Resource and planning - Planning appeal - Application to extend time

Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993

SP Abrahams v Hobart City Council [2020] TASRMPAT 14

1. The appellant has filed an appeal with an application for an extension of time to file the appeal. The appeal is in respect to conditions of a planning permit granted by the Hobart City Council. The permit is for retrospective approval of partial demolition and alterations to windows of a residence. The appellant is the applicant for the permit.
2. The Council has made no submissions in respect to the application.

1. The appellant makes certain assertions of fact in the appeal form and in her submissions. Those assertions were not contested by the Council. They disclose the following:
   • The permit was issued by the Council on 22 December 2025.
   • Although not expressly stated, I infer from the submissions of the appellant that the permit was served on the appellant on 22 December 2025.
   • The appellant and her husband own and operate a yacht repair and boatyard business. The lead up to Christmas, and the Sydney to Hobart yacht race, was a busy period during which they routinely worked 10-12 hour days.
   • In addition to managing the business, the appellant also managed a Sydney to Hobart race campaign which involved extensive and time-critical logistic requirements. Those obligations included her driving from Newcastle to Hobart via the Bass Strait ferry.
   • The appellant's husband was injured during the yacht race, resulting in difficult circumstances for the appellant from1 to 4 January, both in respect to her ability to deal with administrative matters and emotionally.
   • On Monday 5 January 2026, when the appellant believed that the Council's Planning Office would resume operations after the holiday period, she emailed the Council requesting an amendment to the permit conditions.
   • On 6 January 2026 the appellant received a telephone call from the Council and was advised that she should lodge an appeal.
   • The appeal was filed on 8 January 2026.
2. Section 61(5) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 requires that a planning appeal be lodged within 14 days after service of the notice of the decision by the Council. The appeal period therefore ran until 5 January 2026, and the appeal was lodged three days out of time.
3. The Registry of the Tribunal was closed for the Christmas/New Year break from 25 December 2025 to 1 January 2026 inclusive. The appellant therefore had four business days after the date of service in which to file the appeal.

1. The Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Act 2020 provides a power to extend time for the filing of a planning appeal in cl 6(2) of Pt 8 of Sch 2:

(2) The Tribunal may, on written application by a person, extend the time for the institution by the person of an appeal.

2. Clause 6(3) sets out matters that must be taken into account in exercising the discretion to extend time:

(3) The Tribunal, when considering whether to extend the time for instituting an appeal under section 61 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 , must take into account - > > (a) the reason why the appeal was not lodged within the period specified in subclause (1); and > > (b) the time which has elapsed since the end of the period specified in subclause (1) and whether it would be reasonable to expect that the application to extend the appeal could have been lodged before the date on which it was lodged; and > > (c) the extent and cost of any work which has been undertaken in accordance with a permit, referred to in the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, after the expiry of the period specified in subclause (1); and > > (d) any other matter that it considers appropriate.

3. An identical provision in s 13(2A) of the now repealed Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993 was considered by the former Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal in SP Abrahams v Hobart City Council [2020] TASRMPAT 14. At [12] the Tribunal said:

Consideration (d) is a catch-all in respect to any other matters that the Tribunal considers appropriate. In Ghimire v Karriview Management Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1108 at [8] Colvin J identified a number of matters distilled from authorities that a court will usually take into account when considering whether to grant an extension of time to file an appeal: > > There are a number of matters that the Court will usually take into account when considering whether to grant an extension of time. Speaking broadly, special circumstances need not be shown but the Court must be positively persuaded that it is proper for there to be an extension. As to particular matters: > > (1) There should be an adequate explanation for the delay. Generally, mere ignorance of the time limit is not a satisfactory explanation for the delay. A party wanting to appeal may be expected to investigate or inquire about the procedure and time limits for bringing an appeal. > > (2) The extent to which the applicant has taken steps to challenge or dispute the relevant decision in the intervening period will be considered. > > (3) If the outcome can be confidently predicted at the leave stage, it will seldom be in the interests of justice to grant leave where an appeal has little or no prospects of success because of the considerable additional cost and the impact on other litigants who have abided by time limits and are waiting for their appeals to be heard. However, the merits should be examined at a reasonably impressionistic level. The Court does not go into the merits in great detail and assesses the merits in a fairly rough and ready way. > > (4) The Court's view as to the strength of the claim may itself be a matter that is to be weighed with other matters so the fact that the claim might be viewed at the time of the application for an extension to be strong or weak is relevant. > > (5) Prejudice to the respondent, including prejudice that will be occasioned by having to defend the proceedings, is a material factor against the grant of an extension. The extent of that prejudice (which may vary depending upon the financial and other circumstances of the respondent) must be considered with some care. > > (6) Consequences for third parties should be brought to account, particularly more wide ranging effects that might flow if an appeal were allowed despite a period of delay. > > (7) These matters are not exhaustive and they are not rules to be rigidly applied. Also, it must be kept in mind that the Court has a general discretion to be exercised by reference to the particular circumstances of each case. > > As to these matters see: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344; Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [7][9]; Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6]; Hamden v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2013] FCA 3 at [40]; MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [62][66] (approved on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110 at [38]); MZZYV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 957 at [25]; and Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195 at [20].

1. The appellant says that the appeal was filed out of time due to exceptional and unavoidable circumstances. The appeal period was clearly a very busy time for the appellant. For a significant part of the appeal period the Registry of the Tribunal was closed, and I infer from usual practice that for at least part of that period the Council's offices would have been closed, restricting the opportunity for the appellant to obtain procedural advice. The appellant contacted the Council on what she considered was the first opportunity and she acted within reasonable expedition to lodge the appeal within two days from being advised that in order to vary the conditions she would need to lodge an appeal.
2. It does not appear that any prejudice would be suffered by the Council or that any consequences to a third party may result if time to file the appeal is extended. The appellant is the proponent for the development. The permit will not take effect until finalisation of the appeal: s 53(3) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act. Given that the permit is for a retrospective approval the practical consequences of any delay, being the possibility of enforcement proceedings, will therefore rest with appellant.
3. The appeal is against a heritage condition concerning windows. The appellant has standing to appeal the conditions of the permit: s 61(4) of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act. Beyond that I am not able to, even on a reasonably impressionistic level, form a view as to the merits of the appeal. It is not apparent that the appeal has little or no prospect of success.
4. Taking these matters into account I am satisfied that the interests of justice favour extending time for the lodgement of the appeal.

1. Accordingly, I make the following Order:
   1. The time for filing appeal P/2026/9 is extended to 8 January 2026.