Ram v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 This is an application under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") for review by this Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 21 May 2001, affirming a decision of the respondent, by his delegate, to refuse the grant of a protection (class XA) visa to the applicant. The law to be applied is that which existed prior to the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth). background facts 2 The applicant, Vinod Ram, who was born on 28 May 1967, is a citizen of Fiji. He is of Indian ethnicity and of the Christian religion. Mr Ram entered Australia on 20 April 2000, and lodged an application for a protection visa with the respondent's department on 1 December 2000. On 19 December 2000, a delegate of the respondent refused his application. He applied for review by the Tribunal of the delegate's decision on 8 January 2001, and the Tribunal subsequently affirmed this decision. 3 The decision under review in this proceeding is the Tribunal's decision that it was not satisfied that Mr Ram is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations (see below), since it was not satisfied that he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in Fiji by reason of his Indian ethnicity or political opinion. legislative framework 4 Section 36 of the Act provides: (1) There is a class of visas to be known as protection visas. (2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Act defines the Refugees Convention as the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the Refugees Protocol as the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967. 5 Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994(Cth) makes further provision for protection visas. Clause 866.221 of Schedule 2 provides that it is a criterion for a protection visa that the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, as amended by the Refugees Protocol (collectively, "the Convention"). Protection obligations may arise in relation to a person who falls within the definition of "refugee" in the Convention. A refugee is defined in Article 1A(2) of the Convention as any person who: owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country … . Before the Tribunal, Mr Ram claimed that he has a well-founded fear of mistreatment (amounting to persecution) by native Fijians who are members of the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei ("the SVT") should he return to Fiji, for reasons of his Indian ethnicity and political support for the Fijian Labour Party. the tribunal's reasons for decision 6 After considering the relevant legislation and policy, the Tribunal turned its attention to Mr Ram's specific claims and the evidence before it. The Tribunal first referred to the claim that his employment as a construction worker had been affected by the coup in Fiji in 1987. It noted Mr Ram's claims that, following the 1987 coup, he had been unemployed for four months; his uncle's house had been burned and an aunt had been so intimidated by native Fijians that she had migrated to Canada as a refugee. The Tribunal noted that Mr Ram claimed that after losing his job in 1987, he sought some land to farm "but he could not obtain a lease because native Fijians were not willing to sign any new agreements with Indian Fijians or to extend leases which were expiring". In the end, Mr Ram left Tavua (where he had been living) for Suva, and commenced working as a hairdresser in central Suva. 7 The Tribunal noted Mr Ram's claims concerning his inability to purchase land upon which to build a house and his fear of being evicted from leased land by native Fijians. It noted that, in 1995, he and his wife had purchased a house on squatters' land (being land over which there was no formal lease arrangement, but probably owned by native Fijians). 8 The Tribunal went on to refer to Mr Ram's involvement with the Fijian Labour Party. The Tribunal noted his claim of having been a local community leader within the Party, and his evidence concerning activities performed by him for it. It referred to his evidence of an incident in April 1997 when, after visiting a friend and gathering support for the Labour Party, native Fijians (whom he believed to be members of the SVT) had injured him by throwing stones and a bottle at him, and had warned him against visiting their area again. Mr Ram's evidence was that he had reported the incident to the police, as well as other incidents prior to the 1999 election when stones were thrown at his house. 9 The Tribunal also referred to Mr Ram's evidence that he was well known to local SVT members and that they had tried to initiate arguments with him; that he had been threatened at his workplace by native Fijians after the election victory in 1999; that he had not taken these threats seriously, and had continued his involvement with the Labour Party. It noted Mr Ram's claims that, since his departure from Fiji, his wife and children had been chased out of their home and had been abused by native Fijians. Further, his wife had informed him that members of the SVT had been looking for him. In concluding, the Tribunal referred to written and oral evidence provided in support of Mr Ram's application for protection; noted his claim that the Fijian security forces were unable to protect him and that the situation in Fiji remained "volatile"; and referred to relevant country information concerning Fiji, including the takeover of the Fijian Parliament in May 2000 by George Speight and the circumstances surrounding the takeover and its aftermath. 10 The Tribunal accepted Mr Ram's account of his life in Fiji, including that he had "experienced some harassment such as he described" (for example, that stones had been thrown at his house, and that native Fijians had tried to initiate arguments with him). While it found that there was a real chance that Mr Ram could experience similar treatment because of his Indian ethnicity were he to return to Fiji, the Tribunal considered that this treatment was not of a character which could properly be described as persecution for the purposes of the Convention. 11 The Tribunal did not accept that Mr Ram's earlier experiences in the workforce and his inability to secure a farming lease were material to his present opportunities. It accepted that he was "concerned about making a living" upon his return to Fiji, given the downturn in the country's economy. The Tribunal concluded, however, that any difficulties that Mr Ram might encounter in relation to employment upon his return would not be encountered for a Convention reason. The Tribunal reached a similar conclusion in relation to Mr Ram's housing. In particular, it found that Mr Ram had "lived in … uncertain circumstances for many years and it would appear to have been tolerable for him to do so". It "did not consider that the uncertainty over [his] continued entitlement to live in his house is, in all the circumstances, a matter which gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution because of his ethnicity". The Tribunal added: I accept that the applicant's wife and children have left their house and are feeling very insecure and the applicant is unaware of the state of his house and whether or not he would be able to live in it again. He is clearly concerned about the housing for him and his family if he were to return. However, and in the light of independent information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, I do not consider that the circumstances of the applicant indicate that the hardship he may face in securing housing if he were to return would be a consequence of any discrimination or particular treatment because of a reason in the Refugees Convention, that is his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 12 The Tribunal also found that Mr Ram did not fear returning to Fiji because of his religion. 13 The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was "an active supporter of the Labour Party and was involved in helping local people with their problems", but rejected his claims that his political opponents were looking for him or intending to harm him. The Tribunal found the chance of Mr Ram being targeted for harm because of his political involvement remote and, further, that any harm he might suffer could not be regarded as persecution. The Tribunal accepted Mr Ram's account of the assault in April 1997 but doubted that it was politically motivated as claimed. 14 The Tribunal reached these conclusions, having regard to advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ("DFAT") that it was not aware of any serious incidents of politically motivated violence since the coup. The Tribunal stated that it was "satisfied that there is in Fiji a reasonable infrastructure of laws and institutions which together provide protection for people such as the applicant from the type of harm he fears". grounds of review 15 By his amended application for an order of review, Mr Ram relied upon three grounds. These were, first, that the Tribunal had misinterpreted the law relating to persecution; secondly, that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error since it ignored relevant material; and thirdly, the Tribunal had failed to observe the prescribed procedures by conducting the hearing without an interpreter. Mr Ram made written submissions on each of these grounds, although, at the hearing, his counsel addressed only the interpreter ground. (The application also raised a fourth ground of review, namely, the ground referred to in s 476(1)(g) of the Act, but this ground was neither addressed in the written submissions nor pressed at the hearing. There was nothing in the Tribunal's reasons for decision that indicated that a "no evidence ground" might be made out.) Error of law - principle of State protection 16 Before turning to the applicant's claims, the Tribunal set out the principles that were to be applied in determining whether or not Mr Ram's fear of persecution was "well-founded". No error is shown in this statement of principles: cf Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, at 389 per Mason CJ, 398 per Dawson J, 406-407 per Toohey J, and 429 per McHugh J. 17 As already noted, the Tribunal found that, although there was a real chance that Mr Ram would experience harassment from native Fijians if he were to return to Fiji, this harassment would not amount to "persecution" for the purposes of the Convention. After referring to country information, which stated, amongst other things, that the risk of communal harm to Indian Fijians from native Fijians was low and that there had been no recent reports of any serious incidents of politically motivated violence, the Tribunal found that there was a reasonable system of laws and institutions available to provide protection against harm. In these circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to find that there was no real chance that Mr Ram would be persecuted for reasons of his Indian ethnicity or his political activities upon his return to Fiji. 18 I reject the contention, appearing in Mr Ram's written submissions, that the Tribunal erred because it foreclosed reasonable speculation about the chances of persecution against Mr Ram were he to return to Fiji: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220, at [60]-[63] per Sackville J, and at [136]-[137] per Kenny J. As already noted, the Tribunal very largely accepted Mr Ram's account of events in so far as they involved him, including incidents of past harassment. In this circumstance, no occasion arose for the Tribunal to take into account the possibility that its findings were wrong when assessing whether or not there was a real chance of future persecution for a Convention reason: see Rajalingam,at [62] per Sackville J. Where the Tribunal did reject aspects of Mr Ram's evidence (for example, his evidence concerning the motivation for the attack in April 1997), it is plain from the Tribunal's reasons that it then considered the position so far as the applicant was concerned on the assumption that his account was correct. The submission made for Mr Ram, that the Tribunal did not act in accordance with the principles set out in Rajalingam, must be rejected. Error of law - meaning of "persecution" 19 The concept of persecution has been discussed by the High Court on various occasions, as for example, in Chan, at 388 per Mason CJ, 399-400 per Dawson J, and 429-431 per McHugh J; and in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, at 570 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ. See also the recent decision of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Kord [2002] FCAFC 77, at [3] per Heerey J and [15]-[58] per Marshall and Dowsett JJ. Having regard to the High Court's statement of principles, there is no error evident in the Tribunal's summary of the concept of persecution for the purposes of the Convention. 20 The Tribunal accepted that Mr Ram had suffered from verbal abuse, had been provoked to enter arguments, and had had stones thrown at his house. It was open to the Tribunal to find, however, that acts of this kind did not constitute "persecution" for Convention purposes. Further, it was open to the Tribunal to find (as it did) that the protection of the State was available to Mr Ram in respect of any such harassment. The Tribunal specifically found that, to the extent that Mr Ram might face hardship in finding housing or employment on his return to Fiji, such hardship would not be the consequence of any discrimination for a Convention reason. Jurisdictional error - ignoring relevant material 21 In written submissions, Mr Ram contended that the Tribunal's reasons for decision revealed jurisdictional error, capable of attracting the grounds of review in s 476(1)(b), (c) or (e) of the Act: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, at [4] per Gleeson CJ, [41] per Gaudron J, and [82]-[83] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Mr Ram submitted that the Tribunal had not paid regard to relevant material, namely, the DFAT advice that "most people with any political profile in Fiji experienced intimidation, harassment and public criticism after the 19 May 2000 coup" (Political climate in Fiji particularly in relation to ethnic Fijian members of Fiji Labour Party: Country information report No 640/00 12 December 2000 CX47598); and that "[t]he political situation in Fiji remains uncertain and appears likely to continue to be so … [h]ardliners in the country's Melanesian hierarchy are determined to block the country's large ethnic Indian minority from obtaining any meaningful political power" ("Judgment in Fiji" The Sydney Morning Herald 2 March 2001 CX50494) (collectively "the DFAT advice"). In written submissions, Mr Ram's contention was that the Tribunal's acceptance of his support for the Fijian Labour Party was, when read with this advice, inconsistent with its conclusion that there was "nothing before [it] to indicate that people who undertook such activity as the applicant did are at risk of harm" of a kind which could be regarded as persecution in Fiji today. 22 I reject this submission. I accept, as the respondent submitted in written submissions, that the submission gave an incomplete account of the DFAT advice and misrepresented the Tribunal's reasons. The advice also stated that the police had informed DFAT that the intimidation and harassment of persons with a political profile in Fiji had "reduced significantly after George Speight and his co-accused were taken into custody", and that DFAT "was not aware of any serious incidents of politically motivated violence against politically affiliated persons of any ethnicity" since May 2000. It was clearly open to the Tribunal, on the material before it, to find that any chance of Mr Ram being targeted because of his political involvement was remote. 23 There was, in any event, no basis for the submission that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the DFAT advice since the Tribunal specifically referred to the advice in its reasons. Failure to observe prescribed procedures - conducting hearing without an interpreter 24 This ground was not only the subject of written submissions, but also of address at the hearing. Counsel for Mr Ram invoked s 476(1)(a), (c) and (e) in support of his contention that there was reviewable error by reason of there being no interpreter for Mr Ram at the hearing. Counsel submitted that it must have been apparent to the Tribunal that it was unable to understand Mr Ram's spoken English and, therefore, his evidence in support of his application. Counsel for Mr Ram relied (without objection by the respondent) on the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal in support of his submission. 25 Section 427(7) of the Act provides: If a person appearing before the Tribunal to give evidence is not proficient in English, the Tribunal may direct that communication with that person during his or her appearance proceed through an interpreter. In Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 115 FCR 1 ("Singh"), a Full Court of this Court held that, whilst s 427(7) conferred on the Tribunal the power to direct that a person "appearing to give evidence" who was "not proficient in English" proceed through an interpreter, the provision did not impose an obligation on the Tribunal to do so: 115 FCR, at 6 per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Emmett JJ. If an obligation to provide an interpreter arises at all, it is because the absence of an interpreter is inconsistent with the obligation imposed by s 425(1) of the Act to invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. The Court in Singh stated, at 6: There is no warrant for reading s 427(7) as imposing an obligation on the Tribunal. The Act regularly uses the word 'may' and 'must' in contexts where it is clear that the use of the former indicates a discretion whereas the use of the latter leaves no room for discretion. Section 427(7) must be considered in the context of s 425. Section 425(1) provides that the Tribunal 'must invite' an appellant to appear before the Tribunal 'to give evidence and present arguments' relating to the issues arising before the Tribunal. Section 427(7) simply empowers the Tribunal to take steps to ensure that there can be real compliance with s 425(1). There is a clear relationship between ss 425(1) and 427(7). If an applicant for refugee status is unable to give evidence and present arguments in English, the effect of s 425(1) is to necessitate the exercise of the power under s 427(7) to direct that communication proceed through an interpreter: see Perera at 16-17 [20]. (Citation omitted) 26 In Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 ("Perera"), I held (at [17]-[21]) that a failure to provide a competent interpreter to assist a non-English speaking applicant for a protection visa may constitute reviewable error. This conclusion flowed from the provisions of the Act and, in particular, from s 427(7) and the terms of s 425(1)(a) (as it then stood), which provided that the Tribunal was to "… give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence". Sub-section 425(1) of the Act has since been amended: see Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) (1998) (Cth), s 3. This section presently requires the Tribunal to "invite the applicant to appear … to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review." 27 In Singh, however, the Full Court accepted that the principles set out in Perera continue to apply in relation to the present form of s 425(1): see also Long v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 106 FCR 183, at 189-190 per Mansfield J; Cotofan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1042, at [33] per Emmett J; Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 183 ALR 188, at [27]-[31] per Goldberg J; Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541, at [45] per Black CJ, Hill and Weinberg JJ; Tobasi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1050, at [35]-[41] per Mansfield J; Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1101, at [14] per Hill J (on s 366C(3)); Arif v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1053, at [14] per Mansfield J; and WAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1375, at [73]-[74] per Carr J. 28 In his application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (which was dated 7 January 2001) Mr Ram answered "No" to the question "Do you need an interpreter?". In Mr Ram's response to the Tribunal's offer of a hearing (which was dated 27 April 2001), he again answered "No" to the same question. Prior to and at the hearing, Mr Ram was assisted by Mr Mario Lucas of Migration Information Services. When the hearing began on 11 May 2001, the following exchange took place: [Tribunal]: … Mr Ram, we're here today because [you apply] for a protection visa from the Australian government. Oh, do we have an interpreter? Did we order one? I just need to check the file about this. Do you all understand English well? [Mr Lucas]: Yes. [Tribunal]: Do you, Mr Ram, understand English well? [Mr Ram]: Yes. [Tribunal]: I am just going to check the file to see if you have requested an interpreter, because I think that you had. Oh, no, it says "No" on the form. Are you sure it's alright. … (Emphasis added.) 29 Counsel for Mr Ram submitted that, notwithstanding the statements by Mr Ram and his adviser at the opening of the hearing, as the hearing progressed, the Tribunal member should have realised that she was unable to understand Mr Ram adequately. Counsel invited the Court to consider the transcript carefully, and he referred to numerous instances where the Tribunal member had indicated that she had misheard, or was having difficulty in understanding Mr Ram: see, e.g., transcript at pp 6-7, 11-12, 15-17, 20, 23-27, 29, 35, and 38-41. The following exchanges exemplify the nature of the difficulties: Example 1 (transcript, p 16) [Tribunal]: You were involved in what? I'm sorry, I can't understand. I just have to know. I'm sorry to do this. I just have to understand. [Mr Lucas]: Kindly tell the member, she's the member - - - … [Mr Lucas]: Tell her when you got involved in the politics, which year? [Tribunal]: When? It doesn't matter if it's not the exact year, but you've said it was 1988 or thereabouts, was it? [Mr Ram]: Yes. Example 2 (transcript, p 20) [Tribunal]: Any other things? We're talking about ten years here. You know, you went to work everyday, you had a secure job. You had a place to live and you had two kids in that time. [Mr Ram]: Yes, but the only thing, the time when we went to work, because many times the Fijian people, especially the Fijian people, they come and ask about the politics, but I don't talk to them, political matter. [Mr Lucas]: What he says, Madam, is when he is working at the salon some of the customers, Fijian customers, they start talking politics and be in trouble, but during work time, he didn't want to talk politics. He always kept politics outside the work hours, madam. [Tribunal]: Okay, so you didn't want to talk about it. [Mr Lucas]: During working time. [Mr Ram]: Working time. Example 3 (transcript, pp 26-27) [Tribunal]: Yes, okay, but did you know that they were that or did you learn that later? Did you see the people who threw stones? [Mr Ram]: I saw because three people were running towards me, they throw those stones, but on that time when I used to go around to the site, I saw the people (inaudible) chiefs, they are sitting with their people, over there, they are sitting with them too, but they haven't to - - - [Mr Lucas]: I'm sorry Madam. Speak slowly, so Madam can - - - [Tribunal]: Thank you, Mr Lucas. I am finding this incredibly difficult. That's why I keep saying about - - - to you what I think you've said so you can tell me if I've understood it properly. When you were hit you saw three people, did you? [Mr Ram]: Yes. Example 4 (transcript, p 29) [Tribunal]: When did you find out what their names were or had you known them for a long time? When did you learn the name or names of the people who threw stones at you? [Mr Ram]: Because when the time I get hurt, I lodged a complaint, so one of the police officers, he was from that group, and he told them that he got hurt and he lodged a complaint, so he, that guy that came to me, he said, 'I'm very sorry that I did it to you, but I won't do it again' but please - - - [Tribunal]: I'm sorry, I just don't understand this, Mr Lucas. I'm really struggling here. Are you, too? [Mr Lucas]: Yes, I am also because the thing is, you know, these people, I don't know - - - you have to answer the Madam and speak very slowly at the point. [Tribunal]: Well, I mean, I just I find - - - it's not only your accent and the particular way you say words, which I'm just not used to. There's nothing wrong with it. I'm just not used to it, okay, and it takes you a while to get into the rhythm of how people talk. But, it's not only that it's - - - I just feel that it's incredibly difficult to focus on the point. … Example 5 (transcript, p 35) [Mr Ram]: Sorry about my English, Madam. [Tribunal]: Mr Ram, don't ever come to another thing like this without an interpreter, promise me, all right. I'm sorry, it's awful for me to be rude. I don't mean to be rude about it. [Mr Lucas]: I understand. It's very nice Madam can (inaudible). [Tribunal]: It's a very important occasion and it's so important that we understand you. [Mr Lucas]: And Madam also is working around very close parameters or very set parameters. [Tribunal]: Yes, we have, as I told you at the beginning, these are the things that make a refugee and they're the only things that I can think about. Anyway, I do feel as though we're getting there, don't you? 30 Towards the end of the hearing (at transcript, p 56), there was the following exchange: [Tribunal]: I think I have understood you, Mr Ram. Do you think I have understood you? [Mr Ram]: Yeah, because I'm thinking in my mind that all that time it might take (inaudible) go to school more, you know. [Tribunal]: Oh, no, no. What - - - I mean, basically umm, I didn't want to upset you because I couldn't properly understand you. [Mr Ram]: No, because at that time my mum was working, so - - [Tribunal]: Oh, she would have had a hard time. [Mr Ram]: So, I was thinking that on that time I could have worked more, just like go to school more, you know. It was a very hard time. [Tribunal]: Oh, I'm sure it was, I'm sure. I mean, as I said to you, you know, as soon as you explained those circumstances, I said to you your mother would have had a very hard time. [Mr Ram]: (inaudible) so I left school, you know. [Tribunal]: Oh, yeah. But, I think that we have understood each other reasonably. I've said that you know, even though I did sometimes have trouble understanding what you were saying, I accept that you are committed in your heart to the Labor Party, there's no doubt in my mind about that. The problem that I have is that I just don't think that that would see you being persecuted, but what I want to do is to look at everything that has been said today. 31 Counsel for Mr Ram submitted that the transcript showed that the member did not fully understand Mr Ram's evidence. This lack of understanding was, so he said, confirmed in the reasons for the Tribunal's decision. In this connection, counsel for Mr Ram referred to the Tribunal's statement in its reasons that "I understood his evidence to be that there was no lease arrangement over the land although he thought that the land was most probably owned by native Fijians" (emphasis added). Counsel gave other examples of a similar nature. 32 Having carefully considered the transcript and the Tribunal's reasons, I reject the submission made by Mr Ram's counsel that the Tribunal did not adequately understand the evidence that Mr Ram gave. The member referred to her lack of understanding, first, in connection with the significance of Mr Ram's evidence (i.e., on the basis that she knew well enough what he was saying but did not understand its relevance to her inquiry). Secondly, she referred to her inability to comprehend the actual words spoken by Mr Ram (perhaps because of his accent). Whatever the source of her difficulty in understanding Mr Ram, however, it is clear enough that the member recognised the importance of understanding him and how he put his case, and that she adopted a number of stratagems to do so. It was to this end that she persisted in questioning Mr Ram on matters that she apparently thought might be material to her decision. When she believed she did understand his evidence to her, she restated her understanding of it to him. This allowed both Mr Ram and his adviser an opportunity to correct any misapprehension that she might have had. The member also permitted Mr Ram's adviser to take an active part at the hearing, whether in advising Mr Ram on how to address her, or in attempting to clarify her questions for him, or in conveying to the Tribunal the purport of what Mr Ram had said. Bearing in mind that Mr Ram was present throughout the exchanges between the member and his adviser, and that it has not been suggested that he was incapable of understanding the English spoken by the member or by his adviser, he had an adequate opportunity to correct any misinformation that the adviser might have conveyed. Mr Ram was, the transcript shows, capable of asking for clarification when he needed it. 33 I accept, as the respondent's counsel submitted, that the transcript shows that, by the end of the hearing, the Tribunal comprehended sufficiently the evidence that was given by Mr Ram. I reject the submission that there is anything in the Tribunal's reasons that supports a contrary conclusion. It was open to the Tribunal on the material before it to make the findings that it did. I note nothing turns on its use of the word "understand" in the example referred to earlier. 34 Further, as the respondent pointed out, the Tribunal expressly gave Mr Ram an opportunity to make submissions to her subsequent to the hearing. No further submissions were made on Mr Ram's behalf. This indicates, so it seems to me, that neither Mr Ram nor his adviser entertained concerns after the hearing that the Tribunal had not understood Mr Ram's evidence. 35 The question that is raised by counsel for Mr Ram is whether the absence of an interpreter in this case denied Mr Ram the benefit of the rights protected by s 425(1) of the Act. As already noted, Mr Ram does not claim that language difficulties prevented him from comprehending the significance of the member's questions, and communicating his answers. Rather, it is said language difficulties prevented the member understanding fully the evidence that Mr Ram gave to her. The transcript discloses that there were difficulties of this kind, but that the process of communication between the member and Mr Ram was ultimately effective. Mr Ram's answers were responsive, in the end, to her questions, and were consistent with his claims. Although exchanges were disjointed from time to time and not always entirely coherent, by the stratagems to which I have referred, the member ultimately obtained a coherent account from Mr Ram of his history and his claim. As the Full Court said in Singh, at [28]: [T]he proficiency in English contemplated by s 427(7) is the proficiency necessary to enable an applicant to give evidence and present arguments in English in order to communicate the substance of his or her case and to respond to issues raised. It does not require any greater expertise in English. If the applicant can comprehend and articulate English sufficiently well to enable him or her, in a real sense, to give evidence and present arguments in English to the Tribunal, the requirements of s 425(1) will have been satisfied. 36 At most, in this case, the transcript shows that there may have been some immaterial matters that the Tribunal did not fully comprehend and that the Tribunal was critical of Mr Ram's adviser for failing to arrange an interpreter (although, as the respondent noted, an interpreter may not have overcome the difficulties faced by the Tribunal). In the circumstances of this case, however, no reviewable error is shown by the fact that the hearing before the Tribunal was conducted in the absence of an interpreter. I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kenny.