Rahman v Rahman

1 That the enforcement of Orders 1-8 made on 12 June 2025 be temporarily stayed, pending determination of the Plaintiff's motion for stay currently before the Court of Appeal (Case No: 2025/00202852);

2 In the alternative, that the enforcement of Orders 1-8 be temporarily restrained pending either the finalisation of the said appeal or the resolution of the parallel proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Case No: SYC5687/2024);

3 That the trustees appointed under the Orders of 12 June 2025 be restrained from interfering with the belongings of Ms Wafa Rahman, which are not the subject of any claim by the Plaintiff, nor subject to the said Court orders;

4 Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court considers just.

2. The underlying dispute is a matrimonial dispute between Mr Rahman and the first defendant, Ms Mita Farjina Rahman, for whom Mr B Balasubramanian, Solicitor, appeared today.

3. Also before the Court today were the trustees for the sale of a property owned by the Rahmans in Roselands, who had been appointed pursuant to orders of Slattery J. They were appointed to replace Ms Rahman, who had originally been appointed trustee for sale. The trustees were represented today by Mr L J McIntyre of Counsel. In exercise of their powers, the trustees have already sold another property and are holding the proceeds.

4. For the reasons which follow, the motion will be dismissed.

Facts

5. I do not propose to set out the long and complex procedural history that has led to the present motion. It is sufficient to say that these reasons should be read with the benefit of an appreciation of the reasons of Slattery J in Rahman v Rahman [2024] NSWSC 1616, Rahman v Rahman (No. 2) [2025] NSWSC 516 and Rahman v Rahman (No. 3) [2025] NSWSC 678.

6. There has also already been an unsuccessful application made by Mr Rahman to the Court of Appeal to stay orders made by Slattery J: Rahman v Rahman [2025] NSWCA 126 (Adamson JA). I am informed by Mr Balasubramanian that before the Court of Appeal at the moment is a motion by Mr Rahman for a review of Adamson JA's decision and for a stay, together with a form of notice of leave to appeal from the decisions of Slattery J. An appreciation of what is happening in the Court of Appeal is necessary to understand what has happened today.

7. Pursuant to the orders made by Slattery J, the trustees have made arrangements for various chattels and other items to be removed from the property tomorrow (Saturday, 12 July 2025) in anticipation of the property being marketed for sale. The practical effect of some of the orders made by his Honour was to give Mr Rahman the opportunity, if he wished, to attend the property and remove whatever items he wanted before the trustees took steps to dispose of whatever was left in the property. Mr Rahman has not taken advantage of that opportunity.

8. Mr Rahman's appellate motions were before the Court of Appeal Registrar two days ago (Wednesday, 9 July 2025). Importantly for present purposes, Mr Rahman was then represented by Mr A Rogers of Counsel. The Registrar and Mr Rogers had, according to the evidence of Ms Rahman's solicitor, which I accept, this exchange:

"Registrar: Is there urgency with respect to the stay?

Rogers: No.

Registrar: I do not want to receive emails from Mr Rahman in chambers with respect to the continued urgency of the matter. Mr Rogers, noting this is the last matter in the list, I'm happy for you to confer with your client in this regard.

Rogers: Yes, thank you, Registrar. May I leave the Court to confer with Mr Rahman?

Registrar: Yes."

9. Mr Rogers returned to court and told the Registrar that Mr Rahman was prepared to stand over his motion for two weeks to be heard on a date convenient to the Court. There is no doubt that on Mr Rahman’s instructions there was implicitly a disavowal of any urgency in relation to his request for a stay of Slattery J’s orders.

10. Notwithstanding that disavowal, the next day (Thursday, 10 July 2025) Mr Rahman made an application to Slattery J in chambers for a stay of his Honour’s orders in relation to the sale of the property. Slattery J rejected that application.

11. Today (Friday, 11 July 2025), Mr Rahman has approached me in the Duty List for orders which appear to be identical in effect to those which he sought from Slattery J yesterday and which were refused by his Honour.

Consideration

12. For the reasons which follow, I propose to dismiss Mr Rahman's motion and make some orders which give Mr Rahman and his daughter (Ms Wafa Rahman, who he tells me has items in the property) one last opportunity to attend upon the property to take from it what they wish.

13. Furthermore, to hold the position in relation to any other chattels on the property but also to enable Slattery J's orders to continue to be given effect pending whatever may next occur in the Court of Appeal, I will make orders that whatever is left in the property after Mr Rahman and his daughter's visit (should they take up that opportunity) is to be placed in storage. What happens to them after that will be a matter for Mr Rahman, and at his cost.

14. There are three reasons why I do not propose to grant the relief sought by Mr Rahman in the motion.

15. First, there has been no relevant change in circumstances since Mr Rahman's application for a stay which was determined yesterday by Slattery J. That in itself is a sufficient reason for me to decline the present application. The proper course for Mr Rahman is to seek leave to appeal from Slattery J’s decision and not to apply for the same relief to another puisne judge.

16. However, I add as a practical matter that because these proceedings have been closely case managed by Slattery J, his Honour has a deep familiarity with them. I would therefore be hesitant to interfere either with the orders that his Honour has made, or his Honour's order yesterday declining Mr Rahman's application, without very good reason to do so. Mr Rahman has not been able to present any plausible reason for me to do so.

17. Second, Mr Rahman's counsel was expressly given the opportunity to raise the question of the stay before the Registrar of the Court of Appeal on Wednesday – two days ago. That opportunity was disavowed. It would be inimical to the proper functioning of this Court if a party were able on one day to tell the Court that something was not urgent, and then the next day or the day after without any apparent new reason, approach another part of the Court to say that the same thing was now urgent.

18. Third, Mr Rahman has given me no basis on which I could conclude that he has any prospects of successfully appealing against Slattery J's orders or, for that matter, successfully seeking a review of Adamson J's decision. Mr Rahman has apparently not filed any grounds of appeal in the Court of Appeal and he was unable to articulate before me today any reason beyond what I infer is general disagreement with the orders that have been made. It is fundamental in any stay application pending appeal that the Court be given a clear understanding of what the grounds of appeal are that are proposed to be relied upon.

19. For these three reasons I will dismiss Mr Rahman's motion. It is however necessary for me to say something about the form of the orders which I will shortly make.

20. Mr Rahman this afternoon provided to me a competing set of orders for which he pressed. Those proposed orders included in various alternative forms the type of orders which I will in fact make, but took issue with how I propose to resolve two questions of costs.

21. The first is that I propose to make an order that in relation to the costs of storage, those costs are to be borne - subject to further order - by Mr Rahman, but with the trustees paying for those costs out of the funds which they currently hold and which would otherwise then be allocated to Mr Rahman upon any final division of the sale proceeds.

22. The starting point, in my respectful view, is that Mr Rahman is being granted a considerable indulgence by the Court further varying existing orders, so as to give him one last chance tomorrow to seek to deal in a sensible way with the contents of the property. In those circumstances, subject to further order, Mr Rahman should bear those costs.

23. The reason that I propose to make that conclusion subject to further order is that while at the moment I do not understand there could be any circumstance that would warrant Mr Rahman being able to say that someone other than him should be responsible for those costs (even as to part), I wish to leave open the opportunity that as events develop an argument may become available to him to that effect.

24. The second costs issue is the costs of the motion. Mr Rahman's motion will be dismissed. It follows that costs should follow the event.

25. In response to both of these costs issues, Mr Rahman submitted that it was Ms Rahman who should pay those costs because, ultimately, it was her inactivity as the first appointed trustee that has led to all of the present circumstances. I do not agree. The question of the costs of today is not to be determined by taking an overarching view of the history of this matter (and about which I have no evidence) but by reference to the immediate applications and their immediate outcomes. That is why I will in the first instance order the costs of the storage to be visited upon Mr Rahman and that the other parties' costs of the motion today be paid by Mr Rahman.

26. Finally, I should record that in the course of my delivering these reasons at the point when I indicated that Mr Rahman had not told me anything about his grounds of appeal, Mr Rahman rose to his feet and gave me a six page document setting out what he says are the errors he has identified in Slattery J's judgment of 12 June 2025 and Adamson JA's judgment of 2 June 2025.

27. Needless to say, I have not had an opportunity to consider those matters. However, even if the errors set out in the document demonstrated arguable grounds of appeal, I would not have granted the relief sought by Mr Rahman as a matter of discretion. That is because I would still adhere to the first and second reasons I have set out above (see [15] to [17] above) as to why Mr Rahman is not entitled to the relief which he seeks.

Conclusion

28. What I have sought to do by the orders which I will shortly pronounce is to balance the prospect (about the likelihood of which I have no view) that Mr Rahman may be able to persuade the Court of Appeal to grant him a stay or that he may have ultimate success in that Court, against the fact that until some other order is made, Slattery J's orders should be allowed to continue to have effect because those orders have got the process moving for the sale of the property. Further delay is to be avoided.

29. The property can be made vacant in accordance with the orders which I propose to make. Slattery J’s orders in relation to the sale of the property and the proceeds of sale should stand. There is still enough time, if Mr Rahman wishes to do so, to get his procedural house in order in the Court of Appeal and make such application as he may be advised before the Court of Appeal in relation to the further working out of the sale process which is the subject of Slattery J's orders.

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