austlii:act/ACTSCFC/2025/2
General information, not legal advice.
ACTSCFC
2025-12-17
McCallum CJ, Baker JJ
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Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY FULL COURT
Case Title: Re an Application by G for Admission as a Legal Practitioner Citation: [2025] ACTSCFC 2 Hearing Date: 21 June 2024 Decision Date: 17 December 2025 Before: McCallum CJ, Mossop and Baker JJ Decision: The application for admission as a lawyer is refused Catchwords: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – Qualifications and admissions – legal practitioner – application for admission to practice – suitability matters Legislation Cited: Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 3608(2) Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) ss 11, 22, 26, 29, 30, 31 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 11 Cases Cited: Ex parte Lenehan (1948) 77 CLR 403 In the Matter of an Application for Admission as a Practitioner (1997) 195 LSJS 482 Re an Application by L for Admission as a Legal Practitioner [2015] ACTSCFC 1 Parties: G (Applicant) Legal Practitioners Admissions Board (Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Applicant) C Phillipson (Respondent) Solicitors Self-represented (Applicant) ACT Government Solicitor (Respondent) File Number: A 13438 of 2023 THE COURT: Introduction
G made an application to the Supreme Court to be admitted as a lawyer of the Court. Such applications are considered in the first instance by the Legal Practitioners Admissions Board, which advises the Court as to whether it considers the applicant to be eligible and suitable to be admitted as a lawyer. In the case of G, the Board’s advice did not support the application and accordingly there was a hearing before this Court sitting as the Full Court, as required under s 11 of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT).
This judgment determines the applicant’s application.
Legislative framework
The application invokes the Court’s power under s 26(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT), which provides: The Supreme Court may admit the person as a lawyer if satisfied that the person— (a) is eligible for admission to the legal profession; and (b) is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession.
Those requirements are often referred to, respectively, as the eligibility requirement and the suitability requirement.
In deciding whether those requirements are met, the Supreme Court must consider, and may rely on, the advice of the Board in relation to the application, which may be contained in a compliance certificate: ss 26(4) and (5). The Board determined not to give a compliance certificate to G because it was not satisfied that he satisfied the suitability requirement.
Even in a case where the Board is satisfied of both requirements under s 26(2) and gives a compliance certificate, it remains a matter for the Court whether to admit a person as a lawyer. As noted by this Court in Re an Application by L for Admission as a Legal Practitioner [2015] ACTSCFC 1 at [17]-[18], the Board “plays an important part in the governance of the legal profession and its views derived from the accumulated experience of its members deserve respect and due consideration”, but it nevertheless remains a task for the Court to decide for itself whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied.
The issue for determination by the Court in such a case is whether the applicant has satisfied the Court that he is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession. As emphasised in one of the authorities relied upon by the applicant, that task must be exercised “with firmness in the interests of the public”: Ex parte Lenehan (1949) 77 CLR 403 at 426. In the same passage of the judgment, Rich J said: Solicitors are officers of the court and the public expects that the court will, so far as it can, ensure upright and honourable conduct on the part of its officers. The interests of the court, the public, the profession and of the applicant must be considered.
The applicant also relied on the judgment of Doyle CJ in In the Matter of an Application for Admission as a Practitioner (1997) 195 LSJS 482 at 489. In that passage of the judgment, Doyle CJ formulated the task as follows: In the end, the questions to be considered by this Court are these. First, is the Court satisfied that it can hold the applicant out to the public as a person upon whom the public can rely, not just for his professional skills, but as someone who will act with integrity in the course of the administration of justice? Secondly, is the Court satisfied that the courts and the profession will be able to have confidence in the integrity of the applicant as a practitioner? In considering both of these matters the Court must consider whether it is satisfied that the applicant correctly appreciates his role, as a practitioner, in the administration of justice.
The Board is required to advise the Court of its advice by either filing a compliance certificate or telling the Court of its decision to refuse to give a compliance certificate. In the case of a refusal, the Board must file a statement about the decision and the reasons for the decision: ss 30(2)(a) and (3)(a) of the Act.
In advising the Court, the Board is required to have regard to “all suitability matters in relation to the applicant to the extent appropriate”: s 29(1)(a)(ii).
The question of what is a “suitability matter” is addressed in s 11 of the Legal Profession Act. One of the suitability matters is whether the person is currently of good fame and character. Section 22 of the Act provides: 22 Suitability for admission (1) In deciding if a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession under this Act, the Supreme Court or admissions board must consider each of the suitability matters in relation to the person to the extent a suitability matter is appropriate. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit the relevant matters that the Supreme Court or admissions board may consider. (3) However, the Supreme Court or admissions board may decide that a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession under this Act despite a suitability matter because of the circumstances relating to the matter.
The operative element in subsection (3) is “the circumstances relating to the matter”. This indicates an obligation on the part of an applicant to disclose not only any suitability matter but also the circumstances surrounding any such matter.
Rule 3608(2) of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) requires that an application for admission as a lawyer be supported by an affidavit by the applicant and at least three affidavits of character. Rule 3608(5) provides that: an affidavit of character by a person must state (a) how long the person has known the applicant; and (b) the circumstances in which the person has known the applicant; and (c) whether there is or has been any professional or business relationship between the person and the applicant and, if so, the nature of the relationship; and (d) whether the person is related to the applicant by blood, affinity or adoption; and (e) the person’s opinion about the fame and character of the applicant. The Board’s decision to refuse to give a compliance certificate
On 2 May 2024, the Board filed an undated “statement about and reasons for decision” in respect of the applicant, as required under s 30(3)(a) of the Act. That document was forwarded by the Court to the applicant the same day. As already noted, the reason for refusing to give a compliance certificate was that, accepting that the applicant had obtained the necessary qualifications to be eligible for admission, the Board was not satisfied that he was otherwise a fit and proper person to be admitted as a lawyer.
The reasons for that decision, as set out in the statement filed with the Court, may be summarised as follows (the evidence referred to in those reasons is addressed later in this judgment). First, the Board noted that the applicant’s affidavit in support of his application raised a number of potential suitability matters, namely: (a) a Centrelink overpayment of $2,346.79 based in part on discrepancies in income reporting; (b) the termination of the applicant’s employment as a court monitor at the ACT Supreme Court on the basis of an allegation of serious misconduct for, among other things, knowingly making a false statement; (c) the sending of inappropriate emails to former work colleagues at the Disability Royal Commission after ceasing employment there; and (d) matters described by the applicant as “taxation offences”, which in fact appeared to be tax debts and associated penalties for late lodgment of tax returns.
The applicant initially provided three character affidavits in support of the application. The Board considered those affidavits and was not satisfied that they dealt sufficiently with the suitability matters disclosed by the applicant. Accordingly, the Board sought further evidence of good character. The applicant provided three further affidavits in response to that request. After considering the further affidavits, the Board remained of the view that the suitability matters disclosed by the applicant had not been sufficiently addressed.
On 13 March 2024, at the invitation of the Board, the applicant attended a meeting to discuss the status of his application. During that meeting, the applicant: (a) was invited to provide further affidavit evidence as to his good fame and character but declined to provide such evidence; (b) asserted that the Board’s explanation of its role, which was not to determine the application but to make a recommendation to the Court which ultimately determines the application, was wrong; (c) raised a concern that the application may have been determined in the applicant’s absence and that the position of the Board reflected jurisdictional error; and (d) raised the prospect of bringing legal action against the Board and the Government seeking damages.
The Board considered that the applicant’s refusal to provide further affidavit evidence as requested was a breach of his obligation under s 31(1) of the Legal Profession Act, which itself constituted a ground for refusal to give a compliance certificate. For reasons explained later in this judgment, we have not placed any reliance on that aspect of the Board’s reasons.
The Board’s reasons concluded with the following statement: In the absence of additional character evidence from a person or persons who have known the applicant for a period of time that encompasses the suitability matters disclosed, and can attest to his good fame and character based on a reasonable capacity to observe his conduct in that period and more recently, the Board is unable to be satisfied that the applicant is otherwise a fit and proper person to be admitted. The applicant’s affidavit
The applicant’s principal affidavit affirmed in support of the application is dated 28 September 2023. After addressing his eligibility by reason of his academic qualification and practical legal training (which is not in issue), the applicant stated that he has never been prosecuted for and convicted of any offence, or had any offence proved against him.
As noted in the Board’s reasons for refusing to give a compliance certificate, the applicant then disclosed four matters. It may be inferred that he did so because he assessed those matters as being capable of informing his suitability to practice as a lawyer.
Centrelink overpayment
The first matter disclosed was a Centrelink overpayment of “approximately $2,346.79”. The affidavit annexed a statement from Centrelink of transactions on the applicant’s Centrelink account for the period from 1 September 2018 to 5 August 2023 (identified as Annexure E). From an examination of that statement, it can be seen that five “new debts” were debited to the applicant’s Centrelink account during that period, as follows: (i) $346 on 24 May 2019; (ii) $552.79 on 15 August 2019; (iii) Two amounts on 4 September 2019, being $1035 and $1025; and (iv) $423 on 18 May 2022.
On 21 September 2020, by a “debt adjustment”, one of the amounts debited on 4 September 2019 appears to have been reversed (the debt of $1035). The sum of the remaining four debts is $2,346.79, the amount of overpayment disclosed by the applicant in his affidavit.
Whether those overpayments are relevant to the applicant’s suitability to be admitted as a lawyer depends on the reason for the overpayment, including whether it was the result of any misrepresentation by the applicant or simply due to a change in circumstances. The explanation given by the applicant in his affidavit was as follows: The “debts” listed in Annexure E arose due to a combination of instances where: (a) my Centrelink payment ceased when an advance payment hadn’t yet been paid back in full; and (b) I dropped from full-time to part-time study and a previously paid Student Start-Up Loan was then “clawed back” by Centrelink; and (c) Centrelink found discrepancies between my reported income and their income data which accounted for no more than $1000 of the total amount overpaid.
That was not a satisfactory explanation of the overpayments.
As to (a), the assertion that a debt was debited because a payment ceased is unclear: a debt would not arise simply because a payment ceased. It is possible that the applicant intended to explain that the payment was made but that he was not entitled to receive it because it was conditional upon his having repaid some other payment which he had not repaid. The advance payment does not appear to be recorded in the statement in Annexure E. Further explanation was required.
The amount of the Student Start-Up Loan referred to in point (b) is not identified. By a process of deduction (in light of the statement that the discrepancies referred to in (c) accounted for “no more than $1000”), it seems likely that this is the amount of $1025 debited on 4 September 2019. We accept that the fact that a loan was clawed back due to a change in circumstances would not reflect adversely on the applicant’s suitability.
That leaves point (c). There is no explanation of the discrepancies or any disclosure of the process by which they were identified by Centrelink. By reference to the amounts of the debts listed in Annexure E, the assertion that those discrepancies accounted for “no more than $1000” of the total amount overpaid suggests that there were two separate occasions on which discrepancies were identified and an overpayment accounted for as a debt. The fact that those overpayments involved less than $1000 is not to the point. The issue of interest to the Court is whether they involved any dishonesty or misrepresentation on the part of the applicant. The discrepancies ought to have been explained, not dismissed as though they were inconsequential because the amount involved was small.
Termination of employment as a court monitor
As at August 2015, the applicant was employed on a casual basis as a court monitor by a transcription company that provides transcription services at the ACT Supreme Court. The second suitability matter disclosed by the applicant was the fact that, on 27 August 2015, his employment as a court monitor was terminated without notice. In his first affidavit, the applicant stated that his employment was terminated for “serious misconduct” and that the reasons provided were “knowingly making a false statement and threatening the profitability of the business”. The applicant provided an explanation of the conduct he understood to have prompted that decision. He also annexed to his affidavit two statements he had provided to his employer during an investigation of the incident before his employment was terminated.
The circumstances explained in the two statements were that, on 12 June 2015, a person to whom the applicant refers as SQ asked the applicant to make him a copy of the audio recording from Courtroom 4 for that day. The applicant understood SQ to be “a court staff member” but did not know him personally or his position. The applicant made a copy of the audio recording and gave it to SQ. He did not know what was on the audio recording or why SQ required it.
On 17 June 2015, another court employee to whom the applicant refers as TN asked the applicant to check whether a private conversation TN had within court 4 on 12 June 2015 had been recorded. The applicant listened to part of the audio recording but did not have time to listen to the whole recording. He informed TN that he believed TN’s private conversation had not been recorded. TN later returned to the monitor room and either asked or was offered by the applicant to check the audio himself. While TN was listening to the audio, SQ came to the monitor room and saw TN sitting at one of the monitor stations with earphones on.
After listening to the audio recording, TN told the applicant that a private conversation he had in court 4 on 12 June 2015 had been recorded. The applicant concluded that SQ had broken the law by using court recordings to eavesdrop on TN’s private conversation and that SQ had committed “a serious breach of TN’s privacy”. The applicant agreed with TN not to tell anyone that TN knew his private conversation had been recorded.
The following day, SQ rang the applicant and asked him what TN had been listening to when he was in the monitor room the previous day. The applicant told SQ that TN had been listening to a trial. That was a lie. The applicant said that this was part of the reason the applicant’s employment was terminated.
In his affidavit, the applicant acknowledges that, in choosing to lie to SQ, he made a bad decision. He stated that he was not motivated by self-interest but rather “a misguided attempt to remain loyal to a colleague who I perceived had been wronged”. The applicant further stated that, when interviewed by his employer during the investigation, he gave a full and honest account of what had happened. He also stated, not unreasonably, that it was a difficult situation for him to understand and navigate as a then 21-year-old who was relatively new to the workforce and who found himself embroiled in a workplace conflict. The fact that the applicant lied in those circumstances is nonetheless concerning.
In a second affidavit affirmed on 5 October 2023, the applicant provided a copy of an email he received from the Manager of the Sheriff’s Office following the termination of his employment. That person had been on leave during the events in question. The Manager stated that, when he had returned to work and learned what had happened, he was “both saddened and shocked at what has occurred”. He wrote “I also have some very strong opinions about this event and how you have been treated”. The email attached a reference for the applicant in which the Manager described the applicant as “an outstanding colleague to work with”. The Manager wrote, “I can also attest to his discretion, integrity and his high ethical standards which are a significant attribute in any organisation”.
The applicant’s second affidavit also annexed a copy of the letter terminating his employment, which he had not previously been able to locate. The letter referred to the investigation concerning the applicant’s “alleged serious breach of the Confidential Information Policy and Code of Conduct Policy”. The letter stated: My findings of the investigation indicate that you have breached both of these policies which I consider poses a significant risk to our business. Given the seriousness of this misconduct, your employment is being terminated without notice.
It is apparent from the terms of the letter that the applicant was investigated for more than just the false statement he deliberately made to SQ; the investigation evidently extended to the fact that he had previously given SQ a copy of the recording from one of the court rooms on a specified day, without authority. The applicant’s affidavit addresses only the matter of the false statement and does not reflect an appreciation of the significance of the breach of the employer’s Confidential Information Policy.
At the hearing before this Court, the applicant repeated his point, which has some force, about the circumstances in which his employment as a court monitor was terminated. He noted that he was 21 at the time and lacked experience in the workplace. He said that there were “a number of authority figures around”. He said SQ and TM were both employees of the Court; they were not employees of the company by which he was employed. He explained that, while he worked with his two supervisors within the court monitors service, he also worked closely with the Sheriff’s Office, the Court’s IT staff and judges’ associates, ultimately to produce transcripts but also to assist in any other respect. It was his understanding that the primary reason his employment was terminated was the fact that he had deliberately made a false statement to SQ. As already noted, the termination letter states that the person who conducted the investigation also found a breach of the confidentiality policy but there is no clear information as to what that breach was.
The applicant stated that, with the benefit of hindsight and experience, if the same thing were to occur now, he would handle it differently and would try to seek advice from a superior. He felt that he was caught in the middle of a workplace conflict. He stated that he would not make a statement that was untrue if he was admitted as a lawyer.
It may be accepted that the applicant was placed in a difficult position and was young and inexperienced at the time of these events. It also appears that he lied at the request of TN, for TN’s benefit. Having lied and had his employment terminated for at least that reason, his character evidence was all the more important. Termination of contract as a transcriber at the Royal Commission
From the end of May 2022 until 21 February 2023, the applicant was employed as a transcriber at the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability. He was not employed directly by the Royal Commission; his employment was under a labour hire agreement, which meant that it could be terminated at whim. The applicant’s affidavit is opaque on this issue, but it appears his employment was terminated as a result of some dissatisfaction with his conduct. The third suitability matter disclosed in the applicant’s affidavit was two emails he sent after that employment came to an end.
The emails were sent to an officer at the Royal Commission. The tone of the emails was to berate that officer for betraying people with disabilities for his own self-interest. Of particular concern is the second email which, according to the applicant’s best recollection (he says he deleted the email shortly after it was sent), stated “I seriously think if you killed yourself the world would be a better place. Nobody would miss you.” About 5 or 10 minutes after sending that email, the applicant sent a third email apologising to the recipient for his previous email but reaffirming that he was “seriously pissed off about what you’ve done”.
The applicant stated in his affidavit that he regretted his decisions to send the first two emails, especially the email noted above. He stated that these were “errors in judgment” and not the type of errors he would ever repeat if he was admitted as a lawyer. The applicant said that what spurred his decisions to send the emails were his own feelings of frustration, “coupled with a foolish attempt to weaponise guilt as a means to effect change within the [Disability Royal Commission]”. It is to be recalled in that context that the applicant’s role at the Royal Commission was that of a transcriber.
In his explanation of the emails, the applicant stated that he had not included a description of the events within the Royal Commission which led to his sending the emails because those events themselves would not reflect adversely on his good fame and character or whether he was a fit and proper person. He wrote, “I believe the Board wouldn’t reasonably regard these events as relevant in assessing my suitability for admission, except potentially to the extent that they tend in favour of admission”. Separately, he referred to his obligation to keep internal Disability Royal Commission information confidential. He stated, “I’m loath to breach this obligation, apart from which I would be happy to provide a full account required”. The suggestion was that the applicant had called out some immoral act and that, if he disclosed what, the Board would approve of his conduct. However, he provided no context from which the Board could judge that issue.
At the hearing before this Court, the applicant was informed that the Court would be assisted by knowing the factual context in which the emails were sent. The applicant was offered an opportunity to provide further evidence on that issue if he wished. One member of the Court asked the applicant directly why he was terminated by the Royal Commission. The applicant responded that he was concerned the answer to that question would go to matters which remained confidential. He sought to address that issue in the context of the possibility of being granted leave to file further affidavit material. He did say that his work at the Royal Commission involved “quite a lot of distressing material” and that the factual matrix around the termination of his employment involved “things that are both sensitive, very serious, and involve violence, abuse, neglect, and exploitation of people with disability”. He also mentioned that his day-to-day work at the Royal Commission involved typing some quite serious and quite distressing material and that this may have played a role in his emotional response in sending the emails after he left. In answer to a further question from the Court, he confirmed that he was not prompted to send the emails by the fact that his employment was terminated. Rather, the situation involved “ethical concerns or moral concerns” about the treatment of people. He said there was “an ethical or moral matter within the Royal Commission” with which he disagreed and that he raised it internally, but the results were not as he expected, and then his contract was terminated. His decision to send the emails was based on those same matters he had raised internally, but he did not explain in his evidence what those matters were.
As already noted, the applicant’s employment at the Royal Commission was under a labour hire agreement, which meant that it could be terminated at whim by the employment agency (at the request of the Royal Commission), without any process. His best recollection of the reason given at the time for the termination of his employment was that he “wasn’t a good fit”.
At the conclusion of the hearing in this Court, in respect of the possibility of filing further evidence, the applicant reiterated his concern as to whether providing further information to the Court would breach his duties of confidentiality to the Royal Commission. He also expressed concern about the possibility of embarrassment to the Royal Commission, and potentially the Attorney-General’s Department. He said he was concerned for the reputation of the Royal Commission. The Court indicated that those were matters for the applicant to consider. He was granted leave to file any further affidavit upon which he wished to rely.
The applicant filed a further affidavit affirmed on 25 June 2024. In that affidavit, he explained that, at around the time he sent the emails, he was experiencing psychological stress caused by feelings of frustration and sadness along with external events related to housing, finances, employment and education. He believed this stress affected his judgement and decision-making. He stated that he had had two counselling appointments in relation to this stress. The affidavit did not explain the factual context in which the emails were sent, nor did it answer the Court’s question as to why his employment at the Royal Commission was terminated.
Late lodgment of tax returns
Character affidavits
In the context of those disclosures, the requirement for three affidavits of character was important. The affidavits provided by the applicant in support of his application (with names anonymised here) were: (a) an affidavit sworn by BFH on 26 September 2023; (b) an affidavit sworn by CRB on 28 September 2023; and (c) an affidavit sworn by KBA on 29 September 2023.
BFH stated that she had known the applicant for approximately 10 years as a patron of the store at which she is employed. She stated that she first met the applicant in approximately 2013 and that, since that time, she had seen and spoken with the applicant on at least 10 occasions. She stated that she had read the affidavit affirmed by the applicant in support of his application and had taken the matters disclosed into account when assessing his fame and character. She stated: I consider the applicant to be a person of honesty and integrity and I believe that this opinion is shared by those with whom he comes into contact. In my opinion, the applicant is a person of good fame and character.
While that was no doubt a genuine opinion, BFH’s dealings with the applicant as a customer in her store with whom she spoke about once a year do not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to assess his suitability.
CRB was an employee of the strata management company at a block of units where the applicant lived for approximately eight years. CRB stated that, between approximately December 2014 and May 2022, he had many conversations with the applicant. He stated that he had read the applicant’s affidavit and taken the matters disclosed into account when assessing the applicant’s fame and character. His affidavit concluded with the same paragraph as BFH’s set out above.
KBA stated that he had known the applicant for just over six months as a neighbour and personal friend. He stated that, since meeting the applicant in March 2023, he had had “quite a few chats with him” and would consider him a friend. He also had read the applicant’s affidavit and taken the matters disclosed into account. His affidavit concluded with the same paragraph as the others.
We note that the applicant’s affidavit also annexed two character references (not sworn). One, dated 14 April 2023, was from a person who worked with the applicant at the Disability Royal Commission. They spoke in glowing terms of the applicant’s transcription skills and stated that he also went “above and beyond”, “proactively looking for ways he could assist the team”. They also stated that the applicant was always courteous and respectful and a pleasure to work with.
There was also a letter dated 20 March 2020 from a Deputy Registrar of the High Court. That person acknowledged that the applicant had not worked directly under their supervision but said that he had demonstrated himself to be a capable, hard-working and friendly person who had excelled in the role of a member of the court reporting team. We note that letter is addressed to an individual. It is not clear that it was intended to be used as a general character reference.
The Board was right to conclude that those affidavits and the additional letters did not deal sufficiently with the suitability matters disclosed by the applicant.
In response to the Board’s request for further affidavit evidence, the applicant provided three further affidavits (names anonymised here) as follows: (a) an affidavit of LAS dated 3 November 2023; (b) an affidavit of LJA dated 6 November 2023; and (c) an affidavit MEPL dated 10 January 2024.
LAS is the applicant’s paternal grandmother. The rules do not prohibit the provision of an affidavit of character by a person who is related to the applicant by blood. However, such an affidavit may be unhelpful if it does not set out facts indicating that the deponent is in a position to give an objective opinion about the applicant’s good fame and character.
The applicant’s maternal grandmother lives in Queensland. She met the applicant in 2010. If he was 21 when his employment as a court monitor was terminated in 2015, he must have been about 16 when he first met her. They evidently had no further contact until July 2016, when the applicant travelled to the Gold Coast to meet her and they “reconnected”. Since that time, they have spoken 2 to 3 times a week on the phone and the applicant has visited her at least three times.
LAS states that she has always found the applicant to be very caring towards her, showing concerns about her health and checking in regularly to see if she is okay. She stated that the parts of the applicant’s affidavit concerning the Disability Royal Commission did not detract from her opinion about his good character and that he is a kind-hearted young man who cares deeply about making sure everybody gets treated fairly, especially people in a vulnerable position or those who are being mistreated.
LJA is a friend and former housemate of the applicant. She stated that they first met as housemates and had remained friends since and had “hung out on several occasions in Canberra”. She spent a lot of time with the applicant when they shared premises. She found him to be an amiable and goodhearted person who cares a lot about justice. She expressed the opinion that the matters disclosed by the applicant in his affidavit concerning the Disability Royal Commission were not a reflection of his true character.
MEPL lives in Marseille. He states that he has known the applicant for approximately 14 years as a friend and that they have “hung out in person quite a few times and played a lot of multiplayer games”. He states that he has always found the applicant to be a friendly, decent person and that, in his opinion, the matters in the applicant’s affidavit relating to the Disability Royal Commission are not a reflection of the applicant’s true character.
The board was right to remain unpersuaded, after receiving those further affidavits, that the applicant had dealt sufficiently with the suitability matters disclosed. The problem with all of the affidavits of character is that they have been provided by people who know the applicant in a social or friendly context. The affidavits do not speak to the applicant’s character as a future lawyer. None of those affidavits reveal an adequate basis for the deponent to speak to the applicant’s good fame and character in the context of the disclosures he had made. The affidavits are mostly formulaic. To the extent that they expressed opinions beyond the formula, those opinions primarily concerned the applicant’s kindness with friends and family. They did not speak to his integrity or his suitability for admission as a lawyer.
The applicant filed a further affidavit affirmed on 1 December 2023 addressing aspects of his employment as a casual court monitor at the High Court. He did not formally read that affidavit but referred to its contents in submissions and may have intended to read it. In any event, the affidavit does not take the matter of the applicant’s character any further.
At the hearing before this Court, the shortcomings of the character evidence were explained to the applicant and he was offered an opportunity to obtain material from someone he had worked with in a legal context. The applicant stated that he had sought affidavits from persons he had worked with in the past and had been “unable to obtain an affidavit in those respects”. He reaffirmed his reliance on the material we have described above.
Meeting with the Board
A concerning aspect of the application is the manner in which the applicant responded to the Board’s attempts to assist him to progress his application. The Board met with the applicant on 13 March 2024 “to discuss the status of the application”. The Board’s reasons state that, during that meeting, the applicant was “again invited to provide further affidavit evidence as to his good fame and character”. The reasons record that the applicant “declined the Board’s invitation to provide such evidence”.
As noted earlier, the Board subsequently found that the applicant’s “refusal” to provide further affidavit material “as requested” was a breach of his obligation pursuant to s 31(1) of the Legal Profession Act which of itself constituted a ground for refusal to give a compliance certificate. Section 31 relevantly provides: (1) To help it consider whether or not an applicant is eligible for admission to the legal profession under this Act or is a fit and proper person to be admitted under this Act, the admissions board may, by written notice to the applicant, require the applicant— (a) to give it stated documents or information; or (b) to cooperate with any inquiries by the board that it considers appropriate. (2) An applicant’s failure to comply with a notice under subsection (1) within the reasonable period, and in the reasonable way, (if any) required by the notice is a ground for refusing to give a compliance certificate for the applicant.
The Board’s reasons do not state that the applicant was required by written notice to provide further affidavit evidence. Accordingly, we cannot be satisfied that the applicant breached any obligation under that provision such as to afford a stand-alone ground for refusing to give a compliance certificate.
The other matters recorded in the reasons as to the events of the meeting fall into a different category and are concerning. First, the reasons indicate that the Board explained to the applicant that its role was not to determine the application for admission as a lawyer but to make a recommendation to the Court, which ultimately determines the application. The applicant asserted that the Board’s explanation was wrong. It was not. Under s 26 to of the Legal Profession Act, the power to admit a person as a lawyer reposes in the Court. The role of the Board, as prescribed in s 29 of the Act, is to advise the Court as to matters relevant to the Court’s determination of the application.
It may be accepted that ignorance of those provisions does not of itself mean that the applicant is not a suitable person to be admitted as a lawyer. However, a person seeking admission as a lawyer would be expected to consult the legislation before accusing the statutory body charged with receiving such applications of being wrong in its understanding of its role.
More significantly, the applicant went further, in effect accusing the Board of bias and threatening to sue the Board and the Government for damages. Contrary to the applicant’s apparent assessment of the position, the concerns expressed by the Board in respect of his application were objectively well-founded. There were real difficulties with the application. The matters disclosed in the applicant’s affidavit warranted fuller explanation. The absence of a complete explanation in the affidavit as to at least the Centrelink overpayment and the two employment issues gives rise to a concern as to the applicant’s judgement as a lawyer; he should have appreciated that fuller explanations were necessary in the circumstances.
Furthermore, the applicant should have appreciated that, against those disclosures, the character affidavits he had provided were inadequate. None of the deponents spoke to his professional integrity or judgement. He had disclosed matters which raised concerns about his professional judgement and those concerns were not allayed by the character affidavits.
Further affidavit of character
As already noted, the Board’s statement about and reasons for decision were forwarded to the applicant on 2 May 2024.
On 15 May 2024, the applicant filed a further affidavit of character affirmed by AMM, who had known the applicant for “at least seven months as a friend and co-resident” in the same building as the applicant and on the same level. AMM states that, on many occasions, he and the applicant spent time together and with other residents living on that level of the apartment block. He said the applicant would sometimes make cups of coffee for him and others or share food and that they have had frequent discussions on various topics including business, law and politics. He said the applicant had discussed on several occasions his commitment to helping others to achieve justice and broaden the justice system. AMM’s affidavit was otherwise largely in the same form as previous affidavits of character filed by the applicant. It did not take the character issue any further.
Conclusion
The applicant has not satisfied the Court that he is a fit and proper person to be admitted to the legal profession. The essential difficulty is one of a lack of information on two important issues. First, the matters disclosed by the applicant in his principal affidavit in support of the application raise more questions than they answer. While it is understandable that the applicant has confidentiality concerns in respect of some of the explanations that might have been given, the simple fact is that the Court is left unable to assess the true significance of matters that, on their face, are concerning. As was explained to the applicant at the hearing, in respect of the termination of his employment as a court monitor, the material provided by the applicant does not explain the nature or quality of the infringement that prompted that service to terminate the applicant’s employment.
Secondly, in light of the matters disclosed, it was essential for the applicant to provide character evidence that addressed his fitness to be a lawyer. The affidavits provided spoke to his personal qualities and, to a limited extent, to aspects of his conduct in some work contexts but they did not adequately address his suitability to be a lawyer when considered in the context of the matters disclosed.
In our assessment, the applicant’s conduct in the meeting with the Board did not assist. The fact that the Board’s request for further information was met with a threat by the applicant to sue the Board for damages tends to confirm the impression that the applicant was unwilling or unable to provide evidence that would support his case. The threat to sue the Board for damages itself suggests unsuitability.
At the time of the hearing before this Court, the applicant was unemployed. He said he had not applied for or held a job as a paralegal. He worked briefly as a legal assistant in family law and, after that, as a contractor or a court transcriber. He had not held any other kind of employment other than court reporting and transcribing at the Disability Royal Commission. He did not do a placement for his practical legal training, instead doing additional work within the practical legal training course.
If the applicant were able to secure employment as a paralegal and to work under the supervision of an experienced lawyer who could then provide the Court with a character reference directly addressing his fitness, he would be in a better position to provide character evidence that would satisfy the suitability requirement. On the material before the Court, and noting the many invitations and opportunities extended to the applicant to put on better evidence, the application must be dismissed.
Orders
I certify that the preceding eighty-one [81] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Court. Associate: C Pilcher Date: 17 December 2025
(1948) 77 CLR 403
(1949) 77 CLR 403