Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Ltd v Aboriginal Development Commission [1982] FCA 161

Federal Court of Australia|1982-07-01|Before: Keely J

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 - notice

of objection to competency on ground that applicant not a "person aggrieved" - whether applicant an "aboriginal body" - whether decision set out findings, references to evidence and reasons ~ interrelation of s.11(3) and s.13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act considered - whether request "in accordance with" or "under" s.13(1) - whether "not entitled to make the

Aboriginal Development Commission Act, s.3, s.4(1), s.8, s.27(1),s.24(1), s.28.

RALKON AGRICULTURAL COMPANY PTY. LIMITED v_ ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

ABORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION v_ RALKON AGRICULTURAL COMPANY PYY. LIMITED

CORAM : KEELY J. PLACE : ADELAIDE DATE: 5 AUGUST, 1982

Agricultural Company Pty. Limited (Ralkon) and the Aboriginal

Development Commission (the Commission) in relation to a

Ralkon was established by the Point McLeay Community Council

Australian Aboriginal Lands Trust owned two parcels of land

' 2. upon which farming operations were conducted by the Point McLeay aboriginal community. It was proposed at this time that the Aboriginal Land Funds Commission (A.L.F.C.), a Commonwealth body established under the Aboriginal Land Fund Act 1974 (A.L.F. Act) - since repealed - should purchase an

additional property in the area known as "Bartlett's Farm".

It was claimed by Mr. Mansfield, of counsel, for Ralkon that the A.L.F.C. acting under the A.L.F. Act gave a "grant of interest" in the land known as "Barilett's Farm" to Ralkon in 1975. Mr. Debelle, of counsel, for the A.D.C. disputed the existence of such a grant but it was common ground between the parties that, whatever the formal position may have been with respect to the land, Ralkon has at all relevant times farmed "Bartlett's Farm" (together with the two other parcels of land mentioned above). Ralkon has also paid the rates and taxes and has maintained and improved the

Evidence was given of correspondence between the A.L.F.C. and Ralkon concerning "Bartlett's Farm". As the letters were relied on by both parties I shall extract the Televant parts. A letter dated 8 March, 1979 from the

"When the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission purchased "Bartlett's Farm" it proceeded to make a "Grant of

Interest" to Ralkon to enable it to occupy and utilise the land. Under Section 20 of the Aboriginal Land Fund Act 1974 upon making a formal

A letter dated 16 October, 1979 from the A.L.F.C. to Ralkon

"Grant of Interest" your company assumed responsibility for the payment of rates, and other charges associated with operating the property i.e. electricity, water etc. The Commission is not responsible for the day to day operations of the property.

The Aboriginal Land Fund Commission currently holds title to Bartlett's Farm but steps are being taken to prepare a standard agreement which will formalise communities responsibilities in having "Grants of Interest" and allow the Commission to transfer titles to yours and other groups' following incorporation under the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act. The Commassion has been directed to hold titles to land purchased by it for communities until communities incorporate under the Act so as to ensure land is not disposed of."

"In regard to the transfer of title to Bartletts Farm it is likely that the Commission will take steps to effect this transfer pending amendment to Section 78 of the Aboriginal Councils' and Associations Act. The Commission will then formally approve a Grant of Interest under Section 20 (1) (a) of its Act to the Pt. McLeay Community, who will hold title to the property, with the Ralkon Agricultural Company continuing to manage and operate the same..."

Ralkon by letter to A.L.F.C. dated 5 November, 1979 said

"I am in receipt of your 39/75 of 16th Oct 1979. Many thanks.

As regards the transfer of title of 'Bartlett's Farm' I would refer you to yours of 8th March 1979. You informed us then that a formal Grant of Interest under Section 20 (1)(a) had already been given to this Company. No doubt you had inadvertently overlooked this."

In a letter dated 21 December, 1979 the A.L.F.C. replied :-

"T refer to your letter of 5 November 1979 concerning the transfer of title to Bartlett's Farm.

You will recall that in my advice of 16 October 1979 I indicated that it is likely thet the Commission will take steps to effect the transfer of the title pending amendment to Section 78 of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act. The Commission will then formally approve a Grant of Interest under Section 20 (1) (a) of it's Act to the Point McLeay Community, who will hold title to the

property, with the Ralkon Agricultural Company continuing to manage and operate it.

By taking this course of action the Commission would be acting in accordance with its original intention when the initial application to purchase the property was made on behalf of the Point McLeay Community Council in July 1975. It was at that time also intended that the South Australian Aboriginal Lands Trust would accept title to the property and in doing so would reach agreement with the Point McLeay Community Council to arrange a suitable lease for the operating company (Ralkon Co. Pty. Ltd.) over the property. As this arrangement was not proceeded with the Commission accepted responsbility for holding title to the property and subsequently approved a Grant of Interest under it's Act to the Ralkon Company. As mentioned, this course of action was contrary to the Commission's original intention; therefore the Commission will rectify the situation, by rescinding the present Grant of Interest to the Ralkon Company and approving a new Grant of Interest to the Point McLeay Community Council Inc. who will ultimately accept responsibility for holding title to the property.

and maintain the land in accordance with the wishes

of the Pt McLeay Community Council and Ralkon Directors."

Gn 13 May, 1980 the A.L.F.C. wrote to the P.M.C.C. in the following terms :-

"This letter is to inform you that the Commission, at it's 25th meeting, formally agreed to transfer -

the existing Grant of Interest vested in the Ralkon Agricultural Company to the Pt. McLlLeay Community Council Incorporated.

On 21 December 1979 I wrote to the Chairman of the Ralkon Company outlining the Commission's

intentions on this matter. I indicated that the Pt. McLeay Community Council was considered to be the

Bartletts Farm, and that the Ralkon Company, a Corporation which had been established by the

maintain the property in accordance with the wishes of your Council and the Ralkon Directors.

In order that your organisation understands it's responsbilities over the management aspects of

the property I have listed a number of points which should clarify the situation.

The A.L.F.C. will hold title to the property until such time as the Pt. MclLeay Community

Council becomes incorporated under the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, at which time the land title can be transferred to

(d) This transfer of a Grant of Interest to your organisation now formalises the occupation and use of the property referred to as Bartletts Farm by the Pt. MclLeay Community Coiuncil Incorporated..."

On the 23 March, 1981 the Aboriginal Development Commission, (which had replaced the A.L.F.C.) wrote to P.M.C.C. informing it of the decision to offer a lease of "Barlett's Farm" to the P.M.C.C. for a period of 99 years as follows :-

"Tam writing to convey to you the decision of the Aboriginal Development Commissioners in respect to the property known as Bartlett's Farm and in response to your letter of 21 November, 1980 seeking a lease over Bartlett's Farm.

In considering the Council's request, the Commissioners noted that the Council had established

in OQetober 1975, the Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty

Ltd (Ralkon) to manage its farming interests. The Commissioners considered at the same time requests by Ralkon for title to the land as conveyed to the Commission by letter dated 7 July 1980, from Ralkon's consultative committee. The Commissioners also had in mind at the time a report of the unsuccessful attempt by the agricultural consultancy firm of Mr David Price to inspect the property in December 1980.

The outcome of the Commissicners' consideration is that they have decided to offer the Council a 99-year lease to Bartlett's Farm at a nominal rental subject to normal lease conditions and in particular to the following conditions:- ..." (The letter then listed the conditions.)

"IT am writing further to earlier correspondence to inform the Ralkon Agricultural Company that the Commissioners have finally resolved their position in respect of Bartlett's Farm.

The Commissioners, having regard to the facts that (a) Bartlett's Farm was purchased at the request of the Point MclLay Community Council for the benefit of the entire Point McLeay Community,

(b) Ralkon was established by the Point McLeay Community Council Inc. to manage the Council's farming interests, and

have decided to offer the Council a formal lease of the property."

The Aboriginal Development Commission Act 1980 (the

A.D.C. Act) repealed the A.L.F. Act 1974 and the Aboriginal

Loans Commission Act 1974 and established the Commission. The A.D.C. Act provides as follows :-

Section 3. "The purpose of this Act is to further the economic and social development of people of the

Aboriginal race of Australia and people who are descendants of andigenous inhabitants of the Torres

Strait Islands and, in particular, (as a recognition of the past dispossession and dispersal of such people) to establish a Capital Account with the object of promoting their development, self~management and self-sufficiency."

Section 8. "The functions of the Commission are, subject to and in accordance with this Act, to Further the economic and social development of Aboriginals and, in particular, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing -

(a) to assist communities and groups of Aboriginals to acquire land;

(b) to assist Aboriginals to engage in business ' enterprises;

housing and for other personal needs, and to provide such finance;

(d) to assist in the training of Aboriginals in relation to matters related to the functions of the Commissions

. (Ff) to give advice and make recommendations to the Minister with respect to the furtherance of the economic and social development of Aboriginals; and

(g) such other functions in connection with the furtherance of the economic and_ social development of Aboriginals as the Minister determines by notice in writing given to the Commission."

Section 27(1). "The Commission may acquire by agreement any interests in land or personal property

and may, on such terms and conditions as it determines, grant any interests so acquired, or any

interests derived from interests so acquired, to Aboriginal land trusts for the object of enabling

Aboriginals to occupy land or to Aboriginal corporations for the object of enabling members of those corporations to occupy land."

Section 24(1). "For the purposes of enabling Aboriginals to engage in business enterprises, Moneys of the General Fund may, subject to

acquisition of property in pursuance of section 28; "

Section 28. "For the purposes of section 24, the Commission may acquire by agreement any real or personal property, and may grant, sell, lease or otherwise make available property so acquired to an Aboriginal or Aboriginals, or to an Aboriginal body, on such terms and conditions (if any) as are determined by the Commission."

The decision to grant a lease to the P.M.C.C. met with opposition from both Ralkon and the P.M.C.C.. On 30 March 1981 the P.M.C.C. passed a resolution "that all agreements entered into by the previous Council with the A.D.C. be declared null and void". The "offer of title" to the P.M.C.C. was also rejected on 12 May 1981 by a resolution of P.M.C.C. which also resolved "that the land known as

At an extraordinary meeting of the P.M.C.C. on 27 May 1981 it was decided that the Chairman of the P.M.C.C. and the Chairman of Ralkon should "go immediately to Canberra to Tequest the A.D.C. to transfer the title to the South Australian Aboriginal Lands Trust". Their meeting with

However, subsequently, a lease between the P.M.C.C. and the Commission was entered into, lodged for registration on 25 September, 1981 and registered. Ralkon, however, continued to farm the property. By an undated letter received by Ralkon in August or September 1981 the P.M.C.C. gave Ralkon notice to quit the land farmed by Ralkon. There

then followed disputes over the property and proceedings were

By a notice of motion dated and filed on 416 November, 1981 Ralkon sought an order pursuant to s.5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the A.D.J.R. Act) that there be an extension of the time for lodging an application for an order to review the decision of the Commission that a lease of certain property known as "Bartlett's Farm" be granted to P.M.C.C. and on the same day

also made an application for such an order of review.

By a notice of objection to competency filed on 1 December, 1981 the respondent Commission objected "to the jurisdiction

of this court to try this application" on the ground that "the applicant is not a person aggrieved by the decision" within the meaning of the A.D.J.R. Act and on another ground which was not pursued. The notice of objection to competency in its original form contended that the applicant was not a person aggrieved because the respondent was not an

"Aboriginal land trust" nor an "Aboriginal corporation"

within the meaning of the A.D.C. Act and therefore not eligible to receive a grant of interest in land under s.27 (1) of the A.D.C. Act. On 19 February 1982, however, the applicant's solicitors wrote to the respondent's solicitors stating that the applicant qualified for a grant of interest, not as an aboriginal land trust or as an aboriginal corporation under s.27 (1), but as an Aboriginal body under s.28 (1). It was common ground that this was the only ground on which the applicant claimed to be eligible under the Act

In matter No. G62 of 1981 the respondent Commission seeks an order that Ralkon was not entitled to request a statement in writing under s.13 (1) of the A.D.J.R. Act. It was agreed by the parties that both matters should be heard

Section 5 of the A.D.J.R. Act provides :- Section 5. "(1) A person who is aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies that 1s made after the commencement of this Act may apply to the Court for an order of review in respect of the

decision on any one or more of the following grounds:" (The section then lists various grounds.)

It was submitted by Mr. Debelle for the Commission that unless Ralkon could establish that at is "an Aboriginal body" within the meaning of the A.D.C. Act, it would be ineligible to receive a grant of an interest in land under

s.28 of the A.D.C. Act and any application for an extension

ll. of time to lodge an application for an order to review should be dismissed both because the applicant does nat have standing to bring the action and because any order made by

Section 4(1) of the A.D.C. Act 1980 provides that, unless the contrary intention appears, "Aboriginal body" means a body corporate -

(a) that is controlled, whether directly or indirectly, by Aboriginals; and

(b) the principal objects of which are conducive to the advancement of Aboriginals.

There are thus three criteria that must be established :

( ii) that Ralkon is controlled by aboriginals; and

(iii) that the principal objects of Ralkon are conducive to the advancement of aboriginals.

It is common ground that Ralkon is a corporation. On the question of control Mr. Mansfield relied upon affidavit evidence that the directors of Ralkon are all of aboriginal descent and that ali the persons holding shares in Ralkon are persons of aboriginal descent. Mr. Debelle, for the Commission, did not dispute this evidence but submitted that it did not constitute "control" within the meaning of

the Act. He argued that, although aboriginals do at present

control the company in the sense that the shareholders with

voting control are all aboriginals or of aboriginal descent, at is necessary for Ralkon to show "... not only a de facto control, a present-day control, but a satisfaction that that will be the position in the future". Mr. Debelle submitted that it was essential that the articles of association of the Company provided a guarantee that the body corporate would continue to be controlled by aboriginals and it was common ground that the Articles of Ralkon did not provide such a guarantee. However, J am unable to accept Mr. Debelle's submission that it is necessary to establish that the body corporate will continue to be controlled by aboriginals. I consider that Ralkon is and was at all relevant times a body

As to the question of whether the principal objects of Ralkon "are conducive to the advancement of Aboriginals", Paragraph 2 of the memorandum of association of Ralkon states

that the objects for which the company is established include;

"(a) To carry on in all respects the business of Ppastoralist farmer grazier husbander at such place

or places and in such manner as the company shall think fit.

the proper full and effectual carrying out of all of the objects of the company."

Mr. Mansfield conceded that the memorandum "does not refer in any place specifically to aboriginal purposes".

He submitted that the words of the section, namely, that the

objects are conducive to the advancement of aboriginals are sat-

isfied because,"unless there is something which jars in the memorandum or articles as to the role of the company in relation to the advancement of aboriginals, any commercial enterprise generally, .. would be seen as conducive to the advancement of aboriginals". I am unable to accept that submission. Mr. Debelle relied upon the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which defines "conducive" as meaning "conducing or tending to (a specified end); fitted to promote

Mr. Mansfield also submitted that the words "principal objects" were not intended to restrict the Court to looking simply at the objects clause in the company's memorandum of association but that the court should consider

"the memorandum and articles .., the way in which it was incorporated .. the shareholding and the nature of the shareholding ..". He relied upon new articles, which were inserted in 1979, which gave certain rights to holders of residents preference shares who were required to be resident on Point McLeay reserve and to be of aboriginal descent. However I consider that his submission fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that the definition of "Aboriginal body" ain s.4(1) of the A.D.C. Act incorporates two specific requirements (a) that the body be controlled by

aboriginals, and (b) that its principal objects are conducive

their advancement. It thus reguires both "control" ain

practice and the existence of "principal objects" which are

fall within the words of the definition of "Aboriginal body"

where none of its formal objects can be said to tend in a

positive way towards the advancement of aboriginals; it is

not sufficient if the objects are simply not inconsistent

a person aggrieved, relied upon four bases which he

That Ralkon had an interest in the land in any event, namely the grant of an interest to it by the A.L.F.C. pursuant to Section 20 of the A.L.F. Act.

That its interests are adversely affected in that Ralkon itself sought (prior to the decision complained of) to have the land transferred to it by the A.D.C. under the A.D.€. Act or in anticipation of that Act being passed. That it had interests in the land potentially adversely affected by the decision, namely its right or interest in

the occupation of the land, which has persisted since about 1975 and which (on the correspondence) was an

interest intended by the A.D.C. to continue, and that

those interests have in fact been adversely affected by

the P.M.C.C. having the right to, or purporting to have the right to, eject it from the land and having in about September, 1981 sought to eject it; and

That its interests were adversely affected in that it, and its shareholders on the invitation in part of the then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs or his representatives, had invited members of the P.M.C.C. on a voluntary basis to subscribe to Ralkon upon a holding out that their interest would then be recognised through Ralkon as an entitlement

The application for a review seeks an order quashing the decision and referring the matter to the respondent Commission for further consideration. It does so on grounds which include contentions "that the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction to make the decision", "that the decision was not authorised by the enactment" and "that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power

Consumer Affairs (1981) 36 A.L.R. 64 Ellicott J. examined the

question of the meaning of the expression "a person who 1s

aggrieved" in the A.D.J.R. Act and said (at p. 79) :-

"The words 'a person who is aggrieved' should not, in my view, be given a narrow construction. They should not, therefore, be confined to persons who can establish that they have a legal interest at stake in the making of a decision. It is unnec- essary and undesirable to discuss the full import of the phrase. I am satisfied from the broad nature of the discretions which are subject to

review and from the fact that the procedures are clearly intended in part to be a substitution for the more complex prerogative writ procedures that a narrow meaning was not intended. This does not

at least covers a person who can show a grievance which will be suffered as a result of the decision complained of beyond that which he or she has as an ordinary member of the public. In many cases that grievance will be shown because the decision directly affects his or her existing or future legal rights. In some cases however the effect may be less direct. It may affect him or her in the conduct of a business or may, as I think is the case here, affect his or her rights against third parties (cf. Robinson v. Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 C.L.R. 283)".

I agree, with respect, with the opinion there expressed by Ellicott J. - see also Bowen C.J. and Franki J.

in Ricegrowers Co-Operative Mills Ltd. v Bannerman and T.P.C.

(1981) 38 A.L.R. 535 at pp. 539-540, Morling J. in Vickers v

Minister (17/5/1982 - unreported) and Doyle v Chief of General Staff per Fisher J. (8/7/1982 - unreported). I

apply the principle there enunciated to the matters relied upon by Mr. Mansfield in the four matters summarized in his

written reply, which are set out earlier - and in particular the contention that Ralkon's interests have been adversely affected by P.M.C.C. "purporting to have the right to eject

at from the land and having in about September 1981 sought

to eject it". In my opinion Ralkon is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of the A.D.J.R. Act. Accordingly the

It 1s necessary to consider whether Ralkon requires an extension of time to make its application for an order of review - Ralkon having submitted that its application for such an extension is made for greater caution. Section 11(1)(c) of the A.D.J.R. Act provides, inter alia, that an application to the Court for an order of review shall be lodged "within the prescribed period or within

"(3) The prescribed period for the purposes of paragraph (1)(c) 1s the period commencing on the day on which the decision is made and ending on the twenty-eighth day after -

(a) if the decision sets out the findings on material questions of fact, refers to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and gives the reasons for the decision - the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision is furnished to the applicant; or

(b) in a case to which paragraph (a) does not apply -

(i) if a statement in writing setting out those findings, referring to that evidence or other material and giving those reasons is furnished to the applicant otherwise than in pursuance of a request under sub-section 13(1) not

later than the twenty-eighth day after the day on which a document setting out the terms of a decision is furnished to the applicant - the day on which the statement is so furnished.

( ii) if the applicant, in accordance with sub-section 13(1), requests the person

who made the decision to furnish a statement as mentioned an that sub-section - the day on which the statement 1s furnished, the applicant is notified in accordance with sub-section

13(3) of the opinion that the applicant was not entitled to make the request, the Court makes an order under sub-section 13(4A) declaring that the applicant was not entitled to make the request or the applicant is notified in accordance with sub-section 13A(3) or 14(3) that the statement will not be furnished; or

(iii) in any other case - the day on which a document setting out the terms of the decision is furnished to the applicant."

no period is prescribed for the making of applications for orders of review in relation to a particular decision; or

no period is prescribed for the making of an application by a particular person for an order of review in relation to a particular decision;

in a case to which paragraph (a) applies - refuse to entertain an application for an order of review in relation to the decision referred to in that paragaph; or

in a case to which paragaph (b) applies - refuse to entertain an application by the person referred to in that paragraph for an order of review in relation to the decision so referred to,

if the Court is of the opinion that the application

Section 13(1) provides :- Section 13. "(1) Where a person makes a decision to which this section applics, any person who is entitled to make an application to the Court under section 5 in relation to the decision may, by notice

in writing given to the persons who made the decision, request him to furnish a statement in

writing setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or

other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision."

containing "the findings on material questions of fact, ..

the evidence or other material on which those findings were

based and .. the reasons for the decision" which documents I

shall refer to simply as "the reasons". Section 11(3) provides a number of different tests in order to ascertain the "prescribed period". If the decision sets out in writing

"reasons" for the decision the prescribed period ends 28 days

after the day on which that decision is furnished to him

If the decision does not set out "reasons" but a statement in writing giving "reasons" is later furnished to the applicant voluntarily by the decision maker (i.e. without a request by the applicant under s.13(1)), the prescribed period ends 28 days after the day on which the statement in

writing giving "reasons" is furnished to him (s.11(3)(b)(i)).-

accordance with" s.13(1), then the prescribed period ends at

the expiration of 28 days from one of four possible events (s.11(3)(b)(ii)) namely 28 days after the day on which -

the statement containing "reasons" is furnished; or

the applicant is notified in accordance with s.13(3) that he was not entitled to make the request; or

the Court makes an order under s.13(4A) declaring that the applicant was not entitled to make the request; or

the applicant is notified in accordance with sub-section 13A(3) or 14(3) that the statement will not be furnished.

If none of the foregoing apply, then the applicant has 28

days from the day on which the decision is furnished to him

Mr. Debelle submitted that Ralkon does require an extension of time because time expired pursuant to 3.11(3)(a). He claimed that the letter dated 23 March, 1981 from the A.D.C. to Ralkon set out the findings on material questions of fact, referred to the evidence or other material on which the findings were based and gave the reasons for the

decision and that time for Ralkon therefore expired 28 days

Mr. Mansfield submitted that s.11(3)(a) intended a full and complete statement to be furnished - relying on

Palmer _v Minister for Australian Capital Territory (1978) 23

A.L.R. 196. In that case the Administrative Appeals Tribunal

(Fisher J. presiding) considered words in s.28 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 which are the same as those appearing in s.11(3)(a). It held (at p. 206) that the provision "... certainly intended that the citizen should be fully informed" and that "the reasons, when properly given, ensure that the citizen is sufficiently informed to determine whether he wishes to take the matter further ...". In reaching that conclusion the Tribunal relied on statements

by Megaw J. in Re Poyser & Mills Arbitration (1964) 2 Q.B. 467 at pp. 477-478, statements in Iveagh v Minister of

Housing and Local Government (1964) 1 Q.B. 395 by Lord

Denning at p. 410 and by Russell L.J. at p. 405 and by

James L.J. in Elliott v_ London Borough of Southwark (1976) 2

In ats letter of 23 March, 1981 the A.D.C. gave three "reasons" for its decision :-

"(Ca) Bartlett's Farm was purchased at the request of the Point McLeay Community Council for the benefit of the entire Point McLeay community,

(b) Ralkon was established by the Point McLeay Community Council Inc. to manage' the Council's farming interests, and

In my opinion the letter of 23 March, 1981 does not contain sufficient detail to comply with s.11(3)(a) (cf. Fisher J. in

Palmer's Case (supra)). The letter is altogether too

eryptic. I accept Mr. Debelle's submission that the one

statement may perform the double function of both setting out

a finding of fact and of giving a reason. However, in my

Opinion the letter of'23 March, 1981 to Ralkon did not set out the findings, reasons and other matters referred to in s.

Mr. Mansfield submitted that the only relevant provisions of s.11 for the purposes of this case are contained in sub-section 3(b)(11) and that time has not expired because : (1) the application was lodged within 28 days of being notified (under s.13(3)) that it was not entitled to make a request for reasons under s.13 and aiso because (2) the application for reasons, having already been made, was made before this Court could order under s.13(4A) that the applicant 1s not entitled to make the request. Mr. Mansfield submitted that a letter, dated 24 November, 1981, from Ralkon's solicitors to the solicitors for the A.D.C. constituted a request for a statement within the meaning of 8.13. Omitting matters not relevant here it stated :-

"Our client is a person who is entitled to make application to the Court under Section 5 of the

Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act in relation to this decision made by the Aboriginal

Development Commission. Pursuant to Section 13 of that Act, our client hereby requests that you furnish it wath a statement, in writing, setting out any findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving reasons for the decision of the Commission to grant the lease of the

Bartletts Farm property to the Point McLleay Community Council and not to our client."

1981 to Ralkon's solicitors constituted a notice in

writing within the meaning of s.13(3) and s.11(3) (b) (11) that

At a glance

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Judgment (260 paragraphs)