The Tribunal's decision
8 After setting out the relevant law in an unexceptionable manner, the Tribunal considered the applicant's claims and evidence. It set out his claims at considerable length. It likewise made lengthy reference to country information dealing, amongst other things, with human rights in Iran, political dissent, exit from and entry into Iran, treatment on return of persons who had made refugee applications in other countries, and the treatment of "non-Muslim" wives entering Iran.
9 The following embodies the Tribunal's principal findings and some parts of the associated reasoning. As before the delegate issues of credibility were to the fore in the findings made:
(1) The applicant's difficulties in and departure from Iran
"I do not accept that the applicant encountered the difficulties he claimed prior to leaving Iran. I found much of his evidence in relation to his claimed difficulties in Iran was implausible and at times fanciful.
The applicant served in the army and after discharge, with the help of family friends who were politically powerful, he was given a job as personal guard of the Chief of the Pasdaran. Later he was promoted and held several important and sometimes sensitive jobs in the security forces, banking or related departments. He claims he encountered some difficulty at one stage and was jailed and tortured. I reject his claim that he encountered serious difficulty because he was subsequently promoted to other influential, important and sensitive positions including negotiating with the Americans and the representatives of Italy, Germany, France and Britain at a time when they had no formal diplomatic representation in Iran.
The applicant may well have tired of doing secret work or had a clash of ideology because he wanted to assist the people rather than the more powerful forces with which he was working, like the secret service. However, I am not satisfied that he left Iran for reason of his political opinion or any other Convention reason. I make this finding because I reject his evidence about events that occurred after his departure."
I would comment on the reason given for the final finding (ie the rejection of evidence of the events that occurred after Mr Rahmani's departure from Iran). Fairly read: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272; that conclusion cannot be interpreted as suggesting that the Tribunal only considered events after Mr Rahmani's departure from Iran in assessing his claim to refugee status. As the opening sentence of the material I have quoted above indicates, the Tribunal had already rejected his claims relating to events prior to his departure. The phrasing of the justification for the finding made may be "unhappy". It discloses no judicially reviewable error. I labour this matter because it apparently embodies the first two grounds relied upon by Mr Rahmani in the document sent to the court today by him to which I will later refer. A copy of that document is set out in Schedule 1.
(2) Post departure incidents and the applicant's political profile
(a) "I found his claim that authorities raided his family home after he left the country and took evidence like tapes of Khomeni making speeches that were sensitive, implausible and fanciful".
Reasons were given for that conclusion.
(b) "I reject these claims arising from his family correspondence [from his cousin]. The timing of the provision of the correspondence is such that I am not satisfied that it was provided for a purpose other than to enhance the claims of the applicant that he had a profile in Iran."
(c) The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had not been involved in any political activity in Japan, nor had he been associated with any group that would have given him a political profile.
(d) It rejected his claim he was black-listed in Iran as it was not satisfied that he was of any interest to the current Iranian government.
(3) Japan
The Tribunal was satisfied that:
"[T]he applicant had the opportunity to make an application for refugee status and his failure to do so is an indication that the depth of the applicant's fear of persecution is not significant. I take this into account as one factor in reaching the conclusion that I am not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution."
(4) The applicant's marriage and return to Iran
In relation to his marriage the Tribunal:
"[Was] not satisfied on the facts presented by the applicant that even if he did encounter difficulty for reason of his "mixed marriage", he would face any more than a law of general application that would be enforced without discrimination."
The Tribunal noted that neither his wife nor his child were included in his application before it. It also considered that much in the claim as it related to his wife as being speculative. His wife and child were currently living in Japan.
The Tribunal concluded:
"I am satisfied that the applicant has no well-founded fear of persecution upon return to Iran. I can understand that the applicant may be living in a difficult situation in Japan and now that he has a child would prefer to start a life in Australia away from the restrictions and complications of life in Iran or Japan. However, I am not satisfied that he is a refugee within the terms of the convention."
The present application
10 As I have indicated, the application itself does not refer to any particular ground of s 476(1) of the Migration Act. The applicant is unrepresented. The direction given by the court that he file a written statement setting out the reasons why he considered the Tribunal's decision should be overturned was not complied with, although a one-page document was sent today to the court.
11 That document does not assist in identifying a possible ground of review to support the application. I have explained to Mr Rahmani that this court can only set aside a decision of the Tribunal on the grounds set out in the Migration Act. Those grounds do not allow this Court to interfere with the Tribunal's decision just because the Tribunal has taken a particular view of the facts of his case with which it might disagree. As Kenny J commented in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at 257:
"A Tribunal does not commit an error of law merely because it finds facts wrongly or upon a doubtful basis or because it adopts unsound or questionable reasoning."
Importantly, this court cannot change a decision of the Tribunal even if it thinks the Tribunal was wrong on the facts. Furthermore, the Tribunal in its statement of reasons does not have to provide a line by line refutation of an applicant's case.
12 At the hearing before me Mr Rahmani again raised new matters as also matters which, if he had raised them at all previously, he had given them no emphasis. I would instance his alleged conversion to Christianity (a matter not previously raised) and his distribution of fliers in Iran (a matter be said he raised when he first arrived in Australia). I would also reiterate that he had had the assistance of a migration agent when a statement was prepared on his behalf for submission to the Tribunal.
13 Turning to the facsimile document sent to the court today, the nine matters referred to in that document are, save in three instances, no more than challenges to the correctness or in one instance (ie paragraph 9), the reasonableness, of fact-finding: I refer to paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the document. I have already indicated that the court cannot change a decision of the Tribunal if it thinks the Tribunal was wrong on the facts. Two of the remaining three paragraphs (ie paragraphs 1 and 2) related to the Tribunal's non‑acceptance of events before and after his departure from Iran. I have already dealt with this matter.
14 The one remaining paragraph, paragraph 5, involves an insinuation against the Tribunal member, but one falling short of an allegation of actual bias or of non‑exercise of the jurisdiction under the act. It may, though, when coupled with matters raised before me, suggest some incivility at the hearing. I can express no opinion on that matter.
15 The respondent has submitted that the Tribunal's reasons for decision demonstrate that it correctly interpreted the applicable law and that it did not incorrectly apply the law to the facts as found by it. Having regard to the Tribunal's findings and conclusions, its ultimate conclusion that it was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention was the only conclusion reasonably open to it. The opposite conclusion, it was submitted, would have been irrational.
16 After reviewing the Tribunal's decision myself, I cannot see any available ground for interfering with it. While the Tribunal's reasons are not always felicitously structured and phrased, this provides no proper objection to them. And if they betray little by way of second thoughts on the Tribunal's part, the application could properly be considered as one not requiring second thoughts - see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559. I would add that under the shadow of the credibility findings made, but not only under that shadow, it could not reasonably be said that the s 476(1)(g) no evidence ground could be made out in this case, even if there were some factual errors made by the Tribunal.
17 My conclusion, I reiterate, does not mean that the Court considers the Tribunal was right about the facts. It only means that no available ground for review under s 476(1) of the Migration Act has been made out. I cannot enter upon the merits of the matter, but that is what Mr Rahmani seeks. The order of the court will be that the application be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) numbered paragraphs together with the attached schedule are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.