Raissis v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

The general nature of the review

1. The provisions of section 100 of the TAA apply to this review. Notably: 1. sub-section 100(2) of that Act provides that neither the Applicants nor the Respondent are limited in the present application to the grounds of the Objection; and 2. sub-section 100(3) of that Act provides that the Applicants have "… the onus of proving the applicant's case in an application for review", an onus which is discharged by reference to the ordinary civil standard: B&L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2008) 74 NSWLR 481.
2. Under section 63(1) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, in conducting a review the Tribunal ".. is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following: 1. any relevant factual material, 2. any applicable written or unwritten law".
3. Moreover, under section 63(2) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, in doing so the Tribunal "… may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision".

Legislative Background

1. The legislative starting point is the LTMA. This establishes a regime for: 1. imposing and calculating a tax, known as land tax, by reference to the value of land owned by the taxpayer at midnight on 31 December in the year which immediately precedes the year for which the tax is assessed [1] , and 2. exempting from that tax certain categories of land [2] .
2. The principal place of residence exemption on which the Applicants seek to rely is that: 1. which is established in section 10(1)(r) of the LTMA, in respect of "… land that is exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A"; and 2. whose detailed operation and availability are set out in Schedule 1A of the LTMA.
3. Schedule 1A of the LTMA provides relevantly as follows: 1. In clause 2(1), that: Land used and occupied by the owner as the principal place of residence of the owner of the land, and for no other purpose, is exempt from taxation under this Act, in respect of the year commencing 1 January 2005 or any succeeding year, if the land is: (a) a parcel of residential land ….. 1. In clause 3(1), that residential land means: … land that is used and occupied for residential purposes and for no other purpose, that use and occupation being use and occupation of a building or buildings designed, constructed or adapted for residential purposes ….. 1. In clause 2(2), that: Land is not used and occupied as the principal place of residence of a person unless: (a) the land, and no other land, has been continuously used and occupied by the person for residential purposes and for no other purposes since 1 July in the year preceding the tax year in which land tax is levied, or (b) in any other case, the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the land is used and occupied by the person as the person's principal place of residence.

Undisputed matters

1. There is no dispute that: 1. The Bondi Property is residential land within the meaning of clause 3(1) of Schedule 1A of the LTMA; 2. Emmanuel is an owner of the Bondi Property for purposes of clause 2(1) of that Schedule; 3. The earliest date from which Emmanuel could possibly be considered to have made the Bondi Property his principal place of residence is 10 December 2017; 4. Between 1 July 2017 and that date his principal place of residence was at the Paddington Rental Property, which is less than the six-month period contemplated by clause 2(2)(a); and 5. Consequently, clause 2(2)(b) of Schedule 1A of the LTMA applies in determining Emmanuel's claim that the Bondi Property was, as at 31 December 2017, his principal place of residence. That is to say, the principal place of residence exemption can be available only if this Tribunal, in conducting the review, is satisfied on the basis set out in section 63(1) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 that as at that date the Bondi Property was "…. used and occupied by [Emmanuel] as [his] principal place of residence ..".

Some legal propositions

1. In Yen-Cheng Chuan v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 160, at [19] to [23] Verick JM provided a helpful summary of several considerations to be applied in determining a person's principal place of residence. These are, relevantly, in summary: 1. The LTMA does not provide any technical or legal meaning for the expression "principal place of residence". 2. The expression therefore has its ordinary meaning. A common formulation of this meaning is that it is "the place where [the person] eats, drinks and sleeps": per Ridley J in Stoke-On-Trent Borough Council v Cheshire County Council [1915] 3 KB 699, at 706. 3. In ascertaining whether a particular residence of a person is the principal place of residence of the person it is necessary to use an objective test and the conclusion is determined by considering the extent and quality of the use and occupation of the residence in each case: Dean v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) [1996] 2 Qd R 557 per Fryberg J. 4. Adopting the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal's formulation in Re Zino and Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] VCAT 1707: "…. While sleeping by itself in a place can be an indication of a principal place of residence, it is not the sole matter to be taken into account. One needs to look at a whole indicia of matters … One needs to look as well at where the applicant ate; his use of electricity and the furniture and fittings and other matters such as entertainment of friends in the house …. Sleeping in a place does not make a residence. It has got to be the whole indicia of things that are done in a home which are described in the cases ….". 1. Other indicia include evidence of an applicant's use of the address of the property as the residential address for purposes of his or her mail, driving licence, on the electoral roll, in immigration records, income tax returns and telephone bills. 2. To occupy a home as a principal place of residence a person's occupation must have a degree of permanence to it: "a connection to a place of residence of a transient, temporary, contingent or passing nature is not sufficient …" : Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington [2004] NSWADTAP 41 at [42]. 3. Moreover, ".. the intention of the person concerned, gauged objectively, is relevant but not determinative of the issue": Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington [2004] NSWADTAP 41 at [42].
2. In determining the liability of a property to land tax for a particular land tax year "…. Inquiry is not limited to the use to which land is put on the relevant date. It extends to a consideration of its use during a reasonable period preceding and following the relevant date ….. In my view, six months before and after the relevant date is a reasonable period for enquiry in this case …": Leda Manorstead Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2010) 79 NSWLR 724 at 726, per Gzell J.
3. However, the duration of a person's residence is relevant but not determinative: " … occupation of a home, while short, may have the requisite degree of permanence to it. But that will not happen if, when considered objectively, the occupation was transient, temporary, or of a passing nature, or for some other purpose. One may occupy premises for a short time on a transient, temporary or contingent basis, but one can also occupy for a short time as one's principal place of residence. It is the nature of that occupation which provides the element of permanence. The fact that a period of actual occupation is short …. will in practice make it harder for a recipient to show that the occupation was as his or her principal place of residence, but it will not make it impossible ,,": Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington [2004] NSWADTAP 41 at [42].
4. The reasons for a person's departure from the home "… must be both reasonable and adequately explained when considered objectively in the light of their personal circumstances": Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington [2004] NSWADTAP 41 at [42].

The Applicants' position and evidence

1. The Applicants say that the Respondent should be so satisfied, since: 1. Until 10 December 2017 Emmanuel and his family were tenants of Mrs Raissis at the Paddington Rental Property [3] . 2. Shortly before that date Mrs Raissis required that they vacate the Paddington Rental Property [4] , which she wished to sell in order to fund renovation work at a property which she owned in Greece [5] . 3. On that date Emmanuel moved to the Bondi Property as his residence [6] . He had the electricity account for the Bondi Property transferred into his name [7] and moved household furniture and domestic equipment into the property [8] . For the next 3 months he slept there on average 6 days per week and cooked, washed, slept and worked there [9] . He undertook both external and internal improvements during this period. 4. Because of the physical state of the Bondi Property, it was unsuitable to be occupied by Emmanuel's wife and family, who temporarily lived a nomadic life, staying variously with family in Southern Sydney and in Vaucluse [10] while Emmanuel undertook the renovation work referred to above [11] . The family spent a family holiday in Fiji in late 2017 and early 2018 [12] . 5. On or about 11 March 2018, however, Mrs Raissis reversed her plan to sell the Paddington Rental Property: 1. She did so on Spiro's advice, that she could instead refinance the debt secured on the property and thereby raise money to fund the proposed renovation work on her Greek property [13] . 2. This coincided with Belinda's discovery that she was pregnant with her and Emmanuel's third child and the consequent realisation that the Bondi Property, even if renovated, would be too small for their growing family [14] . 3. In the light of these developments, Mrs Raissis then invited Emmanuel and his family to resume their occupation of the Paddington Rental Property, and they accepted this invitation [15] , with the consequence that from 17 March 2018 Emmanuel ceased to reside at the Bondi Property [16] . 1. In any event, Emmanuel discovered on 15 March 2018 that the Bondi Property contained asbestos, to which he did not wish to expose his family [17] . 2. The aggregate effect of these three circumstances - pregnancy, asbestos and Mrs Raissis' change of plan - was that Emmanuel abandoned his residence at the Bondi Property and returned to the Paddington Rental Property with Belinda and their children [18] . 3. Although Emmanuel's residence at the Bondi Property was brief, it was a genuine adoption of the property as his principal place of residence. 4. For a brief period Spiro also occupied the Bondi Property along with Emmanuel but elected not to pursue under the principal place of residence exemption any claim for exemption based on his brief occupancy.

The Respondent's position and evidence

1. The Respondent's position is in summary as follows: 1. Neither Emmanuel nor Spiro were able to demonstrate a consistent understanding as to who resided in the Bondi Property, or who intended to reside in the Paddington Development Property: 1. In December 2017 Spiro sought exemption of the Bondi Property under the principal place of residence exemption [19] . 2. In January 2018, Spiro sought exemption of the Paddington Development Property under a different basis of exemption in Schedule 1A, that it was land intended to be used as the owner's principal place of residence [20] . 3. In March 2018 he supplemented this, by informing the Respondent that the Bondi Property was his principal place of residence from 2017 while the Paddington Development Property was intended to be Emmanuel's principal place of residence [21] . 4. On 9 May 2018 Emmanuel told the Respondent that: 1. He lived at the Bondi Property while waiting for construction of the Paddington Development Property; and 2. He lived at the Paddington Rental Property while Spiro lived in the Bondi Property [22] . 1. On that same date, Spiro informed the Respondent that the Bondi Property was Emmanuel's principal place of residence [23] . 2. On 10 and 11 May 2018, Spiro and Emmanuel informed the Respondent that: 1. Emmanuel resided at the Bondi Property as of 17 December 2017; 2. he used to live in the Paddington Rental Property, where in his capacity as a licensed builder he is undertaking work; and 3. Spiro resides in Vaucluse but intends to occupy when completed a residence at the Paddington Development Property as his principal place of residence [24] . 1. Emmanuel's residence at the Bondi Property was at most only for a period of 3 months [25] , which is so brief as to raise significant doubts that it ever, in fact, became his principal place of residence: see Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington [2004] NSWADTAP 41 at [42]. 2. He took only one step of an ancillary nature which might support the proposition that the Bondi Property was his principal place of residence: see Yen-Cheng Chuan v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 160, at [22]. This was to have the electricity account for the Bondi Property established in his name [26] . 3. He took no other relevant administrative steps consistent with the Bondi Property becoming his principal place of residence: 1. He did not change address on the electoral roll [27] ; 2. He did not change the address on his driver's licence [28] , as he was required to do within 14 days of any change of address under regulation 122(1)(b) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Regulation 2017; and 3. He did not recognise the Bondi Property as his address in an immigration passenger card completed on his return from Fiji on 1 January 2018 [29] . 1. His residence at the Bondi Property was transient and temporary in nature. In this respect the administrative matters referred to above are relevant, as is the absence of any corroborative evidence of him shopping locally or making use of local amenities. 2. Neither the photographs of a van delivering objects to the Bondi Property nor the invoice from the van's operator are convincing as to the transfer of Spiro's household goods to the property. 3. Much of the work undertaken at the Bondi Property during the relevant period "… may .." [30] be more consistent with the implementation of the brothers' longer-term plans to redevelop the property, than with its use as Emmanuel's residence.

Reasoning and decision

1. During the relevant period there can exist only three logical possibilities as to Emmanuel's residence. These are that: 1. Emmanuel had no place of residence; 2. Emmanuel's only place of residence as at 31 December 2017 was the Bondi Property; if that is the case, then necessarily that property was his principal place of residence; or 3. His principal place of residence was in fact elsewhere but he resided temporarily at the Bondi Property during the relevant period on a temporary basis for a period of approximately 3 months, between December 2017 and March 2018.
2. Emmanuel's written evidence (provided in the form of a statutory declaration) and his oral evidence (provided under oath) is clear, that for approximately three months, between December 2017 and March 2018, he spent in general 6 nights a week and led the bulk of his day-to-day domestic life at the Bondi Property.
3. Both Spiro [31] and Mrs Raissis [32] provide written evidence in the form of statutory declarations which is generally corroborative of Emmanuel's evidence on this point. Moreover, Mrs Raissis gave oral evidence to a similar effect.
4. There is limited other corroborative evidence: 1. The electricity account in Emmanuel's name referred to earlier; this clearly supports the proposition that he was resident in the Bondi Property during the relevant period; 2. The photographs of a vehicle parked in the driveway of the Bondi Property, which Emmanuel says, was the means by which he transported from Paddington to Bondi the furniture and household goods which he used during his residence there [33] ; these are of limited value, since there is little basis on which to identify the nature or ownership of any goods transported by the vehicle; and 3. The invoice from Blue Scaffold Erectors Pty Limited [34] for the transport of furniture from the Paddington Rental Property to the Bondi Property on 11 December 2017; this adds little independent corroboration to the written and oral evidence referred to above, since that company is controlled and managed by the Applicants [35] .
5. The reasons for a person's departure from the home are also relevant: Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington [2004] NSWADTAP 41 at [42]. In the present case the evidence indicates that there were four: 1. The three reasons referred to by Mrs Raissis, as summarised in 19(5) above - her change of financial strategy, Belinda's pregnancy and the Bondi Property's insufficient size for Emmanuel's growing family; and 2. Emmanuel's discovery of asbestos in the Bondi Property in mid-March 2015, which made it an unsuitable family residence [36] , On their face these are objectively reasonable bases for Emmanuel to cease residing at the Bondi Property. There is, however, no independent corroboration.
6. Turning to the matters which, the Respondent says, raise questions as to the permanency of Emmanuel's residence at the Bondi Property: 1. There is no evidence that he used local community facilities, such as shops. Emmanuel recognised this, but said in his evidence that: 1. in fact, he occasionally purchased food from a café and a chicken shop in Bondi but had no receipts to demonstrate this practice; 2. there was no petrol station in Bondi which accepted the fuel card which he uses, which is why there is no evidence of his buying fuel locally; and 3. his practice has been to undertake domestic shopping at Aldi in Bondi Junction [37] . 1. The place of residence of his wife and children during the three-month period in question is unclear. In explanation of this, however, Emmanuel gave both written [38] and oral evidence that his wife and family lived temporarily with family members in South Caringbah and Vaucluse, while he undertook the renovation works needed in order to transform the Bondi Property into a residence suitable for a family of four. 2. The Respondent says that Emmanuel failed to transfer his postal address to the Bondi Property, and that this is indicative of a merely transient occupation. Emmanuel says that he did not do so because for many years he has used a post office box at the Grosvenor Place post office [39] as his mailing address. 3. The Respondent says that Emmanuel's failures to change his electoral address and the address on his driver's licence to the Bondi Property are similarly indicative of a transient occupancy at Bondi. Emmanuel says that this was because to do so might jeopardise his child's enrolment in the Paddington public school [40] . There are several points to note about this explanation: 1. His electoral address at the relevant time was in Vaucluse rather than Paddington [41] . This suggests a long-term history of non-compliance, at least so far as electoral registrations are concerned, rather than a conscious decision to protect his daughter's enrolment. 2. The failure to change his address on his driver's licence is equally consistent with either administrative non-compliance or an absence of long-term commitment to residence in Bondi. In view of his failure to change his electoral address, it is not fanciful to detect a pattern of serial disregard on Emmanuel's part for such administrative obligations rather than the absence of a commitment to residence in Bondi. 3. That he seeks to explain these non-compliances by reference to maintaining his daughter's enrolment at school in Paddington is perhaps more significant. Why should that be a relevant consideration, if the family was in fact to move to Bondi once he had completed the renovation works? There are alternative explanations: (1) the family intended to move back to Paddington at some time during the relevant child's primary school career (which is not inconsistent with the brothers' development plans for the Bondi Property) and wished to maintain continuity in the child's education, or (2) the family was to move to Bondi, but was prepared to transport the child on a daily basis to Paddington school and back in order to avoid disruption in the child's education [42] . In the absence of further evidence, no strong conclusion can be drawn. 1. When Emmanuel and his family returned from a holiday in Fiji on 1 January 2018, his incoming passenger card stated that his residential address in Australia was at the Paddington Rental Property [43] : 1. This, the Respondent says, is a relevant indicator as to Emmanuel's views concerning his principal place of residence. 2. The Applicants, however, say that this card is of no relevance in the present case, since it was completed for Emmanuel by Belinda; in support of this argument they point to differences between the handwriting on this card and the handwriting on an earlier incoming passenger card completed by Emmanuel in August 201744. 3. The handwriting does appear to differ between the two cards, and it may well be that Belinda completed the card. The signature on each does appear to be Emmanuel's, however, so that at a formal level he can be taken to have adopted the statements made in it. From a probative perspective, however, this is of limited value, since for him to sign a card pre-completed by Belinda says less about his view of its contents than would his signing a card which he had completed himself. 4. That however does not mean that the incoming passenger card is irrelevant. By including the Paddington address on the card, Belinda may have inadvertently revealed her understanding of the family's future living arrangements. Alternatively, however, since at the time at which she completed the card she and her children were leading a transient life between Vaucluse and South Caringbah, she may have included the Paddington address as her last fixed address. Belinda did not give evidence, and in consequence these speculations cannot be pursued further. The landing card is, therefore, of limited utility. 1. The Bondi Property was acquired by the Applicants for redevelopment, and they have engaged in extensive negotiation with Waverley Council concerning the conditions of development [44] . This, the Respondent suggests, weakens their claim that the property was Emmanuel's principal place of residence, although the tentative way in which the Respondent makes this argument - that work undertaken at the Bondi Property during the relevant period "… may .." [45] be more consistent with the implementation of the brothers' redevelopment plans - suggests that even the Respondent places little weight on this. I accept that their eventual intention for the Bondi Property to be redeveloped makes it difficult for the property to be considered as Emmanuel's principal place of residence on a long-term basis, but this does not of itself preclude the property being Emmanuel's principal place of residence in the short (or even medium) term. This aspect of matters is in my view a neutral factor.
7. There is a fundamental weakness in the Respondent's position: 1. The combined effect of the evidence provided both orally and in the form of statutory declarations by Emmanuel, Spiro and Mrs Raissis is that for a period three months, between mid-December 2017 and mid-March 2018, Emmanuel was resident at the Bondi Property. 2. There is no evidence that during that period he also resided in any other property or had any right or expectation to occupy, then or in the future, any other property. In particular, Mrs Raissis' oral and written evidence is quite clear, that in late 2017 her plan was to sell the Paddington Rental Property but that in March 2018 she changed her plan for the reasons set out earlier and re-leased it to Emmanuel. 3. Emmanuel, Spiro and Mrs Raissis have provided their evidence in ways which expose them to penalties if that evidence were untrue, and I am satisfied that they were aware of the existence of those penalties when they signed their statutory declarations. This is because their statutory declarations each expressly provide, immediately above the declarant's signature, that the declarant makes his or her declaration "… subject to the punishment by law provided for any wilfully false statement in any such declaration".
8. Three factors are consistent with the notion that Emmanuel may have had some expectation in late 2017 that he might resume residence in the Paddington Rental Property: 1. These are: 1. His failure to change the address on his driver's licence, 2. The address written on his incoming passenger card by Belinda, and 3. His expressed desire to retain his daughter's enrolment at school in Paddington. 1. As I have indicated above, however, there are other reasonably plausible explanations for each of these circumstances, which cannot therefore be taken as unequivocal indicators that Emmanuel's principal place of residence at the relevant time was not the Bondi Property. 2. These factors might well have been more determinant had the issue been one of deciding which of several residences occupied by Emmanuel was his principal place of residence. In the absence of any evidence that Emmanuel also occupied another residence or had the expectation that one was or would be available to him, they are insufficient to outweigh the evidence provided by Emanuel, Spiro and Mrs Raissis.
9. I am conscious of the Respondent's general disquiet about the circumstances surrounding Emmanuel's claim. This visceral scepticism is not incomprehensible having regard to three factors: 1. The inability of the Applicants to formulate between 31 December 2017 and 10 May 2018 a consistent account of their respective residential arrangements in relation to the Bondi Property and the Paddington Development Property47 must raise suspicions as to whether their claim for exemption was in reality a gloss placed ex post facto on events in an opportunistic attempt to avoid land tax. 2. The account of events which Spiro and Emmanuel finally settled on [46] happened to produce the most favourable land tax outcome for the Applicants, by offering the prospect of exemption from land tax for both the Bondi Property and the Paddington Development Property. 3. Mrs Raissis' account of her decisions dovetails conveniently with her sons' achieving this favourable treatment. However, at the same time it exposes her to characterisation as both a less than caring parent and grandparent (who was prepared to evict her son, her daughter-in-law and her grandchildren shortly before Christmas and consign them to several months of separation and domestic disruption over the summer) and a less than astute businesswoman (who left a valuable apartment untenanted for 3 months, and was unable to formulate a relatively straightforward alternative financial strategy in order to achieve her objective).
10. I understand these reservations. Nonetheless, viewed objectively the weight of the evidence still supports the Applicants' position. None of the matters which the Respondent has pointed to are sufficient to overcome Emmanuel's, Spiro's and Mrs Raissis' consistent evidence which, I must stress, has been provided in a way which they know exposes them to the risk of penalties if the evidence is untrue. In consequence, whatever visceral scepticism one might have, considered objectively I must conclude that the Applicants have, on the basis of the material before me, satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that the Bondi Property was Emmanuel's principal - indeed, only - place of residence at midnight on 31 December 2017.

Orders

1. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63(3)(c) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 I order that: 1. set aside the decision under review; and 2. substitute for it a decision that the property at Bondi NSW was exempt from land tax for the land tax year 2018 as Emmanuel Raissis' principal place of residence at midnight on 31 December 2017.

Endnotes

1. LTMA s8
2. LTMA s10
3. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 1; E Raissis oral evidence; H Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 2
4. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 1; H Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 3
5. H Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 3
6. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 2
7. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7
8. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7
9. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7
10. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 4; E Raissis oral evidence
11. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7
12. E Raissis oral evidence; E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 14
13. H Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraphs 6 and 7
14. H Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 6
15. H Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7; E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraphs 9 and 11
16. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 11
17. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraphs 8 and 9; E Raissis Oral Evidence
18. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 11
19. Section 58 Documents, p 42
20. Section 58 Documents, p47
21. Section 58 Documents, pp109A and 59
22. Section 58 Documents, pp109-109A
23. Section 58 Documents, pp64-69
24. Section 58 Documents, pp68-70
25. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraphs 2 and 11
26. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7(a)
27. Section 58 Documents, p103.
28. Section 58 Documents, p114
29. Section 58 Documents, p146
30. Respondent's Submissions, paragraphs 62 and 63
31. S Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 2
32. H Raissis Statutory declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 5
33. E Raissis Statutory declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7(b)
34. E Raissis Statutory declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 7(c)
35. Section 58 Documents, pp14-108
36. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraphs 8, 9 and 11
37. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 17
38. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 5
39. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 16
40. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019, paragraph 15 and unnumbered paragraph headed "Electoral Roll".
41. Section 58 Documents, p103
42. E Raissis Statutory Declaration dated 1 March 2019; unnumbered paragraph headed "Electoral Roll".
43. Section 58 Documents, page 146
44. Section 58 Documents, page 1-38.
45. Respondent's Submissions, paragraphs 62 and 63
46. Section 58 Documents, page 69 I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 11 June 2019