Raissis v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

Raissis v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue - [2021] NSWCATAD 99 - NSWCATAD 2021 case summary — Zoe

[10]

The Administration Act

Part 3 of the Administration Act deals generally with assessment of tax liability and section 8 empowers the Chief Commissioner to make an assessment of that liability. That Part also deals with such complementary matters as reassessment, withdrawal of assessments and notices to be given by the Chief Commissioner.
Part 5 of that Act deals with interest and penalty tax. In summary, section 21 provides that if a tax default occurs the taxpayer is liable to pay interest on the tax unpaid at an interest rate time to time applying under Division 1 of that Part. By operation of section 22 the interest rate is the sum of the "market rate component" and "the premium component" and s 22(2) and (3) define those terms, respectively, as follows: 1. The market rate component is the Bank Accepted Bill rate rounded to the second decimal place or another rate specified by order of the Minister. 2. The premium component is 8% per annum.
Section 25 of the Administration Act grants the Chief Commissioner discretion to remit the market rate component or the premium component of interest or both by any amount "in such circumstances as the Chief Commissioner considers appropriate".
Part 10 deals with objections and reviews and includes provisions for the grounds for objections (section 87), time limits and objections made out of time (sections 89 and 90), the determination of objections and the giving of notice of a determination (sections 91 and 93). Section 95 effectively requires interest, under sections 21 and 22 as described above, to run on amounts payable following the determination of any objection.
Division 2 of Part 10 deals with reviews by this Tribunal and by the Supreme Court. Relevantly, section 96 allows a taxpayer to apply to this Tribunal for an administrative review under the ADR Act if the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the Commissioner's determination of the taxpayer's objection or 90 days (not including any period of suspension under s 92) have passed since the objection was served on the Chief Commissioner and he has not determined that objection.

[19]

Analysis of the possible issues

It seems clear and the parties were in consensus that the central issue in these proceedings is whether, as at 31 December 2019, the Paddington Property was used and occupied by Mr Emanuel Raissis as his principal place of residence. (For convenience of reference I shall refer to that issue as "issue 1").
If it was, then the validity of the Chief Commissioner's land tax assessments for 2016, 2017 and 2019 is in issue. It was put to me by Counsel for the Chief Commissioner and I agree (nothing persuasive to the contrary having been put to me by the Applicants), that land tax liability for the 2018 tax year is not in issue. That is because Mr Emanuel Raissis cannot claim the Clause 6 concession in respect of that land tax year because of the result in the Bondi Proceedings, which recognised the Bondi Property as his principal place of residence for the 2018 land tax year. Of course a taxpayer can have only one principal place of residence for each tax year: Black v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2011] NSWADT 66 at [81].
If however issue 1 is answered in the negative, then the Clause 6 concession cannot be available. That must follow from clause 6(5) of the Schedule which provides that (in the circumstances in which Clause 6 operates) the exemption is revoked if the person (here, Mr Emanuel Raissis) failed to actually use and occupy the land as his principal place of residence by the end of a particular period being "the period in which this clause applies". In the circumstances of this case that must be a reference to the period set out in subclause (3)(a) of clause 6, namely: 4 tax years immediately following the year in which the person became the owner of the land
It is uncontested that Mr Emanuel Raissis became the owner of the Paddington Property on 26 October 2015 (the date on which the transfer of title to him and his brother was registered). The 4 tax years which immediately followed that year were 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. The 2019 tax year expired on 31 December 2019.
So, in order to satisfy the time limit in clause 6(5), Mr Emanuel Raissis must have used and occupied the relevant land, being the Paddington Property, as his principal place of residence by 31 December 2019.
The question of whether he did so is precisely the focus of enquiry in issue 1.
So, if issue 1 is answered in the negative, the Chief Commissioner's land tax assessments for the 2016, 2017 and 2019 tax years are not open to challenge on the basis of the PPR exemption or relevant concessions and so cannot be in issue in these proceedings.
Finally, it is clear that the third issue for determination by me is whether, as sought by the Applicants, there should be any remission of the interest on the land tax debt, either that calculated as the market rate component or the premium component.

[26]

General principles

In Yen-Cheng Chuang v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 160 ("Yen-Cheng"), at [19] to [23], the Tribunal provided a useful summary of the considerations applicable to determining a person's principal place of residence, as follows: 1. The LTM Act does not provide any technical or legal meaning for the expression "principal place of residence", so the expression has its ordinary meaning. 2. In ascertaining whether a particular residence of a person is the principal place of residence of the person it is necessary to use an objective test and the conclusion is determined by considering the extent and quality of the use and occupation of the residence in each case: Dean v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) (No 2) [1996] 2 Qd R 557 per Fryberg J. 3. Older cases appear to accept that one formulation of a place of residence is "the place where [the person] eats, drinks and sleeps". (See, for example, Stoke-On-Trent Borough Council v Cheshire County Council [1915] 3 KB 699, at 706.) However, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, in Ziino v Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] VCAT 1707 ("Ziino"), added a note of caution in the following terms: "…. while sleeping by itself in a place can be an indication of a principal place of residence, it is not the sole matter to be taken into account. One needs to look at a whole indicia of matters… One needs to look as well at where the applicant ate; his use of electricity and the furniture and fittings and other matters such as entertainment of friends in the house... Sleeping in a place does not make a residence. It has got to be the whole indicia of things that are done in a home which are described in the cases...". 1. Other indications of a principal place of residence include evidence of the taxpayer's use of the address of the property as the residential address for purposes of his or her mail, and whether that is the address shown on his or her driving licence, on the electoral roll, in immigration records, income tax returns and telephone bills.

[27]

"Reside"

It is also useful to consider the High Court's observations as to the verb "reside". In Commissioner of Taxation v Miller (1946) 73 CLR 93 at 99, ("Miller") the Chief Justice Sir John Latham thought there was no judicial authority making it impossible to apply the ordinary meaning of the word "reside". He adopted the formulation suggested in Levene v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1928] AC 217 at 222, where Viscount Cave LC had relied upon the Oxford English Dictionary meaning of the term, being: "to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place."
Latham CJ also observed that a person is not the less "resident" at the property simply because from time to time he or she leaves it for the purpose of business or pleasure. It seems clear that, in at least some situations, the taxpayer's absences, even frequent absences, for business or other purposes, do not prevent a property from being treated as that person's principal place of residence, but only if the application of other criteria justified that conclusion: Uechtritz v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWADT 111 ("Uechtritz").
In Uechtritz the taxpayer was a prominent and successful businessman who was reported to be in the course of transitioning to retirement. The Tribunal accepted evidence that he intended to retire and use the subject property (at Byron Bay) as his principal place of residence in retirement, notwithstanding that he would continue his substantial investment, philanthropic and social activities, which involved reasonably frequent travel and use of another substantial residence owned by him at Rose Bay in Sydney, even though he had made the Rose Bay residence available for use by other family members and it was so used.
The Tribunal accepted that his use of and residence at the Byron Bay property was substantial and that he had other connections with that property and the region, notwithstanding his ownership and occasional extended use of the Rose Bay property. The Tribunal concluded that the Byron Bay property was his permanent place of residence. But it also commented, at [61], that Mr Uechtritz's particular "variegated and peripatetic lifestyle" made the case unusual.

[28]

First Home Owners Grant cases

Some assistance is provided by cases which considered whether particular property had been occupied as the "principal place of residence" of a taxpayer for the purposes of the First Home Owners Grant. It must be remembered that the eligibility criteria for such grants are different from those applicable to the PPR exemption and the Clause 6 concession in respect of land tax. In particular, section 12(1) of the First Home Owner Grant (New Homes) Act 2000 requires an applicant to satisfy the Chief Commissioner that they "occupy" the principal place of residence for the periods described in the subsection, whereas Schedule 1A, clause 2(1) of the LTM Act requires land for which the principal place of residence exemption is sought to have been "used and occupied" by the owner, subject to the conditions of that clause and Part 2; the use of the land being an additional consideration.
However, with that distinction in mind, the cases in relation to the First Home Owners Grant do provide a useful guide to ascertaining a principal place of residence.
In Bates v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] NSWADT 13 ("Bates") the Tribunal found that an applicant who had resided for about two months at a property which she had recently purchased had "occupied" the property for the purposes of section 12(1) of the relevant Act but had not done so as "her principal place of residence".
The Tribunal confirmed that the intention of the applicant is relevant, but it is not determinative of the issue. Nor is the fact that the applicant resided in the property for a short period of time. These matters, if established, must be considered in light of all the evidence, including where the applicant resided otherwise during any relevant period, the reasons given by the applicant for not residing there, whether that arose from matters entirely out of control of the applicant and the nature of the applicant's residence at the property.
The Tribunal observed that this list was by no means exhaustive, as each case must be considered in the context of its particular facts. The Tribunal concluded that Ms Bates had not satisfied the residential requirement of the Act.

[30]

The principles in Ferrington

Ferrington was another case involving the consideration of a grant under the First Home Owners scheme. In that case the taxpayer entered into a contract to purchase her home on 24 April 2001. On 5 June 2001 settlement of her purchase took place. On or about that date she moved into the property and connected the utilities, but on 28 June 2001 (that is, approximately 3 weeks later) she moved out and returned to live at her parents' home, which had been her prior place of residence. She then let the newly-purchased property to tenants.
The Administrative Decisions Tribunal at first instance set aside the Chief Commissioner's decision which was to refuse the First Home Owners Grant and to impose a penalty of 20%. The Tribunal's decision at first instance was upheld by the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal.
In its reasons for decision, the Appeal Panel suggested important tests for determining a taxpayer's "principal place of residence" and the degree of permanence required in order to satisfy that concept. The tests were these: 1. The phrase "principal place of residence" should be given its ordinary meaning in the context in which the phrase appears. 2. Consideration as to whether a person has been residing at or occupying premises as their principal place of residence is to be assessed objectively, in the light of the circumstances relating to the actual occupation of the dwelling. 3. The intention of the person concerned, gauged objectively, is relevant but not determinative of the issue. 4. In order for there to be a finding that a particular person occupied a property as their principal place of residence their occupation must have a degree of permanence to it: a connection to a place of residence of a transient, temporary, contingent or passing nature is not sufficient, nor is occupation for some other purpose. 5. The duration of a person's residence is relevant but not determinative of the issue. A particular person's occupation of a home, while short, may have the requisite degree of permanence to it, but as the Appeal Panel put it at [42]: "But that will not happen if, when considered objectively, the occupation was transient, temporary, contingent or other passing nature, or for some other purpose. One may occupy premises for a short time on a transient, temporary, or contingent basis, but one can also occupy for a short time as one's principal place of residence." 1. Significantly, the Appeal Panel noted that it is the nature of the occupation which provides the element of permanence. The fact that a period of actual occupation is short will in practice make it harder for the taxpayer to demonstrate that the occupation was as his or her principal place of residence, but it will not make such a conclusion impossible. 2. The reasons for a person's departure from the property must be both reasonable and adequately explained when considered objectively in the light of their personal circumstances. In Bates the Tribunal thought that whether non-residence at the property resulted from matters entirely out of the control of the person was a factor to be considered. But in Ferrington, the Appeal Panel, whilst noting that "that is undoubtedly correct", cautioned that it should not be read as stipulating a requirement that the reasons for departure must be completely out of the relevant person's control.

[33]

The relevant principles emerging from the cases

The starting point must be the principal emerging from Yen-Cheng, to the effect that the relevant legislation does not provide any technical or legal meaning of the phrase "principal place of residence", so the term must be given its ordinary meaning.
The recent cases serve to emphasise that much depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. But the cases which I have summarised above and most significantly, Ferrington, do provide useful beacons as to whether particular facts will give rise to a conclusion that the taxpayer has established his or her principal place of residence in a particular property.
The following principles and factors relating to the question of principal place of residence seem to me to be particularly pertinent to the position of the Applicants here: 1. the taxpayer's intention as to his or her use and occupation of the property is a relevant factor, but significantly it is not determinative: see Bates and Ferrington. 2. The extent and quality of the taxpayer's occupation in each case is a better guide than any expression of intention: see Yen-Cheng citing Dean v Commissioner of Stamp Duties. 3. The fact that the taxpayer has for a period slept in the particular property does not make that property his or her principal place of residence and a whole indicia of matters which are attended to in a home must be considered: Ziino. The extent and quality of the taxpayer's occupation must be assessed objectively and must be such to indicate the requisite degree of permanence, so that an occupation which is transient, contingent or of a passing nature or for some other purpose will not satisfy the statutory requirement (Ferrington). 4. Although temporary or occasional occupation of another property may not, depending on the facts, deprive a particular property from proper characterisation as the principal place of residence (as in Uechtritz), Chief Justice Latham's formulation in Miller is a more authoritative guide, particularly his reliance on the notion of a principal place of residence being a property which is dwelt in permanently or for a considerable time and overall is the person's "settled or usual abode".

[34]

Application of those principles to the present facts

I began by considering whether, at the appropriate times, (including in particular 31 December 2019 and the period immediately surrounding that date) there was sufficient indication in the Applicants' evidence that the Paddington Property could be regarded as Mr Emanuel Raissis' "settled or usual abode" or, on the contrary, whether on the evidence and an objective assessment of the nature of his occupation of the property, that occupation could properly be characterised as transient, contingent or of a passing nature or for some other purpose.
I concluded that, on any reasonable objective assessment of the question, at that time and indeed probably continuing substantially into calendar year 2020, the building work and fitting out of the Paddington Property could not be regarded as being so well-developed as to facilitate Mr Emanuel Raissis' use and occupation of it as his settled or usual abode.
On the contrary, his occupation of the property can properly be characterised as transient and contingent.
In reaching those conclusions I gave particular weight to the following. 1. The contents of the table of consents and approvals to various stages of the construction of the residence at the Paddington Property, which was prepared on behalf of the Chief Commissioner, based on the documentation obtained from Woollahra Municipal Council. The table (which for convenience I will refer to as "the Consent and Construction Timeline" or "the Timeline") was included in the Respondent's Outline of Submissions filed on 3 December 2020. Those submissions were duly served on the Applicants and several references to the Consent and Construction Timeline were made in the course of Counsel's submissions at the hearing. No objection to the document was taken by the Applicants. Amongst other things the Timeline indicates that: 1. although a certificate of structural adequacy was issued on 5 November 2019, an electrical compliance certificate was not issued until 18 February 2020. It seems a reasonable imputation that electrical wiring may not have been in complete form (or at the least, a form suitable for inspection) during late December 2019 or January 2020; 2. the necessary inspection of the building prior to covering waterproofing in any wet areas did not occur until 5 March 2020. Again it is a reasonable imputation that internal tiling may not have been in place in December 2019 or January 2020. That appears to be supported by the fact the plumbing and drainage certificate of compliance was not issued for a further 4 months; not until 28 May 2020; and 3. an occupation certificate was not issued until 12 August 2020, by which time Mr Emanuel Raissis had left the property. 1. The weaknesses in some of the documentary evidence produced by Mr Emanuel Raissis. His statutory declaration of 10 August 2020 attached an electoral roll change, indication of connection of electricity in January 2020 and drivers licence change. Apart from the fact that each of these items of evidence post-dates the taxing date of 31 December 2019, those documents, even in combination, do not substantiate actual residence by any particular person. 2. An Origin electricity bill, which was attachment 5 to Mr Emanuel Raissis' document package filed on 17 August 2020, indicated that the electricity "supply start date" was 12 January 2020. That would appear to indicate that prior to that date, insofar as Mr Raissis asserts that he was sleeping and eating at and otherwise using the property, he must have been doing so without a main line electricity connection (again noting that the electricity compliance certificate was not issued until 18 February 2020). Of course, it is possible to prepare meals and perhaps to install partial lighting in residential premises without such an electricity connection and perhaps that is what happened; but if so, it is hardly persuasive as to the establishment of the principal place of residence. Again I note the onus is on the Applicants to establish that. 3. It was put to me by both the Applicants that Mr Emanuel Raissis was able to sleep at the property regularly. But it seems clear from matters referred to in (1), (2) and (3) above that his sleeping arrangements may well have been very simple and temporary; there was insufficient evidence before me to demonstrate that he regularly cooked or heated his meals at the Paddington Property and it seems unlikely that he had any electricity supply before 12 January 2020, or that such supply as he had was ready for inspection prior to 18 February 2020. Again on these matters the Applicants have not satisfied the onus which they bear in these proceedings. 4. There was no evidence as to the furniture and fittings which Mr Emanuel Raissis had available at the property or such other matters as entertainment of friends in the house. Those were the matters seen as important indicia in Ziino. In the absence of any contrary indication these matters are a strong indication that at least in December 2019 and in January 2020 the extent and quality of Mr Emanuel Raissis' use and occupation of the property was inconsistent with it being his principal place of residence.
Additionally, Mr Emanuel Raissis' testimony at the hearing at two stages, (the content of which I accepted as genuine and plausible), contained an indication that his connection to the Paddington Property at relevant times (including of course as at midnight on 31 December 2019) was of a transient, temporary or contingent nature. 1. The first instance of this was when, in the course of his answers to my questions, he conceded that for a substantial part of what he described as "the holiday period" around Christmas 2019 and New Year 2020 he was not at the property. The transcript of the relevant part of the proceedings is as follows: SENIOR MEMBER: And where were you for the Christmas break? WITNESS (E. RAISSIS): I went to my family's house, to my parents' house and we went away to Mudgee. A few things. SENIOR MEMBER: So, over the Christmas break how much time would you have spent in the (Paddington Property) premises? WITNESS: Ah, I took a few days off, you know the Public holidays and things. I was trying to get the house finished and move in. … SENIOR MEMBER: So when you said the "Christmas break" what sort of dates were you talking about? What did you regard as the Christmas break? WITNESS: Oh, that's holidays between Christmas and New Years." 1. Secondly, under cross-examination and subsequently in answer to questions which I raised, Mr Raissis' evidence was that in December 2019 and January 2020 his wife and children were living with his mother at a separate house in Dillon Street, Paddington and that that period was, quite understandably, a time of some pressure in terms of close family relationships given his stated wish to complete the construction and fit-out of the Paddington Property, but that, again very understandably, he wished to reunite with his immediate family as soon as possible. I was given to understand that that reunion did not take place during that period or for some time afterwards.
Those items of testimony support the contention that, for that extended period which includes 31 December 2019 and would appear to extend (at least) through January 2020, Mr Emanuel Raissis' connection to the Paddington Property can be regarded as temporary and transient and as contingent on the satisfactory resolution of the issues concerning his family.

[39]

Premium component

In Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Incise Technologies Pty Ltd (RD) [2004] NSWADTAP 19 ("Incise Technologies") at [62] the Tribunal adopted suggestions on behalf of the Chief Commissioner that there were four cumulative criteria for justifying any remission of the premium component and those criteria were adopted by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Winston-Smith v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2018] NSWSC 773.
The criteria were these: 1. the full payment of all principal tax owing and not in dispute. The Appeal Panel in Incise Technologies thought that criterion should be clarified to mean that all principal tax that has been assessed and is not in dispute has been fully paid at the time of the request for remission of interest; 2. the taxpayer has cooperated in providing relevant information to the Chief Commissioner so as to enable assessments to be issued; 3. such cooperation by the taxpayer has occurred prior to the Chief Commissioner commencing any investigation or, at the very least, within reasonable time after a request for information is made by the Chief Commissioner; "i.e. the taxpayer has taken reasonable care"; and 4. there has been no wilful default in not paying tax on time.
I understand the submissions of the Chief Commissioner to be to the effect that these four criteria have not all been satisfied and there is no ground upon which the Tribunal, as part of this review, should remit the premium component.
The onus of establishing that all four criteria have been satisfied is on the Applicants. They have put nothing of substance forward in relation to this, other than by repeating their allegations of unfair treatment.
As I read the history of their communication with the Chief Commissioner it seems to me that they have not established that they have completely cooperated in providing all relevant information to the Chief Commissioner to enable assessments to be issued. Again, the onus is on the Applicants to establish their contention and they have failed to do so.
That being so, I cannot be satisfied that all four criteria for the remission of interest at the premium rate have been satisfied or that this interest charge should be remitted.
The Appeal Panel in Incise Technologies recognised that there could be other circumstances in which it would be appropriate to remit the premium component such as where the Chief Commissioner has in some way contributed to the tax default. I find that there was no such contribution to the tax default.

[45]

Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW) 10 Land exempted from tax (1) Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Act the following lands shall, subject to sections 10B, 10D, 10E, 10G and 10P, be exempted from taxation under this Act - … (r) land that is exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A, … Schedule 1A Principal place of residence exemption Part 1 Preliminary 1 Definitions (1) In this Schedule - "principal place of residence exemption" - see clause 2. "residential land" - see clause 3. "strata lot" means a lot under the Strata Schemes Development Act 2015. "taxing date" - means midnight on the thirty-first day of December. (2) For the purposes of this Schedule, a reference to the owner of land includes, if there are joint owners, any one or more of those joint owners. Part 2 Principal place of residence exemption 2 Principal place of residence exemption (1) Land used and occupied by the owner as the principal place of residence of the owner of the land, and for no other purpose, is exempt from taxation under this Act, in respect of the year commencing 1 January 2005 or any succeeding year, if the land is - (a) a parcel of residential land, or (b) a strata lot or, subject to this Schedule, land comprised of 2 or more strata lots. (2) Land is not used and occupied as the principal place of residence of a person unless - (a) the land, and no other land, has been continuously used and occupied by the person for residential purposes and for no other purposes since 1 July in the year preceding the tax year in which land tax is levied, or (b) in any other case, the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the land is used and occupied by the person as the person's principal place of residence. (3) If the owner of land is entitled to the exemption conferred by this Schedule, no other person is liable to be assessed for taxation under this Act in respect of the land during the period of the owner's entitlement to the exemption. (4) The exemption conferred by this Schedule is referred to as the "principal place of residence exemption". (5) The principal place of residence exemption is subject to the restrictions set out in Part 4 … Part 3 Concessions in application of principal place of residence exemption 6 Concession for unoccupied land intended to be owner's principal place of residence (1) An owner of unoccupied land is entitled to claim the land as his or her principal place of residence if the owner intends to use and occupy the land solely as his or her principal place of residence. In such a case, the owner is taken, for the purpose of the principal place of residence exemption, to use and occupy the unoccupied land as his or her principal place of residence. (2) This clause does not apply unless - (a) the land is unoccupied because the owner intends to carry out, or is carrying out, building or other works necessary to facilitate his or her intended use and occupation of the land as a principal place of residence, and (b) if those building or other works have physically commenced on the land, no income has been derived from the use and occupation of the land since that commencement, and (c) the intended use and occupation of the land is not unlawful. (3) This clause applies in respect of the assessment of a person's ownership of land only in the period of - (a) 4 tax years immediately following the year in which the person became owner of the land, or (b) if, after the person became owner and before the building or other works physically commence, the land is used and occupied for residential purposes by another person - 4 tax years immediately following the tax year in which the other person ceases to use and occupy the land for those purposes. (4) Without limiting subclause (3) (a) - (a) this clause does not apply in respect of the assessment of a person's ownership of land in a period referred to in subclause (3) (b) unless the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that, by the end of the first of the 4 tax years concerned - (i) the building or other works will be, or have been, physically commenced, or (ii) significant steps will be, or have been, taken to enable those works to physically commence, and (b) if the building or other works are not physically commenced by the end of that tax year (or the Chief Commissioner is not satisfied that, by the end of that tax year, significant steps have been taken to enable those works to physically commence) - (i) the principal place of residence exemption applying by operation of this clause to the land is taken not to have applied to the land in respect of that tax year (unless subclause (3) (a) applied to the assessment in that tax year), and (ii) land tax liability is to be assessed or reassessed accordingly. (5) If the principal place of residence exemption applies by operation of this clause to land not actually used and occupied by a person as his or her principal place of residence on a taxing date, that exemption is revoked if the person fails to actually use and occupy the land as his or her principal place of residence by the end of the period in which this clause applies in respect of the assessment of the person's ownership of the land and to continue to so use and occupy the land for at least 6 months. (6) The effect of the revocation is that the principal place of residence exemption is taken not to have applied to the land in respect of any tax year to which, but for the revocation, it would have applied. Land tax liability is to be assessed or reassessed accordingly. …

At a glance

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Judgment (47 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (5)

Cases Cited (11)

Cited By (12)