Raoul (by his tutor Karamihas) v Hanna

AN UNDERCURRENT IN THE PROCEEDINGS

1. The proceedings have been driven by rivalry between the defendant (the plaintiff's nephew, a builder by trade) and Joseph Khalifeh (a friend of the plaintiff, a private investigator). Although their paths did not cross until early September 2014, each man appears very quickly to have identified the other as a threat to the plaintiff's interests, if not his own.
2. On 25 February 2014, with assistance provided by Mr Khalifeh, the plaintiff executed in favour of Mr Khalifeh an enduring power of attorney and an enduring guardianship appointment.
3. On 8 September 2014, with assistance from the defendant, the plaintiff executed an instrument purporting to revoke the power of attorney (but not the guardianship appointment) dated 25 February 2014. The guardianship appointment subsists.

THE COMMENCEMENT, AND COURSE, OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1. These proceedings were commenced by a summons filed on 23 April 2015, accompanied by a notice of motion filed on the same day seeking an order that Emanuel Karamihas (an accountant) be appointed as tutor for the plaintiff. Not without misgivings, on the return of the summons and the notice of motion on 8 May 2015, the defendant consented to an order made by the Registrar (under UCPR rule 7.18) that Mr Karamihas be appointed as tutor.
2. On the same occasion (8 May 2015), the parties submitted to an interlocutory arrangement, expressed to be until further order, preserving property of the plaintiff and restraining both parties from taking any step towards a sale of the land.
3. On 28 August and 18 September 2015, consent orders and undertakings were recorded by Darke J, as the Real Property List judge, having the effect of quarantining, until further order, the sum of $392,190 paid out by the insurer who insured the subject property against fire damage.
4. In an amended summons (filed on 15 February 2016), upon which the plaintiff moved at the final hearing of the proceedings, there was a claim for relief the effect of which was: 1. to have declared void or set aside the instrument dated 8 September 2014 which purported to revoke the enduring power of attorney dated 25 February 2014 executed in favour of Mr Khalifeh; and 2. to seek confirmation that Mr Khalifeh is entitled hereafter to act as attorney for the plaintiff pursuant to the instrument dated 25 February 2014.
5. On its face, that instrument dated 25 February 2014 purports to have been executed by the plaintiff (and certified by a solicitor) on 25 February 2014 in respect of an appointment as attorney accepted by Mr Khalifeh on 24 February 2014. In fact, the instrument was executed and certified, and Mr Khalifeh accepted his appointment as attorney, on 25 February 2014. The reference to "24 February 2014" in the instrument is a clerical error of no operative significance.
6. During the course of the final hearing, the plaintiff abandoned the claim for "restoration" of the power of attorney dated 25 February 2014. He did, however, foreshadow a claim for orders under section 41 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 NSW designed to subject the plaintiff's estate to management under the Act.
7. That foreshadowed claim was advanced, initially, in terms that Mr Khalifeh should be appointed manager of the plaintiff's protected estate, then, when that proposal met opposition, in terms that the plaintiff's tutor should be appointed to the office of manager. That proposal, too, was opposed by the defendant, who contends that management of the plaintiff's estate should be committed to the NSW Trustee.
8. The question whether any (and, if so, what) protected estate management orders affecting the plaintiff should be made has been deferred pending the determination of other questions in the proceedings. Depending on the outcome of those other questions, and the very substantial claims for costs made in the proceedings, there may be no utility in the making of orders subjecting the estate of the plaintiff to protective management. Considerations of utility loom large upon an exercise of the Court's discretion in the making, or revocation, of protected estate management orders: Re W and L (Parameters of protected estate management orders) [2014] NSWSC 1106; CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 498 at [50]-[58].
9. At the time Mr Khalifeh accepted his appointment as the plaintiff's attorney on 25 February 2014, he also accepted appointment as the plaintiff's enduring guardian. The guardianship appointment has never been revoked. Neither its validity nor its continuing operation is challenged in these proceedings.
10. As the plaintiff's enduring guardian Mr Khalifeh is authorised: (a) to decide where the plaintiff lives; (b) to decide what health care the plaintiff receives; (c) to decide what other kinds of personal services the plaintiff receives; and (d) to consent to the carrying out of medical or dental treatment on the plaintiff.
11. No controversy attaches to the observation that the plaintiff is presently incapable of managing his own affairs - whether expressed in terms of management of his estate or management of his person. During the course of the final hearing, the plaintiff attended court, briefly, for the purpose of his incapacity for self-management being demonstrated to the Court. In a relatively informal, conversational setting, and with the benefit of an interpreter (to assist the plaintiff, whose French is better than his English), he was gently examined, cross examined and given opportunities to speak at will. The common assessment of counsel, and myself, was that he is indeed currently incapable of managing his own affairs.
12. The plaintiff presented as a gregarious man, not inhibited by any formality attending the proceedings (or by anything at all), but disoriented in an unfamiliar setting. He spoke of each of Mr Khalifer and the defendant as "a good man". Of the two, only the defendant was present in Court; he greeted the defendant warmly. He displayed flashes of indignation about loss of his home, an awareness that it had been destroyed by fire, and a sense that he had been taken down by somebody. However, he had no clear appreciation of who it was who may have taken advantage of him. He departed the courtroom loudly proclaiming "Happy Easter" to all present. Well received though the proclamation was, it was plainly not appropriate to the occasion save as confirmation of a general loss of mental capacity.
13. Two affidavits, purportedly sworn by the plaintiff on 1 April 2016 and 20 April 2016 respectively, have been formally read in presentation of his case. Both were purportedly sworn after the date upon which the parties agree he was incapable of managing his affairs. With the acquiescence of counsel, I pay no heed to either affidavit in my assessment of the facts of the case. Given the state of the plaintiff's mental health, they are inherently unreliable.
14. At the outset of the final hearing (on 16 May 2017), I recorded a formal notation that "it is agreed between the parties that the plaintiff is presently, by reason of mental illness, incapable of managing his affairs and that he has been so incapable from a date no later than 20 September 2015".
15. That date was selected by the parties by reference to a date upon which the defendant's medico-legal expert (Professor Ian Coyle) personally examined the plaintiff and confirmed his incapacity.
16. After taking the evidence of Professor Coyle and the plaintiff's medico-legal expert (Dr Gail Jamieson) in conclave, the date upon which the plaintiff can uncontroversially be characterised as having been incapable of managing his affairs can be pushed back to 13 December 2014, upon which date Dr Jamieson examined the plaintiff.

CENTRAL QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE

1. There is no challenge to the plaintiff's capacity for self-management at the beginning of 2014 when, on 25 February 2014, he appointed Mr Khalifeh as his enduring attorney and guardian.
2. That leaves most of the year 2014 (more particularly, an indeterminate time between 25 February 2014 and 13 December 2014) as the period during which the plaintiff's capacity for self-management is controversial.
3. The parties agree that the critical time for assessment of his capacity, for the purpose of these proceedings, is 16 September 2014, when he executed the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer under challenge in the proceedings. They agree too that that question of capacity must be determined as capacity to understand, and to transact, the particular business evidenced by those two instruments.
4. The proceedings having been commenced by summons, the parties expressly disclaimed any need for pleadings, content to outline their respective cases in written submissions.
5. It is agreed between them that the central questions for determination are: 1. whether or not the plaintiff had the mental capacity on 16 September 2014 to enter the deed of arrangement and to execute the memorandum of transfer, taking Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423 at 437- 438 as the authoritative statement of the law to be applied upon an assessment of capacity; 2. whether (applying equitable principles discussed in cases such as Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 and Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621) the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer should be set aside as an unconscionable catching bargain; and 3. whether (upon an exercise of jurisdiction for which sections 7, 8, 9 and 19, and clauses 1(a) and 1(b) of Schedule 1, of the Contracts Review Act 1980 NSW provide) those instruments should be declared to have been "unjust", in the circumstances relating to them at the time they were made, and set aside.
6. The parties accept that: 1. notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have signed the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer without the requisite mental capacity, by operation of section 42 of the Real Property Act 1900 the defendant acquired legal title to an estate in remainder in the land upon registration of memorandum of transfer AI909367; but 2. subject to the requisite findings of fact being made, it would be open to the Court to order that the plaintiff be restored to proprietorship of an estate in fee simple in the land on the case sought to be made by the plaintiff because: 1. a person such as the defendant, who has title by virtue of section 42, may nevertheless hold title subject to "personal equities", rights in personam as distinct from rights in rem (Hillpalm Pty Limited v Heaven's Door Pty Limited (2004) 220 CLR 472 at 491 [54]); and 2. the orders sought by the plaintiff by reference to the Contracts Review Act 1980 are of a kind which the Act authorises the Court to make.
7. The plaintiff contends that, by reason of mental incapacity on the part of the plaintiff, the memorandum of transfer was void or, at least, voidable and that, in any event, it should be set aside upon an exercise of the Court's equitable jurisdiction over catching bargains or pursuant to the Contracts Review Act.
8. Whether or not the plaintiff had the requisite mental capacity to enter the deed of arrangement bears directly upon the validity of the deed. If (to the knowledge of the defendant, actual or constructive) he lacked capacity, the deed is void.
9. Because of the operation of the Real Property Act, section 42, the prime relevance of the question whether the plaintiff had the requisite mental capacity to execute the memorandum of transfer might be located in the way in which it feeds into: (a) the Court's equitable jurisdiction to set aside an unconscionable transaction; and (b) its jurisdiction to make orders affecting an "unjust" contract under the Contracts Review Act.

COMPETING CONTENTIONS

1. In presentation of the plaintiff's case, his counsel likened it to Aboody v Ryan [2012] NSWCA 395; 17 BPR 32,359, in which the Court of Appeal (constituted by Bathurst CJ, Allsop P and Campbell JA) affirmed the judgment of Slattery J in Ryan v Aboody [2012] NSWSC 136. Counsel for the defendant strongly contested any analogy between that litigation and this. In the absence of any dispute about the law, the focus for attention must be on the facts of the present case. Reasoning by factual analogy from an earlier case is not a recommended procedure for finding the facts of a particular case. I do not embrace it.
2. In presentation of the defendant's case, counsel laid heavy emphasis on the facts that the proposal for what ultimately became the deed of arrangement originated with the plaintiff (not the defendant); a similar proposal had been put to Mr Khalifeh by the plaintiff before any such proposal was put by the plaintiff to the defendant; the proposal had its ultimate origins in an anxiety on the part of the plaintiff that he needed to adopt such a proposal to avoid losing his home in circumstances in which he was unable, from his own resources or otherwise, to obtain a discharge of the mortgage over the property; and (the defendant contends) the deed of arrangement, as the plaintiff fully understood, gave him precisely what he wanted (to be free of the mortgage and secure in his home) on terms better than those contemplated in the Khalifeh proposal.

CONTEXTUAL FACTS

1. A full appreciation of the parties' competing contentions requires acknowledgement of the following contextual facts: 1. The plaintiff was born in July 1939 in Egypt. 2. In the early 1970s he migrated to Australia from Egypt. 3. Between the late 1970s and her death in 1998, the plaintiff was married to Susie (Souad), the sister of the defendant's father. There were no children of the marriage. 4. The plaintiff and his wife purchased the Campsie land and lived there together for over 30 years. 5. Upon his wife's death, the plaintiff became registered as proprietor of the land as the surviving joint tenant. It was at that time unencumbered. 6. In 2004 the plaintiff mortgaged the land to secure a loan of $200,000 to a friend, Mr Lewis Hiley. 7. Between 2005 and March 2014 or thereabouts, the plaintiff had instructed Hunt and Hunt, solicitors, in unsuccessful endeavours to force Mr Hiley to repay the loan. 8. On 10 August 2011 the plaintiff executed a Will (presently his only known Will) in which he provided a plethora of gifts to charity, together with inconsistent provisions about his preparedness or otherwise to confer testamentary benefits on family. 9. On 28 January 2013 the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident which led him, with assistance from Mr Khalifeh, to instruct his present solicitors (Konstan Lawyers), with whom Mr Khalifeh had a working relationship, to institute proceedings for the recovery of personal injury compensation. 10. Those proceedings were ultimately settled on 5 November 2014 (and the settlement was documented over a period extending to 5 December 2014) without the appointment of any tutor to represent the plaintiff in the proceedings and, apparently, without any substantial concern about the plaintiff's capacity to provide instructions until a conference with counsel (about the current dispute) on 4 December 2014. 11. It was through those solicitors that the plaintiff executed instruments for the appointment of Mr Khalifeh as an enduring attorney and an enduring guardian on 25 February 2014. 12. In March-April 2014 the plaintiff proposed to Mr Khalifeh that, if Mr Khalifeh helped him by paying off the mortgage affecting his land, the plaintiff would, in return, either transfer ownership of the land to Mr Khalifeh or leave it to Mr Khalifeh in his Will. 13. Before he abandoned that proposal (he says, because he realised it was not in the plaintiff's best interests), Mr Khalifeh took the proposal sufficiently seriously to prepare a draft "deed of agreement" dated 9 April 2014 (Exhibit CB 6, Volume 4, page 1391) which was not unlike that ultimately, independently of Mr Khalifeh, prepared by the defendant's solicitor (Mr Anthony Panopolous) as the "deed of arrangement" (Exhibit CB 6, Volume 4, pages 1465-1466 and 1468-1469) under challenge in these proceedings. 14. At different times throughout 2014, a total of six solicitors (four of whom gave evidence at the final hearing of the proceedings) acted for the plaintiff either without forming an opinion that he was incapable of managing his own affairs or being prepared to act for him notwithstanding any doubts that they might have had as to his capacity to understand particular transactions. 15. On 16 June 2014, in circumstances not fully explained in the evidence, the plaintiff was the subject of a Canterbury Hospital "Aged Care Assessment" report of Dr Bruce Boman (a psychiatrist, not called to give evidence in the proceedings) which opined that, at that time, the plaintiff had capacity to manage his own affairs without the appointment of a financial manager (an appointment made by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of NSW (NCAT) under the Guardianship Act 1987 NSW similar to the appointment of a protected estate manager under section 41 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009) and testamentary capacity. 16. The plaintiff is a person who, even in his prime, presented to family and friends as eccentric.
2. Caution is required in the process of assessment of the plaintiff's mental capacity to understand, and to enter, the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer he executed on 16 September 2014 not to be unduly deflected by express, implied or presumed opinions of solicitors who dealt with the plaintiff on other dates and for the transaction of other business. Accepting that an assessment of capacity might be assisted by a review of evidence about the plaintiff's presentation and conduct at different times, and in the transaction of different business, care needs to be taken not to be deflected (although possibly aided) by collateral opinions.
3. In presentation of his case the defendant relied heavily on an inference, or inferences, of capacity said to arise from opinions attributed to solicitors who had had dealings with the plaintiff in 2014. In doing so, he cited observations made by me in Scott v Scott [2012] NSWSC 1541; (2012) 7 ASTLR 299 at [209] and [270] about the utility of contemporaneous observations of an allegedly incapable person, particularly observations of an experienced solicitor.
4. It is as well to set out my treatment of general law principles relating to mental capacity in Scott v Scott at [197]-[209], remembering that the question in that case was whether an enduring power of attorney was valid, not, as here, a question about the validity of a deed of arrangement and an associated memorandum for the transfer of land. Mutatis mutandis, I adhere to the views there expressed: "197 Gibbons v Wright is cited as the pre-eminent Australian authority on the question of the nature and degree of mental capacity to effect an inter vivos transaction. It establishes that different degrees of mental soundness may be required for the validity of different transactions, and that the "standard" is relative to the particular transaction: Crago v McIntyre [1976] 1 NSWLR 729 at 739C-F. 198 The foundation passages appear in the joint judgment of Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ at 91 CLR 437-438: "The law does not prescribe any fixed standard of sanity as requisite for the validity of all transactions. It requires, in relation to each particular matter or piece of business transacted, that each party shall have such soundness of mind as to be capable of understanding the general nature of what he is doing by his participation. ... . .. [The] mental capacity required by the law in respect of any instrument is relative to the particular transaction which is being effected by means of the instrument, and may be described as the capacity to understand the nature of that transaction when it is explained. As Hodson LJ remarked (in Estate of Park [1954] P 89 at 136), 'One cannot consider soundness of mind in the air, so to speak, but only in relation to the facts and the subject-matter of the particular case'. Ordinarily the nature of the transaction means in this connection the broad operation, the 'general purport' of the instrument; but in some cases it may mean the effect of a wider transaction which the instrument is a means of carrying out. ..." 199 What follows from this statement of principle is that each case must be considered on its own facts. Care needs to be taken not to over-generalise. There is no rule of general application relating to all powers of attorney without regard to particular facts. Attention must be focussed on all the circumstances of the case, including the identities of the donor and donee of a disputed power of attorney; their relationship; the terms of the instrument; the nature of the business that might be conducted pursuant to the power; the extent to which the donor might be affected in his or her person or property by an exercise of the power; the circumstances in which the instrument came to be prepared for execution, including any particular purpose for which it may ostensibly have been prepared; and the circumstances in which it was executed. 200 An exploration of all the circumstances of the case will, not uncommonly, call for consideration of events leading up to, and beyond, the time of execution of the disputed power of attorney, as well as on the focal point of the time of execution itself. A longitudinal assessment of mental capacity, along a time line extending either side of the focal point, may be necessary, or at least permissible, in order to examine the subject's mental capacity in context. Medicos and lawyers, alike, tend to embrace that approach. It is difficult to do otherwise. Context has a temporal as well as spacial and relational dimensions. 201 Given equity's tender regard for protection of the weak and considerations of conscience, an examination of the question whether a donor had mental capacity to grant a power of attorney will, not uncommonly, also invite a critical inquiry as to whether any element of undue influence may be discernable. 202 Where an Enduring Power of Attorney confers on an attorney power to dispose of the principal's property to or for the benefit of the attorney or third parties, the nature and degree of mental capacity required to grant such a power may approximate that required for the making of a valid will. In that event, the "standard" laid down by Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 564-565 might apply or be approximated. 203 That "standard" is explained in the following terms: "It is essential to the exercise of [a power to make a will] that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties - that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made." 204 An Enduring Power of Attorney limited in its terms, or effect, to authorisation of acts for the benefit of the principal may require consideration of factors different from those considered upon an assessment of mental capacity for the making of a valid will. 205 It is not, literally, a matter of imposing, or recognising, a different "standard" of mental capacity in the evaluation of the validity of different transactions. What is required, rather, is an appreciation that the concept of "mental capacity" must be assessed relative to the nature, terms, purpose and context of the particular transaction. Nothing more, or less, is required than a focus on whether the subject of inquiry had the capacity to do, or to refrain from doing, the particular thing under review. 206 Insights into appropriate lines of inquiry, or relevant considerations, in a particular case can be obtained from consideration of similar cases in which the validity of similar transactions has been reviewed. However, care needs to be taken not to elevate helpful passages in potentially analogous cases into rules of general application, whether characterised as an applicable "standard" or rules of law or merely practice. At the end of the day, a qualitative judgment needs to be made in each case on the facts of the particular case. Process and form are not unimportant. In some cases, they may point the way to a substantive outcome of a dispute. However, they are not ends in themselves. The focus of the Court must be on the substance of the inquiry whether the particular subject had, in fact, the requisite capacity - understanding - to effect a particular transaction. 207 Assistance in the current proceedings is available from the observations of a variety of judges. 208 The following observations are taken from the judgment of Young J in Ranclaud v Cabban [1988] ANZ ConvR 134: "...whilst it may be one thing to be aware that a person under a Power of Attorney may act on one's behalf, where the Power, as in the present case, is a general power under s 163B and Schedule VII of the Conveyancing Act 1919 [the precursors of s 8 and Schedule 2 of the Power of Attorney Act 2003], such a power permits the donee to exercise any function which the donor may lawfully authorise an Attorney to do. When considering whether a person is capable of giving that sort of power one would have to be sure not only that she understood that she was authorising someone to look after her affairs but also what sort of things the Attorney could do without further reference to her. ... [p 136]. ... [In the present case] experienced solicitors on both sides have witnessed Powers of Attorney and Revocations of Powers. One might ask how a person who was incapable could make a Power of Attorney in the presence of such professional gentlemen. I think the answer is relatively clear. A person only seeing a little bit of the picture and seeing [the Principal] for a short time... may well form the view that it is safe to allow [the Principal] to proceed. It is only when one gets a complete overview of the evidence that one can see just how incapable [the Principal] really is. ... [p 137]." 209 His Honour's observations should not be taken as a general criticism of the utility of evidence of an experienced legal practitioner called as a witness to the execution of an instrument the subject of controversy about the mental capacity of an executing party. In Zorbas v Sidiopoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 at [89] he recounted his experience that, in probate cases, "the most valuable evidence is usually given by the experienced solicitor who witnessed the will as opposed to a very highly qualified psychiatrist whose evidence is based not on any personal observation of the testator, but who has reasoned his or her opinion from medical and hospital notes". One is tempted to adapt Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous aphorism (in the opening lines of The Common Law, 1881): "The life of the law is not logic, but experience". That is not wholly correct, however. In particular, an acknowledgement should be made of the importance of expert medical evidence as a lens through which a myriad of facts can be seen in context, as a guide to correct decision-making and as a safeguard against error."
5. In its critical review of the facts of the particular case the Court must make use of whatever evidence may be available as bearing upon the decision to be made. However, the nature of that decision is such as to counsel caution against undue reliance upon particular pieces of evidence. The evidence must be viewed as a whole, taking care not to make unwarranted assumptions.

The opinion of Dr Boman, 16 June 2014

1. The defendant placed considerable reliance upon the opinion of Dr Bruce Boman recorded on 16 June 2014 in a Canterbury Hospital Discharge Report on the plaintiff. That report expressed an opinion that the plaintiff possessed both capacity to manage his own affairs without a financial manager and testamentary capacity.
2. The precise circumstances in which Dr Boman prepared his report - a hand written document in the form of a routine clinical note - are unknown. Dr Boman was not called to give evidence. Neither party has adduced evidence to explain his absence from the witness box. Both sides of the record disclaim knowledge of the circumstances in which the report was prepared; but the defendant invites the Court to infer (as might well be inferred) that it might have been prepared at the instigation of Mr Khalifer as a preliminary to the plaintiff's adoption of Mr Khalifer's draft deed dated 9 April 2014. The terms of that draft deed exhibit an awareness of a need to address the plaintiff's mental state; they include a proposed "declaration" by the plaintiff that he was "of sound mind".
3. The headline opinion of the report (that the plaintiff possessed capacity to transact business) attracts attention; but it also invites inquiry as to why the report was prepared at all (Did the plaintiff present as a person who needed confirmation of his capacity as a preliminary to the transaction of business?) and what information Dr Boman had when forming the opinion expressed.
4. There are two particular suggestions on the face of the report that Dr Boman might not have had the benefit of accurate information about the plaintiff's affairs in formation of the opinion of capacity.
5. First, in its consideration of the plaintiff's testamentary capacity, the report recorded that the plaintiff "wants a $100,000 or so to go to" a school in Egypt, without any apparent appreciation that the plaintiff had made a Will on 10 August 2011 providing for a full array of gifts to charitable organisations and others, one of which was a gift of $80,000 to a Catholic convent in Egypt.
6. On any view, the Will is a document open to debate because it both confers gifts on the plaintiff's late wife's family and disclaims any intention to do so. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Dr Boman's summary of what he was told by the plaintiff about testamentary intentions does not sit altogether comfortably with the Will or the fact that the plaintiff evidently made no mention of the Will. It may be, as Mr Khalifer deposed in cross examination (transcript page 178) that the plaintiff wanted to change his Will. However, if that be the fact, it was evidently not communicated to Dr Boman. The possibility that the plaintiff was confused about his testamentary intentions, or forgetful about subsisting arrangements for their implementation, cannot be excluded in the absence of any evidence from Dr Boman in elaboration of the report.
7. Secondly, in its treatment of the mortgage on the plaintiff's land, the report appears to have the plaintiff say that he wanted to "compensate his friend" (presumably Mr Khalifer) for having "saved him from his current financial problem". In context, this suggests that the plaintiff thought, or might have thought, contrary to the fact, that the mortgage had been discharged. In any event, it suggests that Dr Boman was not provided with accurate information about the plaintiff's financial circumstances, an important factor in consideration of the plaintiff's capacity given the plaintiff's preoccupation with being "saved" from the risk of a mortgagee sale.
8. Upon an assessment of Dr Boman's opinion as evidence bearing upon the plaintiff's capacity as at 16 September 2014, allowance must, in any event, be made for the passage of three months from June to September. The plaintiff's mental health was in a state of decline during 2014, the rate and progress of which (Professor Coyle confirmed) cannot be known in the absence of precise, contemporaneous records.
9. Taking everything into account, the opinion expressed by Dr Boman on 16 June 2014 in the abstract is not a reliable guide to an assessment of the plaintiff's capacity to transact the particular business purportedly transacted by the plaintiff on 16 September 2014.

The Report of Margaret Kennedy-Gould dated 27 July 2014

1. On 18 June 2014 Margaret Kennedy-Gould, an Occupational Therapist, interviewed the plaintiff in his home environment . Mr Khalifer was present at the beginning and end of the interview, but not during it . Ms Kennedy-Gould prepared a report dated 27 July 2014 (Exhibit CB6, Volume 4, pages 1397-1415) which Mr Khalifer, on 19 September 2014, assured Konstan Lawyers he had discussed with the plaintiff.
2. The Kennedy-Gould report was prepared in aid of the plaintiff's compensation claim. It presented the plaintiff as "a rather frail elderly man, somewhat flamboyant in his appearance". It alluded to problems experienced by Ms Kennedy-Gould in communication with him, some the product of language, some possibly attributable to capacity limitations. However, it recorded that the plaintiff "seemed to be generally oriented to time, place and person", and that a formal assessment by a clinical psychologist and geriatrician would be required to determine whether [he had] any cognitive problems attributable to [his] accident".

The ACAT Report dated 20 January 2015

1. On 20 January 2015 an Aged Care Assessment Team Assessor (Ms HM Hislop) reported on her assessment of the plaintiff on 16 January 2015, following his displacement by destruction of his residence by fire and as a preliminary to his possible admission to nursing home accommodation or a substitute programme of care. She recorded a diagnosis of dementia, but reported that he was alert, oriented and able to concentrate on the assessment, and apparently able to cope living on his own, with assistance: Exhibit CB6, Volume 4, pages 1578 and 1580.
2. Dr Jamieson, with whom Professor Coyle agreed, did not regard this report (prepared for the purpose of assessing a need for, and an entitlement to, government assistance) as definitive of the plaintiff's mental state or as an impediment to her conclusion that the plaintiff was incapable of managing his own affairs when she examined him on 13 December 2014.
3. It is no criticism of an ACAT Report to recognise its purpose-driven character, as must be done in the present proceedings.

The evidence of Professor Coyle and Dr Jamison

1. In a joint report dated 15 February 2017 (Exhibit CB6, Volume 3, page 112 et seq) Professor Coyle and Dr Jamieson (at paragraph 25) expressed an opinion to the effect that, if the plaintiff had the legal capacity to comprehend legal advice and to give instructions to his lawyers in the settling of his compensation claim, then it could not logically follow that he had a lack of capacity with respect to execution of the deed of arrangement and memorandum of transfer.
2. That opinion was based upon assumptions about the nature and complexity of the two different tasks, the adequacy of legal advice and assistance given to the plaintiff in the performance of those tasks, the competency of particular legal practitioners to express an opinion on mental capacity, and the course of events relating to the performance of particular tasks not the subject of direct evidence in these proceedings.
3. When confronted (at transcript pages 203-206) with an expression of doubt on my part about the correctness of the opinion expressed in paragraph 25 of the joint report, both Professor Coyle and Dr Jamieson accepted that it was overly simplistic and based upon incomplete information. An assessment of capacity is fact-sensitive, both as to time and the nature of business to be transacted. Capacity can fluctuate over time. It can also depend upon the nature of assistance available to the person whose capacity is the subject of assessment.
4. Drawing, particularly, upon both their joint report and the oral evidence that Professor Coyle and Dr Jamieson gave in conclave (without, it must be said, the benefit of an opportunity to hear other evidence adduced at the final hearing of the proceedings), the following observations about the plaintiff's mental capacity on 16 September 2014 can be made without controversy: 1. He was suffering from dementia, probably Alzheimer's Disease. 2. He was highly suggestible. 3. He was vulnerable to undue influence. 4. He would not have been able to understand anything complex. 5. He probably would have understood that, if he signed the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer as presented to him, that would rid him of the mortgage; but he probably would not have been able to understand any greater complexity than that. 6. His capacity to understand the deed of arrangement, the memorandum of transfer and what was proposed to be done with them would have depended upon what explanations were given to him, who was present at the time business was transacted, and other variables such as the level of stress he was under and fluctuations in his condition.
5. A critical factor in consideration of each of the central questions for decision in the current proceedings is the nature and quality of any explanation given to the plaintiff about the proposed documentation, and the underlying transaction(s), in the period between the time when such business was first proposed earlier in 2014 and 16 September 2014.

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. In their respective submissions directed towards the validity or otherwise of the business transacted on 16 September 2014 the parties paid particularly close attention to the sequence of events between 25 February 2014 (when the plaintiff appointed Mr Khalifeh his enduring attorney and enduring guardian) and 13 December 2014, when Dr Jamieson assessed the plaintiff's competency.
2. The beginning of the period coincided with a realisation that the plaintiff had been, and would be likely to continue to be, unsuccessful in his endeavours (through Hunt & Hunt, solicitors) to force Mr Hiley to obtain a discharge of the mortgage over the plaintiff's land. At about the same time the plaintiff turned to Mr Khalifeh for assistance, using Konstan Lawyers, who (on the recommendation of Mr Khalifeh) were acting for him in relation to his personal injury compensation claim.
3. Between March and August 2014 or thereabouts there was a time during which the plaintiff looked to Mr Khalifeh to service the mortgage, if not to discharge it. For at least part of that time, if not the whole time, the plaintiff and Mr Khalifeh appear to have been working on the basis that, if Mr Khalifeh paid out the loan secured by the mortgage, the plaintiff would transfer his land to Mr Khalifeh, or leave it to Mr Khalifeh on his death, as a means of being able to remain in his own home for as long as he could, passing it over only when no longer needed. The draft deed dated 9 April 2014 and the medical report dated 16 June 2014 prepared by Dr Boman are consistent with steps being taken by or on behalf of the plaintiff and Mr Khalifeh towards implementation of such a proposal.
4. Whether or not, and how, that proposal would have resulted in Mr Khalifeh obtaining an interest in the land beyond a right to reimbursement of interest instalments he made on behalf of the plaintiff is a subject for speculation. It causes critical attention to be given to the evidence of Mr Khalifer and, indeed, to the whole case advanced on behalf of the plaintiff; but, ultimately, it does little more than that. It does, however, confirm the tendency of mind of the plaintiff in thinking about how to rid himself of his troublesome mortgage.
5. A turning point in the fate of the plaintiff's land came at the end of August 2014. That is when the plaintiff showed the defendant a letter dated 28 August 2014 from his mortgagee: Exhibit CB6, Volume 4, page 1438. Absent Mr Khalifeh's explanation of the mechanics attending his servicing of the plaintiff's mortgage, it lent an appearance of truth to a suggestion that Mr Khalifeh, like Mr Hiley before him, had let the plaintiff down in attempts to free the plaintiff's land from the threat of a forced, mortgagee sale. With that explanation, suspicion of Mr Khalifeh loses force. It does not dissipate entirely, but it does lose force.
6. An apprehension on the part of the defendant that Mr Khalifeh was taking advantage of the plaintiff led to a meeting between all three men in early September 2014, an encounter which set in train a tug-of-war between the defendant and Mr Khalifeh centred upon the plaintiff's land.
7. After the meeting, according to the defendant, the plaintiff told the defendant that, if the defendant paid out the mortgage debt, he would give his land to the defendant. Whether or not (as Mr Khalifeh asserts and the defendant denies) the defendant had at the meeting asserted a claim of familial ownership of the land, the defendant readily embraced the plaintiff's proposal that he could acquire the land if he paid out the mortgage. He actively encouraged the plaintiff to take that path. He counselled no caution.
8. Between 3-18 September 2014 or thereabouts the defendant took the initiative in arranging the plaintiff's affairs, including execution of a revocation of the power of attorney held by Mr Khalifeh; a valuation of the plaintiff's land; the preparation and execution of the deed of arrangement and memorandum of transfer presently under challenge; discharge of the mortgage over the land as a prerequisite for registration of the transfer; and the making of arrangements for the plaintiff both to retain the defendant's own solicitor to do most of the legal work associated with the proposed transfer and to obtain "independent" advice from another solicitor nominated by the defendant.
9. With the defendant, the plaintiff attended upon the defendant's then solicitor (Mr Anthony Panopolous of Alphonse & Associates) on each of 4, 8 and 16 September 2014. The first two attendances were largely preliminary to those on 16 September 2014. At the instigation of the defendant, between two separate attendances upon Mr Panopolous on 16 September 2014, the plaintiff obtained legal advice on the deed of arrangement (advice limited to the deed, without a critical examination of the whole transaction or its wisdom) from Mr Tony Taouk, another solicitor, of Magna Carta Lawyers.
10. On 4 September 2014 the plaintiff signed a letter of authority for Mr Panopolous to obtain all his files from Konstan Lawyers. On 8 September 2014 the plaintiff signed an instrument purportedly revoking Mr Khalifeh's power of attorney.
11. On 8 September 2014 Mr Panopolous sent two letters which produced blow back against the defendant. One was a letter to Konstan Lawyers enclosing the plaintiff's direction for release of his files. The other was a letter to Mr Khalifeh enclosing the plaintiff's revocation of his power of attorney.
12. On 11 September 2014 Mr Khalifeh obtained from the plaintiff a typed authority to Konstan Lawyers purporting to withdraw the plaintiff's direction that they deliver their files to Mr Panopolous, and purporting to withdraw his revocation of Mr Khalifeh's power of attorney. That authority was not sent to Mr Panopolous immediately.
13. Between 11-19 September 2014 or thereabouts there appears to have been a period during which Mr Khalifeh was unaware that the plaintiff's land was in the process of being transferred out of the plaintiff's sole ownership and the defendant was unaware that Konstan Lawyers were acting for the plaintiff in compensation proceedings. That period came to an end when Mr Khalifeh discovered what had happened with the land.
14. There followed a period during which the plaintiff appears to have been torn between the defendant and Mr Khalifeh, leaning one way then the other. During that period, on or about 21 September 2014, the defendant says that the plaintiff asked him to "reverse" the land transfer on the basis that Mr Khalifeh had told him that he, Mr Khalifeh, would do for the plaintiff what the defendant was doing.
15. That period came to an end on or about 2 October 2014 when Mr Panopolous received a letter (dated 1 October 2014) from Konstan Lawyers enclosing an authority from the plaintiff directing him to forward the plaintiff's documents to Konstan Lawyers.
16. In presentation of his case, the defendant contends that the plaintiff deliberately kept separate all business associated with his transfer of land and all business associated with conduct of his compensation proceedings. That seems unlikely. The more plausible inference is that the plaintiff, unable to manage his affairs without assistance, went with the flow of what was arranged for him, or said to him, by the defendant and Mr Khalifeh without sufficient insight to ensure that everybody was aware of the broader picture.
17. The defendant contends there is some incongruity in the fact that on 5 November 2014, apparently dealing with separate people within the office of Konstan Lawyers, the plaintiff both settled his compensation claim and gave preliminary instructions for action to be taken to recover his land. Particular incongruity is seen in the taking of instructions to settle compensation proceedings contemporaneously with the setting in train of an action which, in due course, included an allegation of mental incapacity.
18. That there is an element of incongruity cannot be denied, but the defendant makes too much of it.
19. In a state of imperfect knowledge, Konstan Lawyers instructed junior counsel for the plaintiff to provide advice and, in a conference held on 4 December 2014, having met the plaintiff, counsel recommended that a geriatrician be consulted. That led to the plaintiff being examined by Dr Jamieson.
20. In retrospect, all persons involved in these proceedings may have been better off than they now can be had steps been taken immediately to have the plaintiff's estate subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, whether upon an application to NCAT for the appointment of a financial manager or on an application to the Court for the appointment of a protected estate manager.
21. That would have saved both the plaintiff's tutor and Mr Khalifeh (on the one side) and the defendant (on the other side) from a tendency to view the plaintiff's dilemma through the prism of a mutual attribution of bad faith, subordinating the welfare of the plaintiff to a process of litigation which has exposed them all to ruinous legal costs, with consequent delay in sorting out the plaintiff's affairs.

ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE

1. I am satisfied that: 1. the plaintiff was incapable of understanding the business purportedly transacted by him on 16 September 2014 without assistance that included a careful explanation of disadvantages (as well as advantages) attending it, taking into account his present and prospective needs and alternative courses of action open to him. 2. the plaintiff did not receive that assistance from any person. 3. with one exception, the defendant, Mr Panopolous and Mr Taouk proceeded upon an assumption that they could, and did, discharge any obligation owed to the plaintiff if they satisfied themselves (as they evidently did) that the plaintiff was sincere in his expression of a desire to transfer his land to the defendant in return for obtaining a discharge of the mortgage arising from Mr Hiley's borrowing. The exception is to be found in Mr Panopolous' proposal (implemented without any apparent input, and no understanding, on the part of the plaintiff) that the plaintiff be protected by securing him a life estate in the land rather than subjecting him to an absolute transfer of the land in favour of the defendant. 4. from the perspective of the plaintiff, the terms of the deed of arrangement and transfer were improvident in that: (i) they deprived the plaintiff of access to capital should he require it in his declining years; (ii) in a practical sense, they subjected him to discretionary decisions on the part of the defendant in management of the land and the provision of support; (iii) they made no provision for protection of the plaintiff from a remainderman other than the defendant should the defendant die or should his interest in the land be sold or charged to somebody else; and (iv) the remainder interest created in favour of the defendant was disposed of by the plaintiff at an undervalue.
2. Mr Panopolous impressed me as a witness prepared, as a professional man, to concede that, in retrospect, the advice he gave to the plaintiff may have been less than adequate; that he may have seen his role, primarily, as protection of the interests of the defendant as an established client; that he may have failed to comply with the plaintiff's instructions by omitting to include in the deed of arrangement express provision for what would occur if the plaintiff needed admission to a nursing home; and that, in sending the plaintiff away to get independent legal advice, he failed to arm the plaintiff, or any solicitor prospectively advising the plaintiff, with details of the instructions given to him by the plaintiff sufficient to enable the plaintiff to receive appropriately critical advice.
3. Mr Taouk's performance of the obligations of an independent solicitor appears to have been irretrievably compromised by an erroneous belief that it was sufficient for him to take the plaintiff through the draft deed of arrangement, without general inquiries about the plaintiff's circumstances, because: (a) the plaintiff appeared content to transfer his land to the defendant in return for a discharge of the mortgage over the land; and, significantly (b) in Mr Taouk's understanding of his obligations, the plaintiff and the defendant were members of the one, united family.
4. I do not share Mr Taouk's confidence in his ability to judge the plaintiff's capacity or to provide competent, thorough, independent advice to his elderly client. Observance of forms in the provision of independent advice is no substitute for substance in the provision of advice. It was not enough for Mr Taouk to confine his advice (as he did) to the terms of the deed of arrangement to be executed without calling for associated documentation referred to in the draft deed (such as the memorandum of transfer to be executed), without exploring the underlying transactions (the mortgage and discharge, the creation of separate property interests to be held by the parties, and loosely drafted contractual entitlements) and without testing the plaintiff's understanding of the legal and financial implications of what he proposed to do that day (including the plaintiff's general testamentary intentions).
5. The fact that neither Mr Panopolous nor Mr Taouk made inquiries of the solicitors who were acting for the plaintiff in his compensation proceedings, or of Mr Khalifer as the plaintiff's attorney, cannot be excused by the closeness of any association between the plaintiff and the defendant or by the defendant's suspicions about Mr Khalifer.
6. The plaintiff's age, his status as a widower without children, his evident eccentricities, the nature of the transaction as a conveyance of the plaintiff's home out of his sole ownership, his dependency upon a pension for his livelihood, and the role of the defendant in arranging for the transaction to be effected, and for legal services attending it to be provided, were sufficient to ring alarm bells about the plaintiff's capacity and vulnerability.
7. The transaction, if effected, would operate to supplant any Will that the plaintiff may have made. Notwithstanding that, his general testamentary intentions were not explored. Neither was the possibility that there might be others than the defendant who might reasonably be thought to be objects of his bounty or to have a call upon it.
8. Instead of heeding any alarm bells, Messrs Panopolous and Taouk pressed ahead, in haste, apparently relying upon a perceived need for expedition borne of the plaintiff's anxiety to be rid of the mortgage charged on his land, and the defendant's desire to close his deal with the plaintiff, as quickly as possible.
9. A curious omission in steps taken by the defendant to protect the plaintiff's interests is the fact that revocation of Mr Khalifer's power of attorney was not accompanied by a revocation of his appointment as an enduring guardian. The defendant's focus appears to have been overly concentrated on the plaintiff's estate, to the exclusion of his person. This was even though, as the plaintiff's guardian, Mr Khalifer might reasonably be expected to have a role in deciding when, and where, the plaintiff might move from his home towards nursing home accommodation.
10. The focused attention of the plaintiff, the defendant, Mr Panopolous and Mr Taouk upon giving effect to the plaintiff's proposal for transferring title to his land in return for a discharge of the mortgage, without exploring the availability of alternatives open to the plaintiff, operated to blind all participants in the process to the plaintiff's want of capacity; his vulnerability to exploitation; and his need for financial, if not estate planning, advice generally.
11. Had the solicitors inquired of the plaintiff about the existence of a Will, they might have discovered his desire to benefit charity from his estate and, inconsistent though the terms of his Will may have been, a desire to withhold benefits from the defendant's family.
12. They might also have exposed for consideration, as an alternative to the proposal narrowly given effect, the possibility that the plaintiff's mortgage might have been discharged by the defendant as consideration for a contractual promise on the part of the plaintiff to make a Will in his favour.
13. Even if, as the defendant says, the defendant might not have been prepared to come at such an arrangement, any discussion of it, or other alternatives, might at least have exposed for the plaintiff's attention that his best interests might have resided in an arm's length sale of his residence, not an uncommercial, conditional gift of it.
14. The plaintiff adduced expert evidence directed to establishing a value for the plaintiff's life estate, and a corresponding value for the defendant's remainder interest, as at 16 September 2014. That evidence necessarily depended upon assumptions about the market value of the land (agreed at $675,000); the gross rental value of the land; and future expenses referable to the land, as well as the plaintiff's life expectancy.
15. Taking all variables into account, a fair inference is that the remainder interest acquired by the defendant for the price of obtaining a discharge of the mortgage charged on the land was acquired at a substantial discount: something in excess of $250,000. Against that, it must be noted, for and against both parties, that any decisions made about dealing with the land in September 2014 were necessarily made in a state of uncertainty about how long the plaintiff might live and what, if any, special needs he might have for his maintenance in the future.
16. The parties engaged in hot controversy over whether or not the transfer of the plaintiff's land in September 2014 did, or did not, put his pension at risk. Despite suggestions to the contrary, I very much doubt whether this was the subject of any advice given to the plaintiff by the solicitors.
17. Nor do I regard it as necessary for me to make a determination about the correct interpretation, and likely operation, of legislation and administrative policies attending the administration of the plaintiff's pension. Deficiencies in the advice tendered to the plaintiff may have been aggravated by a failure to consider a risk to his pension entitlements. They were, however, of a much broader character.
18. I am not satisfied that the plaintiff, the defendant or either of the solicitors who treated with the plaintiff fully understood the nature, or practical implications, of creation of a life estate with an interest in remainder. I am reasonably confident that neither solicitor tendered advice to the plaintiff about the potential operation of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1898 NSW, assuming (contrary to the tenor of expert medical opinion) that he could have understood it. Mr Panopolous conceded that he did not; I doubt Mr Taouk's evidence that he did so. Moreover, in a case which required precision in drafting of the terms of any agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant the deed of arrangement was imprecise: in its treatment of the plaintiff's entitlements to support from the defendant and contingencies that might arise in the event of the plaintiff's need for nursing home accommodation, and in case of the defendant's death or desire to deal with the property in his own interests.
19. The improvident nature of the business transacted on 16 September 2014 might not have been realised, in fact as well as potential, had the plaintiff's house not been destroyed by fire. Even as late as final submissions during the course of the hearing of these proceedings, the defendant offered an undertaking said to ensure that the plaintiff can obtain financial assistance from him necessary for the plaintiff to remain in nursing home accommodation appropriate to his needs, an undertaking not easy to give proper, practical effect even if well intentioned. Assuming it could be properly policed by or on behalf of the plaintiff, it would increase the plaintiff's dependency on the defendant.
20. The destruction of the plaintiff's house by fire exposed a need for critical examination of the character of the business transacted on 16 September 2014. The fact that the fire was caused (on 3 January 2015) by misadventure on the part of the plaintiff is consistent with his lacking a capacity for self-management in the conduct of the ordinary affairs of life by that time. Nor is it any less so for the fact that a year earlier than that fire the plaintiff's neglect of his kitchen stove had caused another fire.
21. In response to criticism that nobody apprised the plaintiff of disadvantages attending the business to be transacted on 6 September 2014, the defendant bravely asserted that there were no disadvantages at all: principally, perhaps, because of a central premise that (a) the plaintiff fully understood what he was getting himself into, having been the originator of a proposal to the defendant and (b) the deed of arrangement was, arguably, more beneficial to the plaintiff than the draft deed prepared by Mr Khalifer.
22. This contention is defective in more than one way. It assumes, contrary to the fact, that the plaintiff was able to understand his own business, and what was and was not in his own interests. It ignores the deprivation of the plaintiff of any access to capital tied up in his land should he need access to capital in his declining years. It manifests a misconceived tendency to view the proceedings as a contest between Mr Khalifer and the defendant, rather than a contest between the plaintiff and the defendant.
23. The defendant's late offer of an undertaking to support the plaintiff in his nursing home accommodation, should the proceedings be dismissed, cannot deflect attention from a need to examine the character and enforceability of the deed of arrangement, and the memorandum of transfer, at the time they were executed. Objectively, jointly and severally, those instruments were improvident.
24. Even if the defendant's undertaking were to be accepted, there is no firm foundation in the evidence for confidence that it would not be honoured in the breach. It was an undertaking proferred after the close of evidence. The defendant's capacity to honour it was not explored.

The Plaintiff's mental capacity

1. Absent a necessary, careful explanation of the business to be transacted on 16 September 2014, the plaintiff lacked the mental capacity to transact it. He was fixated on being rid of his troublesome mortgage, without understanding how that could be, or was to be, brought about, and without understanding the disadvantages to him in the manner of which it was proposed that he be rid of the mortgage. He signed what was suggested to him he should sign to be rid of the mortgage, without any appreciation of the meaning or legal and financial implications of the creation of a life estate in himself, the conferral of a remainder interest in his land upon the defendant or the respective rights and obligations of himself and the defendant. He signed the documentation without any appreciation of the fact, or extent, of his future dependence on the defendant for security and support, or appreciation that the defendant acquired a present entitlement to his land.
2. The defendant ought to have known of the plaintiff's incapacity to transact the business of 16 September 2014 (based upon his knowledge and experience of the plaintiff as a frail, elderly man open to suggestion) but he implicitly relied upon solicitors (Messrs Panopolous and Taouk) to protect him in the transaction of that business by ostensibly standing between the parties.
3. The solicitors, for their part, were not sufficiently vigilant, or protective of the interests of the plaintiff, to see in fact, or to guard against, the plaintiff's incapacity. Their intervention between the parties was too formal to address, let alone to overcome, the plaintiff's lack of understanding of the business transacted or its wider implications for him. The plaintiff was manifestly elderly, frail and suggestible. He acquiesced in what was put before him. Mr Panopolous recognised a conflict between the interests of the parties but left the defendant to arrange for the plaintiff to receive "independent" advice about the deed of arrangement before he, himself, resumed a course of acting for both parties. Mr Taouk recognised a need to question the plaintiff's capacity (in view of age and frailty) but set a low threshold for capacity because of his uncritical acceptance of the proposed transaction as intra-family business.
4. At common law, the plaintiff's want of mental capacity to transact the business of 16 September 2014, coupled with the defendant's state of knowledge of it, is sufficient to render the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer void.
5. By virtue of section 42 of the Real Property Act 1900, registration of the memorandum of transfer was sufficient to vest legal title in the parties in accordance with its terms, but the defendant's interest in the land is subject to personal equities.

The unconscionability of the Deed of Arrangement and the Memorandum of Transfer.

1. Whether or not it is correct to characterise the plaintiff as wanting in mental capacity to transact the business of 16 September 2014, his age, frailty and state of health were sufficient to attract characterisation as a special disability, recognising that he was at a serious disadvantage, vis-a-vis the defendant in transacting that business at that time. He was unable to make a sound judgement as to his own best interests, or to protect his own interests.
2. Knowing of the plaintiff's age and frailty, in circumstances in which he ought also to have known of the plaintiff's vulnerability, the defendant took advantage of the plaintiff's weakness of mind and body in rushing him towards entry into improvident business.
3. The defendant's conduct, in inducing the plaintiff to transact that business and in retaining the benefit of it for himself, was unconscientious. He cannot, in good conscience, retain the benefit of the bargain.
4. To the extent that they might otherwise have legal force, the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer are liable to be set aside in equity, and the defendant must be viewed as holding his interest in the plaintiff's land on trust for the plaintiff, subject only to the plaintiff himself doing equity by allowing for the defendant's discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage.

The Contracts Review Act 1980 NSW

1. The plaintiff's case can be accommodated by an application of equitable principle without necessary resort to the Contracts Review Act 1980.
2. Nevertheless, for completeness, the availability to the plaintiff of relief under the Contracts Review Act is noted.
3. Each of the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer warrants characterisation as an "unjust" contract in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made, paraphrasing section 7(1) of the Act and noting both the definition of "unjust" in section 4(1) of the Act (as including "unconscionable, harsh or oppressive") and the factors enumerated in section 9 of the Act as material to the finding of a contract as "unjust".
4. The contracts were attended by both procedural and substantive injustice (West v AGC (Advances) Limited (1986) 5 NSWLR 610 at 620), manifested in the improvident character of the business thereby transacted and the inadequacy, and haste, of the advice tendered to the plaintiff in the transaction of it.
5. The plaintiff's frailty of mind and body, his vulnerability to exploitation, and his suggestibility - in short, his special disability or disadvantage - deprived the process of the defendant's reaching of an agreement with him, and the resultant agreement, of any entitlement to be characterised as "just". In reality, there was a marked inequality in bargaining power between the plaintiff and the defendant. The contractual documentation was not the subject of negotiation in any real sense because the plaintiff was incapable of engaging in any form of negotiation; he simply acquiesced in arrangements made by the defendant. The plaintiff did not receive legal or other advice that was truly independent of the defendant and that brought home to him the improvident nature of the business proposed to be transacted. He was vulnerable to exploitation, and he was exploited, by his rushed entry into improvident business.
6. The public interest, consulted as required by section 9, in all the circumstances of the case, favours a finding of "unjust contract" in respect of the deed of arrangement and the memorandum of transfer, jointly and severally.
7. Within the paradigm for which section 7(1) of the Act provides, and for the purpose of avoiding so far as practicable an unjust consequence or result, the justice of the case dictates that (paying due regard to sections 7, 8 and 19 of the Act, as well as Schedule 1) orders be made having the effect of declaring that the defendant holds his interest in the plaintiff's land on terms that provide for the defendant to be compensated for his discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage.
8. In substance, the relief available under the Contracts Review Act is the same as that available in equity.

PROPOSED ORDERS

1. Subject to: (a) allowing the parties an opportunity to be heard as to the form of orders to be made; (b) due consideration of whether any (and, if so, what) orders should be made upon an exercise of protective jurisdiction affecting the estate of the plaintiff; and (c) due consideration also of costs questions, particularly so far as they might affect the estate of the plaintiff, I propose to make orders to the following effect: 1. DECLARE that neither the deed of arrangement nor the memorandum of transfer executed by the plaintiff and the defendant on 16 September 2014 is binding on the plaintiff. 2. DECLARE that: (a) the land contained in Folio Identifier 1/103764 and (b) the insurance compensation paid consequentially upon destruction of the building on that land on 3 January 2015, are held on trust for the plaintiff, subject only to a charge in favour of the defendant in a sum (to be agreed between the parties or, in default of agreement, determined by the Court) sufficient to compensate the defendant for his discharge of mortgage AB 207266, with interest calculated at a reasonable rate. 3. ORDER that, subject to that charge, an estate in fee simple in the land contained in Folio Identifier 1/103769 vest in the plaintiff for his own use and benefit.
2. The costs incurred in the prosecution, and defence, of these proceedings present difficulties potentially more difficult than the balance of the proceedings.
3. I am mindful that, notwithstanding criticism directed to both sides of the record, each of Mr Khalifer, the tutor for the plaintiff and the defendant pursued the proceedings, in part, because of a belief (at times misguided) that, by doing so, he was acting in the best interests of the plaintiff.
4. Whether (and, if so, to what extent) the general rule that "costs follow the event" should be displaced by the approach adopted upon an exercise of protective jurisdiction is a question that requires consideration, as does the question whether recourse to the plaintiff's estate to pay costs should be limited in any way.
5. In the careful husbanding of the plaintiff's estate that is required in the wake of these proceedings, it might also be appropriate, if not necessary, to give consideration to whether orders should be made (under Chapter 2 of the Succession Act 2006 NSW) for the making of a statutory will on behalf of the plaintiff. His current Will does not accommodate his circumstances or, if Mr Khalifeh's evidence be accepted, his testamentary intentions; it is inconsistent in its treatment of the defendant's family. If any part of the costs of these proceedings is, directly or indirectly, to be charged against his estate it might be done by a combination of orders that includes provision for a statutory will tailored to ensure that the resources available to him in his declining years are not diminished by the costs of the proceedings .

Introduction

1. On 28 June 2017 I published, as my principal reasons for judgment in these proceedings, a judgment styled Raoul (by his tutor Karamihas) v Hanna [2017] NSWSC 728.
2. On 30 June 2017 I made orders and notations that included the following, designed to give effect to those reasons: "2. DECLARE that neither the deed of arrangement nor the memorandum of transfer executed by the plaintiff and the defendant on 16 September 2014 is binding on the plaintiff. 3. DECLARE that: (a) the land contained in Folio Identifier 1/103764 and (b) the insurance compensation paid consequentially upon destruction of the building on that land on 3 January 2015, are held on trust for the plaintiff, subject only to a charge in favour of the defendant in a sum (to be agreed between the parties or, in default of agreement, determined by the Court) sufficient to compensate the defendant for his discharge of mortgage AB 207266, with interest calculated at a reasonable rate. 4. ORDER that, subject to that charge, an estate in fee simple in the land contained in Folio Identifier 1/103764 vest in the plaintiff for his own use and benefit. 5. RESERVE to the defendant liberty to contend that the compensation to be allowed to him should include an allowance for any increase in the capital value of the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764 following his procuring of a discharge of the mortgage AB207266. 6. DECLARE, pursuant to section 41(1)(a) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 NSW, that the plaintiff is incapable of managing his affairs. 7. ORDER, pursuant to section 41(1)(a) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009, that the estate of the plaintiff be subject to management under the Act. 8. RESERVE for further consideration all questions relating to the identity of the person or persons to be appointed as manager of the protected estate of the plaintiff. 9. ORDER, pending determination of those questions or further order of the Court, that the NSW Trustee be appointed as receiver and manager of the estate of the plaintiff with all the powers and discretions that it would have if management of the plaintiff's estate were committed to it pursuant to section 41(1)(b) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act. 10. ORDER (without prejudice to the generality of the preceding order) that, as receiver and manager of the estate of the plaintiff, the NSW Trustee: a) take possession of the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764 and the insurance compensation paid consequentially upon destruction of the building on that land on 3 January 2015 (as well as any other property that might comprise the estate of the plaintiff) and hold the same pending further orders of the Court; b) be at liberty to apply any part of the estate of the plaintiff in payment of ordinary expenses associated with the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764; and c) be at liberty to apply to the Court, should it be minded so to do, for leave to effect a sale of the land on notice to the plaintiff's tutor (Emmanuel Karamihas) and the defendant. 11. ORDER, subject to further order, that, pursuant to rule 7.15(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW, Emmanuel Karamihas be confirmed in the office of tutor for the plaintiff for the purpose of these proceedings."
3. These orders were accompanied by procedural orders, including an extension of the time within which a notice of appeal might be filed, designed to allow the parties and the Court to address in an orderly way questions (including questions about costs) consequential upon the principal judgment.
4. Those questions were addressed (with supplementary evidence, written submissions and oral argument) in a series of appearances, outside regular court hours, on 6 October and 8, 16 and 22 November 2017.
5. In the course of argument on those dates, counsel for the plaintiff drew to my attention, and I accept, that paragraph 26 of my principal reasons for judgment is factually incorrect in suggesting that Mr Khalifeh was nominated for appointment as a protected estate manager for the plaintiff. He was not. The plaintiff's tutor, Mr Karamihas, was nominated for that role: Transcript (23 May 2017), pages 435-437, read with undated "Outline of Submissions - Appointment of Financial Manager" incorporating a draft "Minute of Orders".
6. The proposal that Mr Karamihas be appointed as a protected estate manager for the plaintiff was opposed by the defendant in terms expressed as opposition to "an appointment of either the tutor or Mr Khalifeh in any way, shape or form". In presentation of his case, the defendant, not unnaturally, identified the tutor and Mr Khalifeh as his adversaries. That said, the evidence did not explore the nature of the relationship, if any, between the tutor and Mr Khalifeh.
7. When, during the course of the principal proceedings, questions about the identity of a prospective protected estate manager for the plaintiff were exposed for debate, both sides of the record accepted, without resistance, that, in due course, management orders should be made, and that management of the plaintiff's protected estate should be committed to the NSW Trustee.
8. Having been appointed on 30 June 2017 as receiver and manager of the estate of the plaintiff, the NSW Trustee has maintained a watching brief over the final stages of the proceedings.
9. Upon final disposition of the proceedings by publication of these supplementary reasons for judgment, and supplementary orders, I propose to commit management of the plaintiff's protected estate to the NSW Trustee. Nobody opposes such a course.
10. As agreed between the parties, the questions which require determination consequentially upon publication of my principal judgment comprise the following: 1. Whether the defendant should be granted an allowance for capital gains (in lieu of interest) referable to the subject property. 2. A determination of the proper order for costs in the proceedings. 3. Consideration of the defendant's foreshadowed application for a statutory will. 4. Whether any (and, if so, what) directions should be given to the NSW Trustee, as manager of the protected estate of the plaintiff, for the sale of the subject property. 5. Whether there should be any (and, if so, what) orders for a stay of the orders made in these proceedings pending determination of the defendant's appeal (by a notice of appeal filed on 2 November 2017) in proceedings numbered 2017/331772 in the Court of Appeal. 6. Whether the plaintiff's liability to restore to the defendant the money the defendant paid to obtain a discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage should be set off against any costs liability imposed upon the defendant.
11. Formal orders are also required, upon confirmation of the NSW Trustee's management of the plaintiff's protected estate, to ensure that the solicitor for the plaintiff accounts to the NSW Trustee for money held in his trust account (including money held pursuant to orders made by Darke J on 28 August and 18 September 2015) for the benefit of the plaintiff.
12. In the course of hearing the parties' respective applications for consequential relief the plaintiff objected (on the grounds of the privilege in aid of settlement and relevance) to evidence sought to be adduced by the defendant. I uphold that objection.

The nature and extent of an allowance in favour of the defendant

1. Order 3 of the orders made on 30 June 2017 contemplated, as was uncontroversial, that an allowance be made in favour of the defendant in a sum sufficient to compensate him for his discharge of a mortgage registered against the plaintiff's title to the subject property, with interest calculated at a reasonable rate.
2. That allowance, in the terms contemplated, is agreed in the sum of $239,007.00, subject to an ongoing accrual of interest (at an agreed rate) pending payment.
3. The defendant is not satisfied with such an an allowance. He wants $378,400.00, a claim that includes an allowance for an increase in the (notional) value of the property since the date upon which he paid out the plaintiff's mortgage and thereby "saved" the property for the plaintiff. Order 5 of the orders made on 30 June 2017 reserved to him an opportunity to advance that a claim.
4. In my assessment, there is no basis upon which the defendant can, or should, be allowed anything more than a repayment of what he expended in securing a discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage, together with an allowance for interest.
5. The defendant does not accept that, the arrangements pursuant to which he acquired an interest in the subject property having been, in effect, "set aside", he has no ownership interest in the land.
6. There is no basis upon which an allowance should be made in favour of the defendant by reference to a notional "capital gain", arising from any increase in the value of the property, in circumstances in which, on the Court's findings, he should never have become a proprietor of the property. The obligation of the plaintiff, in seeking equity, to do equity rises no higher than an allowance for the defendant calculated as a repayment of his outlay together with reasonable interest.
7. If (contrary to my determination) the defendant were to be allowed something referable to a notional "capital gain", there would be a live question as to the availability of evidence suitable for calculation of such a "gain".
8. Evidence as to value adduced in the principal proceedings was not adduced for a purpose that contemplated the case which the defendant now seeks to make. The plaintiff contends, in my opinion reasonably so, that it would be procedurally unfair to him for that evidence to be used as the defendant presently seeks to use it without the case being reopened. In my opinion there is no basis, in fairness, for this to be done.

The proper orders for costs

1. By his tutor, the plaintiff seeks an order that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs assessed: 1. on the ordinary basis, up to and including 7 April 2017 (the date of a Calderbank letter addressed by the plaintiff's solicitors to the defendant's solicitors with an offer, not accepted by the defendant, to settle the proceedings); and 2. on the indemnity basis, thereafter.
2. The defendant opposes any order for him to pay costs on the indemnity basis because, he says, it was not unreasonable for him to reject the offer of the plaintiff's tutor in circumstances in which the tutor either maintained a case that the power of attorney made in favour of Mr Khalifeh be confirmed as operative or, at least, did not explain what protective regime would operate vis-a-vis the plaintiff's property if (as the tutor proposed) the proceedings were dismissed.
3. The defendant contends that all costs should be paid out of the estate of the plaintiff because he, no less than the tutor, pursued these proceedings (in whole or part) to protect the interests of the plaintiff. This contention emphasises the fact that the defendant acquired the subject property at the request of the plaintiff in order to save the property from a potential mortgagee sale (feared by the plaintiff) and to allow the plaintiff to continue to reside at the property (with promises of financial support by the defendant in the event that he was required to move to nursing home accommodation).
4. Although the tutor and the defendant, so far as concerns their own motives for conduct of the proceedings, disclaim any intention but an altruistic one, there remains in the proceedings an undercurrent of disputation between Mr Khalifeh (perceived by the defendant to be an associate of the tutor) and the defendant. The defendant continues to maintain that the plaintiff's interests would best be served by implementation of the arrangements pursuant to which he acquired the property.
5. Although there is scope for operation of the approach to costs commonly adopted upon an exercise of protective jurisdiction (illustrated by CCR v PS (No. 2) (1986) 6 NSWLR 622 at 640), and the width of the discretion as to costs conferred on the Court by section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 NSW is sufficient to enable costs orders to be tailored to the unusual circumstances of the present case, I am not satisfied that, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, there is a sufficient basis for displacement of the general rule (reflected in rule 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW) that "costs follow the event".
6. In my opinion, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the appropriate order is that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs assessed: 1. on the ordinary basis, up to and including 11 April 2017 (the day before the defendant rejected the plaintiff's Calderbank letter); and 2. on the indemnity basis, thereafter.
7. A date subsequent to the date of the plaintiff's Calderbank letter is appropriate to accommodate the fact that the defendant was entitled to a reasonable time to consider the plaintiff's offer. Selection of 11 April 2017 accommodates the fact that on 12 April 2017 the defendant's solicitor sent to the plaintiff's solicitor a detailed rejection of the Calderbank letter. In those circumstances, four days' grace represents allowance of a reasonable time for the defendant to have reflected on the Calderbank letter.
8. In my assessment, contrary to a submission of the defendant, the plaintiff's Calderbank offer was more favourable to the defendant than the defendant ultimately achieved in the proceedings. It provided for the subject property to be sold and for the defendant to receive from the proceeds of sale a sum totalling $450,000.00, particularised as including repayment of the mortgage "debt", interest, an allowance for sundry expenses and an allowance described as "bonus premium and legal costs".
9. The defendant conducted his defence of the principal proceedings in an adversarial manner, and the proceedings were determined upon an application of equitable principles (reinforced by findings under the Contracts Review Act 1980 NSW), not through any disinterested application of the Court's protective jurisdiction.
10. Where the Court's protective jurisdiction does come into play (in circumstances in which the plaintiff was, as is common ground, incapable of managing his affairs from the outset of the proceedings) is in protection of the plaintiff's estate from the possibility that costs incurred in his name by the tutor were excessive. Any entitlement of the tutor to recoup his costs from the estate of the plaintiff (in the event that he is unable to recover them from the defendant) should be regulated in a manner reflective of the tutor's role as a representative of a person incapable of self-management. The tutor should look to the defendant for payment of his costs in the first instance. It may be (although I presently refrain from making such a decision) that he should have no recourse to the estate of the plaintiff.
11. Whether or not the plaintiff's tutor should have any (and, if so, what) recourse to the estate of the plaintiff is a question which cannot, at this stage, of these proceedings, be determined. It is a question best dealt with, if need be, in the course of management of the plaintiff's protected estate.
12. Accordingly, it is appropriate that the Court order that the tutor have no recourse to the estate of the plaintiff for the payment of his costs without the leave of the Court or the NSW Trustee.
13. The defendant contends, but I do not accept, that any costs liability he has to the plaintiff should be reduced by reason of the facts that: (a) until the penultimate day of the final hearing, the plaintiff's tutor maintained a case that the power of attorney made in favour of Mr Khalifeh should be "restored"; and (b) the tutor's submission to the Court's proposal that there should, instead, be a protected estate manager must be (the defendant contends) counted as a success for the defendant on that issue.
14. Although, throughout the proceedings, there was an undercurrent of rivalry between Mr Khalifeh (a witness called by the tutor) and the defendant, that rivalry did not change the essential character of the proceedings: the plaintiff sought, and the defendant resisted, relief designed to "set aside" the arrangements pursuant to which the defendant took title to the subject property.
15. The defendant has consistently maintained, as he still maintains, that he is in some way entitled to the property in question. That claim of entitlement, as pursued, is inconsistent with any assertion on the part of the defendant that he has acted, and seeks still to act, only in the best interests of the plaintiff. It is not enough, as the defendant suggests, that the defendant grounds his "entitlement" in an historical family connection with the property and an expectation that he should be able to maintain that connection.

The defendant's foreshadowed application for a statutory will

1. In the course of dealing with the principal proceedings, it was necessary to consider the terms of the plaintiff's current will (principal judgment, paragraphs 47 and [56]-[57]); to notice that the plaintiff might have wanted to change his will (principal judgment, paragraphs [57] and [137]); to notice the favourable terms in which the plaintiff, admittedly incapacitated, spoke of both Mr Khalifeh and the defendant (principal judgment, paragraph [31]); and to notice the possibility that, in the wake of these proceedings, it might be appropriate, if not necessary, to give consideration to whether orders should be made, under chapter 2 of the Succession Act 2006 NSW, for the making of a statutory will on behalf of the plaintiff, including a will that might allow for costs relating to these proceedings to be "charged" against the plaintiff's deceased estate (principal judgment, paragraph [137]).
2. In light of these observations, and the fact that the defendant is a member of the plaintiff's extended family, the defendant invited the Court to consider authorising a will to be made for the plaintiff in terms designed to charge the plaintiff's estate with payment of the "debt" due to the defendant (arising from the defendant's repayment of the plaintiff's mortgage) and, after a series of specific legacies, to leave the residue of the plaintiff's deceased estate to the defendant.
3. This proposal, it was contended, would enable a more complete justice to be done, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, bearing in mind that the defendant was (at least in part) motivated in his defence of the proceedings by a desire to protect the interests of the plaintiff.
4. The object of the defendant's proposal was, in essence, to defer until after the defendant's death any entitlement (by way of a restitutionary allowance or an order for costs) the defendant might have against the plaintiff, accepting that the whole of the plaintiff's estate might be consumed in his lifetime or, upon a subsequent application for a statutory will, the defendant might lose any presumptive entitlement he might have to be a testamentary beneficiary of the plaintiff.
5. The present proceedings do not provide an appropriate vehicle for consideration of an application for the making of a statutory will for the plaintiff. They are too heavily laden with a need to resolve adversarial disputation between the plaintiff and the defendant. Nor do the proceedings, as presently constituted, provide an appropriate vehicle for consideration of claims which others than the defendant might have on the testamentary bounty of the plaintiff.
6. I do not exclude the possibility that, at some future time, the defendant might make an application for a statutory will and that, as protected estate manager of the plaintiff, the NSW Trustee might acquiesce in such an application being made. Nor do I exclude the possibility that, with due regard to the statutory criteria for the making of a statutory will, the defendant might be named as a beneficiary in a will authorised to be made on behalf of the plaintiff.
7. However, the jurisdiction conferred by the Succession Act 2006 for authorisation of a statutory will on behalf of a person lacking testamentary capacity is protective in character. The Court's discretionary power to authorise the making of a statutory will must be exercised in a manner informed by the Court's protective jurisdiction. A guiding principle upon an exercise of that jurisdiction is that whatever is done, or not done, for or on behalf of a person (in this case, the plaintiff) in need of protection must be for the benefit, and in the interests, of that person: GAU v GAV [2014] QCA 308; [2016] 1 Qd R 1 at [48].
8. It is not appropriate, in these proceedings, to entertain an application for a statutory will a (if not, the) primary object of which is, not to benefit the plaintiff, but to benefit the defendant, protecting him from economic consequences of having maintained a misguided claim of right to retain an ownership interest in the subject property.
9. In these circumstances, I do not propose to make an order in these proceedings for, or in anticipation of, authorisation of a statutory will for the plaintiff.

Whether any (and, if so, what) direction should be given to the NSW Trustee, as manager of the protected estate of the plaintiff, for the sale of the subject property

1. The plaintiff's residence having been destroyed by fire, the subject property presently comprises a vacant block of land.
2. Even if (as the defendant has proposed) the insurance moneys received consequent upon the fire were to be applied in construction of a new residence for the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unlikely ever to occupy it. It is common ground between the parties that the plaintiff's present incapacity is such that it is in his best interests that he continue to reside in a nursing home.
3. The defendant contends, nevertheless, that it is in the plaintiff's interests for the property not to be sold, at least pending disposition of the defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeal, so that, if the defendant succeeds in the appeal, the arrangements he made, he says, for the benefit of the plaintiff, can be reinstated. This, he says, would facilitate the plaintiff's retention of pension entitlements as well as, incidentally, allowing him (the defendant) to retain an ownership interest in the property.
4. There is no apparent benefit to the plaintiff in retention of the subject property as vacant land independently of an assessment (which the Court is not in a position to make) about how best, in the current market, to dispose of the property.
5. Insofar as the defendant's contentions, in essence, reflect an application for a stay of orders under appeal, they should be dealt with in accordance with the principles governing the grant of such a stay.
6. Viewed in terms of management of a protected estate, the question whether (and, if so, what) directions should be given to the NSW Trustee is not one which requires consideration in these proceedings as the proceedings have unfolded.
7. Subject to such (if any) orders that might be made on the defendant's stay application, the NSW Trustee should be left to manage the protected estate of the plaintiff in the ordinary course. If it seeks the protection, or guidance, of the Court on an application for directions, it can apply in due course.

The defendant's application for a stay pending appeal

1. As recently confirmed in Mao v AMP Superannuation Limited [2017] NSWCA 296 at [7], the principles in relation to an application for a stay of orders under challenge on appeal are summarised in Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Limited (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 and Chen v Lym International [2009] NSWCA 121 at [12]-[15].
2. No submissions were put to me about the strength, or otherwise, of the defendant's grounds of appeal. I assume, without deciding, that the defendant has an arguable case on appeal.
3. The defendant's essential argument in favour of a stay is that the utility of his appeal would be lost (he contends) if the subject property were to be sold before a final determination of the appeal.
4. In circumstances in which the property presently comprises a vacant block of land and, even if a new residence were to be constructed on the land, the plaintiff's health is such that he could not live there, the defendant's case really boils down to a submission that, pending a determination of the appeal, the property should be retained as part of the estate of the plaintiff so that he (the defendant), if he is successful on the appeal, might retain an ownership interest in the property for himself.
5. I do not accept that, if the property were to be sold pending appeal, the utility of the appeal would be destroyed. The plaintiff's residence having been destroyed by fire, any contest between the plaintiff and the defendant about the property is essentially a contest about money.
6. In my opinion, the defendant has not established that there is a proper case for a stay of the orders under appeal. The plaintiff should not be kept out of the benefit of his property for the convenience of the defendant, especially if a sale of the property is necessary for the plaintiff's maintenance or advancement in life.
7. That said, the appropriate course is: (a) to decline to grant a stay of the orders under appeal; but (b) to direct the NSW Trustee, as protected estate manager of the plaintiff, to give to the defendant not less than 14 days written notice of any proposal to sell the property, thereby reserving to the defendant an opportunity to renew his application for a stay (in circumstances in which evidence can be adduced about the plaintiff's then personal circumstances and factors bearing upon the desirability, or otherwise, of a sale at that time).
8. If a stay were to be granted having the effect of restraining a sale of the property pending appeal, it would, prima facie, be appropriate to require the defendant to give to the Court the usual undertaking as to damages as defined by the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 NSW, rule 25.9.

Set off

1. The plaintiff contends, and the defendant accepts, that the Court has jurisdiction to order that the plaintiff's liability to restore to the defendant the money the defendant paid to obtain a discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage be set off against the defendant's liability to pay to the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings: Sivritas v Sivritas (No. 2) [2008] VSC 580 at [14] and [20]-[21], following Team Dynamic Racing Pty Limited v Longhurst Racing Pty Limited [2008] QSC 36; R Derham, Derham on the Law of Set Off (Oxford University Press, 2010), paragraph [2.98].
2. The defendant contends that the "debt" due to him consequent upon an allowance being made in his favour for his discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage debt should be paid out of the proceeds of the insurance payout to the plaintiff, leaving the plaintiff to pursue the defendant for costs after an assessment of the plaintiff's costs.
3. The plaintiff (by his tutor) apprehends that, if that course were to be adopted, the defendant might not subsequently be able to satisfy his liability for costs. This apprehension is reinforced by submissions made by counsel for the defendant that, unless allowed to have his costs of the proceedings out of the estate of the plaintiff, the defendant lacks the financial resources to acquire the subject property on any sale of it by the NSW Trustee. It should also be noted, in this context, that the defendant funded discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage by borrowing money on the security of his parents' residence.
4. In my opinion, the justice of the case, requires that, upon an undertaking by the plaintiff (by his tutor) to proceed to an assessment of his costs with all due expedition, the plaintiff's liability to make restitution to the defendant be set off against the defendant's liability to pay the plaintiff's costs pursuant to the Court's order for the payment of costs.
5. Implementation of that set off, grounded in the Court's inherent jurisdiction to control enforcement of its judgments and orders, may require that directions be given, upon any sale of the subject property, to preserve part of the sale proceeds pending an assessment in due course of the defendant's liability to pay costs.

The Court's Orders

1. The Court makes the following orders in final disposition of these proceedings: 1. ORDER, pursuant to section 41(1)(b) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 NSW, that management of the estate of the plaintiff be committed to the NSW Trustee. 2. ORDER, subject to order 1 of these orders, that orders 9 and 10 of the orders made on 30 June 2017 be discharged. 3. ORDER, subject to further order, that Emanuel Karamihas by himself his servants and agents be restrained from hereafter acting as tutor for the plaintiff otherwise than: 1. as may be necessary for him to act for the plaintiff on an assessment of the costs of the plaintiff payable by the defendant pursuant to these orders; 2. as may otherwise be necessary for giving effect to these orders; or 3. as might be agreed in writing by the NSW Trustee as manager of the protected estate of the plaintiff. 1. ORDER, subject to further order, that each of Emanuel Karamihas and the solicitors on the record for the plaintiff jointly and severally account to the NSW Trustee (as manager of the protected estate of the plaintiff) for all property of the plaintiff in their possession, custody or control. 2. ORDER, subject to order 4 of these orders, that the orders made by Justice Darke on 28 August and 18 September 2005 (providing for funds to be held on trust by the solicitors for the plaintiff until further order of the Court) be varied so as to conform to order 4 of these orders. 3. ORDER that the amount of the charge referred to in order 3 of the orders made on 30 June 2017 be assessed (up to and including today) as $242,203.55, with interest accruing at the agreed rate of $33.91 per day 4. ORDER that the defendant pay the plaintiffs' costs assessed: 1. on the ordinary basis, up to and including 11 April 2017; and 2. on the indemnity basis, thereafter. 1. ORDER, subject to further order, that Emanuel Karamihas (the plaintiff's tutor) have no recourse to the protected estate of the plaintiff for the payment of his costs (other than by recovery of costs from the defendant) without the leave of the Court or the NSW Trustee. 2. ORDER, subject to further order, that, in management of the protected estate of the plaintiff, the NSW Trustee be at liberty: 1. to sell the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764; and 2. to apply to the Court for directions generally. 1. ORDER, pending final determination of the proceedings numbered 2017/331772 in the Court of Appeal or further orders of the Court of Appeal or this Court, that, as manager of the protected estate of the plaintiff, the NSW Trustee give to the defendant not less than 14 days written notice of any proposal by the NSW Trustee to sell the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764. 2. RESERVE to the defendant liberty to apply for an order that these orders, or the orders made on 30 June 2017, be stayed pending final determination of the proceedings numbered 2017/331772 in the Court of Appeal in the event that the defendant is given written notice by the NSW Trustee of a proposal that the NSW Trustee sell the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764 3. Conditionally upon the tutor for the plaintiff (Emanuel Karamihas) giving to the Court an undertaking that he will proceed with all due expedition to an assessment of the costs of the plaintiff payable by the defendant pursuant to these orders, ORDER that: 1. subject to any further orders of the Court, the defendant's entitlement to enforce the charge referred to in order 3 of the orders made on 30 June 2017 be stayed pending assessment of the costs of the plaintiff payable by the defendant pursuant to these orders; and 2. the liability of the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the amount charged against the title to the land contained in folio identifier 1/103764 be set off against the liability of the defendant, pursuant to these orders, to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings. 1. RESERVE to the parties (including to Emanuel Karamihas and the NSW Trustee) liberty to apply for orders in the working out of these orders or the orders made on 30 June 2017.

Amendments 30 June 2017 - Paragraph 133 (2)(a) altered to correct the folio identifier number to: 1/103764. 30 June 2017 - Paragraph 133(3) altered to correct the folio identifier number to: 1/103764. 22 November 2017 - Paragraph 100 first sentence last word amended to "guardian". 21 December 2017 - Addendum (21 December 2017) added. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 21 December 2017