37 The scheme of the relevant provisions dealing with objections and reviews to determine this question was examined by the Full Supreme Court (Giles, Basten and Campbell JJA) in Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Paspaley [2008] NSWCA 184. His Honour Basten JA (Giles and Campbell JJA agreeing) who handed down the principal judgment made the following instructive observations:
27 Importantly, the review provided by s 97 (consistently with s 96) is limited to a decision "that has been the subject of an objection under Division 1": s 97(1). Accordingly, a decision to which an objection cannot be taken, and a decision to which an objection has not been taken, will not fall within the scope of s 97 (providing a review by this Court), but will fall within the exclusion in s 103A(1).
28 It is also important to note that the right of review under s 97 is given by reference to the operative decision of the Chief Commissioner and not to a ruling made on an objection. Although the existence of an objection is a necessary precondition to the power of review by the Court, and it is the taxpayer's dissatisfaction with the determination of the objection which provides standing to seek review, it is the initial decision which is the subject matter of the review. Consistently, the parties are not limited to the grounds of the objection in relation to the application for review: s 100(2). Further, it is the original assessment or other decision which is confirmed, revoked or replaced: s 101(1)(a) and (b).
29. There are assessments and other decisions which fall within s 86(2), as to which a taxpayer may lodge an objection. Such a decision cannot be the subject of review under ss 96 or 97. It would be surprising if, given that policy, judicial review might be available under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act in relation to those assessments or decisions. Section 103A imposes a blanket "no jurisdiction" embargo, except as provided by Part 10 itself. If Part 10 provides no exception, the embargo would apply.
30 Where the Chief Commissioner refuses permission to lodge an objection after the 60 day period, there seems to be no reason why a written objection may not be lodged with respect to that decision. If an objection were to be lodged, but rejected, there would appear to be statutory power to review the decision to refuse permission to lodge out of time an objection to an assessment. That would mean that a general review would be available under ss 96 or 97, a conclusion which would suggest strongly that such decisions were not to be treated differently for the purpose of the privative clause in s 103A from other decisions which might be subject of review.