in proceedings RO 1308/2025 is summarily dismissed pursuant to s. 18(1) Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004.

1. By originating motion filed 17 July 2025, Mr Bajaj seeks the following orders:

At a hearing below in the *Supreme Court/Court of Appeal Ramesh Bajaj will apply that orders made upon hearing in the Case No. MC/CIV/PER/RSTN/4888 of 2025 in the Magistrates Court at Perth on 15 May 2025 that adjourns an application to a trial before the magistrate on 17 July 2025 be set aside; the application returned for determination of a prescribed dispute in the Magistrates Court constituted by the Magistrate under provision in section 71 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) ('RTA') to satisfy on notice of termination by provisions in sections 61 and 62 of the RTA; and upon exercise of discretion make a declaration to permanently stay the pending trial proceedings in the Magistrates Court at Perth.

1. At the hearing on 4 August 2025, Mr Bajaj clarified that he was seeking an order that any future trial of his application under s 71 of the RT Act be stayed, and instead his application be dealt with according to the 'statutory procedure' contained in s 71 of the RT Act. Mr Bajaj accepted that his application under s 71 of the RT Act should be dealt with, but that it could not and should not be dealt with under the minor case procedure provided for in pt 4 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) (MC CP Act). Therefore, Mr Bajaj was seeking an order that his application be returned to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with under s 71 of the RT Act.
2. The grounds of Mr Bajaj's originating motion are at times difficult to understand, and provide as follows:

1. The learned registrar erred in law, mistakenly denied the existence of jurisdiction and power to determine the Form 12 application of prescribed dispute under the provision in section 12A of RTA using practice and procedures to validate termination of residential tenancy agreement and order for possession by the breach of a term on lessor's right of entry under provision in section 46 in respect of agreement defined by RTA on a minor case under section 26(b) in Part 4 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) ('MCCPA') that power used to control under Part 3 section 16(b), 16(j), 16(o)(i), thereupon
   1. result an abuse of process of the court absent jurisdictional fact of a reasonable cause of action or defence on the civil matter not a minor case of s 26(a) of MCCPA be without jurisdiction or power to apply practices and procedures under the Magistrates Court (Minor Case Procedure) Rules 2005 WA ('MCMPR') establishes a jurisdictional error to satisfy threshold requirement of Section 36(1)(c)(i) of Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) ('MCA').
2. The learned registrar erred in law, misapprehending or disregards the jurisdiction of the Magistrates court and a power on a claim of prescribed class of section 12A under RTA in respect of Form 12 application for a failure to satisfy the provisions in section 13A(2), prior making orders relying MCMCR s 6A, that directions made to adjourn the application to trial by magistrate under the Part 4 of MCCPA, thereupon
   1. result an abuse of process of court in practice and procedures by failure to exercise jurisdiction absent the jurisdictional fact of steps taken to claim the right be without jurisdiction and power establishes jurisdictional error to satisfy threshold requirement of Section 36(1)(c)(i) of MCA.
3. The learned registrar erred in law, misconceiving the prescribed dispute of residential tenancy application of Form 12 under RTA by public consideration on a necessity to maintain and prevent waste of judicial resources that confines use to genuine disputes under statutory provisions in an efficient, economic and expeditious manner; that judicial and administrative resources are used effectively, within authority and power to operate within the limits of judicial function to hear upon statutory nature of civil proceedings in a court constituted by the magistrate, or registrar by delegated power under the MCA section 28; that directions made to adjourn the application to trial by magistrate under the Part 4 of MCCPA, thereupon
   1. result an abuse of process of court in exceeding at limits of statute power in the use of practice and procedures on claim of right as just and fair valid upon actual and operative reason satisfy threshold requirement of Section 36(1)(c)(i) under the MCA establishing a jurisdictional error.
4. The learned registrar erred in law, refusing to consider question of jurisdiction or a question of law, failed to observe the rules of procedural fairness (or natural justice), in that the procedural direction was made in excess of power or jurisdiction; a failure to disregard, or not disclose communication and knowledge on state of mind at asserting a breach; awareness of parallel proceeding by misconduct restraining order Restraining Order Act 1997 (WA) ('ROA') absent the jurisdiction to seek or enforce right that directions made to adjourn the application to trial by magistrate under the Part 4 of MCCPA, thereupon
   1. result an abuse of process of court making order of directions outside the limits of the function and power conferred, or lacks power; validates at precondition of a jurisdictional fact, or be an apprehended bias, or just and fair exercise of steps taken on actual and operative reason satisfy threshold requirement of Section 36(1)(c)(i) under the MCA establishing a jurisdictional error.
5. The learned registrar erred in law, misapprehending, or disregards the function, jurisdiction and power of Magistrates Court under MCA in Part 2 and 3 at authority and power in residential tenancy proceedings under RTA derives under MCCPA s 8 that an exercise of civil jurisdiction under s 6 upon the vexatious claim without reasonable cause of action or a defence is unjustifiably oppressive and prejudiced thus in a way manifestly wrong. A permanent stay is necessary in the public interest to maintain confidence on the use and authority of Courts to preserve a right accorded by law and integrity of review proceedings; discretionary relief to stay proceedings if not granted results in misadministration of justice, thereupon
   1. result an abuse of process of court that a failure to not protect the use of court's own processes to pursue a trial alleged upon a right and newspaper publication on information be interference in course of justice; a consequential outcome if continue on proceedings is difficult to remedy.
6. As a result of Mr Bajaj's written and oral submissions, and doing the best I can, I understand that Mr Bajaj asserts that the registrar made a jurisdictional error in the following ways:

(1) by refusing to deal with Mr Bajaj's application under s 71 of the RT Act on 15 May 2025, and instead programming the application to a trial. Mr Bajaj submits that in programming the matter to a trial, the registrar was proceeding on the basis that the minor procedure under pt 4 of the MC CP Act applied, when it did not. Mr Bajaj appears to agree that a magistrate, and not a registrar, was required to deal with his application, but does not agree that the minor case procedure applies, and submits it is a jurisdictional error on the part of the registrar to proceed on this basis and to list the matter for trial;

(2) by ordering the matter proceed to a trial, when the registrar had not satisfied himself of the jurisdictional facts required to underpin such a decision, namely that the tenant had demonstrated a reasonable defence or cause of action opposing his application;

(3) by ordering the matter proceed to a trial, in circumstances where to do so amounted to an abuse of process. That abuse of process is submitted to arise out of the following interrelated matters:

(i) the failure by the tenant to commence her own action for retaliatory action after issuing the breach notice, and without any evidence demonstrating that the tenant has a reasonable defence to his s 71 application;

(ii) the commencement by the tenant of an application for a misconduct restraining order alleging similar matters to her claims in response to the s 71 application; and

(iii) the provision of information to the local newspaper which resulted in a number of stories being published about him and the tenancy (copies of which were included in Mr Bajaj's affidavit).

1. Section 36 of the MC Act provides for an alternative statutory form of relief to the traditional prerogative writs. The procedure for making, and in relation to, an application under s 36(1) of the MC Act is set out in O 56A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC). The provisions provide for a two stage process whereby a person may apply ex parte under s 36(1) of the MC Act to the Supreme Court for an order requiring the 'Court officer' who made the decision and any person who will be affected by the act, order or direction, to satisfy the Supreme Court at a later hearing that the act, order or direction made by the court officer should or should not be done or made or set aside, as the case requires.
2. Mr Bajaj seeks both an initial review order and a stay of execution pursuant to O 56A r 3(3)(d) of the RSC pending the final determination of the review hearing (if granted).
3. Importantly, s 26(2) of the RT Act modifies the application of s 36 of the MC Act in relation to matters arising under the RT Act, by providing that no order shall be made under s 36 of the MC Act unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that:

(a) the Magistrates Court had or has no jurisdiction conferred by or under the RT Act in respect of the proceedings; or

(b) that a party to the proceedings has been denied natural justice.

1. The legal principles in relation the application of s 36 of the MC Act were explained in Rayney v AW[1] and Bajaj v Magistrate Trevor Darge.[2] I have not repeated those here, save to say that:

(a) the reference to 'no jurisdiction' in s 26(2) of the RT Act should be taken to mean jurisdictional error;

(b) at the first stage in the process the court is empowered to make a review order requiring the decision-maker to show cause if the material before the court demonstrates an arguable case in relation to a ground of jurisdictional error or a denial of natural justice. That is, if the material demonstrates that the case has reasonable prospects of success;

(c) an application under s 36 of the MC Act is concerned only with the legality of decisions, and not the merits; and

(d) an application for a review order may be refused on discretionary grounds.

1. The categories of jurisdictional error in relation to a decision of an inferior court (in addition to a denial of natural justice) were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Bajaj v Magistrate Trevor Darge as follows:[3]

First, if an inferior court or an anomalous tribunal mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of jurisdiction. Second, if it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises that jurisdiction does exist. Third, if it is an essential condition of the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a particular matter that a certain event or requirement has in fact occurred or been satisfied ( [...] a jurisdictional 'fact') there will be jurisdictional error if the court or a tribunal purports to act in circumstances where that event has not in fact occurred or that requirement has not in fact been satisfied even though the matter is the kind of matter which the court has jurisdiction to entertain. Fourth, jurisdictional error will occur where an inferior court disregards or takes account of some matter in circumstances where the statute establishing it and conferring its jurisdiction requires that that particular matter be taken into account or ignored as a precondition of the existence of any authority to make an order or decision in the circumstances of the case. Fifth, it will exceed its authority and fall into jurisdictional error if it misconstrues the statute establishing it and conferring jurisdiction and thereby misconceives the nature or the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the case.

1. Order 56A r 3(3)(d) of the RSC provides that the court may make an order that the review order operates as a stay of the proceedings in question until such time as the court specifies in the order, or orders otherwise. The test for ordering a stay of the proceedings under this order is:[4]

whether or not the applicant has demonstrated that 'there are special circumstances sufficient to satisfy the Court that it is just and reasonable to order a stay so as to preserve the subject matter and integrity of the litigation'.

1. The RT Act regulates the relationship of lessors and tenants under residential tenancy agreements.
2. There is no dispute that a fixed term residential tenancy agreement exists between Mr Bajaj and his new tenant.
3. The RT Act details how a residential tenancy agreement can be terminated. Section 60(1) of the RT Act provides that despite any act or law to the contrary, a residential tenancy agreement shall not terminate or be terminated except in one of the circumstances specified in s 60 of the RT Act. Relevant for present purposes is s 60(1)(a) which provides for a termination:

(a) where the lessor or tenant gives notice of termination under this Act and -

(i) the tenant delivers up vacant possession of the premises on or after the expiration of the period of notice required under this Act; or

(ii) a competent court, upon application by the lessor, terminates the agreement under section 71;

1. The requirements for a notice of termination are contained in s 61 of the RT Act.
2. Section 62 of the RT Act is concerned with notices of termination by a lessor on the ground of a breach of term of a residential tenancy agreement. Relevantly, s 62 provides:

(1) A lessor may give notice of termination of a residential tenancy agreement to the tenant upon the ground that the tenant has breached a term of the agreement and the breach has not been remedied.

(2) Where a lessor gives notice of termination under this section, the period of notice shall be not less than 7 days before the day on which the tenant is required under the notice to give the lessor possession of the premises.

(3) Where notice of termination is given under this section upon the ground of a breach of the agreement other than the agreement to pay rent, the notice is ineffectual unless a notice specifying the breach and requiring that it be remedied is given to the tenant not less than 14 days before the notice of termination is given.

1. Section 71 of the RT Act is concerned with an application by a lessor or tenant for termination of a residential tenancy agreement and an order for possession. Section 71 relevantly provides:

(1) Where a lessor or a tenant under a residential tenancy agreement gives notice of termination to the other under this Act except under section 70A and the tenant fails to deliver up possession of the premises on the day specified, the lessor may, subject to section 62(5)(a), within 30 days after that day, apply to a competent court for an order terminating the agreement and an order for possession of the premises.

(2) Subject to this section, a competent court shall, upon application under this section, make an order terminating the agreement and an order for possession of the premises, if it is satisfied -

(a) that notice of termination was given by the lessor or tenant to the other and that it complied with and was given in accordance with this Act; and

(b) where the notice was given by the lessor upon a particular ground prescribed by this Act, other than a notice given by a lessor on a ground referred to in section 71C or 71H, that the lessor has established that ground and, in the case of notice upon the ground of a breach by the tenant of a term of the agreement, that the breach is in all the circumstances such as to justify termination of the agreement; and

(c) where the notice was given by a lessor upon a ground referred to in section 71C or 71H, in respect of the relevant matters referred to in subsection (3A).

(5) Subject to subsection (3)(a), where the court terminates a residential tenancy agreement and makes an order for possession of the premises under this section, it shall specify the day as from which the orders shall operate, being within 7 days after the day on which the orders are made.

1. The RT Act also stipulates which courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes arising under a residential tenancy agreement or the RT Act.
2. Section 15(1) of the RT Act provides that:

Where a lessor or tenant under a residential tenancy agreement or a party to an agreement for an option to enter into a residential tenancy agreement claims that a breach of the agreement has occurred or that a dispute has arisen under the agreement, the lessor or tenant may apply for relief to a competent court.

1. As to which court is the competent court, s 12A(1) of the RTA provides that:

(1) The Magistrates Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine a prescribed dispute and such disputes are not justiciable by any other court or tribunal.

1. A 'prescribed dispute' is defined in s 12 of the RTA as:

prescribed dispute means any matter that may be the subject of an application under this Act, other than an application made under this Act that is, or involves, a claim for an amount over the prescribed amount, but includes an application made under clause 8 of Schedule 1, irrespective of the amount claimed.

1. Mr Bajaj's application is for a termination order, and does not involve a money claim, therefore it is a prescribed dispute.
2. Turning to the applicable court procedures when considering a prescribed dispute, s 12A(2) of the RTA provides that:

(2) A prescribed dispute is a minor case for the purposes of Part 4 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 and the jurisdiction conferred by subsection (1) is to be exercised accordingly.

1. Part 4 of the MC CP Act details the court procedures to be followed when hearing a minor case claim.
2. The term 'minor case' is defined in s 26 of the MC CP Act as:

(a) a claim within the jurisdiction of the Court where -

(i) the value of the claim or of the relief claimed is not more than the minor cases jurisdictional limit; and

(ii) the claimant has elected to have the claim dealt with under the minor cases procedure;

(b) a matter within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in section 8 that is declared to be a minor case for the purposes of this Act by the written law that confers jurisdiction on the Court to deal with the matter; or

(c) any other claim within the jurisdiction of the Court (including a claim within the jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of a consent given under section 6(1)(f)) that the parties agree is to be treated as a minor case.

1. Section 27 of the MC CP Act provides that the primary object of the Magistrates Court, when dealing with a minor case, is to attempt to bring the parties to a settlement acceptable to all. The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, do all things and take all such steps as it considers to be appropriate to achieve that primary object. However, if the court is unable to bring the parties to a settlement acceptable to all the parties, s 27(4) of the MC CP Act provides that the court must then deal with the minor case.
2. The Magistrates Court (Minor Cases Procedure) Rules 2005 (WA) (Minor Case Procedure Rules) apply to every minor case, unless the court in a particular case orders otherwise.[5] The Minor Case Procedure Rules make provision for a variety of procedural matters, including making and defending a claim; listing a minor case for a status conference or a pre-trial conference; the referral of a minor case to mediation; consent orders and settlement; the listing of a minor case for a trial; and how to lodge and serve documents.
3. Section 14 of the RT Act provides that proceedings under the RT Act shall be heard and determined wherever practicable within 14 days after they are instituted and, where that is not practicable, as expeditiously as possible.
4. Section 20 of the RT Act provides that a competent court hearing any application may exercise a number of different powers. Relevant for present purposes are the powers to:[6]

(a) hear the application in such manner as it considers best suited to the purposes of the Act;

(b) decline to entertain the application if it considers that the application is frivolous;

(c) adjourn the hearing to any time or place or to a time and place to be fixed; and

(d) generally give all such directions and do all such things that it thinks necessary or expedient in the proceedings.

1. Section 21 of the RT Act provides that a competent court is not bound by the rules of evidence.
2. As to who has jurisdiction to make orders, s 13A of the RT Act provides that:

(1) For the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction conferred by section 12A and 13, the Magistrates Court is to be constituted by a magistrate.

(2) Despite subsection (1), a registrar of the Magistrates Court may, subject to the directions of a magistrate, exercise the court's jurisdiction in respect of any application that is to be dealt with in accordance with Part 4 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 if -

(a) the application is within a prescribed class of applications; and

(b) either -

(i) the application is not disputed; or

(ii) a party to the application does not appear.

1. The prescribed class of applications are contained in r 7 of the Residential Tenancies Regulations 1989 (WA) (RT Regulations).
2. Mr Bajaj's application to the Magistrates Court was for an order terminating the residential tenancy agreement, made pursuant to s 71 of the RT Act. Such an application is not a prescribed class of applications for the purposes of s 13A of the RT Act.
3. Regulation 7(4) of the RT Regulations also provides that:

The registrar may at any time adjourn the hearing or determination of any matter and -

(a) seek directions or further directions from; or

(b) refer the matter for hearing or determination by,

the Magistrates Court constituted by a magistrate.

1. Section 36 of the MC Act makes provision for a review of a decision of 'Court officer'. A 'Court officer' is defined in s 3 as:

Court officer means a magistrate, a JP when constituting the Magistrates Court, or a registrar when performing functions delegated to a registrar under s 28 of the MC Act.

1. Section 28 of the MC Act provides that the rules of the Magistrates Court may delegate to a registrar any or all of the 'Court's jurisdiction and powers', with certain exceptions.
2. Mr Bajaj seeks review of orders made by a registrar. However, not all orders made by a registrar will fall within the scope of s 36 of the MC Act. In Hemmett v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd,[7] Vaughan J (as his Honour then was) considered the scope of s 28 of the MC Act and the question of when a registrar will be acting pursuant to a delegation under that section.[8] As outlined by Vaughan J, it is not the case that every function undertaken by a registrar will fall within the scope of the delegation referred to in s 28 of the MC Act, and the mere fact that a registrar is exercising a power provided for in a regulation, is not determinative. Also relevant (but not determinative) is whether the registrar, in exercising the function, is undertaking a task which is properly characterised as administrative or judicial. Vaughan J held:[9]

In order to be susceptible to a review order under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) it is not sufficient that a nominated task be allocated to a registrar - here the Principal Registrar - under a rule of the Magistrates Court. It must also be part of the 'Court's jurisdiction and powers' within the meaning and for the purpose of s 28 of the Act. That phrase takes its meaning from Pt 3 of the Act as amplified in Pt 2 and Pt 3 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA); it is, however, concerned with concepts that have an established legal usage. In the present civil context it is concerned with the Magistrates Court's authority to adjudicate on and determine the disputes that can be litigated before it (jurisdiction) and the means the Court may employ in doing so (powers). (citations omitted)

1. Mr Bajaj's written and oral submissions did not address this issue.
2. However, I do not consider it is necessary to resolve the question of whether Registrar Raine, in making the orders on 15 May 2025, was exercising any or all of the 'Court's jurisdiction and powers' delegated to him under s 28 of the MC Act. This is because assuming (without deciding) that the registrar was exercising such jurisdiction and powers, I am not satisfied that Mr Bajaj has demonstrated an arguable case that the registrar made a jurisdictional error in adjourning Mr Bajaj's application to a trial.

Issue 1 - has Mr Bajaj established an arguable case that the registrar made a jurisdictional error? Issue 1 - no jurisdiction to proceed under the minor case procedure

1. I am not satisfied that Mr Bajaj has established an arguable case in relation to his ground of review that the registrar had no jurisdiction to programme his s 71 application to trial for the following reasons.
2. First, I do not accept Mr Bajaj's submission that the registrar did not have jurisdiction to hear his s 71 application as a minor case claim, and in the course of so doing programme the matter to a trial.
3. Mr Bajaj's application is for the termination of the residential tenancy agreement pursuant to s 71 of the RT Act. Therefore, the Magistrates Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear his application pursuant to s 15 and s 12A(1) of the RT Act.
4. Further, in accordance with s 12A(2) of the RT Act, the Magistrates Court was required to deal with Mr Bajaj's application in accordance with the rules applicable to a minor case claim under pt 4 of the MC CP Act.
5. Nothing in s 12A(2) of the RT Act is inconsistent with any provision of MC CP Act. Section 8 of the MC CP Act relevantly provides that the Magistrate Court's civil jurisdiction includes any jurisdiction conferred on the Magistrates Court by a written law. In the present case, that jurisdiction was conferred by the RT Act.
6. During his oral submissions, as I understood them, Mr Bajaj submitted that whilst his application was a minor case, the minor case procedure did not apply. I do not accept this submission. The provisions I have outlined above were applicable to Mr Bajaj's application and required the minor case procedure to apply to Mr Bajaj's application.
7. Section 28 of the MC CP Act and r 5 of the Minor Case Procedure Rules makes provision for a court to order in a particular case that the Minor Case Procedure Rules do not apply. No such order was made in this case.
8. Secondly, Mr Bajaj submitted that instead of the minor case procedure applying, the Magistrates Court was required to apply the 'statutory procedure' outlined in s 71 of the RT Act. Mr Bajaj submitted that this 'statutory procedure' was applicable where an applicant has provided evidence as to each of the relevant matters referred to in s 71 of the RT Act. Effectively, Mr Bajaj's submission was that if the applicant can put on evidence in support of their application, and a defendant does not put on evidence demonstrating a reasonable defence, then under s 71 of the RT Act, the court must grant the application on the first return date without ever holding a trial or other form of hearing.
9. This submission proceeds on the basis of a fundamental misunderstanding of s 71 of the RT Act.
10. Section 71 provides the competent court with the power to order the termination of a residential tenancy agreement, if satisfied of the matters specified in s 71(2) of the RT Act. The competent court is required to 'be satisfied' of those matters. Section 71 says nothing about how the court is to reach the requisite level of satisfaction. Rather, the process by which the relevant court considers an application, and reaches (or does not reach) the requisite level of satisfaction is outlined in other provisions of the RT Act. This includes s 12A(2), which provides that the court is to use the minor claim procedure in pt 4 of the MC CP Act. Other relevant sections bearing on the exercise of the power under s 71 of the RT Act include s 14 and s 20 of the RT Act.
11. Section 71 does not create its own separate 'statutory procedure'.
12. Thirdly, the Minor Case Procedure Rules provide for a wide variety of methods to deal with applications, including consent agreements, status conferences, pre-trial conferences, mediations and holding a trial. Accordingly, programming the matter to a trial was an option within the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction. Any question as to whether that was the most appropriate procedural decision as provided for in the Minor Case Procedure Rules is a question going to the merits of the decision and not jurisdiction.
13. Fourthly, the registrar did not have any jurisdiction to hear and determine Mr Bajaj's application under s 71 of the RT Act. In accordance with s 13A of the RT Act, when read with r 7 of the RT Regulations, the registrar did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a s 71 application. The registrar did, however, have power under r 7(4) of the RT Regulations to adjourn the hearing of any matter and refer the matter for hearing or determination by a magistrate. This is what the registrar did.
14. Mr Bajaj submitted in his oral submissions that the registrar may have had jurisdiction under some form of delegated authority. However, there is no evidence of any such delegated authority before the court. Its existence would also appear to have been unknown to the registrar, who stated on 15 May 2025 that he did not have jurisdiction to finally determine the s 71 application.
15. For these reasons, Mr Bajaj has not established an arguable case that the registrar lacked jurisdiction to programme Mr Bajaj's s 71 application to trial on 15 May 2025.

1. Mr Bajaj's second basis for asserting a jurisdictional error is that the registrar failed to satisfy himself, before programming the s 71 application to trial, of the necessary jurisdictional fact, being that the tenant had demonstrated a reasonable defence or cause of action opposing his application.
2. There is no merit to this submission. There is nothing in the text of s 71 of the RT Act, or any provision of the MC CP Act or the Minor Case Procedure Rules that supports the conclusion that an application under s 71 of the RT Act cannot be programmed to a trial unless the tenant has demonstrated a reasonable defence or cause of action opposing his application.
3. At its highest, s 27 of the MC CP Act provides that the primary object of the Magistrates Court, when dealing with a minor case, is to attempt to bring the parties to a settlement acceptable to all. The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, do all things and take all such steps as it considers to be appropriate to achieve that primary object. However, if the court is unable to bring the parties to a settlement acceptable to all the parties, s 27(4) provides that the court must deal with the minor case.
4. The transcript of the hearing on 15 May 2025 reveals that the registrar did attempt to ascertain whether s 71 application might be the subject of an acceptable settlement between the parties. Having concluded that there was no prospect of such a settlement, the registrar proceeded to programme the matter to trial.

1. It is important to observe that an 'abuse of process' and 'jurisdictional error' are distinct concepts. However, in appropriate factual circumstances, it is conceivable that the conduct underpinning an allegation of an abuse of process may also form the basis of a submission that a decision maker has acted outside the scope of their statutory powers.
2. However, in the present case, I am not satisfied that Mr Bajaj has established an arguable case of an abuse of process for the following reasons.
3. First, the application that was before the Magistrates Court was Mr Bajaj's application to terminate the tenancy under s 71 of the RT Act. The tenant was not required to commence her own application in the court by way of defence to Mr Bajaj's application.
4. Accordingly, the fact that there was no application made by the tenant to the Magistrates Court (including one alleging retaliatory action) and the fact that the tenant had previously issued Mr Bajaj with a breach notice (but not followed that up with a termination notice or application to the Magistrates Court) did not constitute an abuse of process on the part of the tenant. Further, listing the s 71 application for trial in those circumstances did not amount to an abuse of process.
5. Secondly, Mr Bajaj submitted that in proceeding to a trial, he was being denied procedural fairness as he did not have pleadings or information or the material facts as to the matters which would underpin the tenant's defence to his action. This submission is misconceived. The orders of the registrar provided Mr Bajaj with procedural fairness by ordering both parties, including the tenant, to file their witness statements attaching all relevant documents, prior to the trial. This facilitated, rather than denied, Mr Bajaj procedural fairness.
6. Thirdly, I do not accept that listing the s 71 application for trial, in circumstances where the tenant had commenced an application for a misconduct restraining order, amounts to an abuse of process. The two applications are separate matters. Ordering a trial to resolve the underlying issues in the s 71 application in circumstances where there appears to be different versions of events, is the opposite of an abuse of process, and instead facilitates the orderly determination of a dispute between the parties.
7. Nothing in the registrar's orders prevented Mr Bajaj from submitting at the hearing of the misconduct restraining order application (if he wished) that the misconduct restraining order application was an abuse of process. Further, nothing in the fact of the tenant's misconduct restraining order application would prevent Mr Bajaj from submitting at the trial of his s 71 application (if he wished), that the tenant's refusal to allow him entry to conduct repairs was unreasonable and that the allegations underpinning the misconduct restraining order application were unfounded and simply an attempt to add credibility to the tenant's refusal of access. In any event, the tenant's application for a misconduct restraining order was dismissed on 23 July 2025.
8. Fourthly, I am not satisfied that programming the s 71 application to a trial in circumstances where articles had appeared in a local newspaper amounts to an abuse of process. Again, to the extent those articles reveal an underlying dispute between the parties and different versions of events, ordering a trial to resolve these issues is the opposite of an abuse of process.
9. In these circumstances, Mr Bajaj has not established an arguable case that programming his s 71 application to a trial constituted an abuse of process and therefore a jurisdictional error.

1. Mr Bajaj's originating motion only seeks review of the orders of the registrar made on 15 May 2025.
2. I raised with Mr Bajaj the utility in seeking a review order in relation to these orders, given that events had progressed since 15 May 2025. On 17 July 2025, the trial did not proceed, and instead the matter was adjourned to a status conference on 28 August 2025.
3. Mr Bajaj submitted that there was utility, and that was because the 15 May 2025 orders proceeded on the basis that the Magistrates Court had jurisdiction to deal with his application using the Minor Case Procedure Rules, when it did not. Mr Bajaj submitted that the magistrate made the same error on 17 July 2025 in making order 1 - which adjourned his application to a status conference. Although Mr Bajaj did not apply to amend his originating motion, his submission was that if a jurisdictional error was established in relation to the 15 May 2025 orders, this would also infect order 1 made on 17 July 2025 and it would be appropriate to make orders that the matter be returned to the Magistrates Court to be determined using the 'statutory procedure' in s 71 of the RT Act, and not proceed to the status conference as ordered by the magistrate.
4. For the reasons outlined above, I do not consider there has been any jurisdictional error made by the registrar on 15 May 2025 and therefore nothing 'infects' order 1 made by the magistrate on 17 July 2025. Further, to the extent Mr Bajaj is submitting that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to make order 1 for the same reasons that the registrar lacked jurisdiction to make the 15 May 2025 orders, then for the same reasons outlined above, I do not accept that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction.

1. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that Mr Bajaj has demonstrated an arguable case that the registrar made a jurisdictional error in adjourning Mr Bajaj's s 71 application to trial. I therefore decline to make a review order.

Issue 2 - has Mr Bajaj established that a stay should be ordered?

1. As I have concluded that Mr Bajaj has not established an arguable case that the registrar (or the magistrate) made a jurisdictional error, there is no basis upon which to order a stay of the orders of the registrar made on 15 May 2025 (or order 1 of the orders of the magistrate on 17 July 2025) and I decline to make such an order.

1. In his oral and written submissions Mr Bajaj raised a number of other matters.
2. Mr Bajaj referred to an injunction directed to his managing agents and their decision to terminate his agreement with them. This falls outside the scope of the present s 36 review order application.
3. Mr Bajaj also referred to the tenant not paying rent since the 15 May 2025 hearing. If this is the case, then this is a separate matter which Mr Bajaj will need to consider and exercise any rights he wishes under the RT Act.

1. For the reasons outlined above, I will make the following orders:
   1. The applicant's application for a review order and stay of the orders made by Registrar Raine in matter MC/CIV/PER/RSTN/4888 of 2025 on 15 May 2025 is dismissed.
   2. There be no order as to costs.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Rayney v AW [2009] WASCA 203 [25] - [34] and the authorities cited therein.

[2] Bajaj v Magistrate Trevor Darge [2021] WASCA 218 [47] ‑ [54] and the authorities cited therein.

[3] Bajaj v Magistrate Trevor Darge [2021] WASCA 218 [53]. See also Re Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219; (2006) 32 WAR 501 [181]; Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 177 - 178.

[4] Zucal v Harper [2005] WASCA 76; (2005) 29 WAR 563 [58].

[6] RT Act, s 20(a), s 20(b), s 20(h) and s 20(m).

[7] Hemmett v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 214.

[8] Hemmett v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 214 [62] - [85].

[9] Hemmett v Market Direct Group Pty Ltd [2018] WASC 214 [80].