On 31 October 2025 I dismissed an application for urgent relief in this proceeding. Oral reasons were given on that day. This is a written record of those reasons revised from the transcript to improve syntax and remove repetition.
This is an urgent application before starting a proceeding, commenced under r 7 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The sole prospective applicant, Ms Angela Margaret Rainbow, appeared self-represented on the application, asserting that her claims for relief were urgent and that no prospective respondent should be heard.
Over some years now, Ms Rainbow has had dealings with the Department of Veterans' Affairs relating to her status as a service provider as an occupational therapist to veterans in Australia. The dispute revolves around her methods of claiming payment for the services provided to the veterans. I will not set out the detail of the affidavit that is before me as Ms Rainbow is the only named party on this action and she is aware of its content.
The Department has raised allegations about the propriety of claims made for services submitted through an online program utilised in the usual course by Ms Rainbow, or an entity under which her business operates. In her affidavit, Ms Rainbow says that in about mid August her access or ability to submit claims through the online program in the usual way was stopped. The affidavit also refers to there having been an audit of the payment claims made over a specified period.
Ms Rainbow had (and continues to have) the representation and assistance of a lawyer in her correspondence with the Department. The correspondence passing between that lawyer and the Department is annexed to the affidavit. It shows that on 18 September 2025, Ms Rainbow's legal representative wrote to the Department asking for clarification, making comments and raising issues with respect to the conduct of the Department in connection with the audit, a related investigation and the cessation of the online payment service. In that letter, the lawyer foreshadowed to the Department that "fresh" proceedings in this Court might be instituted. The word "fresh" indicates that there have been, as Ms Rainbow informed me, previous proceedings in this Court between her and the Department. I have not familiarised myself with the subject matter of those proceedings, and it has not been suggested by Ms Rainbow that I should do so.
Ms Rainbow is now the recipient of a "notice to show cause letter", provided to her in early October. By that notice, the Department notified Ms Rainbow of issues that had arisen in the audit and otherwise in its inquiries in relation to her claiming practices. I will not iterate what those allegations are in the course of my oral reasons. They are known to Ms Rainbow. The notice gave Ms Rainbow until 15 October to provide a response.
The correspondence then shows that on 20 October the Department wrote to Ms Rainbow's lawyers noting that no response had been received. In that correspondence, it was said that the matter might proceed to a decision with respect to the possible revocation of Ms Rainbow's provider status with a possible decision as soon as 24 October.
On 23 October, Ms Rainbow's lawyer wrote again to the Department. That is the last of the letters annexed to the affidavit. By that letter, the lawyer asked the Department to afford Ms Rainbow until 21 November in order to provide a response, given the nature and number of the allegations that are referred to in the notice. Ms Rainbow told the Court that she is unaware of there having been any response from the Department, and that it is her concern that her status as a provider could be revoked at any time.
The affidavit also refers to the execution of search warrants upon Ms Rainbow by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and including the laying of criminal charges against her. Ms Rainbow submitted that the AFP must necessarily have acted on information provided by the Department. She asserts that the Department had an obligation to afford her procedural fairness before notifying the AFP of any of the concerns that might form the basis of a suspicion grounding a search warrant executed against her. Ms Rainbow otherwise submitted that she has not been afforded sufficient time in order to respond to the allegations referred to in the notice.
Ms Rainbow told the Court that her lawyer is unaware that she has prepared this action and invoked the jurisdiction of the Court. I will proceed on that assumption.
The Department and the AFP are not joined as respondents, nor are they named as prospective respondents in the action. Nonetheless, relief claimed is in the following terms:
The respondent Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining them whether by themselves, their offices, employees, agents or otherwise from: (a) terminating the applicant's Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) provider registration; and (b) withdrawing the applicant and applicant's employees of Life Live it entitlement to claiming via their usual online software claiming channel and processes.
The respondent DVA be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining them whether by themselves, their offices, employees or otherwise from enforcing the recently removed Clause 130(a) of the DVA Notes for Allied Health Providers - Section One - General (18 December 2024) enabling services to be rendered by the health care provider or on the health care providers behalf when completing online claiming.
The respondent DVA be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining them whether by themselves, their offices, employees or otherwise from engaging the services of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to commence/continue investigations and or execute further search warrants at the applicant's home and or Life Live it offices or any other associate agent before the applicant has been offered procedural fairness and an opportunity to provide a detailed response related to any claiming or other concern expressed to the applicant by DVA.
The Second Respondent Australian Federal Police (AFP) be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining them whether by themselves, their offices, employees or otherwise from investigating any further claiming concerns until the applicant has been offered procedural fairness by DVA and sufficient time to provide a detailed response.
Ms Rainbow invites the Court to grant the relief that she seeks on an urgent and ex parte basis. Her submission is that the urgency arises because she believes that her provider status could be revoked at any time before she has had a reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegations contained in the notice, having regard to their number and nature. She also submits that the Court should act urgently so as to restore to her usual access to the online payments system. At present, without access to that system, she must submit manual requests for payment and must verify the claims for services provided. I understand that to mean that she must, in respect of each such submission, verify that the services have in fact been provided. I will proceed on an assumption that that is an onerous task, without making a finding to that effect.
Ms Rainbow told the Court that she is presently under enormous personal and financial strain, including financial pressure on her businesses, and that she is attending to a number of responsibilities at the one time.
When asked by the Court why she had not notified the Department and the AFP of her intention to bring this action or serve the papers on either of those agencies, Ms Rainbow told the Court that she had been overwhelmed with other tasks and responsibilities. She said that she had spent many hours over the last week preparing the documents and had been single-mindedly focused on getting the matter before the Court which, she said, was a difficult task.
I have regard to Ms Rainbow's status as a self-represented litigant. I do not criticise her for failing to understand the implications of not notifying other interested parties of the relief that might be sought against them in this Court. However, I am not satisfied that I should proceed to grant the relief sought. I do not consider that the application is one that ought to be granted as an urgent application before the start of a proceeding in the absence of the affected parties, those affected parties being the Department and the AFP. I have regard to the subject matter of the controversy between the parties and the nature of the restraints that are sought by Ms Rainbow, and I have weighed them in the balance in asking myself whether or not I should proceed in the absence of the prospective respondents, so as not to afford them any opportunity to be heard.
On the information presently before me and having regard to the notice, I am not presently satisfied that there is an imminent threat of a breach of procedural fairness at all. As I have mentioned, the notice afforded an opportunity to be heard and set a time by which a response should be made. No response was made, even though Ms Rainbow was represented by a lawyer in those dealings. The lawyer's response was only made on 23 October, just over a week ago.
Nor on the material before me am I presently satisfied that it is at all obvious that more time would ordinarily be required to respond to the requests for information. I emphasise that I am acting only on the material that is presently before me and I make no final judgment about that for the purposes of any subsequent proceeding about whether such a breach has in fact occurred. I have already mentioned that on 23 October, Ms Rainbow's lawyers asked for until 21 November to respond. On the basis of the submissions of Ms Rainbow today, I find that Ms Rainbow has chosen to use about a week of that time commencing this proceeding. That is her choice. However that time could have been spent and deployed in responding to the allegations made on the notice.
In addition, as I have mentioned, Ms Rainbow has not made her own lawyer aware that she has brought this application. It is her lawyer that has sought until 21 November to respond, and it has not been demonstrated on the material before me that her lawyer is not in the possession of sufficient material to prepare that response having regard to the long history of dealings between the prospective parties.
I have regard to those circumstances when asking myself whether I should proceed on an ex parte basis. I do not consider that the subject matter of the claim on its face has sufficient merit in order to proceed in the absence of the other parties.
In relation to the AFP, I am not satisfied that it has any obligation to afford procedural fairness when proceeding with an investigation. Nor am I satisfied on the material before me that the Department should be restrained from reporting any activity to the AFP that is of concern to it.
Accordingly, having regard to the subject matter of the claim and the absence of the prospective respondents, I dismiss the application for relief before the start of a proceeding. Nothing that I have said precludes Ms Rainbow from commencing the substantive proceeding foreshadowed in the application. In her material, she has indicated that that proceeding will be commenced in 14 days. When that proceeding is commenced, it should of course name all appropriate parties, being those parties whose interests might be affected, and who have an entitlement to be heard in connection with the claims for relief.
[4]
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Charlesworth.
Legislation Cited (1)
Court Rules 2011
Rainbow, in the matter of an application by Rainbow [2025] FCA 1359 | Case summary | Zoe