the figure derived from the plant records. 20. Thirdly, Ranford is able to determine the quantity of gold that it can expect to extract from any given quantity of ore taken from this particular location. The amount of gold concentrate being obtained by Ranford at the present time correlates with the yield expected from the quantity and grade of ore being processed." 34. I note that in cross-examination, par18-20 were attacked; see pp26-29 of the transcript. Par15 was not sought to be controverted; this may raise an issue of mutual or unilateral mistake - see Clause 6 of the contract, at p3. However, this issue was not sought to be raised before me. (ii) Misleading and deceptive conduct: Second, Mr Wyvill submitted that it was reasonably arguable that P and H is liable in damages to Ranford, for misleading and deceptive conduct, pursuant to s52 of the Trade Practices Act. He submitted that the daily invoices (see Clauses 3-4, p3) given by P and H to Ranford, which Mr Padgett had signed, represented that P and H had, in total, shifted 99,449 cubic metres of ore to Ranford's stockpile. Ranford had relied on that representation. Consequently, pursuant to s82 of the Trade Practices Act, there was a serious question that Ranford could recover damages from P and H. P and H'S CASE 35. Mr Henwood submitted that Ranford's case was "spurious", and amounted to "bluster" and mere "assertion"; cf Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (supra) at p605. He submitted that Ranford had failed to discharge its onus of showing that there was a serious question to be tried, in relation to the genuineness of the offsetting claim. He submitted that this Court, in effect, was being asked to believe that there was a genuine dispute, on the basis of "an allegation, in effect, ... that the scrapers used by P and H Earthmoving were effectively two-thirds full for the whole contract". And this, notwithstanding the following 5 matters, viz: (i) Mr Padgett signed the contract on 20 January 1994, some 4-5 weeks after P and H had completed its work under the contract, notwithstanding his alleged concerns as to the "volume of ore in the stockpile" which he said he had raised in December 1993 and January 1994 with Mr Hutchinson; see pars 30-31 of Mr Padgett's affidavit of 20 April 1994; (ii) Ranford had not adduced any primary evidence to support the "assertions" that its records showed that less ore was processed than was supposed to have been in the stockpile: see Scanhill (supra) at p186. (iii) Ranford's records were unreliable: see transcript pp26-29.

(iv) The evidence supports the conclusion that Ranford cannot pay the amount set out in the statutory demand; and (v) Mr Padgett had been present on site for most of the time that P and H was carrying out its work under the contract, allegedly making observations about the under-filling of the scrapers; yet he still signed the invoices presented to him - see the affidavit of Mr McHugh of 8 March 1994, par5 and 6. 36. Mr Henwood conceded that to examine these matters would require this Court to go beyond the established approach: see transcript p51, and, in particular, Mibor (supra) at 365-366. However, he submitted that the legislature could not have intended to allow - "mere assertions without any real basis in fact preventing winding up proceedings in circumstances where ... it's a fiction masquerading as genuine disputes." 37. Mr Henwood also conceded that the authorities establish that Mibor (supra) at pp366-7 showed that - "the Court will not embark upon any extended inquiry in order to determine whether there is a genuine dispute ... and certainly will not attempt to weigh the merits of that dispute." However, he submitted that the authorities show that the Court does in fact look into the merits to some degree; see, for example, Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (supra) and CFC Corporation Pty Ltd v Lanier (Australia) Pty Ltd (supra). 38. I agree with Mr Henwood's latter submission, particularly in light of the views of Hayne J in Mibor (supra) at 365: "I do not consider that Div 3 of Pt54 of the Corporations Law requires the Court to conduct a trial of the kind described in order to determine whether a dispute is a genuine dispute. IT MAY BE THAT IN SOME, PERHAPS LIMITED, CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT MAY HAVE TO MAKE SOME INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE CLAIM THAT A DEBT IS DISPUTED BEFORE IT COULD BE SATISFIED THAT THAT DISPUTE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE. EACH CASE WILL FALL FOR DECISION UPON ITS OWN FACTS". (emphasis mine) 39. I consider that the factual matrix of this case is such that this Court should investigate, to some degree, the factual basis of Ranford's claim to ensure there is a "genuine dispute and/or counterclaim"; or, as Mr Henwood put it, to ensure "fiction is not masquerading as a genuine dispute". However, I remind myself that this Court's role in any such investigation is limited; as is said in Mibor (supra) at p307 - "all that the legislation requires is that the Court conclude that there is a (genuine dispute)". Further, in that regard, Ranford has only to establish that there is a serious question to be tried. I permitted the deponents of affidavits to be cross-examined. CONCLUSIONS 40. Taking into account Mr Henwood's submissions, and in particular the effect of Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (supra) at p186 and Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (supra) in relation to Ranford's failure to adduce primary evidence, I consider that notwithstanding that suspicions of a "masquerade" by Ranford are not wholly dispelled, in the circumstances Ranford has discharged its onus. I consider that it has shown that there is a serious question to be tried on the issues it has raised; there is a "genuine dispute" and an "offsetting claim" in this case. THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR PADGETT 41. Before turning to issue (4) on p6 I should refer to the ruling I made during the hearing on 22 April 1994. 42. During the course of the hearing, Mr Henwood applied to cross-examine Mr Padgett in relation to his affidavit. In support, he submitted that if leave was given to cross-examine, P and H would be able to demonstrate that "many of the allegations made in Mr Padgett's affidavit, insofar as it can be relied upon, are without foundation and therefore not a genuine dispute ... (which addresses) the question your Honour is required to determine." 43. Mr Henwood rightly conceded that the Court's role is limited, in applications under s459G (see p11). However, he submitted that authorities such as Mibor (supra) at 364-365 and Scanhill Pty Ltd (supra) at 189-190 establish that in some, perhaps limited, circumstances the Court may have to make some investigation of the factual basis of the claim, and therefore cross-examination should be allowed, to test the genuineness of the dispute. He submitted that this Court must explore the defences referred to in Mr Padgett's affidavit of 20 April because they were "a recent invention", a matter which goes to the genuineness of the dispute. He submitted that the Court should make "some inquiry into the merits"; otherwise it would "allow mere works of fiction to masquerade as genuine disputes". If the assertions and allegations made in Mr Padgett's affidavit could not be tested at least to some extent it appeared that when anything is asserted in an affidavit in support of an application under s459G the process envisaged by the Statutory Demand procedure would be stultified. 44. Mr Wyvill submitted that the authorities so far have not permitted cross-examination on supporting affidavits: see, for example, Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (supra) at 605 and Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (supra). He submitted that there is only one authority - Mibor (supra)

where a respondent had sought to cross-examine a deponent on his supporting affidavit; and there Hayne J had not allowed it. 45. He submitted that Scanhill (supra) did not support P and H's application. In that case Beazley J did not allow cross-examination, even though the affidavit, which asserted bare facts (it resembled a pleading) was bereft of particulars; he submitted that here Ranford's supporting affidavit set out detailed particulars of its claim and consequently the case for cross-examination was weaker than in Scanhill. 46. Mr Wyvill conceded that if this case involved a simple issue of fact, such as the delivery or non-delivery of goods, cross-examination would be permissible. However, it involved a complex factual matrix and was not suitable for cross-examination. Ranford would then have to cross-examine the deponents of affidavits in support of P and H, to ascertain if the dispute is genuine. Effectively, then, the Court would be departing from its limited role in that it would be conducting an investigation into the merits and the likely result of the dispute. He submitted that:- "... the authorities are unanimous in saying that it is a very high hurdle they need to cross. It's only in the clearest of cases that you look at the genuineness and expose the lack of genuineness very quickly". He submitted that in the complex factual matrix of this case, cross-examination would not resolve that question. 47. In reply, Mr Henwood conceded that the facts were complex and that he might not succeed in cross-examination in destroying the whole of Ranford's assertions. However, he submitted that P and H could thereby clearly show that the dispute was not genuine, and that the substantiated amount was greater than the statutory minimum. 48. I ruled that:- "... this Court has a very limited role in (ascertaining)

the genuineness of the dispute. And it is clear also that that determination is not to take place as a result of some protracted inquiry. All of that would tend to support the proposition put forward by Mr Wyvill. However ... I THINK IT RIGHT IN THIS CASE AND ON THE FACTS, as I presently understand them to be, to grant Mr Henwood's application, and I will give you leave to cross-examine ...." (emphasis mine) 49. My reasons for that ruling were that I concur with what Hayne J said in Mibor (supra) at 365:- "It may be that in some, perhaps limited circumstances the court may have to make some investigation of the factual basis of the claim that a debt is disputed before it could be satisfied that that dispute is a genuine dispute. Each case will fall for decision upon its own facts." 50. I considered that this case involves allegations of several factual disputes; and notwithstanding that this Court has a limited role and must not embark on an inquiry into the merits of the dispute or the credit of a deponent, to establish if the dispute is "genuine", it was a case where the Court should "make some investigation of the factual basis of the claim before it could be satisfied that that dispute is a genuine dispute"; see Mibor (supra) at p365. 51. In my opinion, what amounts to an "extreme case" (Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (supra)) or "some, perhaps limited, circumstances" or "rare" cases (Mibor, at pp364-365) is always a question of fact bearing in mind the nature of the proceedings and the limited role of the Court therein. WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIATED AMOUNT IS LESS THAN THE STATUTORY MINIMUM, UNDER S459H(3) 52. I have indicated I am satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried in regard to the genuineness of the dispute as to the amount of the debt and the offsetting claim. This Court is now required to calculate the substantiated amount of the demand (s459H(2)). The calculation is in accordance with the formula, "admitted total" minus "offsetting total" in s459H; see pp9-10. 53. As noted earlier, the "statutory minimum" is currently $2,000. 54. As to the approach to the calculation, Thomas J said in Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (supra) at 605:- "Broadly speaking, the Court is required to examine the claim, assess the undisputed parts of the debt that has been demanded, and deduct from it any offsetting claims of the debtor company. If the result is $2,000 or more, the Court has a discretion to vary the demand and to declare the varied demand to have had effect from the time when the original demand was served." However if the result is less than $2,000 then the statutory demand must be set aside: see s459H(3) and CFC Corporation Pty Ltd v Lanier (Australia) Pty Ltd (supra) at 776. 55. As noted earlier, this case involves complex factual issues; this points to a serious difficulty in calculating "the substantiated amount" since many and varied factors, some presently speculative in light of the limited examination, impinge on the calculations. However, in accordance with the directive in s459H(2), I turn to this task, noting its inherent difficulties. 56. Mr Wyvill did not dispute that Ranford had become indebted to P and H, as a result of the contract, but submitted that the amount of the debt as claimed ($180,869.94) was not due and payable to P and H, and that Ranford had an offsetting claim far in excess of P and H's claim. 57. Initially, on the affidavit material, Ranford's case, as deposed to by Mr Padgett on 20 April, was that:-

"23. Average cost of carting ore and overburden amounts to $3.07 per cubic metre. On a shortfall of 28,319 cubic metres, the amount that I estimate the stockpile was short on figures supplied by P and H, Ranford has been called upon to pay an amount of $86,939.33 for cartage which has not taken place. ... 25. Ranford supplied fuel to P and H for its earthmoving equipment. P and H moved both ore and overburden. If P AND H have moved a volume of approximately 28,000 cubic metres less than has been charged, then to now move that extra volume would mean also moving approximately 42,000 cubic metres of overburden, a total of approximately 70,000 cubic metres of extra material, to make good the shortfall. This will incur additional fuel costs of approximately $10,500.00. 26. P and H were requested to stockpile sufficient ore for Ranford to operate double shift throughout the wet season. When it became apparent that the stockpile was insufficient, Ranford reduced to one shift. It has not processed any ore of significance since 7 March 1994, when the stockpile ran out. 27. Ranford has ben virtually at a standstill for approximately one month. It is unlikely that Ranford will be able to cart its own ore again until the end of April 1994, by which time Ranford is likely to have been unproductive for approximately two months. 28. Ranford has been denied income from gold production for a period of approximately two months as a result of P AND H failing to stockpile the quantity of ore requested and as invoiced. 29. The expected income from such gold production for a period of two and a quarter months amounts to approximately $180,000.00. This is on the basis of processing 13,000 cubic metres per month with a grade comparable to that which Ranford has been experiencing over the past 12 months or so. Gold has been selling at approximately $17.00 per gram, amounting to a monthly income of approximately $80,000.00. This amounts to $180,000.00 lost because of undersupply over a period of two and a quarter months, the amount of time which I believe Ranford will be out of production as a result of P and H's failure to stockpile as requested and as invoiced." 58. In essence, Ranford here claims that the amount of its undisputed debt to P and H is $93,929.71, based on the amount of ore it contends was delivered by P and H; that figure is derived from $180,869.04 (P and H's claim) - $86,939.33 (par23) to make good the alleged shortfall. It also claims to have an "offsetting claim" of $190,500 (being $180,000 plus $10,500 for fuel). If Ranford's version of the facts is accepted as reasonably arguable, and the statutory formula in s459H is applied to these figures, clearly the "substantiated amount" is negative and this Court, applying s459H(3), would have to set the statutory demand aside. 59. However, later in the proceedings, relying on evidence adduced from Mr Padgett in cross-examination and re-examination, Mr Wyvill prepared "a statement of the assessment of loss" which sets out a 'best case' and 'worst case' assessment of the loss Ranford claims to have sustained. 60. That assessment of loss is as follows:- "RANFORD GOLD MINES ASSESSMENT OF LOSS Cost of rectifying Respondent's breach Best case ore 28,000 by $3.07 per cubic meter 85,960.00 o/burden 42,000 by $3.07 per cubic meter 128,940.00 extra fuel 10,500.00 Total
$225,400.00 Worst case ore 28,000 by $1.62 per cubic meter 45,360.00 o/burden 42,000 by $1.00 per cubic meter 42,000.00 extra fuel 10,500.00 Total $97,860.00 Consequential loss Worst case - loss on income March - 3 weeks at $20,00 per week 60,000.00 April - 4.5 weeks loss of 60% capacity 53,000.00 May - 4.5 weeks loss of 50% capacity 45,000.00 Total
$158,000.00 Best case - additional expenses 17 weeks (4 months) at $15,000.00 per week additional overheads -
$255,00.00 SUMMARY Worst case 158,000 + 97,860 = $255,860.00 Best case 225,000 + 255,000= $480,400.00 " 61. If the facts upon which Ranford made these calculations are accepted as reasonably arguable, on Ranford's 'best case' assessment the undisputed debt to P and H for its work under the contract would be $94,909.04 (P and H claim for 180,869.04

• cost to Ranford of replacing 28,000 cubic metres shortfall, 85,960). Ranford's offsetting claim would amount to (128,940 + 10,500

255,000)= $394,440; see the submissions at transcript pp45-46. The substantiated amount would therefore be negative. 62. On the 'worst case' scenario for Ranford on its figures, its undisputed debt to P and H would be $135,509.04 (180,869.04 - 45,360). Ranford's offsetting claim would amount to (42,000 + 10,500 + 158,000)=$210,500. Again the substantiated amount would be negative. 63. Mr Wyvill submitted that since whichever of these two bases the Court adopted, the "substantiated amount" would be lower than the statutory minimum, the statutory demand must be set aside, pursuant to s459H(3). 64. Mr Henwood submitted that Ranford's assertion that its undisputed debt, on the initial calculation, is $94,909.04, cannot be sustained. He submitted that there is no basis to support Mr Padgett's claim that the "average cost of carting ore and overburden amounts to $3.07"; see par23 of Mr Padgett's affidavit. He submitted that at best the contract price of $1.62 (see p3) could be used to calculate the amount involved in genuine dispute. 65. Mr Padgett, clearly an experienced person in alluvial gold mining operations (see par5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of his affidavit), was not cross-examined on this aspect of his evidence. On those bases, I find that that amount is in genuine dispute, and reject Mr Henwood's submission. 66. For the purposes of calculating the "admitted total" and the "offsetting total", I consider that the contract figure of $1.62 (p2) should be used in assessing the undisputed debt, and the remainder of the $3.07 ($1.45) should be used in calculating the offsetting total. 67. On that basis Ranford's undisputed debt to P and H, according to Ranford, amounts to $45,876.78 (1.62 x 28,319); while the remainder, of $41,062.55 (1.45 x 28,319), forms part of the offsetting total. I also take into account Ranford's offsetting claim for $10,500 in respect of the fuel (par25 of Mr Padgett's affidavit, p20). Mr Henwood did not cross-examine Mr Padgett on this aspect; taking into account Mr Padgett's experience in alluvial mining operations (see p23), I consider that that amount may be treated as part of a genuine offsetting claim for present purposes. 68. In respect of Ranford's substantive "offsetting claim", Mr Henwood submitted (transcript pp28, 29) that the figure of $180,000 for loss of production (see par29 of Mr Padgett's affidavit, p23) has not been made out by Ranford as "the gold remains in the ground. It can be dug up at a later time". (transcript pp29 and 59). 69. He submitted that in re-examination Mr Padgett was asked how long his "tribute basis" was in force (see transcript p35) and there was no suggestion that Ranford would not have time within that period to mine the remaining alluvial gold. 70. At first blush, this submission is attractive. However on reflection, and for the purposes of this application, I consider it to be of no consequence. 71. Notwithstanding that I consider that it was not a term of the contract that P and H would deliver a fixed amount of ore to the stockpile, the evidence before this Court shows a reasonably arguable case that Ranford relied on the daily invoices presented by P and H, as accurately stating the quantity of ore stockpiled (in total 99,449 cubic metres). 72. The consequence of this approach, which I am constrained to adopt, is that Ranford arguably suffered a "loss of income". 73. For the purposes only of this application, bearing in mind the facts and the presently-speculative nature of matters relevant to calculating the "admitted total" and "offsetting total", having regard to the submissions of Mr Wyvill (at transcript p46) and par29 of Mr Padgett's affidavit, and the fact that Mr Padgett was not cross-examined on the "monthly income" of Ranford, I accept the figure of $158,000 as being a genuine offsetting amount in relation to the consequential loss of Ranford. 74. As a result, it is unnecessary for this Court to attempt to assess if there is a genuine offsetting claim in respect of "additional expenses" (p25) (see transcript p46) since, applying the formula, the substantiated amount is already negative. That is to say, the "admitted total" (180,869.04 - 45,876.78) is 134,992.26. The "offsetting total" (41,062.55 + 10,500 + 158,000) is 209,562.55. The substantiated amount, being "admitted total" less the "offsetting" total equals -$74,570.29. 75. The "substantiated amount" being a negative figure on these calculations, Ranford is entitled to an order pursuant to s459H(3) setting aside the Statutory Demand. 76. Accordingly, I order that the Statutory Demand of 9 February 1994 be set aside. RULING ON COSTS (Delivered 25 May 1994) 77. On 24 May for reasons published I granted the applicant's application of 2 March 1994 under s459G of the Corporations Law for an order that the respondent's Statutory Demand of 9 February 1994 under s459E(2)(e) be set aside. Mr Wyvill of counsel for the applicant applied for costs, Mr Henwood opposed that application, I reserved on the question and rule on it today. THE APPLICANT'S SUBMISSIONS 78. Mr Wyvill's submissions were as follows. The ordinary principle - that costs should follow the event - should apply here. The applicant had done nothing to render it inapplicable. In particular, it had not "concealed its hand" from the respondent until the latter had served its Statutory Demand on 9 February. Thomas J in Re Morris Catering (Australasia) Pty Ltd referred at 605-6 to the significance on the question of costs of "the element of surprise in the raising by the (applicant) of its disputes and its claims." In that regard par 12 of the affidavit of 8 March 1994 of Mr Hutchinson, a director of the respondent, referred to the discussion between the parties' directors on 7 February 1994 (2 days before the respondent issued its Statutory Demand) in which the applicant's directors had indicated in some detail (see Annexure "E") the basis of its denial that it was indebted to the respondent in the amount of $180,869.04 for which the respondent had invoiced it; see p4 of the judgment of 24 May. There had been no "holding back" by the applicant of its case in that respect; that is, it had not acted wrongly, unfairly or improperly in that it had not held back material facts in its case so as to induce the respondent to take the course it took on 9 February. 79. Mr Wyvill emphasized that as at 7 February the consequences of the alleged shortfall in the applicant's stockpile of ore were unknown, the applicant was still using it, and the applicant's directors had stated at the meeting that day all that they then knew. He submitted that the respondent had taken precipitate action 2 days later, without any attempt at negotiation, without waiting to see what happened as regards the stockpile, and at a time when it knew of the existence and nature of the applicant's complaint. Accordingly, the respondent should be treated as having then assumed the risk that it might have to pay costs, if the applicant's complaint proved to be sufficient to have its Statutory Demand set aside. THE RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS 80. Mr Henwood's submissions were as follows. The appropriate order in the circumstances was "no order as to costs", leaving each party to bear its own burden in that respect. The bulk of the applicant's case had been provided to the respondent very late in the day - only 2 days before the hearing on 22 April. The applicant's allegation on 7 February of a shortfall in the stockpile had been very "loose"; and in any event at that time the applicant admitted that it owed the respondent a considerable amount of the invoiced debt of $180,869.04, namely $96,658.37. The judgment of 24 May held that the applicant had an arguable case for a set-off; but that case had first been raised in Mr Padgett's affidavit of 20 April, only 2 days before the hearing. Accordingly, the situation was one in which the respondent had been taken by surprise at the hearing, in most respects; the observations by Thomas J in Re Morris Catering (Australasia) Pty Ltd (supra) as to the effect on costs of "surprise" were applicable. Until 20 April the respondent could reasonably have expected to succeed as to a very considerable part of the amount of $180,869.04 set out in its Statutory Demand, and that it would not have been set aside. Accordingly, it was neither reasonable nor appropriate to now "saddle" the respondent with the whole of the costs of the application of 2 March. CONCLUSIONS 81. Section 459N vests in the Court discretionary power to order the respondent to pay the applicant's costs of its successful application of 2 March. In exercising that discretion I consider that in general the usual principle that "costs follow the event" should apply. 82. I consider that the respondent cannot rely on having been taken by surprise, as it chose to resist the application of 2 March on 22 April, 2 days after it had received what was clearly late notification of the full extent of the applicant's case. The position as to costs would have been quite different had the respondent chosen not to contest the application on 22 April. 83. In Felkro Nominees Pty Ltd v Austissue Pty Ltd ; , the respondent consented to the setting aside of its Statutory Demand, but was nevertheless ordered to pay the applicant's costs. Heerey J noted that there was a "genuine dispute" and said at p608:- "Now that a statutory regime is in force for resolving the often sterile disputes which used to take place about the validity of demands, creditors have to realise that if they invoke winding up provisions by issuing a statutory demand they run the risk that if a debtor establishes that the amount claimed is subject to a genuine dispute, the debtor will get an order for costs, as s459N expressly contemplates. Although the applicant is an alleged debtor, this proceedings is one to enforce a statutory right. it is not a case of the applicant seeking some form of discretionary indulgence. The applicant has succeeded and on ordinary principles ought to recover its costs." 84. However, the costs outcome depends on the circumstances of each case. Compare, for example, the different factual situation which led to an order that each party bear its own costs, in Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd at 790. In the present case, in light of the factual situation as it stood on 9 February, it cannot be suggested that the making of the Statutory Demand that day was an abuse of process; see the observations of McLelland J in LandD Audio Acoustics Pty Ltd v Pioneer Electronics Australia Pty Ltd at 538, which I consider apply, mutatis mutandis, when the propriety of making a Statutory Demand is under contemplation. His Honour said:- "Proceedings by a person as creditor for the winding up of a company on the ground that it is unable to pay its debts will ordinarily be held to be an abuse of process: (1) if the winding up proceedings are bound to fail, e.g. if it is clear that the applicant will not be able to prove that he is a creditor ... or will not be able to prove that the company is unable to pay its debts ...; (2) if the application is made for some improper purpose, e.g. if the applicant is seeking to use the winding up proceedings to coerce a company into paying an alleged debt without affording the company a reasonable opportunity to ascertain or have it established that the debt is properly payable; or (3) if issues will arise in the winding up proceedings of a kind inappropriate for determination in such proceedings, e.g. a substantial contest as to the existence or enforceability of a debt relied on by the applicant, which should properly be resolved in separate proceedings brought for that purpose." 85. In the circumstances of this case I see no reason why the general principle as to costs should not apply. Accordingly, the applicant should have the costs of its application of 2 March. I certify for counsel in that respect, apart from the proceedings on 24 May. 86. Orders accordingly.