1. The relevant parts of the decision in the Federal Circuit Court are not with respect to the Applicant, Ms Kaur, but with respect to Mr Rajput, and his companies. I consider that the declarations in that Federal Circuit Court are statements by a court pronouncing upon the existence of a legal state of affairs. The statements made in that Federal Circuit Court decision concerned failures to meet basic employer obligations and serious contraventions of workplace laws, in a registered tax agent business. The Applicants' reference to the possibility of an appeal is not a basis to doubt the correctness of that decision.

1. The next matter that the Applicants raised was the failure to notify of the Federal Circuit Court decision. The Applicants provided some background, namely that the Respondent had sent a letter dated 17 February 2025 to the Applicant, entitled, 'Preliminary Inquiries by the Tax Practitioners Board regarding your conduct as a registered tax practitioner'. The Applicants' legal representative formally replied to that letter in writing, on 10 April 2025, and did not notify the Respondent in writing until 29 April 2025, with respect to the Federal Circuit Court decision, which it accepts was 66 days late.

1. The Applicant said in the written submission, that if he had his time again, he would have disclosed the outcome in the Kaur decision earlier than 29 April 2025, but explains that for the period from 17 February 2025, his attention was focused on satisfying the Respondent's preliminary inquiries, which were numerous and detailed in nature. That may be true, but nevertheless, the fact is that the Applicant failed to notify the Respondent, with respect to that decision, a matter that required notification under section 30-35(1)(c). Mr Rajput judgment. Therefore, it remains a matter of concern that he failed to do it, and that failure represented a breach of the statutory regime.

1. The next matter was the Khokar statement which was provided as part of proceedings commenced by Ms Khokar in the Supreme Court on 3 November 2025. The Applicants say that unsurprisingly, the allegations that Ms Khokar relied upon were similar to those in the Kaur matter. The Applicants do not deny that the Respondent was entitled to rely on evidence in the witness statement, but say that very little weight should be given to it. I do not consider this to be a matter of great significance. It is relevant that Ms Khokar has made allegations of a similar nature to those made by Ms Kaur. If those allegations were substantiated, then that would be a matter of concern. But the Supreme Court matter was resolved by way of a settlement agreement, and on the basis of no admission, as to liability.

Therefore, the Khokar statement does not add much. The allegations are matters that will have to be considered by the Tribunal at the substantive hearing. And the weight to be given to it would be determined at that point, but for the purpose of the stay application, I do not give any weight to the allegations made in the Khokar statement.

1. The next matter relates to the covert ATO audit. The Commissioner commenced an audit without undertaking what the Applicants say is the usual course of first advising the taxpayer that a review of their financial affairs will occur before progressing towards audit. They say that there are corresponding procedural fairness issues, and that there should not be any weight given to the findings of the audit. I accept that it is difficult to assess the outcome of that audit on the material currently before me. The Applicants say that the methodology was flawed in that it inferred that all deposits to Mr Rajput's bank accounts were assessable income, unless the transaction narrations indicated that the deposits were not income. They say that the alleged impugned transactions were never put to Mr Rajput, and that there are numerous entities within the group of the Applicants, each having their own bank accounts, and there would be various transfers between those entities, which would necessarily result in assessable income to the extent that was found in the audit. The Applicants note that they have lodged objections against each of the assessments or the amended assessments that have been issued by the Commissioner.

1. It is not for me, on a stay application, to indicate one way or the other, about whether or not those findings will remain after those challenges have gone through. Both parties agreed that, on a stay application, one does not conduct a mini trial and make findings of fact where there appears to be disputes. And this is one area where that applies. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that some weight should be given to those findings, because they were assessments which were extensive and detailed, and because of the large sum of money which was found to be owed. But I do not give that much weight to that factor.

1. The final matter raised by the Applicants was related to the insufficient number of tax agents. The Applicants say that not much weight that should be placed on this, and that there are indications that it has good prospects of overturning any findings about this. I am not really in a position to say one way or the other. I note that the Respondent's letter dated 17 February 2025, asserted there were 23,091 returns lodged, and that the Applicant says there were really only 11,565 active clients, therefore less than half than what the Respondent acted upon. The Applicant say that in February, or following February 2025, it did provide a very comprehensive response to the Respondent on the question of the sufficiency and suitability of supervisory arrangements in place by the Applicants. And therefore says that very little weight should be given to that matter. I am prepared to not give any significant weight to those findings. But nevertheless, they are findings made after a comprehensive investigation, and therefore some weight should be given to them.

1. In conclusion with respect to the prospects of success, in my view, the Applicants have not demonstrated that they have any real prospects of success. One can reach that view relying upon the Kaur decision in the Federal Circuit Court alone, and the findings made therein. But I come to that conclusion based on that, and the other matters that I have been taken to. In my view, the available material does not provide a sufficient foundation for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the applications for review are likely to result in an outcome other than termination, that would justify a stay.

1. With respect to the other matters, besides prospects of success that were set out in Scott, the Applicant makes some general submissions that the stay should be granted, because the Applicants' clients will be inconvenienced and need to find suitable tax agents at very short notice, to continue providing tax agent services. I accept the submission that there will be inconvenience and I am required to take that into account when considering whether or not this is a stay. There is, obviously, also significant inconvenience and potentially financial harm to staff members, who may find themselves not employed, and therefore have to find alternative work if the Applicants are not able to continue to provide their services.

1. The Applicants say that if a stay is granted, it would allow the Applicant to salvage his business to the point where he will be able to continue to provide tax agent services, which will have a benefit for the staff and the clients, alike.

1. The Applicants say that if the state is not granted, there is every likelihood that the Applicants will be adversely affected financially, because it is unlikely that by the time the substantive hearing occurs, all of the clients, of their own volition, will have moved on to find new tax agents. I accept that there is no chance of an expedited hearing in this matter, and so therefore there will be a significant delay until this matter can be heard. And that is likely to have a financial impact on all of the Applicants. But these are matters that need to be considered in the mix.

1. I am concerned that the Applicants have not provided much probative evidence about the nature, or extent of adverse consequences beyond bare assertions from Mr Rajput that they would be adversely affected financially, and that the client base is unlikely to remain with him unless he is permitted to continue practising. But as I have said, those matters are not particularly controversial and are likely consequences. The refusal to stay the decisions will have some negative reputational and financial consequences for the Applicants, there is no doubt about that. But in the circumstances, I would give that little weight, because financial impacts are an inevitable consequence in circumstances where the person is prevented from engaging in their chosen profession, and the prospect of economic loss to the Applicants consequent upon regulatory action is inherent in the regulatory regime in which the decisions were made. There are numerous authorities to that effect. Whilst there are adverse consequences for the Applicants, I consider they are outweighed by other considerations, particularly the public interest.

1. I also note that in terms of damage to reputation that the Applicant's reputation has already been significantly damaged by the media attention, and so, that is going to take place whether or not there is a stay or not. I accept the Respondent's submissions with respect to the public interest in that it does favour the refusal of the stay. The Respondent is the statutory body tasked with administering the TASA. And the purpose of the TASA is to ensure that taxation services are provided to the community in accordance with appropriate standards of professional and ethical conduct. There is a public interest in maintaining these standards. And there is, accordingly, a public interest in allowing the decisions under review to take effect without further and indeterminate delay.

1. It is noteworthy that the public and taxpayers in particular are entitled to protection from persons who are considered not fit and proper to provide tax agent services, which, in my view, flows from the decision in Kaur. The public is entitled to the protection offered by those decisions. I note further that the decisions were made after a very comprehensive process of investigation, and a process which enabled the Applicants to be heard, and to make submissions. I note that the Applicants participated in the process leading up to the decisions being made, and that they had legal representation and made significant written submissions. And so it is not as if the decisions that were made are in any way arbitrary or without foundation. Quite to the contrary, the decisions were made by the regulatory authority, taking into account all relevant matters and as I said, after affording the Applicants the opportunity to be heard, and then making the decisions at that point. So they should be given significant weight, and it is important for the public interest that those decisions are adhered to, and that the Tribunal does not interfere.

1. This is, of course, just one factor. There are, obviously, examples where decisions are made by the regulator, which are stayed, but in this case, the other factors favour refusing the stay, and one of those factors is public interest. Another Scott factor is the consequences for the Respondent, and I think there is significant overlap with the public interest factor there. So I do not say much more about that.

1. I do not consider that the applications for review would be rendered nugatory if stays were refused. And I also do not believe that the stays being sought are necessary to secure the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the applications for review, in the sense that I am not satisfied on the evidence that if a stay is not granted, that the applications for review would not proceed.

1. There is a very significant financial impact on the Applicants, but the evidence does not satisfy me that that will prevent the review proceeding. And therefore, that is a factor that favours not granting the stay.

1. I conclude that the Applicant has been found to engage in conduct that is relevant to the issues that will be further determined at this hearing. There is a risk to the tax system and the tax profession, if the Applicants are entitled to continue to provide services. The public is entitled to the protection of the decisions, pending the determination of the applications for review.

1. And as I said, the public interest weighs overwhelmingly against the grant of the stays. I have considered whether or not there should be a stay with conditions, but I am not satisfied that allowing the Applicants to continue to provide services, even if limited to their current set of clients, and even if those clients are properly notified of the decisions that have been made, I still do not think that is sufficient to protect the public's interest. And so I do not consider the factors with respect to granting a stay can even be satisfied, with those conditions that are being suggested.

1. The reality is that the Applicants have exhibited behaviour based, as I said, primarily on those findings made in the Kaur decision, that fall significantly short of the standard of professional and ethical conduct expected of a tax professional. A further matter was relied upon, which is not determinative of the matter, but it is of concern, that the P&G entity appears to have breached the conditions attaching to the interim stays, by taking on new clients. There was an explanation for that, and it does appear that it was inadvertent, and the explanation is sufficient. But it does just highlight the difficulty of imposing conditions on a stay. But as I said, that matter is not determinative of the issues.

1. The decision of the Tribunal is to refuse the stay application and to refuse any application for a stay with conditions. That applies with respect to all of the Applicants.

I certify that these 50 (fifty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President P Britten-Jones.

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[1] Scott v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798; (2009) 51 AAR 114.