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On 6 April 2000 the Applicant was told by the programme manager that his "resignation had been accepted" and that his job "is no longer here". The Applicant did not resign; he reported that he had been dismissed to Ms Jones shortly afterwards. The Applicant lodged an unfair dismissal application on 27 April 2000. The Respondent filed a Notice of Answer (by Leslie James Hansen) alleging abandonment of contract (see [2]).

Procedurally, the Respondent repeatedly failed to attend Commission conferences. The Commission made multiple accommodation efforts including changing venue to suit an expressed phobia of heights, yet the Respondent did not avail itself of conciliation or conferences (see [2]). At the hearing set down on 16 January 2001 the Respondent again did not appear. The Commission, relying on s.27(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979, proceeded to hear the matter in the absence of the Respondent (see [1]–[2]).

On the merits the Commissioner accepted the Applicant's account, corroborated in material respects by Ms Jones, and found that the action of the Respondent on 6 April 2000, even if not a formal dismissal, was tantamount to dismissal (see [5]–[7]). Applying the 'fair go all round' test, whether the employer abused its right to terminate the contract, the Commissioner held the termination was unfair (see [8]). Because the Commission was not satisfied that a formal traineeship existed to which reinstatement could be ordered, it awarded compensation: $5,040 for loss (three months' pay at $420/week) and $500 for injury, total $5,540 (see final paragraphs).

Why the court decided this way

There are three linked strands in the Commissioner’s reasoning: jurisdiction to proceed ex parte, factual conclusion that a dismissal occurred, and application of the unfair dismissal legal test.

1. Jurisdiction: The Commissioner set out and applied s.27(1)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 as authorising the Commission to "proceed and herein determine the matter or any part thereof in the absence of any party" who has been duly summoned or served. The Commission found that notices had been properly issued, that the respondent had been accommodated and repeatedly failed to attend, and thus it was appropriate to proceed without the respondent given the prejudice further delay would cause the applicant and the Commission (see [1]–[2]). The statutory power, together with the history of non‑attendance and service by prepaid post, provided the procedural foundation.

2. Factual finding of dismissal: The Applicant’s evidence that he had not resigned, combined with Ms Jones's corroborative evidence about the timing and that the Applicant complained of victimisation, led the Commissioner to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the Applicant had been dismissed (or that the employer’s actions were tantamount to dismissal) on 6 April 2000 (see [5]–[7]). The inference that the raising of safety issues influenced the Respondent’s attitude to the Applicant underpinned the causation for the unfair dismissal finding.

3. Legal test for unfair dismissal and remedy: The Commissioner applied the established unfair dismissal formulation described as ensuring a "fair go all round" and characterised the inquiry as whether the employer's exercise of the termination right amounted to an abuse (citing Undercliff at [8]). Having found abuse, the Commission then considered remedy. Reinstatement was deemed inappropriate because the Commission concluded that "it is more likely than not that there never was a formal traineeship" and thus no identifiable position existed for reinstatement (see [9]). The Commissioner therefore applied the Ramsay Bogunovich approach to quantifying compensation and used available evidence (including the Applicant's statement of intending to start his own business within two to three months) to award three months' pay plus an award for injury (see [9]–[13]).

Before and after state of the law

Before this decision (and in its reasoning) the Commission relied on established principles in unfair dismissal jurisprudence in Western Australia: the 'fair go all round' standard, expressed in local authority such as Undercliff, is the central legal yardstick to determine whether a termination is an abuse of the employer's right to dismiss (see [8]). The decision also confirms the administrative procedural power in the Act to hear matters ex parte when a party has been duly served and fails to appear, provided the tribunal is satisfied that service and opportunity to attend have been afforded (see [1]–[2]).

After this decision, the practical postures confirmed are:

• The Commission will exercise s.27(1)(d) where there is a history of non‑attendance and proper service, and where the tribunal considers further delay would prejudice the applicant (see [2]).
• A traineeship document describing a 'nominal' period does not automatically convert to a fixed‑term employment contract immune to termination; the agreement's nominal duration may be contingent upon competency achievement and ordinary notice provisions (see [10]).
• Where reinstatement is impractical because no formal position exists, compensation assessed on a fair estimate of lost earnings and injury will be awarded, using precedent methodologies (Ramsay Bogunovich) and specific evidence about the applicant's prospective plans to limit speculative awards (see [9]–[13]).

The decision therefore aligns with and applies existing law rather than creating novel doctrine; it provides an example of quantification of loss in a short‑duration traineeship context.

Key passages with plain-English translation

1. Passage: "The Commission... is empowered to hear a matter, in the absence of a Respondent: 'To proceed and herein determine the matter or any part thereof in the absence of any party... who has been duly summoned... or duly served with notice of proceedings.'" (see [2]) Plain English: If the Commission has put a party on notice and that party keeps failing to come to conferences or the hearing, the Commission can go ahead and decide the case without them.

2. Passage: "In those circumstances, the action... if not a real dismissal is tantamount to dismissal." (see [7]) Plain English: Even if the employer did not use the word 'dismissed', the way they treated the applicant was effectively the same as firing him.

3. Passage: "The test is whether the employer has breached its right to terminate the contract of employment in such a way as amounts to an abuse of that right." (see [8]) Plain English: To decide if a dismissal was unfair you ask whether the employer used its power to fire someone in a way that was unjust or abusive.

4. Passage: "The total sum to be awarded will be $5040 for loss and $500 for injury, making a total of $5540." (see final paragraph) Plain English: The Commission orders the employer to pay the applicant $5,540, being three months' wages plus a small sum for hurt and distress.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

Practitioners should look for fact patterns with these features where this decision is directly instructive:

• An employee in a traineeship or provisional training placement raises workplace safety complaints and shortly afterwards is informed their position no longer exists, without resigning.
• The employer claims abandonment or resignation but contemporaneous evidence (witnesses, calls to third parties) supports the employee’s account that they were dismissed.
• The employer or its representative repeatedly fails to attend Commission conferences or hearings despite proper service and accommodation of venue/timing requests.
• There is no clear, formal executed traineeship or fixed-term contract to which reinstatement can be ordered, rendering compensation the practical remedy.
• Evidence exists about the employee’s likely short-term plans (e.g., intending to start a business) that can reasonably limit the period of foregone earnings for compensation calculation.

When those elements appear together, the Commission’s approach in this case, proceeding ex parte if necessary, finding a dismissal arguably tantamount to termination, applying the 'abuse of right' test, and awarding compensation rather than reinstatement, is the applicable template.

How later courts have treated it

This decision is an industrial commission interlocutory/ex parte merits decision by Commissioner J F Gregor. The reasoning relies on established Commission authorities (Undercliff) and precedent method for compensation (Ramsay Bogunovich). As such, it is best read as an application of settled Commission practice: enforcing procedural powers under s.27(1)(d), applying the 'fair go all round' unfair dismissal test, and calculating compensation when reinstatement is infeasible. Later decisions will typically follow these principles in analogous circumstances, particularly in Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission practice, as they reflect statutory powers and established local precedent. Users should check subsequent WAIRC decisions and any appellate authority for refinement of compensation quantification or specific procedural thresholds for ex parte hearings.

Still-open questions

Several practical or doctrinal uncertainties remain for future cases:

• The boundary between a 'nominal' traineeship term and a fixed‑term contract remains fact‑sensitive. This decision treats the particular traineeship document as non‑binding for a fixed term, but different drafting or an executed formal traineeship could change the remedy analysis.
• The appropriate measure of loss where an employee has reasonable prospects of starting a business or otherwise mitigating loss is inherently speculative. The Commissioner used the applicant's stated plans to limit loss to three months; other fact patterns may produce different estimations and invite closer scrutiny of mitigation obligations.
• Procedurally, while s.27(1)(d) was properly invoked here, the decision gives practical guidance but not an exhaustive formulation of the threshold required before proceeding ex parte. Future cases may refine what constitutes 'good service' and the degree of accommodation required before a tribunal should proceed in a party's absence.
• The decision records findings of victimisation tied to raising safety concerns. The interaction between unfair dismissal law and statutory protections for whistleblowing, workplace health and safety complaints, or antidiscrimination protections was not fully explored here; these intersections remain areas for further development if litigants frame claims under multiple statutory heads.
• Finally, the quantification method applied following Ramsay Bogunovich is high-level here; practitioners may expect further elaboration in subsequent awards or appellate review on discounting future earning prospects, calculation of injury to feelings in unfair dismissal contexts, and the appropriate weight to place on short-term plans to mitigate loss.

Conclusion: This decision is a concise application of Commission procedure and unfair dismissal doctrine to a short traineeship context where safety complaints were raised and the employer effectively terminated the relationship. It is most useful as a practical exemplar for prosecuting or defending unfair dismissal matters involving traineeships, ex parte procedure, and compensation quantification when reinstatement is impracticable.